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Abstract 
 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to further the field of 
grounded semantics using a range of computational and empirical studies. 
Over the past thirty years, there have been many algorithmic advances in the 
modelling of semantic cognition. A commonality across these cognitive models 
is a reliance on hand-engineering “toy-models”. Despite incorporating newer 
techniques (e.g. Long short-term memory), the model inputs remain unchanged. 
We argue that the inputs to these traditional semantic models have little 
resemblance with real human experiences. In this dissertation, we ground our 
neural network models by training them with real-world visual scenes using 
naturalistic photographs. Our approach is an alternative to both hand-coded 
features and embodied raw sensorimotor signals. 
We conceptually replicate the mutually reinforcing nature of hybrid 
(feature-based and grounded) representations using silhouettes of concrete 
concepts as model inputs. We next gradually develop a novel grounded 
cognitive semantic representation which we call scene2vec, starting with object 
co-occurrences and then adding emotions and language-based tags. Limitations of 
our scene-based representation are identified for more abstract concepts (e.g. 
freedom). We further present a large-scale human semantics study, which 
reveals small-world semantic network topologies are context-dependent and 
that scenes are the most dominant cognitive dimension. This finding leads us to 
conclude that there is no meaning without context. Lastly, scene2vec shows 
promising human-like context-sensitive stereotypes (e.g. gender role bias), and 
we explore how such stereotypes are reduced by targeted debiasing. 
In conclusion, this thesis provides support for a novel computational 
viewpoint on investigating meaning - scene-based grounded semantics. Future 
research scaling scene-based semantic models to human-levels through virtual 
grounding has the potential to unearth new insights into the human mind and 
concurrently lead to advancements in artificial general intelligence by enabling 
robots, embodied or otherwise, to acquire and represent meaning directly from 
the environment. 
 iii 
 
 
Declaration 
 
I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where it builds 
on other people’s work or ideas this is clearly marked.  
  
 iv 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor 
Richard P. Cooper, my supervisor and mentor. His expertise, availability and 
patience proved invaluable. He has provided guidance at key moments in my 
research while also allowing me to work independently. Without his support, 
this work would not exist. 
Throughout my PhD, I have had the great fortune of working for my 
boss Steven Yule, Director of Research at Sky, who has provided me with 
immense flexibility and support and helped me grow into a leader in the 
commercial world of Research and Data Science. I would also like to thank Dr 
Andrew Haughton, Insights Director at Sky, my main stakeholder, who has 
been a great ally and coach. He appreciates and understands the challenges, 
nuances and inherent complexities of predicting human behaviours and 
intentions. Over the last five years at Sky, in my role as Head of Strategic 
Analytics, I have had the pleasure of leading a large department with 25+ 
researchers, data scientists and engineers. I am grateful to everyone in my 
team, but in particular to my friends and colleagues Kevin Connolly, Chris 
McLean, Hsueh Qu Li, Adam Ball, Jeny James-Charman and Cotton Ghose. 
I am also indebted to the late Prof. Svend Østergaard from Aarhus 
University, who mentored me ten years ago and introduced me to 
computational and statistical modelling. I am also grateful to BRGS (Birkbeck 
Research Graduate School) for providing a wide range of doctoral training and 
development opportunities and for awarding me the first prize in their 
inaugural PhD poster competition. 
I would also like to thank Prof. James McClelland and Prof. Lawrence 
Barsalou for providing guidance and feedback during two Embodied and 
Situated Language Processing conferences (ESLP 2014, 2018). Lastly, I would 
like to thank my beloved wife, Michelle Li. She has been tremendously 
supportive and understanding throughout this entire process and has made 
numerous sacrifices to help me get here. 
 
 v 
 
 
Dedication 
 
To my wife, Michelle Li. 
 
  
 vi 
Contents 
 
1 Introduction: From Pixels to Meaning .......................................................................... 1	
1.1	 Background: Grounding Meaning ............................................................................ 1	
1.2	 Thesis Overview .......................................................................................................... 3	
2 Artificial Intelligence and Robotics: Origins of Grounded Cognition ......................... 8	
2.1	 Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 8	
2.2	 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 9	
2.3	 Classical Theory of Cognition .................................................................................. 10	
2.4	 Development of Grounded Cognition .................................................................... 13	
2.4.1	 Grounded Cognition: Roots in Philosophy and Linguistics ..................... 15	
2.4.2	 Grounded Cognition: Roots in Psychology ................................................ 19	
2.4.3	 Grounded Cognition: Roots in AI and Robotics ........................................ 20	
2.4.4	 Summary .......................................................................................................... 27	
2.5	 Limitations of Grounded Artificial Intelligence .................................................... 28	
2.6	 Towards a Computational Grounded Semantics ................................................. 32	
2.7	 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 35	
3 Feature-based and Grounded Semantic Representations ........................................... 37	
3.1	 Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 37	
3.2	 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 38	
3.3	 Disembodied Symbolic Models ............................................................................... 40	
3.4	 Latent Semantic Analysis ......................................................................................... 45	
3.5	 Disembodied Sub-Symbolic Models ....................................................................... 49	
3.6	 Grounded Developmental Robotics ....................................................................... 54	
3.7	 Computational Study I: Noise Tolerance ............................................................... 59	
3.7.1	 Theoretical Background ................................................................................. 59	
3.7.2	 Methodology .................................................................................................... 62	
3.7.3	 Results ............................................................................................................... 66	
3.8	 Discussion ................................................................................................................... 69	
3.9	 Summary ..................................................................................................................... 72	
4 Extending Symbol Interdependency: Perceptual Scene Vectors ................................ 73	
4.1	 Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 73	
4.2	 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 74	
4.3	 Evidence for Symbol Interdependency .................................................................. 78	
4.4	 Surface Semantic Analysis ........................................................................................ 81	
4.5	 Computational Experiment: Perceptual Scene Vectors ....................................... 83	
4.5.1	 Theoretical Background ................................................................................. 83	
4.5.2	 Experimental Hypotheses .............................................................................. 90	
4.5.3	 General Methodology ..................................................................................... 91	
4.5.4	 Experiment 1: 20 concepts ×	26 n-gram features ........................................ 93	
4.5.5	 Experiment 2: 20 concepts ×	26 random n-gram noun features .............. 94	
4.5.6	 Experiment 3: 20 concepts ×	26 random n-gram verb features ................ 95	
4.5.7	 Experiment 4: 20 concepts ×	300 / 150 / 50 LSA dimensions .................... 97	
 vii 
4.5.8	 Experiment 5: 20 concepts ×	Perceptual Scene Vectors (PSVs) ................ 98	
4.5.9	 Experiment 6: 20 new concepts ×	300 LSA dimensions .......................... 106	
4.5.10	 Experiment 7: 20 new concepts ×	Perceptual Scene Vectors (PSVs) ..... 107	
4.5.11	 Quantifying Semantic Coherence ............................................................... 109	
4.6	 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 113	
5 Grounding Concrete versus Abstract Semantics ...................................................... 120	
5.1	 Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 120	
5.2	 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 121	
5.2.1	 Comparing Concrete and Abstract Words ................................................ 122	
5.2.2	 Modelling Abstract Semantics .................................................................... 124	
5.2.3	 Dimensions of Semantic Representations ................................................. 127	
5.2.4	 Concreteness Revisited ................................................................................ 135	
5.2.5	 Role of Emotions in Grounding Abstract Concepts ................................. 136	
5.3	 Computational Study I: Evaluating PSVs using BrainBench ............................ 139	
5.3.1	 Objective ......................................................................................................... 139	
5.3.2	 Methodology .................................................................................................. 140	
5.3.3	 Results ............................................................................................................. 141	
5.4	 Computational Study II: Grounding Concrete to Abstract Concepts .............. 142	
5.4.1	 Objective ......................................................................................................... 142	
5.4.2	 Methodology .................................................................................................. 142	
5.4.3	 Results ............................................................................................................. 143	
5.5	 Computational Study III: Extending PSVs with Emotions ................................ 145	
5.5.1	 Objective ......................................................................................................... 145	
5.5.2	 Methodology .................................................................................................. 147	
5.5.3	 Results ............................................................................................................. 150	
5.6	 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 155	
6 Network Topology of Semantics: Grounding and Relativity of Meaning ................ 164	
6.1	 Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 164	
6.2	 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 165	
6.3	 Multidimensional Semantic Space ........................................................................ 167	
6.4	 Human Experiment: Mapping our Meaning Space ........................................... 174	
6.4.1	 Visualising Semantic Space ......................................................................... 174	
6.4.2	 Relative Importance of Dimensions ........................................................... 176	
6.4.3	 Brain-based Componential Semantics ....................................................... 178	
6.4.4	 Relativity of Meaning ................................................................................... 183	
6.4.5	 Objectives ....................................................................................................... 185	
6.4.6	 Methodology .................................................................................................. 191	
6.4.7	 Results ............................................................................................................. 198	
6.5	 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 229	
6.5.1	 Contributions ................................................................................................. 229	
6.5.2	 Limitations ..................................................................................................... 237	
6.5.3	 General Implications .................................................................................... 239	
6.5.4	 Implications for AI ........................................................................................ 243	
6.5.5	 Summary ........................................................................................................ 244	
7 Gender Bias in Grounded Semantics: Network Regularisation and Debiasing ....... 246	
7.1	 Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 246	
7.2	 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 247	
7.2.1	 Historical and Empirical Foundations of Bias .......................................... 249	
 viii 
7.2.2	 Implicit Gender Biases ................................................................................. 250	
7.2.3	 Biases in Machine Learning ......................................................................... 251	
7.2.4	 Gender Biases in Machine Learning ........................................................... 254	
7.2.5	 Awareness of Debiasing Machine Learning ............................................. 254	
7.3	 Investigating Gender Bias in Grounded Semantics ............................................ 255	
7.3.1	 Objective ......................................................................................................... 255	
7.3.2	 Methods .......................................................................................................... 256	
7.3.3	 Results ............................................................................................................. 265	
7.4	 Discussion ................................................................................................................. 282	
7.4.1	 Contributions ................................................................................................. 283	
7.4.2	 Importance of Grounded Data .................................................................... 285	
7.4.3	 Gender Bias .................................................................................................... 289	
7.4.4	 Limitations ..................................................................................................... 289	
7.4.5	 Debiasing Semantic Networks .................................................................... 291	
7.4.6	 Summary ........................................................................................................ 297	
8 General Discussion ................................................................................................. 299	
8.1	 Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 299	
8.2	 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 300	
8.3	 Main Contributions ................................................................................................. 302	
8.4	 Responding to Critiques of Grounded Cognition .............................................. 305	
8.4.1	 Grounded Semantics and Dreyfus’ Critiques ........................................... 305	
8.4.2	 Grounded Semantics and Johnson-Laird et al.’s Critique ...................... 309	
8.5	 Future Applications ................................................................................................. 310	
8.5.1	 Implications for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics ............................... 310	
8.5.2	 Implications for Advertising and FinTech ................................................ 315	
8.6	 Future Research ....................................................................................................... 319	
8.6.1	 Empirical Ground Truths for Semantic Modelling .................................. 319	
8.6.2	 Large-scale Cognitive Semantic Modelling ............................................... 320	
8.6.3	 Development of Semantic Network Topologies ...................................... 322	
8.7	 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 323	
 Network Analysis ................................................................................. 325	
A.1	 Overview ............................................................................................................. 325	
A.2	 Graph Theory ...................................................................................................... 325	
A.3	 Network Analysis ............................................................................................... 326	
A.4	 Main Network Metrics ...................................................................................... 327	
 Limits of Simple Plots ........................................................................... 329	
B.1	 Overview ................................................................................................................... 329	
B.2	 Challenges of Visualising Multiple Dimensions ................................................. 329	
 Limits of PCA and MDS ........................................................................ 331	
C.1	 Overview ................................................................................................................... 331	
C.2	 Dimensionality Reduction ...................................................................................... 331 
 Enlarged Images of Results ................................................................... 333	
References ................................................................................................................. 349	
 ix 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 (A) The traditional view of cognition playing a mediating role between perception 
and action. (B) Brooks’ model reveals cognition as an emergent property of perception and 
action ................................................................................................................................................... 2	
Figure 2.1: Example of a Physical Symbol System ..................................................................... 12	
Figure 2.2: Comparison of traditional and embodied symbol states ...................................... 13	
Figure 3.1: Arbor porphyriana (tree of Porphyry) ..................................................................... 44	
Figure 3.2: Example format of the feature-based representations. .......................................... 62	
Figure 3.3: Silhouettes and their corresponding silhouette profiles based on the 2D to 1D 
transformation ................................................................................................................................. 64	
Figure 3.4: Performance of the neural networks trained on feature-based, grounded and 
hybrid representations as a function of noise ............................................................................. 67	
Figure 3.5: Classification accuracies of the grounded neural network ................................... 68	
Figure 3.6: A Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) representation of the grounded semantic 
space (left), and a hierarchical cluster plot of the same grounded semantic space (right) .. 69	
Figure 4.1: Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of Sign ................................................................... 75	
Figure 4.2: MDS plots from Louwerse (2011) of the 16 verbal descriptors × 26 features used 
in Rogers and McClelland (2004) .................................................................................................. 83	
Figure 4.3: The differentiation of conceptual representations based on 26 hand-coded n-
gram features (a + d), 26 random noun n-gram features (b + e) and 26 random verb n-gram 
features (c + f). .................................................................................................................................. 96	
Figure 4.4: The differentiation of conceptual representations based on 300 LSA dimensions 
(a + d), 200 LSA dimensions (b + e) and 100 LSA dimensions (c + f) ....................................... 98	
Figure 4.5: Zhao et al.’s PSPNet framework optimised for extracting global-scene-level 
priors. .............................................................................................................................................. 101	
Figure 4.6: PSPNet’s 3 level of abstraction: (i) objects (level 1), (ii) object parts (level 2), and 
(iii) parts of object parts (level 3) ................................................................................................ 102	
Figure 4.7: Example from Zhou et al. demonstrating object-level scene segmentation. .... 103	
Figure 4.8: Schematized example of steps 3 and 4, respectively, extracting the probabilities 
and binarising ................................................................................................................................ 103	
Figure 4.9: Conceptual representations of 20 verbal descriptors with discernible taxonomic 
and associative hierarchies based on the hidden layer associations of the neural network 
trained using PSVs ........................................................................................................................ 106	
 x 
Figure 4.10: (a + b) Conceptual representations of 20 novel animate and inanimate verbal 
descriptors based on 300 LSA-dimensions. (c + d) The relationships of the same 20 concepts 
based on the hidden layer associations of the simple feedforward neural network trained 
using PSVs ...................................................................................................................................... 108	
Figure 5.1: The recurrent neural network from Hoffman et al. (2018) .................................. 125	
Figure 5.2: (A) A histogram of the concreteness ratings of 40,000 word lemmas originating 
from Brysbaert et al. (2014) (B) A boxplot of the standard deviations of the same concreteness 
ratings ............................................................................................................................................. 136	
Figure 5.3: A bar chart of the BrainBench results across a range of distributed “off-the-shelf” 
representations and our perceptual scene vector (PSV) .......................................................... 141	
Figure 5.4: A correlation plot of the PSV’s hidden layer representations. Concepts are 
grouped into concrete (blue), intermediate (green), and abstract (red) groupings ............. 144	
Figure 5.5: Example output of the emotion detection and the resultant JSON file ............. 147	
Figure 5.6: Schematic overview of PSVs, scene2vec and investigating the correspondence 
with LSA by correlating their respective representational dissimilarity matrices (RDMs) 
.......................................................................................................................................................... 149	
Figure 5.7: Outline of the 12 different comparisons between grounded and language-based 
representations, using our adapted representational similarity analysis (RSA) ...................... 150	
Figure 5.8: A correlation plot of the scene2vec’s hidden layer representations .................. 152	
Figure 5.9: Hierarchical cluster plot of the hidden layer neurons representing the semantic 
associations of PSVs (A) and scene2vec (B) representations .................................................. 153	
Figure 5.10: Concept- and category-level correlations of PSV and scene2vec representations 
in relation to LSA 300 distributed representations .................................................................. 154	
Figure 6.1: Example of Troche et al.’s (2014) dichotomous measure of concreteness, with the 
x-axis depicting concreteness ratings. ........................................................................................ 169	
Figure 6.2: The three-dimensional semantic space generated by Troche et al. (2017) ........ 171	
Figure 6.3: Visualising the semantic space generated using PCA of the 400 noun concepts in 
Lynott and Connell’s (2013) modality exclusivity norm study .............................................. 178	
Figure 6.4: Binder et al.’s (2016) cosine-similarity comparison of 434 nouns using brain-based 
representations (left) with LSA representation (right). ........................................................... 181	
Figure 6.5: A screenshot of how the conceptual feature rating exercise looks like on a 
computer screen ............................................................................................................................ 194	
Figure 6.6: A screenshot of how the MaxDiff exercise looks like on a computer screen. .. 195	
Figure 6.7: Correlations between the 16 cognitive dimensions and the concreteness ratings 
merged from Brysbaert et al. (2014) ........................................................................................... 200	
Figure 6.8: (A) Factor Analysis components matrix with conditional formatting (blue for 
larger numbers and red for smaller numbers). (B) A scree plot of the first nine principal 
components extracted ................................................................................................................... 201	
 xi 
Figure 6.9: Comparing t-SNE’s semantic embedding space (A) with MDS’ space (B) for all 
544 concepts. .................................................................................................................................. 203	
Figure 6.10: A matrix of network topologies as t-SNE’s perplexity (columns) increases and 
the correlation threshold (rows) decreases, labelled A to P ....................................................... 205	
Figure 6.11: Three views of the semantic topology of 544 concepts, based on nodes colour-
coded to represent (A) the concreteness spectrum based on ratings integrated from Brysbaert 
et al. (2014), (B) the most dominant cognitive dimension selected in the MaxDiff discrete 
choice modelling task, and (C) the k-core clusters. .................................................................. 207	
Figure 6.12: Plotting the relationship between a log-rescaled t-SNE perplexity and (A) 
network components, (B) diameter, (C) clustering coefficient and (D) the small world index 
(SWI) ............................................................................................................................................... 210	
Figure 6.13: Overall semantic topology, including concept labels and the nodes of the 
network colour-coded according to the concreteness spectrum, ranging from red (abstract) 
to green (intermediate) and blue (concrete) ............................................................................. 212	
Figure 6.14: A random topology based on shuffling the semantic dimensions across 16 
dimensions ..................................................................................................................................... 217	
Figure 6.15: (A) An adapted Lorenz-style plot of the cumulative distribution of network 
dimensions’ maximal activations across the 19 k-core network clusters. (B) An overview of 
the 16 cognitive dimensions plotted based on the Gini coefficient and the absolute semantic 
dominance - a measure of the number of nodes being maximally activated ......................... 219	
Figure 6.16: (A) Sankey plot of the incidence matrix with place-to-cluster relations 
highlighted. (B) Sankey plot of the incidence matrix with ingestion-to-cluster relations 
highlighted ..................................................................................................................................... 221	
Figure 6.17: (A) Semantic network in context-free general condition. (B) Semantic network 
in the home move context. (C) Semantic network in the cooking context. (D) Comparison of 
network degree distributions using density functions. ........................................................... 223	
Figure 6.18: (A) Semantic network in context-free general condition. (B) Semantic network 
in the house on fire context. (C) Semantic network in the water buoyancy context. (D) 
Comparison of network degree distributions using density functions. ............................... 224	
Figure 6.19: (A) Semantic network in context-free general condition. (B) Semantic network in 
the car boot sale context. (C) Semantic network in the gifting context. (D) Comparison of 
network degree distributions using density functions. ........................................................... 225	
Figure 7.1: Depiction of four concepts, along with an example image and automatically 
generated tags ................................................................................................................................ 259	
Figure 7.2: Visualisation of the semantic networks grounded in Google Images ............... 265	
Figure 7.3: Visualisation of the semantic networks grounded in Getty Images .................. 268	
Figure 7.4: Three different network centrality measures (Betweenness, Closeness and 
Strength) across the Getty Images and Google Images networks. ........................................ 269	
 xii 
Figure 7.5: Visualisation of the regularised semantic networks by applying a graphical 
LASSO on the network associations grounded in Google Images (A) and Getty Images (B) 272	
Figure 7.6: A depiction of a small and quasi-representative set of images for the search term 
nurse in both Google Images (A) and Getty Images (B). .............................................................. 273	
Figure 7.7: Quantifying the gender bias in the semantic networks grounded in Google Images 
(A) and Getty Images (B) ............................................................................................................... 275	
Figure 7.8: The regularised graphical LASSO networks are shown for the conditions 
consisting of debiasing (A) only occupation, (B) only business and (C) occupation and business
.......................................................................................................................................................... 279	
Figure 7.9: A summary plot of average bias levels for the original scene2vec Google Images 
network along with the three debiasing experimental conditions of (i) occupation-only, (ii) 
business-only and (iii) occupation and business ............................................................................ 281	
Figure 8.1: Depiction of two virtual scenes in Real Sim City modelled on real-world locations
.......................................................................................................................................................... 311 
 
  
 xiii 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Model parameters and sum square error for ANN training of feature-based, 
grounded and hybrid models ....................................................................................................... 65	
Table 4.1: 20 verbal descriptors × 26 features used in Rogers and McClelland (2004); 
Louwerse (2011) used the first 16 verbal descriptors (excluding mammals) ......................... 92	
Table 4.2: Summary of our predictions for experiments 1 through 7. Weak predictions 
indicate very poor associative and taxonomic relationships, whereas strong predictions 
more meaningful relationships ................................................................................................... 109	
Table 4.3: Summary of Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) across all 7 experiments, quantifying the 
similarity in semantic clustering between the various language and Perceptual Scene Vector 
(PSV) experiments and the ground truth clustering from Rogers and McClell .................. 112	
Table 6.1: Troche et al.’s (2017) conceptual feature ratings (CFR) instrument, the first column 
contains the 14 cognitive dimensions and the second column the verbal descriptions for 
participants .................................................................................................................................... 170	
Table 6.2: A summary of our central hypotheses .................................................................... 190	
Table 6.3: Our conceptual feature ratings (CFR) instrument, based on Troche et al.’ (2017) 
question format of “I relate this word to/with…” .................................................................... 193	
Table 6.4: Stimuli used in the context-specific experiments (phase 3) ................................. 196	
Table 6.5: Interclass correlations (ICC) of the 16 cognitive dimensions for both the conceptual 
feature ratings (CFR) and the Maximum-Difference (MaxDiff) scores ...................................... 199	
Table 6.6: The top-6 concepts (out of 544) for each of the 16 dimensions. The numerical score 
is the aggregated conceptual feature rating (CFR) measured on a 7-point Likert scale. .. 202	
Table 6.7: Network metrics for SemNet and bootstrapped RandNet, including 95% 
confidence intervals for the null model (LCI: lower confidence interval, UCI: Upper 
confidence interval). ..................................................................................................................... 216	
Table 6.8: The incidence matrix for calculating Gini coefficients. ......................................... 218	
Table 6.9: Key network metrics across three context comparison sets, each containing a 
general context and two context-specific networks. ................................................................ 226	
Table 6.10: Summary of the differential activation quotient (DAQ) between the six grounded 
scenarios and the general context-free conceptual feature ratings (CFR) ............................ 227	
Table 7.1: The 60 concepts used in the gender bias experiments. The concepts are grouped 
into ten categories. ........................................................................................................................ 257	
 1 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1                          
Introduction: From Pixels to 
Meaning 
 
1.1 Background: Grounding Meaning 
Thirty-five years ago, Rodney Brooks, a robotics pioneer from 
Stanford ran a popular lecture series titled “From Pixels to Predicates”, which 
provided a grand new vision of artificial intelligence and human 
intelligence. At the time, Brooks was only starting out as a young post-doc. 
Sixteen years later, in an influential review of the ground-breaking work, 
Brooks (1999) recalls the two simple overheads presented during this 
lecture series (see figure 1.1). The first (figure 1.1A) was a diagram depicting 
traditional cognition with cognition being a qualitatively distinct module 
from perception and action, while in the second diagram (figure 1.1B), 
cognition emerged dynamically from the coupling of perception and action. 
Therefore, cognition was not merely a module transforming sensorimotor 
information. This original perspective became popularised as Brooks-style 
AI and led to decades of research on how intelligence in planning and 
 2 
decision making could be acquired dynamically through sensorimotor 
interactions in the real world. 
 
Figure 1.1 (A) The traditional view of cognition playing a mediating role between 
perception and action. (B) Brooks’ model reveals cognition as an emergent property of 
perception and action. Source: Digital adaptations from Brooks (1999). 
 
Despite the successes and (eventual) failures of pure Brooks-style 
AI, Brooks’ original vision of grounding predicates in pixels (the visual 
world) was never realised in the field of cognitive modelling research. 
Traditional computer vision in the 1990s and even early 2000s were too 
cumbersome, inefficient and fragile to help accomplish Brooks’ “pixels to 
predicates” research vision. Brooks (1999, p. ix) summarised this dilemma 
in the following passage: 
 
“Computer vision systems ought to be able to operate in the 
ordinary sorts of environments that people operated in, cluttered 
offices with things stuck on walls and disorderly piles of papers that 
partially obscured objects…a computer vision system should be 
able to operate outdoors and pick out trees, hills, pathways, curbs, 
houses, cars, trucks, and everything else that a three-year-old child 
could name. There were no vision systems around doing anything 
even remotely as sophisticated.” 
 
However, over the last decade, with significant advances in deep 
learning this is no longer the case (see LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015, for a 
brief review). Nonetheless, the most sophisticated and recent models of 
cognitive semantics (e.g. Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Hoffman et al., 2018) 
still rely on hand-coded, modeller-defined and idealised “toy-
environments” which have little in common with human 
 3 
phenomenological experiences of our environment. In this dissertation, we 
are inspired by Rodney Brooks’ influences and the increasing importance 
of grounded theories of cognition in psychology, despite a lack of 
mechanistic models of grounded semantics. We propose to fill this gap in 
the extant literature through our present research programme on 
grounding meaning in the real-world complexities of naturalistic visual 
scenes. 
1.2 Thesis Overview 
Here, we briefly provide an overview of the seven core chapters 
constituting the present dissertation, primarily based on artificial neural 
network modelling, network analysis and one large-scale human study on 
context-dependent and -independent semantics with over 500 concepts and 
more than 2,000 participants in an online survey. 
In chapter 2, we review the extant literature on grounded cognition 
and outline its increasingly influential role in emphasising the importance 
of real-world sensorimotor associations constituting the building blocks of 
intelligence. It rejects the notion of cognition being the result of 
computational manipulation of amodal symbols. We discuss widely cited 
contemporary reviews on grounded cognition by psychologists like 
Lawrence Barsalou, which frequently overlook the historical influences of 
artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive robotics while only sketching out the 
importance of these fields for the future of grounded cognition research. In 
our review, in addition to highlighting well-known philosophical, 
linguistic and empirical influences, we also incorporate overlooked Asian 
philosophical precursors and focus on the origins rooted in AI and robotics 
research from the 1970s and 1980s as an alternative paradigm to GOFAI 
(Good Old-Fashioned AI). Thus, essential but seemingly neglected influences 
from AI and robotics on modern-day grounded cognition are resurfaced. 
We conclude with an overview of the importance of semantics as a testbed 
 4 
for grounded cognition and discuss future implications for scaling 
computational models of human and artificial systems situated in the real 
world. 
In chapter 3, we conceptually replicate the findings from Goldstone 
and Rogosky’s (2002) study based on the ABSURDIST graph-matching 
algorithm. Fodor (1998) claimed that relations between concepts in a 
semantic system are insufficient for mapping correspondences between 
concepts. The ABSURDIST model, using relative and absolute distance 
measures between concepts, shows that relations between concepts are 
critical for semantic representations. Our investigation differs from 
Goldstone and Rogosky’s in one critical manner. In-line with the present 
thesis of real-world grounding, we opt not to use the technique of 
generating concepts using an arbitrary set of absolute (extrinsic) and relative 
(intrinsic) coordinates. Instead, we use the well-known feature-based 
approach from Rogers and McClelland (2004) for encoding distributed 
representations while using our novel 2D silhouette-based technique for 
encoding extrinsic or grounded representations of concept images. The 
same neural network architecture is implemented across all three 
conditions (feature-based, grounded and hybrid), where hybrid 
representations consist of half of the most informative features from both 
the feature-based and grounded input datasets. Our results support the 
findings of Goldstone and Rogosky (2002), by revealing that hybrid 
representations show a markedly slower rate of decline in classification 
accuracy for our concepts as a function of increasing levels of noise 
perturbations applied to the hidden layer representations. Grounded 
representations perform the poorest (highest rate of noise-intolerance), 
while feature-based inputs are moderately tolerant to increasing levels of 
noise. Therefore, hybrid representations (grounded/extrinsic and 
distributed/intrinsic) appear to be mutually reinforcing and superior to 
either grounded or feature-based representations in isolation. 
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In chapter 4, we review Louwerse’s (2011) experiments supporting 
the symbol interdependency hypothesis, which posits that meaning extraction 
attributed to embodied representations or algorithms should instead be 
assigned to language. In a range of computational experiments, we find 
evidence for language surface structures encoding meaning best when 
sufficiently constrained by modeller-determined feature sets, with 
performance deteriorating for randomly selected language surface 
structures. Furthermore, Latent Semantic Analysis’ meaning encoding 
improves as weaker dimensions are removed. These findings collectively 
indicate that although language is important, increasing the relevance of 
linguistic, statistical regularities is also critical. Our novel approach, 
Perceptual Scene Vectors (PSVs), uses object co-occurrences from images to 
automatically extract strong associative and taxonomic relationships more 
successfully, measured both qualitatively and quantitatively, with an 
original application of a cluster-correspondence metric. PSVs encode 
meaning without modellers hand-coding relevant features, which provides 
an ecologically valid approach to extending symbol interdependency 
beyond language and partially solving the relevance problem in semantics by 
grounding meaning extraction in real-world visual scenes. 
In chapter 5, we outline how empirical and computational studies 
on semantics have been limited to concrete concepts, despite the 
importance and prevalence of abstract words in the human lexicon. 
Recently, there has been an increased focus on describing the content of 
abstract concepts through introspective, emotional, metaphorical and 
situational descriptions (Borghi et al., 2017). The literature converges on 
emotions being essential for abstract words, hypothesised as embodied 
abstract semantics (Kousta et al., 2011). Here, we replicate the concreteness 
continuum by re-analysing data from a large-scale normative study 
(Brysbaert, Warriner, & Kuperman, 2014) and externally validate PSVs 
using a neuroimaging benchmark. We then compare situationally 
grounded concepts with traditional language-based representations and 
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find PSVs can successfully represent concrete but neither intermediate nor 
abstract concepts. Lastly, we develop our new scene2vec representation by 
extending PSVs with emotion labels extracted from photographs, which 
yield noticeably enriched semantic representations across the concreteness 
spectrum, despite a lower performance for more abstract concepts. Our 
original contribution of modelling semantics using emotions only partially 
supports the embodied abstract semantics hypothesis and indicates that there 
is more to representing abstract meaning than emotions alone. 
In chapter 6, our large-scale human study, we collect semantic 
dimension and importance ratings from 2,062 participants on 544 English 
words spanning the concreteness spectrum. Critically, we also have six 
context-specific conditions (e.g. imagine you are cooking) followed by ratings 
of the same semantic dimensions. We generate a network topology using 
non-linear dimensionality reduction (t-SNE). Our novel application of 
graph-theoretical techniques to cognitive semantic networks reveals that (i) 
semantic networks have a small-world structure, (ii) context-free semantic 
networks are organised lexically on a concreteness gradient, (iii) changes in 
context can dynamically modulate the lexical network topology, and (iv) 
scenes are the most vital and influential dimension shaping our conceptual 
networks. Collectively, these findings support a grounded perspective on 
meaning. There is no meaning without context. 
In chapter 7, we build on the results of object-co-occurrences 
capturing semantics (chapter 4), limitations discovered in exclusively 
scene-based meaning (chapter 5) and the dynamic topology of meaning 
captured using network analysis grounded in cognitive dimensions 
(chapter 6). Here, we extend scene2vec with an additional “off-the-shelf” 
algorithm linking visual scenes to word tags, based on our simulation results 
from chapter 3 which reveals the mutually reinforcing nature of amodal 
and modal representations. This modified scene2vec representation is used 
to explore the critical issue of gender bias in two popular web-based image 
repositories - Google Images and Getty Images. Using network analysis and 
 7 
our novel application of graphical LASSO regularisation to computational 
semantics, we show, as predicted, that scene2vec trained on Google Images, 
but not on Getty Images, encodes well-established gender-occupation 
stereotypes from the psychological literature (e.g. man-doctor or woman-
nurse). The presence of context-specific human-like gender biases in 
scene2vec provides a new and scalable method for mechanistically 
investigating bias. Lastly, we develop a simple debiasing technique, called 
semantic feature neutralisation (SFN), which can selectively target and 
remove undesirable biases in our small-scale semantic model, while leaving 
desirable gender associations intact (e.g. man-trousers or women-skirt). 
Finally, in chapter 8 we conclude the dissertation with a summary 
of why grounded representations are essential for cognitive science and 
artificial intelligence. We outline three future research opportunities, which 
are: (i) creating a ground truth for benchmarking cognitive semantic models, 
(ii) large-scale semantic modelling, and (iii) developmental investigations 
of semantic network topologies. Lastly, we propose that a move towards 
human-level AI will benefit from realistic virtual grounding, enabling rapid 
iterative progress while also providing a novel, ecologically-valid 
foundation for cognitive modelling of semantics. 
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Chapter 2                                 
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics: 
Origins of Grounded Cognition 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Grounded cognition is an increasingly influential theory of 
intelligence emphasising the importance of real-world sensorimotor 
associations constituting the building blocks of thought. It rejects the notion 
of cognition being the result of computational manipulation of amodal 
symbols. However, literature reviews of grounded cognition (e.g. Barsalou, 
2008, 2010) typically focus on Western philosophical origins and an 
overview of the linguistic roots underpinning contemporary ideas of 
grounding. Additionally, these accounts frequently conclude with a 
summary of a range of promising current and future research in domains 
of artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive robotics. In our brief review, we 
highlight some of these well-known philosophical, linguistic and empirical 
influences but also incorporate overlooked Asian philosophical precursors. 
Our original contribution consists of discussing the origins of grounded 
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cognition rooted in AI and robotics research from the 1970s and 1980s as an 
alternative paradigm to GOFAI. In addition to covering behaviour-based 
robotics (Brooks, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c) we also review less 
well-known grounded AI models (Munson, 1971) and conceptual graphs 
(Sowa, 1976, 1979). We conclude with an overview of the importance of 
semantics as a testbed for grounded cognition and future implications for 
scaling computational models of human and artificial systems situated in 
the real world. 
2.2 Introduction 
Cognitive science is the field dedicated to descriptively, inferentially 
and mechanistically understanding predominantly human mental 
processes. Artificial intelligence, on the other hand, is founded on the 
principles of developing useful real-world intelligent systems and studying 
human intelligence (Winston, 1984). In traditional frameworks of both 
human and artificial intelligence, theorists have viewed cognition, the 
mental processes constituting thought, as disembodied symbol 
manipulation. In this framework, abstract symbols are manipulated by 
rules and operators which collectively give rise to the full range of complex 
human meaning and behaviours. The German mathematician and 
philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 - 1716) is one of the 
forefathers of this approach, based on the ambition of creating a logical 
calculus of all human concepts (Sun, 2008). More recently, Chomsky (1957), 
outlined a quintessentially symbolic model of language processing known 
as transformational-generative grammar focusing on syntax, morphology and 
phonology with detailed information processing steps leading to the 
emergence of linguistic patterns and subsequently, conceptual processing. 
Chomsky’s work marked a significant departure from more traditional 
linguistic perspectives that overlooked explanations relating to the mind or 
the brain. 
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Grounded cognition (GC) is usually negatively defined as the 
opposite view towards this classical paradigm of intelligence. In GC, both 
the environment and the body are critical constituents to shaping cognition 
(Barsalou, 2010). Some theorists of grounded cognition (e.g. Froese, 2007; 
Chemero, 2011; Vallet, 2015; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) have 
suggested GC leading a paradigmatic shift away from more traditional 
symbolic views to the ones incorporating the influence of our body and 
situational factors. Somewhat surprisingly, some even claim GC is the 
dominant new cognitive science paradigm (Stewart et al., 2010). 
In this review, we start with an overview of so-called classical 
cognition and attempt to delineate its fuzzy boundary with grounded 
cognition. Our review of GC’s extant literature is chronologically 
structured. We start with its millennia-old roots in philosophy and transition 
towards linguistics, artificial intelligence, psychology and culminate with 
contemporary cognitive robots. We challenge the dominant narrative 
outlined by Barsalou (2010) of a one-way influence of psychological notions 
of the embodied mind on robotics and artificial intelligence. Finally, we 
discuss our novel research programme - developing cognitive semantic 
models grounded directly in the visual world - a core thesis of the present 
dissertation. 
2.3 Classical Theory of Cognition 
A typical example of a classical theory of cognition is Alan Newell’s 
(1980) physical symbol systems (PSS), which postulates that symbols are 
expressions with their origins in physical patterns and their manipulation 
gives rise to new expressions. Cognitive scientists who adopt the PSS, 
implicitly or explicitly, adhere to a so-called “hamburger model of 
cognition”, consisting of perception-cognition-action modules, with a special 
focus on the intermediary cognitive stage, and treating perception and action 
as mere inputs and outputs (Willems & Francken, 2012). This standard view 
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has many core strengths, which are: (i) type-token binding, (ii) inference, (iii) 
productivity, (iv) recursion, (v) propositions and (vi) scalability (Barsalou et al., 
2003, p.84). A core unifying perspective of much of cognitive science from 
these strengths is the solipsistic framework, which states that there is a 
definitive and non-negotiable boundary between the mind and the world. 
In this view, perceptions form the inputs from the world into the mind, 
while actions are outputs from the mind to the world. This idea also carries 
the implicit notion of reducing cognising agents to passive recipients of 
information from the world. The focus of traditional cognitive scientists on 
the “inner workings” of the mind, is in stark contrast to previous 
behaviourist paradigms studying stimulus-response pairs (for a historical 
perspective see Watson, 1913). 
At the inaugural cognitive science conference, Allen Newell (1980) 
restated the fundamental contribution of both AI and computer science to 
the field of cognitive science through a detailed review of a physical symbol 
system (see figure 2.1). The apparent similarities between this view of 
cognition and the actual architecture of the modern computer are not a 
coincidence - Newell concluded his seminal article by stating that this 
insight into cognitive processing was “discovered indirectly while 
developing a technical instrument” (p. 182). In this review, we later argue 
that somewhat ironically, this is also the case for grounded cognition in two 
distinct ways. First, much of the philosophical and linguistic theory of 
grounding emerged as an oppositional framework to traditional 
computational methods. Second, early mechanistic formulations of 
grounding from AI and robotics predate the dominant theories of 
grounding from the 1980s and 90s. 
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Figure 2.1: Example of a Physical Symbol System. Source: Newell (1980). 
 
Glenberg (2015) postulates some key catalysts for the proliferation 
of the so-called “cognitivist perspective”, which overthrew the well-
established tradition of studying perception, action and cognition. Two of the 
primary drivers, discussed by Glenberg are the emergence of computer 
science and the gradual realisation in linguistics that perceptual input alone 
could not satisfactorily account for the diversity of language. We will 
specifically focus on the first catalyst, as this is also widely used to delineate 
an allegedly insurmountable divide between the goals of computational 
modelling and grounded cognition. Newell and Simon’s (1976) Physical 
Symbol System Hypothesis claims that intelligent behaviours can arise in both 
humans and machines given that in both human and artificial intelligence, 
the core mechanism relies on the manipulation of abstract symbols. In some 
grounded cognition accounts (see Shapiro, 2011) this computational view 
is regarded as the antithesis to grounding. 
Although some more modern cognitive architectures like ACT-R/E 
(Trafton et al., 2012) claim embodied properties due to the viability of 
sensorimotor re-enactments, we would still argue that these models are not 
grounded in the real world or realistic proxies such as naturalistic sights 
(e.g. photographs/videos) and sounds (e.g. audio files). The data inputs 
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feeding into the architecture typically consist of hand-coded features 
lacking any resemblances to the real world. The inputs are not grounded in 
real-world experiences. 
2.4 Development of Grounded Cognition 
Grounded theories of cognition (e.g. Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2008) challenge traditional views of cognition by claiming that 
conceptual representations are grounded in sensorimotor experiences, and 
also processed at this level, and not in an abstract, amodal manner (see figure 
2.2). A variety of related but different terms such as embodied cognition, 
situated cognition and enactive cognition refer to positions against classical 
theories of cognition. Grounded cognition is a unifying umbrella concept 
spanning all of these more specialised definitions. Grounded theories 
initially gained traction within the humanities, in particular, cognitive 
linguistics and semiotics (Lakoff, 1993; Talmy, 1996). In contrast, 
disembodied cognitive theories generally favour a system in which 
conceptual representations are symbolic and abstract, and therefore 
qualitatively different from sensory and motor codes. Fodor’s (1983) 
modularity hypothesis is an example of such a perspective since it states 
that central cognition is amodal but that efferent and afferent connections 
to the world are modal. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of traditional and embodied symbol states. Source: Barsalou 
(1999). 
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Barsalou (2010) reviewed the past, present and future of grounded 
cognition spanning philosophy, linguistics, psychology, neuroscience and only 
included two passing citations on behaviour-based robotics and artificial 
intelligence. However, according to Barsalou (2010), the future of grounded 
cognition is closely tied with physical robots, because these fields provide 
an ideal test bed for grounded cognition theories. Somewhat surprisingly, 
the review fails to outline any contributions of the field of robotics as a 
historical antecedent to the rise and dominance of grounded cognition and 
its influence in psychology over the past thirty years. According to 
Barsalou’s (2010) timeline, grounded cognition is rooted in philosophy and 
linguistics, while future developments are likely to come from cognitive 
ecology, neuroscience and robotics. Although we broadly agree with this view, 
we claim that an overlooked aspect of the history of grounded cognition is 
artificial intelligence and robotics. When discussing the origins of grounded 
cognition, Barsalou’s (2010) review merely states the following: “[I]n 
robotics, Brooks (1991b) and Kirsh (1991) advocated incorporating the 
environment and the body into a new generation of robots.” (p. 718). 
Similarly, in a related review article by Mainzer (2009) titled “From 
embodied mind to embodied robotics: Humanities and system theoretical aspects”, 
the same argument is made about linguistic, semiotic and philosophical 
ideas shaping contemporary embodied robotics. Surprisingly, Mainzer 
does not include a single citation of Brooks-style robotics and AI 
influencing embodied theorising. Although traditional symbolic 
computational references are made, like Tarski’s (1935) correspondence 
theory of truth, outlining the isomorphism between the real world and 
symbolic abstractions. There is current literature detailing the interrelated 
origins of grounded cognition and ecological psychology (see Clark, 2008). 
Although to the best of our knowledge, there are no such equivalent 
reviews for the fields of AI and robotics. In this introduction, following an 
overview of some of the fundamental philosophical, linguistic and empirical 
milestones, we outline pioneering research from the fields of artificial 
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intelligence and robotics between the years 1971 and 1991, which helped 
shape the rise of mechanistic formulations of grounded cognition in 
psychology. The research outlined, on grounded cognition in AI and 
robotics, either pre-dates or concurrently develops with other philosophical 
and linguistic research programmes between 1980-1999. 
Grounded cognition has had a great many research outputs in 
cognitive linguistics (Johnson & Malgady, 1979; Johnson, 1981; Johnson & 
Henley, 1988; Talmy, 1996; Bundgaard & Østergaard, 2007), but has since 
influenced research on memory (Roediger, 1980), emotions (Niedenthal et al., 
2001, 2005; Markman & Brendl, 2005), action understanding (Tucker & Ellis, 
1998), judgement and decision making (Schnall et al., 2008), and even applied 
fields such as organisational psychology (Harquail & King, 2010), educational 
psychology (Sousa, 2010), clinical psychology (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and 
cognitive neuroscience (Matheson & Barsalou, 2017). 
2.4.1 Grounded Cognition: Roots in Philosophy and Linguistics 
In philosophy, Merleau-Ponty (1945) emphasised the close 
relationship between perception and action and theorised the basis of 
conceptual representations originating from grounded interactions in the 
real world (Anderson, 2003). However, the most impactful criticisms to the 
physical symbol system perspective of Newell and Simon (1976), as well as 
other related hypotheses (e.g. Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) came from a 
thought experiment by Searle (1980). John Searle’s Gedankenexperiment 
revolves around imaging a scenario whereby a non-Chinese speaker finds 
themselves in a sealed room with two slots, one from which they receive 
Chinese logograms, mostly a series of “meaningless squiggles” to the non-
Chinese speaker (p. 3) and another slot from which they can output 
perfectly grammatical phrases of Chinese symbols. The only aid the non-
Chinese speaker inside the locked room has is an extensive rulebook 
mapping inputs of Chinese logograms with grammatically correct outputs 
of Chinese logogram sequences. Searle asks: does the person inside the room 
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speak and understand Chinese? The person inside the room is performing 
operations on formally specified input-output mappings, as per the 
rulebook, but are they fluent in Chinese? Searle answers this question 
negatively, and most critically, parallels this to the physical symbol system, 
a closed system of abstract amodal symbols (devoid of perception and 
action) from which meaning of symbols only stems from its interrelations 
with other abstract amodal symbols. Similarly, Harnad’s (1990) “symbol 
merry-go-round” argument succinctly summarises why a closed system of 
abstract symbols cannot be the underlying theory of meaning, given this 
circularity and that only by breaking away from the vicious cycle by 
grounding those symbols in perception, action and other bodily states such 
as emotion, does meaning genuinely emerge. 
At first glance, the relatively recent hype and interest in grounded 
cognition can seem like an entirely new “paradigm” discovered in the late 
20th century. However, in reality, it is more of a resurrection of ancient 
philosophical and even religious ideologies, a gradual elaboration of 
philosophical and metaphysical principles through the deployment of 
original and elegant research paradigms. The origins of grounded cognition 
are typically traced back to the philosophical ideas of the ancient Greek 
philosopher Epicurus (341 - 270 BCE), based on his atomic materialist views 
of matter being at the heart of everything - from physical to mental objects, 
and that genuinely disembodied or symbolic states disconnected from 
external reality are impossible (Barsalou, 2008). Even abstract concepts such 
as good or bad are omitted from explanatory descriptions of human thought; 
instead, the focus is on actual physical instantiations like pleasure and pain 
(Shapiro, 2011). Numerous grounded cognition theorists (e.g. Clark, 2008; 
Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 2015) have shed light on the historical pedigree 
of the idea that higher-level cognition is not independent of perception and 
action, one of the core pillars of grounding in cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence. This scholastic lineage can also be dated as far back as Aristotle 
(367 - 347 BCE) and the notion of Aristotelian metaphysics of emotions 
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(Gabbe, 2016). Grounded philosophies of cognition even provide coherent 
phenomenological accounts of the embodied soul, which according to Wright 
(1991) was used in the 17th century for medical diagnoses. 
These Western philosophical origins have been extensively 
discussed in the grounded cognition literature (see Haugeland, 1993; 
Barsalou, 2008; Mainzer, 2009), although the ancient Indian thought system 
Samkhya-Yoga has been entirely overlooked. The present author proposes 
that this South Asian history is more directly relevant to grounded 
cognition, especially given the increasingly popular intertwined nature 
with modern-day Buddhist philosophy, mindfulness and grounded 
cognition (e.g. Watts, 2013). Samkhya, also written as Sankhya, is one of the 
core pillars of Indian philosophy, originating circa 5th century BCE, which 
has strong rationalist and reductionist underpinnings (Sinha, 1979) and is 
widely acknowledged to be strongly dualist, given its distinction between 
buddhi (“intellect”) and ahaṅkāra (“consciousness”). However, when 
Samkhya is combined with Yoga, to form Samkhya-Yoga, the focus is on 
applied knowledge, consisting of integrating the three “modules”: (i) 
perception, (ii) inference and (iii) memory. This integration leads to abstract 
knowledge, translated from Purusha, meaning ‘pure consciousness’.  
Furthermore, it also seems that Samkhya-Yoga, as interpreted 
through Sinha’s (1979) translations, advocates that all knowledge be 
grounded in sensory inputs, more specifically the visual and auditory 
modalities. Our delineation of the philosophical origins of grounded 
cognition indicates that early philosophical/religious texts sought to find 
common relationships between the mind, body and environment, which 
share some surface-level similarities with psychological theories of 
grounding. More recently in Europe, during the age of reason, enlightenment 
philosophers such as Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) also claimed that all 
mental sensations are affected either directly or indirectly through physical 
objects (Svare, 2006). 
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At the intersection of philosophy and linguistics, resides Lakoff and 
Johnson’s (1980) highly influential conceptual metaphor theory (CMT), with 
the core trilogy 1  of publications cited approximately 100,000 times. To 
contextualise this, only the top three most highly cited publications out of the 
top 100 reported by Nature News (Van Noorden, Maher, & Nuzzo, 2014), 
contain more lifetime citations than received for CMT. In CMT, concepts 
are represented by relation to another more basic domain. Lakoff and 
Johnson develop a diagrammatic framework, known as conceptual blending, 
for explaining the process through which typically more abstract 
conceptual domains (known as the target domain) are metaphorically 
grounded in more basic conceptual domains (called the source domain). For 
example, happiness (the abstract target domain) can be interpreted via the 
metaphoric extension of verticality (the source domain), and lead to people 
generating and understanding linguistic utterances such as “I am feeling a 
bit down today”. Another example of a target-source relationship would be 
difficulty-heaviness. Although exceptions exist, the typical pattern is such 
that the source domain is grounded in sensorimotor content, while the 
target domain consists of abstractions or reactions to the sensory input. We 
argue that conceptual blending is a descriptive framework lacking clear 
specifications or predictions. However, Lakoff and Johnson’s original 
theory is philosophical and requires a robust empirical basis. Also, Turner 
(1996) and Gibbs, Ellison and Heino (2006) critique that such metaphoric 
extensions are not only a literary artefact but also associated with human 
cognition (Barsalou, 2008). 
In their more recent work titled Philosophy in the Flesh, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) fail to make any effort of relating their underlying ideas to 
proposals in AI and cognitive science and furthermore omit to appreciate 
non-philosophical approaches to grounding. Therefore, unfortunately, 
                                                      
1 Lakoff and Johnson (2008), Lakoff (2008) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999) being respectively 
cited 55,564, 27,413 and 16,390 times. 
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their philosophical work is challenging to evaluate from both an empirical 
and a computational perspective. Even Gallese and Lakoff’s (2005) 
descriptive model of bootstrapping sensorimotor information for 
conceptual processing falls short of being detailed enough to constitute a 
formal theory. The descriptive model suggests that concepts are 
fundamental building blocks from which linguistic meaning and reasoning 
emerges based on the neural theory of language (NTL) and theory of cogs (ToC). 
In Feldman and Narayanan’s (2004) NTL, the same neural structures 
implemented for perception and action in the real world are also used 
offline for abstract reasoning through inference mechanisms based on 
ToC’s use of generic X-schemas that allow for abstract logical inferences 
based on a symbolic inference-engine architecture outlined in Narayanan 
(1997). We find that, like Barsalou (2010) and Mainzer (2009), Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) and Gallese and Lakoff’s (2005) also fail to credit the fields 
of artificial intelligence and robotics contributing to the rise of grounded 
cognition. 
2.4.2 Grounded Cognition: Roots in Psychology 
In cognitive science, the origins of grounding cognition typically 
point toward Gibson’s (1979) theory of situated action, focusing on the 
interplay between close action-perception coupling dynamics leading to an 
emergence of complex behaviours, in the absence of symbolic modal or 
amodal representations. Gibson’s theory of situated action, as well as his 
related work on the brain’s role in vision strongly deny the solipsistic 
framework adopted by mainstream cognitive scientists. However, 
stalwarts of traditional symbolic cognitive science (e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1981) went to great lengths at discrediting Gibson’s views as neo-
behaviourism with different terminology (Shapiro, 2011). 
Garbarini and Adenzato (2004) suggest that grounded cognition 
stems from the confluence of James Gibson’s theory of affordances (Gibson, 
1979) and Eleanor Rosch’s principles of categorisation (Rosch, 1977). The first 
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core principle outlined by Rosch is cognitive economy - the effort to 
distinguish between two objects must be proportional to the advantages of 
this distinction and perceived world structure. Second, perceptual 
information reaches us in a non-arbitrary or meaningful way, for example, 
focusing on the role of functional needs of a particular object being viewed 
in different ways by different organisms. 
There is an abundance of empirical demonstration experiments 
showing the embodied or grounded nature of cognitive processing (see 
Barsalou, 2010). Here, we will limit our focus to only semantics, which has 
gained a great deal of attention. Much of this evidence relies on the premise 
that if semantic knowledge is rooted in low-level sensorimotor areas in the 
brain, then these should also be active during retrieval of higher-order 
semantic knowledge (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). For example, in an fMRI 
study, Hauk (2004) found that reading action words (e.g. pick, lick, kick) 
activates premotor and frontal areas associated with performance of actions 
with corresponding body parts (e.g. hand, mouth, leg), which Hauk 
interprets as supporting embodiment. This link between embodied 
accounts and neuroscientific evidence is a recurring theme within the 
grounded cognition literature, not least because the seminal paper 
outlining perceptual symbol system (Barsalou, 1999) emphasises the natural 
fit between embodiment and brain mechanisms, based on simulation 
theory’s reliance on modality-specific activations, and the brains modality-
specific areas. 
2.4.3 Grounded Cognition: Roots in AI and Robotics 
In the domain of artificial intelligence and robotics, mechanistic 
frameworks emerged in the early 1970s, which closely resembled many 
aspects of ecological psychology. Most of these historical frameworks are not 
related to grounding meaning per se but are more focused on practical 
navigation tasks along with the computational challenges of planning and 
executing motor sequencing in increasingly complex and realistic 
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environments. Munson (1971, p.1) was perhaps one of the first roboticists 
to acknowledge that a fully formalised model of any realistically complex 
environment was unfeasible due to a range of reasons such as (i) lack of 
sensory precision, (ii) lack of complete descriptions, (iii) lack of effector (motor) 
precision and (iv) memory storage limitations. Munson (1971) developed one 
of the first formalised frameworks for the planning, execution and monitoring 
of robotic systems in an uncertain environment. The general formulation 
was inspired by the inadequacies of problem solvers available at the time 
to cope with real-world dynamic environments when only using first-order 
predicate calculus. Munson’s (1971) work cited the problem that arose in 
“robotry” as a result of the disconnect between an agent’s internal and 
external environments and their links to acting and planning. In many 
ways, these days, one might be tempted to categorise Munson’s (1971) AI 
research framework as GOFAI and unrelated to grounded cognition, 
Brooks-style AI or present-day cognitive robotics. However, there are many 
reasons why, despite the implementation-level similarities with GOFAI 
(decision trees and maximising utility), the approach is a precursor to 
grounded cognition. 
First, Munson recognises the additional problems posed through 
the distinction between internal and external states. Second, in response to 
the first dilemma, there is an emphasis on relating planning (cognition), 
execution (sensorimotor outputs) and monitoring (sensorimotor inputs) as 
opposed to conceptualising each stage as a distinct process like in the classic 
“sandwich model” of cognition. Third, there is an explicit acceptance of the 
limitations of game-theoretic formulations of decision making under 
uncertainty due to the inherent complexity of the environment in spite of 
retaining the concept of utility for comparisons with the “ultimate rational” 
execution (p.9). Fourth, the robot’s knowledge space is dynamically defined 
using a three-element tuple, {𝑚%; 𝑃; 𝐶}, which we interpret as a grounded 
intelligence structure, whereby model relations (𝑚%), state of the plan (𝑃) and 
control information (𝐶 ) are entangled. These four points taken together 
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suggest a tight coupling between perception and action - the fundamental 
tenet underlying grounded cognition.  
Furthermore, Munson’s combination of a dynamically-coupled 
knowledge space for monitoring, planning and executing motor commands 
makes a strong case for the first-ever adaptive AI platform. Therefore, we 
argue that even though Munson never uses the term “grounding” or 
“behaviour-based”, the highly original ideas expressed and formalised are 
strong precursors to dynamic perspectives of grounded cognition as well 
as Brooks-style behaviour-based robotics. In the words of Brooks (1999, 
p.8), “the coupling of perception and actuation systems…is the cornerstone 
of behaviour-based robotics”. 
We mentioned that most examples of early AI and robotics research 
were not associated with semantics, although there is one notable 
exception. One of the first technical breakthroughs in a natural language-
based grounding of artificial intelligence originated from John F. Sowa in 
the mid-70s, who at the time was an IBM researcher. Sowa (1976) developed 
a novel type of knowledge structure, called conceptual graphs, which was a 
significant step forward in both AI and grounding meaning because it 
allowed for a seamless interface between users and a database interface. 
The system allowed users to access database items without knowledge of 
the technical details underlying the database or metadata structures but via 
the conceptual graph abstraction. Additionally, the conceptual graphs 
permitted for relations to be generated between concepts to encode 
functional dependencies. This approach developed at a time when large 
volumes of physical (usually paper) records were transcribed into large 
computational databases. Conceptual graphs provided a formal notation 
for human users to interact with the conceptual graphs by translating a 
natural language query into a conceptual graph, which in turn would be 
converted into a machine-readable query to access the most relevant 
information from the database. To the best of our knowledge, this was the 
first prototype of a simple, yet functional, natural language-based search 
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functionality. A further extension and elaboration of some of the original 
features of conceptual graphs in Sowa (1979) outlined the unique property 
of not only being an interface but also encoding, storing and decoding 
semantic associations from the real world. Sowa’s (1976, 1979) conceptual 
graphs also relied on Heidorn’s (1975) NLP parser and therefore could be 
grounded in the real-world linguistic environment. This is an early example 
of grounding semantics in real-world language. 
In a series of technical and philosophical publications, Rodney 
Brookes developed a new research programme for AI, called behaviour-
based robotics or Nouvelle AI, which went beyond some of the pioneering 
early efforts of Munson (1971) and Sowa (1979). Behaviour-based AI moved 
away from the “sandwich model” of perception-cognition-action by allowing 
cognition to be an emergent property of the dynamic interactions with the 
world through perception and action. Brooks’ underlying philosophy was 
that robots should operate in the types of environments humans operate in, 
different from the sterile lab conditions under which earlier versions of 
GOFAI-based robots like the Shakey operated (Brooks, 1999). 
In the first landmark publication introducing the ideas underlying 
behaviour-based robotics, although not the term itself, Brooks (1986) 
presented the layered control system for mobile robots. Traditional robots 
typically consisted of a wide range of modules and sub-modules for highly 
specialised tasks. However, in Brooks’ architecture, the modules were 
structured in hierarchical layers, with increasing levels of competence as 
one moved from the more basic to the higher-order layers. Critically, higher 
layers can entirely subsume the functions of the lower-level layers, even 
though the addition of higher layers does not impact the lower levels' 
functions. Thus, sensors directly send inputs to all the hierarchical 
structured modules, which in turn, all send outputs to the actuators. The 
different levels have different functional properties determined by the 
make-up of the individual layers comprised of multiple modules (or 
processors) that only send messages to each other within the same layer. A 
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single module is an augmented FSM (finite state machine) with the ability to 
read-write LISP data structures. However, these modules only have the 
“shortest range” memories because their single element buffer can be 
overwritten with new information before it is read by another module 
within the same layer (Brooks, 1986). In this initial publication, there were 
three layers. The zeroth level ensured that the robot did not collide with other 
objects. The zeroth level + first level enabled the robot to move around 
aimlessly without crashing into other objects. Lastly, the zeroth level + first 
level + second level allowed the robot to demonstrate more exploratory 
behaviours such as moving towards corridors with free space. From the 
robot moving around successfully using the behaviour-based subsumption 
architecture, Brooks (1986) ruled out the need for a central processor. 
Brooks (1989) managed to use the behaviour-based subsumption 
architecture to control a six-legged robot, which has significantly harder 
control system challenges that need to be overcome (Brooks, 1999). This 
insect-like robot was called Genghis, one of Brooks’ more famous creations, 
now located in the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum. Genghis’ AI 
architecture was built incrementally using a network of 57 augmented finite 
state machines (modules) structured hierarchically to enable Genghis to 
perform a range of increasingly complex behaviours from standing up and 
simple walking to the highest level, steered prowling which allowed Genghis 
to follow slow moving objects or people. Such behaviours demonstrated 
that highly sophisticated and co-ordinated macro-level behaviours could 
emerge from a broad set of layered micro-level primitive functionalities. In 
other words, fundamental building blocks combined in the right way could 
lead to the emergence of complex adaptive behaviours. 
Despite the successful outcomes of Brooks (1986, 1989), both of them 
were still based on in situ coupling of the sensory and motor systems, 
without manipulating internal representations, and hence, lacked 
demonstration of more sophisticated behaviours. This shortcoming was 
also one of the reasons for the behaviour-based approach to AI receiving 
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strong criticisms from more traditional AI and robotics researchers. As a 
direct response to this mounting criticism, Mataric and Brooks (1990) re-
purposed the subsumption architecture in a new robot called Toto, to 
demonstrate the feasibility of acquiring distributed map representations 
grounded in navigation behaviours. Moreover, these maps were 
dynamically deployable in real-time navigation. This dynamic behaviour 
was the first example of complex mapping representations being encoded 
directly from grounded interactions. Once more, Toto was based on the 
layered subsumption architecture and therefore contained no central 
processor, and there was overlap between the modules representing Toto’s 
spatial position and planning the actions. Like with Genghis, Toto could do 
a range of increasingly more complex behaviours as a result of the higher-
level layer interacting with the lower layers.  
The most significant difference with Toto was that unlike in 
previous subsumption architectures, landmark identification automatically 
led to the relative mapping of the different landmarks. However, even this 
process was not centralised. Maja Mataric, then a graduate student in 
Rodney Brooks’ lab, demonstrated the feasibility of graph-like structures 
being encoded in a decentralised information system comprised of a series 
of augmented finite state machines (Mataric, 1990). Each finite state 
machine is a node in the map-style representation. Mataric and Brooks 
(1990) utilised this distributed mapping technique to allow Toto to acquire 
a map of its environment through gradual exploration. The so-called map-
nodes, which are empty at compile time, gradually start obtaining 
information (the type of landmark and corresponding direction) in parallel 
in a distributed manner. Toto’s localisation is performed by all the nodes 
comparing their details with the current information, to activate the 
corresponding node. However, if a matching node is not found, this is 
interpreted as a new landmark and is added to the graph. Finally, nodes 
spread their activation to other nodes in the direction of travel, which leads 
to more sophisticated planning repertoires (Mataric & Brooks, 1990). As one 
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would expect, despite the initial starting position of Toto varying across 
trials, over time, landmarks clustered together based on their spatial layout. 
The robot Toto was also capable of dynamically changing its goals stored 
in long-term memory and behaving in a manner consistent with flexible plans 
being generated from the distributed map representation. This early study 
demonstrates the incremental acquisition, representation and manipulation 
of a distributed graph-like representation through the close coupling of 
sensorimotor and environmental signals and without the need for a central 
processor. Unsurprisingly, in a later review of this work, Brooks (1999, p.37) 
claimed that “[he] view[s] this work as the nail in the coffin of traditional 
representationalism”. However, as we shall discuss in section 2.5 of this 
chapter, Brooks (1999) ended up adopting a more balanced conclusion and 
even accepting that behaviour-based AI failed to live up to the original 
expectations. We also suggest that Mataric and Brooks’ (1990) robot Toto is 
a physical instantiation of the frameworks and models put forward by 
earlier grounded robotic principles from Munson (1971) and Sowa’s (1976, 
1979) work on demonstrating the feasibility of using conceptual graphs 
grounded in natural language to represent meaning. 
Brooks (1991c) summarises the successes of the behaviour-based 
robotics paradigm initiated through the development of the subsumption 
architecture in 1986, and subsequent refinements and demonstrations 
through robots like Genghis and Toto. Critically, we argue, Brooks (1991c) 
highlights two central themes, which are sufficiently significant not to be 
hidden in the main body of the article but highlighted with bullet points on 
the first page of the article. We include the excerpt below from Brooks 
(1991c, p.1227): 
 
• “Situatedness: The robots are situated in the world—
they do not deal with abstract descriptions, but with the 
"here" and "now" of the environment that directly 
influences the behavior of the system. 
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• Embodiment: The robots have bodies and experience the 
world directly — their actions are part of a dynamic with 
the world, and the actions have immediate feedback on 
the robots' own sensations.” 
 
Brooks’ (1991c) quotes on situatedness and embodiment are eight 
years before Barsalou’s (1999) influential perceptual symbol hypothesis 
provided a descriptive argument in favour of tighter couplings between 
sensorimotor activities and high-order cognition. Also, Brooks’ (1991c) 
theoretical overview is based on more than five years of robotics 
experimentation demonstrating the feasibility and benefits (e.g. increased 
efficiency and speed) of grounding higher-order intelligent operations such 
as planning using situated graph representations in an unpredictable 
environment. Therefore, the shift from a modular cognitivist theory of mind 
or traditional GOFAI to grounded or dynamic cognitive representations not 
only preceded the rise of grounded cognition in psychology (Barsalou, 
1993, 1999) but was founded on rigorous mechanistic models. Furthermore, 
Brooks-style grounding in robotics, because of the nature of the discipline, 
provided functional models of non-separation of data and computation 
given the distributed representation of both across the same modules. 
2.4.4 Summary 
In conclusion, unlike Barsalou (2010), we argue that the 
aforementioned developments in AI and robotics (Sowa, 1976, 1979; 
Munson, 1971) in conjunction with the five seminal theoretical papers from 
Rodney Brooks, published between 1985 and 1991, support our claim that 
grounded cognition’s origins are also partly rooted in AI and robotics. 
Naturally, as discussed, we also acknowledge ancient Western and Asian 
philosophical influences as well as from linguistics more recently. Theories 
of grounding in cognitive psychology only emerged in the mid-to-late 
1990s (Barsalou, 1993, 1999). Although, lesion studies from cognitive 
neuropsychology did demonstrate a role of the modal systems in 
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representing category knowledge (Warrington & Shallice, 1984). However, 
it was not until Barsalou (1993), that there was a specific descriptive 
psychological theory of human knowledge being grounded in our 
sensorimotor modalities. The same is also the case for some linguistic 
conceptions of grounding (e.g. Lakoff, 1993). Similarly, Varela et al. (1991) 
book titled The Embodied Mind emerged after the core behaviour-based 
robotics developments. Varela et al. provide a detailed overview of Brooks’ 
robotics experiments. The cognitive descriptions and theories of the human 
embodied mind and the importance of being embedded in real-world 
dynamics only appeared several years following the aforementioned 
conceptual graphs grounded in language (Sowa, 1976) or behaviour-based 
robotics (e.g. Munson, 1971; Brooks, 1986). Additionally, a range of 
philosophical articles fleshing out the importance of behaviour-based 
robotics from the embodiment and situatedness principles (Brooks, 1990, 
1991a, 1991b, 1991c) also pre-date the earliest publications from cognitive 
psychology. Grounded cognition’s origins are, therefore, based on AI and 
robotics. 
2.5 Limitations of Grounded Artificial Intelligence 
Contemporary efforts of behaviour-based robotics are broadly still 
based on many of the core principles outlined in Brooks (1991c, 1999). More 
recently, a plethora of interrelated research domains have branched out 
from the original behaviour-based robotics research of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, such as developmental robotics (Asada et al., 2001; Weng, 2004), 
cognitive robotics and evolutionary robotics (Minato & Ishiguro, 2007; Nolfi et 
al., 2016), which have mainly advanced from an engineering and computer 
science perspective. In other cases, so-called embodied-roboticists use tried-
and-tested analytical methods, such as dynamical systems modelling using 
differential equations, to generate perception-action couplings (e.g. Pfeifer 
& Scheier, 2001). These types of approaches are reminiscent of the 
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pioneering research of Munson (1971). However, these key developments 
are not entirely relevant for our present purposes of investigating natural 
human cognition mechanistically. 
Mainzer (2009) praises the behaviour-based robotics paradigm for 
being superior at accounting for the dynamic emergence of new robotic 
behaviours from simple modules running in hierarchal unison between 
sensations and actions. Still, Mainzer (2009) also critiques grounded 
roboticists for merely assuming that macro-level self-organising principles 
automatically lead to the desired goal of human-like intelligence (p. 296). 
Therefore, the suggestion is for roboticists and AI researchers to understand 
the processes of controlled emergence better to build a system that might 
gradually display more human-like behaviours if the artificial system is 
guided appropriately. 
Barsalou (2010) claims that grounded theories will eventually 
synthesise with classic symbolic and sub-symbolic perspectives and the 
new developments in behaviour-based/embodied robotics will allow for 
mechanistically evaluating different embodied theories. We agree, that 
there has been an increased effort to investigate the mechanistic nature of 
embodiment and higher-order cognition (e.g. Cangelosi & Riga, 2006; 
Pezzulo et al., 2011), but this has primarily focused on ensuring embodied 
constraints are operationalised through the use of hardware (e.g. physical 
or virtually embodied robots). We believe much of embodied robotics 
merely consists of ensuring that physical or virtual effectors execute specific 
actions. There is, however, a relative lack of research on grounding higher-
order cognition in the environment, as opposed to directly embodying 
abstract concepts like numbers in lower-level sensorimotor contingencies 
like robotic finger configurations (e.g. De La Cruz et al., 2014). 
An overview of behaviour-based robotics would not be complete 
without an outline of some of the core limitations. We first highlight some 
of the dominant criticisms from Dreyfus (2007), followed by our 
suggestions. Although Hubert Dreyfus is well-known as an “ideological 
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foe” of AI (Dennett, 2006, p.434), most of the philosophical points raised 
more than a decade ago are still relevant and largely remain unanswered 
by the AI community. Many of Dreyfus’ critiques of grounded AI models, 
especially behaviour-based ones, have somewhat inadvertently been 
addressed in this dissertation’s later computational and empirical research 
chapters. We, therefore, include the labels (C1 to C5) to highlight some of 
the critical challenges posed by Dreyfus, which we address in the present 
dissertation. 
Dreyfus (1997) raises one of the most robust sets of criticisms not 
only against behaviour-based but AIs/robots in general. The main criticism 
is that computational systems are inherently unable to account for an 
intentional agency, which Froese and Ziemke (2009) interpret as 
computational intelligence not having an “understanding of their situation” 
(p. 467). In other words, Dreyfus critiques the inability of AI agents to 
acknowledge relevant features under real-world conditions based on the 
system determining these particular features to be salient as opposed to 
being pre-determined by a human modeller (Froese & Ziemke, 2009). We 
strongly agree that historical as well as current computational modelling 
research aiming to mimic human intelligence are unable to demonstrate 
sensitivity to context-dependent relevancies (C1). However, this critique has a 
corollary criticism, namely that most computational models, grounded or 
otherwise, do not focus on understanding (C2). We interpret the term 
“understanding” as humans’ (and other animals’) ability to navigate their 
surroundings full of interdependent conceptual associations. It is difficult 
to imagine a robot genuinely understanding anything if it does not have 
human-like semantic representations in the first place. 
The third criticism is that there is a sense of “inadequacy of current 
embodied AI for advancing our scientific understanding of natural 
cognition” (Froese & Ziemke, 2009, p.467). In our view, the inability for 
computationally grounded models to provide sufficient insights into 
human cognition (C3) is directly related to the tried-and-test GOFAI 
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practice of modellers determining a phenomenon of interest and then hand-
coding so-called “grounded representations” (e.g. Hoffman et al., 2018). 
This leads to a certain degree of circularity in the modelling processes, 
mainly if models are evaluated by behaviours displayed. Another criticism 
of behaviour-based robots is that embodiment does not overcome the 
grounding problem (Froese & Ziemke, 2009, p.467). We argue that this 
dilemma of being embodied but not necessarily grounded in the 
environment (C4) originates from an over-emphasis on either physical or 
virtual effector-systems at the expense of grounding the robot in the 
messiness and dynamics of real-world changes. In our view, grounding a 
computational model or robot with the objective of having human-like 
experiences is unrealistic if we fail to provide a sufficiently realistic 
environment. For example, for a cognitive model, if we want to input visual 
object features, we should not resort to binary feature lists (e.g. 10011000) 
when instead we could use naturalistic photographs. 
Lastly, but quite critically, Dreyfus’s (2007) fifth major criticism of 
embodied robotics is the frame problem (C5). Dennett (2006, p. 434) 
eloquently phrases the severity of the frame problem with “Hubert Dreyfus 
and John Searle are tempted to compose obituaries for the field [AI], citing 
the frame problem as the cause of death”. Originally, the frame problem was 
narrowly formulated by McCarthy and Hayes (1969) to describe the issue 
of using first-order logic (FOL) systems to generate sufficiently exhaustive 
and useful axioms that can describe the properties and interrelations of a 
robot’s environment. However, Dennett’s (2005, 2006) broader definition of 
the frame problem describes the inability of AI systems to comprehend the 
most relevant aspects of a given scene autonomously, without the human-
modeller hand-coding the relevant features a priori. In a given scenario, 
how could an AI agent solve a particular challenge by automatically only 
focusing on the most important features and associated actions for a given 
task? This “looser philosophical formulation” of the frame problem, as 
opposed to the original FOL-based one, is intertwined with what most AI 
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researchers associate with the relevance problem - autonomously 
understanding critical aspects of the environment that are relevant.  
Neither traditional nor behaviour-based AI approaches have 
sufficiently addressed any of the above five challenges. We hypothesise this 
failure is a result of not focusing on automatically extracting semantic 
associations from the real world - the key ingredient for context- and task-
specific understanding. As AI researchers, both GOFAI and behaviour-based 
advocates, increasingly focused on narrower problems, typically with 
specific commercial applications, the challenges mentioned above actually 
became harder to address. Unsurprisingly, like in GOFAI, one of the main 
unacknowledged shortcomings of the behaviour-based robotics paradigm 
also consists of (i) an excessive focus on dynamic planning and action in 
spatial domains or well-defined games and (ii) a lack of extracting complex 
meaning structures from real-world sources. This is a gap in the extant 
literature we would like to address in our current research programme. For 
far too long have mechanistic theories of intelligence, either from cognitive 
modelling or AI and robotics, ignored real-world meaning. However, at 
least for higher primates, it seems realistic to assume that much of our 
intelligence originates from our semantic memory system. Acknowledging 
this might also help address the five challenges defined in Dreyfus (2007). 
2.6 Towards a Computational Grounded Semantics 
Intelligence is a broad and multifaceted phenomenon, with a great 
deal of debate on its origins, structure, development and manifestations 
across a range of species. Recently, there have even been proposals for 
accepting that plants display minimal cognition, from environmentally 
adaptive behaviours. This has led to the term plant cognition emerging 
directly as a result of the increasingly widespread influence of grounded 
cognition in theories of human intelligence (Garzón & Keijzer, 2011). In 
psychology, cognition is associated with, for example, perception, learning 
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and memory and judgement and decision-making processes. Despite cognitive 
psychology’s plethora of interrelated fields of study, we suggest that 
semantics is likely to be the main component for intelligence to emerge in both 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Semantics is the study of 
meaning-making and representation through our interconnected 
experiences. Within the domain of semantics in cognitive psychology, 
concepts constitute the basic building blocks of meaning. Our emphasis on 
cognitive psychology sketches the focus of this dissertation. We omit 
discussions of formal semantics, logic and semiotics, as that is beyond the 
scope of our present research programme. Laurence and Margolis (1999, 
p.3) argue that concepts not only are the most fundamental constructs in 
theories of mind but also that this leads to plenty of controversies and 
unsettled debates on the very nature of semantics itself. In our view, the 
importance of grounded cognition in cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence will primarily be based on the relative merits of this more 
ecological stance to account for human-level semantic processing. 
In traditional cognitive science, a widely accepted theory of 
semantic cognition is founded on spreading activation models. It is worth 
pointing out that we view these models, despite their historical pedigree in 
GOFAI, as sub-symbolic models, and very much compatible with some 
forms of embodied and grounded modelling, even though some 
proponents of grounded cognition (e.g. Chemero, 2011) overstate the 
differences between such spreading activation models and grounded 
cognition principles.  
Collins and Loftus (1975) created the first spreading activation 
model of semantic cognition, by extending the work on earlier static 
network models (Quillian, 1967). These models generally contain five core 
features. First, the graph-theoretic concepts of nodes and links are used to 
represent concepts and their relations respectively. Second, concepts 
acquire their meaning through their correlations with other concepts. 
Third, memory retrieval from these networks is equivalent to activating the 
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internal representation. Fourth, activation propagates from one concept to 
other concepts via the links. Fifth, concepts can typically build up residual 
activation which increases their likelihood of being activated in subsequent 
retrievals. In the classic model of semantic processing by Collins and Loftus 
(1975), in addition to having a semantic network based on the five 
aforementioned principles, there is a secondary lexical network, which is 
organised based on phonetic similarities (e.g. car and bar would be 
connected although car and bus would not be), which is linked to the 
semantic network. The activations across different nodes are summed 
(weighted by the activation strength) with activations spreading greater 
distances taking longer to spread (McNamara, 2005). Although these 
models have been highly influential in cognitive science (Neely, 1977; 
Crestani, 1997; Anderson, 2013), they have received little attention within 
the grounded cognition literature. This illustrates one of the critical 
challenges of the GC literature, in that it consistently attempts to distance 
itself from “traditional cognitive science” without specific references to 
influential models that have been empirically tested for over four decades. 
In our research programme, we aim to build bridges between historically 
disparate fields in pursuit of grounding meaning in everyday 
surroundings.  
A fundamental philosophy spanning this present dissertation is the 
notion of “understanding by building” (Froese & Ziemke, 2009, p.468). 
However, we argue that contemporary computational attempts of 
grounding semantics are in a similar state of GOFAI, before the era of 
behaviour-based robotics revolutionised the field by transcending idealised 
and static grid worlds. Contemporary grounded models are exceedingly 
pre-occupied with sensorimotor interactions of physical hardware as 
opposed to naturalistic environments. Currently, cognitive modellers are 
unable to automatically or semi-automatically ground meaning without 
recourse to hand-coding features. Therefore, we aim to address this 
shortcoming by extracting, processing, transforming and representing complex 
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semantic associations grounded in the visual disorderliness of the real 
world, which comes naturally to humans and other animals but remains a 
challenge for computers. We believe this will further a mechanistic 
understanding of grounded cognition. 
2.7 Summary 
In contemporary cognitive science, there is a dominant narrative 
(Mainzer, 2009; Barsalou, 2010) of grounded cognition’s roots stemming 
from ancient Western philosophical ideas and, more recently, linguistics. 
Furthermore, these reviews also suggest that grounded cognition is likely 
to see promising future outcomes from the fields artificial intelligence and 
cognitive robotics. We only partially agree with this. In this chapter, we 
have provided a novel account of an alternative historical influence - the 
overlooked Indian philosophical and religious influences of Samkhya-Yoga, 
which pre-dates the Western philosophical viewpoints of grounding and 
embodiment by almost 200 years. More importantly, we also demonstrate 
that influences from artificial intelligence and behaviour-based robotics 
also predate (e.g. Munson, 1971; Sowa, 1976; Brooks; 1986) the earliest 
literature on embodiment in cognitive psychology (e.g. Barsalou, 1993, 
1999). Support for this interpretation of our timeline is strengthened by 
both explicit theorisings of situatedness and embodiment, in Brooks’ (1991c) 
review article aimed at a general scientific audience and Varela et al.’s 
(1991) detailed overview of Brooks’ behaviour-based robotics paradigm. In 
our literature review, we outline some of the hidden influences of robotics 
and artificial intelligence but also agree with Barsalou (1993) that these 
fields will be necessary for evaluating theories of grounded cognition once 
more explicit frameworks are mechanistically fleshed out. However, we do 
not limit this future development to originating only from robots with 
physical hardware, perhaps with the goal of mimicking a “real body”. 
These surface-level similarities might eventually turn out to be less critical 
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to the scientific progress of grounded cognition overall. Some of this 
exciting and innovative engineering-oriented research will be outlined in 
the next chapter. 
In conclusion, we believe that the focus of the traditional AI on 
movement and action planning has led to researchers overlooking semantic 
modelling. We also argue that there is a significant gap in the cognitive 
science extant literature on grounding cognition mechanistically in real-
world visual information. The aim is to sidestep the dilemma of modeller-
defined and hand-crafted semantic input features which are particularly 
problematic for evaluating cognitive semantic models given the model 
outputs are reflections of the statistical regularities encoded in the input 
data. Additionally, manual feature engineering does not facilitate scalable 
evaluations of cognitive semantic models. Grounding semantic models 
creates new avenues for assessments using large-scale language corpora 
and neuroimaging data. Our research objective is further aided by the 
unabated rise in unstructured data like naturalistic photographs, freely 
available on the internet, and the increased availability of powerful deep 
learning algorithms for exploiting the statistical regularities in real-world 
pictures. Our current thesis brings us back full-circle, from the early 
pioneering efforts of Sowa’s (1976) conceptual graphs to the rise of 
behaviour-based robotics and subsequent spread of grounded theories in 
psychology to finally our original research programme of visually 
grounding semantics using recent advances in artificial intelligence. 
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Chapter 3                                  
Feature-based and Grounded 
Semantic Representations 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Fodor (1998) claimed that relations between concepts in a semantic 
system are insufficient for mapping concept correspondences. Goldstone 
and Rogosky’s (2002) study based on the ABSURDIST graph-matching 
algorithm showed that relations between concepts are critical for 
representing semantics. Our conceptual replication of Goldstone and 
Rogosky’s finding is based on real-world visual grounding, instead of an 
arbitrary set of absolute (extrinsic) and relative (intrinsic) coordinates. We 
use the feature-based approach from Rogers and McClelland (2004) for 
encoding intrinsic representations while using our novel 2D silhouette-
based technique for encoding grounded/extrinsic representations. Hybrid 
representations consist of half of the most informative features from both 
the feature-based and grounded inputs. The same neural network 
architecture is implemented across all three conditions. Our results support 
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Goldstone and Rogosky, by revealing that hybrid representations show a 
markedly slower rate of decline in concept classification accuracy as a 
function of increasing levels of noise perturbations applied to the hidden 
layer representations. Grounded representations perform the poorest, 
while feature-based inputs are moderately tolerant to increasing levels of 
noise. Hybrid representations are mutually reinforcing and superior to 
either grounded or feature-based representations in isolation, suggesting a 
more pluralistic cognitive semantic perspective. 
3.2 Introduction 
In semiotics, the study of meaning-making, the semiotic triangle is a 
well-known descriptive model of the relationships between real-world 
objects (e.g. a real dog), symbols (e.g. the word DOG) and mental concepts, 
first proposed by Ogden and Richards (1923). Semantic representations are 
conceptual structures of human knowledge and are typically considered to 
have both symbolic and semantically rich properties (Shallice & Cooper, 
2011). In cognitive science, these representations are typically instantiated 
as interconnected networks of associations. Feature-based representations 
are symbolic in the sense that their format is arbitrarily associated with the 
real-world objects they represent, per Newell and Simon’s (1976) symbol 
manipulation perspective. In contrast, grounded conceptual representations 
are, at least partially, based on sensorimotor (e.g. vision, audition and haptic) 
and somatic (e.g. emotion) states. 
A long tradition in computer science and machine learning involves 
applying noise to feedforward neural networks and observing the 
subsequent impact on the networks’ behaviours. In most cases, the aim of 
injecting noise into the network is to either improve model convergence or 
avoid overfitting and thereby increase the generalisability of a given 
network beyond the training data. This is irrespective of whether the noise 
is additive vs multiplicative, cumulative vs non-cumulative or even 
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normally vs uniformly distributed (Jim, Giles, & Horne, 1996). From a 
psychological perspective, noise tolerance of artificial neural networks 
(ANNs) is seen to correspond to theoretically important aspects of 
modelling human cognition. For example, in computational 
neuropsychology (e.g. Hinton & Shallice, 1991), the lesioning of ANNs has 
been associated with “graceful degradation” of the network’s performance, 
as opposed to catastrophic effects. 
McClelland and Rogers’s (2003) Nature review paper outlined the 
significance of understanding the dynamics of noise on ANNs that model 
aspects of semantic knowledge. McClelland and Rogers observed the 
impact of adding random noise (of varying degrees) to the activations of 
particular properties of different concepts. The noise was fed into a 
feedforward neural network trained on labelled data for associating 
concepts with features and characteristics (e.g. Canary-CAN-Grow, Canary-
CAN-Move, Canary-CAN-Fly and Canary-CAN-Sing). Interestingly, they 
found that the impact of adding increasing quantities of random noise to 
the inputs of the network led to perturbations in the semantic 
representation of the network, approximating the impact of destroying 
neurons associated with representing concepts in the brain. They also 
discovered that shared properties across concepts (e.g. Canary-CAN-Grow) 
are significantly more resistant to noise injections than more idiosyncratic 
properties (e.g. Canary-CAN-Sing), at equivalent levels of noise 
perturbations. Furthermore, with increasing levels of noise perturbations, 
concepts become more generalised. For example, concepts typically not 
associated with their superordinate category’s prototypical properties (for 
example, Penguin-CAN-Fly) become more activated. 
One direct relationship between such computational noise 
perturbation experimentation using artificial neural networks and 
cognitive science is the case of semantic dementia, which is a progressive 
neurodegenerative condition related to a deterioration of semantic memory 
as a result of a loss of neurons associated with semantic memories located 
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in the anterior and lateral regions on the temporal lobes (McClelland & 
Rogers, 2003). Increased levels of noise perturbations in ANNs can be 
equated to the severity of the neuronal loss or brain atrophy in semantic 
dementia. Interestingly, McClelland and Rogers’ (2003) Parallel Distributed 
Processing (PDP) noise modelling could simulate the symptom of patients 
with semantic dementia, who display a tendency of overgeneralising 
common words for more specific ones (e.g. “animal” instead of “a rabbit”). 
In other words, there are real parallels between injecting noise in an 
artificial neural network and cognitive processes being distorted as a result 
of the neuronal loss. However, to what extent are the semantic models of 
human memory as explicated by McClelland and Rogers related to theories 
of grounded cognition? In the next sections, we will briefly cover a variety 
of different perspectives that have been particularly influential in 
accounting for how meaning is processed in the cognitive system. 
AI was very much divided into two distinct camps from its 
inception - symbolic AI versus sub-symbolic or neural networks (Franklin, 
2014). Both of these areas were marked with one commonality: they made 
extensive use of hand-coded and feature-based knowledge representations, 
in the sense that mental representations of concepts were captured using 
arbitrary and discrete notations. We provide an overview of disembodied 
symbolic models and sub-symbolic models, as well as grounded cognitive 
developmental robotics. This is followed by a presentation of some original 
computational research that investigates the robustness of grounded, feature-
based and hybrid representations. 
3.3 Disembodied Symbolic Models 
In artificial intelligence, abstract and amodal symbolic models were 
the norm well before the term was coined by John McCarty for the 1956 
Dartmouth Workshop, featuring Marvin Minsky, Claude Shannon and 
numerous other pioneers of the field. Other such formalisms were 
 41 
developed in the mid 30s and early 40s such as Alan Turing’s Turing 
Machine, Alonzo Church’s Lambda Calculus and Emil Post’s Production 
System (Franklin, 2014). Good Old-Fashioned AI, more commonly known by 
its acronym GOFAI, a term typically reserved for traditional symbolic AI, 
is primarily based on a series of programmed instructions operating on a 
set of formal amodal symbolic representations. The core assumption 
operating across most GOFAI algorithms is that the storage format of 
knowledge is inherently meaningless, and atomic symbols are arbitrary 
and can be manipulated based on a set of formal rules essentially a grammar. 
Although, a gross oversimplification, much of GOFAI can be described as 
comprised of CONDITION-ACTION or IF-THEN rules that make use of atomic 
symbols called productions. Hence the systems built with this approach are 
called production systems. 
In the early cognitive sciences, Newell and Simon’s (1972) work 
underpinned the state-of-the-art thinking of such techniques. They 
developed dynamic goal hierarchies, without the need for overly explicit 
goal transitions, through the chaining of goals and sub-goals. This led to 
other mechanisms being developed to allow artificial cognitive systems to 
cope with increased complexity. For example, conflict resolution 
mechanisms started becoming increasingly important with the advent of 
implicit goal hierarchies, which could lead to productions being activated 
simultaneously as a result of a particular condition (Johnson-Laird & Shafir, 
1993). Newell and Simon (1980) were the first to characterise and formalise 
the notion of the Physical Symbol Systems (PSS), that had clear parallels to 
Turing machines, but that also significantly extended the original ideas of 
symbolic manipulation by grounding it in the cognitive sciences. Notions 
such as tokens - arbitrary symbols, token-relations (for example, based on 
proximity) - and expressions for token handling were deployed to account 
for the production of symbolic interactions, in other words, meaning. They 
also proposed that such computations within a PSS would be sufficient for 
intelligent behaviour to emerge. Related concepts such as production rules, 
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probabilistic mechanisms, frames, fuzzy sets, and more complex data 
structures were gradually incorporated in GOFAI. A constant across all 
these developments was the core reliance on knowledge being represented 
using logical formalisms (e.g. predicate calculus), whereby atomic symbols 
in and of themselves were only meaningful in their interrelations with other 
equally meaningless atomic symbols. 
One core assumption of this disembodied symbolic approach is that 
the physical structure of the brain is not essential when constraining the 
types of computational mechanisms responsible for human cognition. At 
this stage, it would be useful to explore some of the overarching details of 
a Turing machine, as this is mostly seen as synonymous with computation, 
which in turn is seen to be a general theory of cognition, more commonly 
referred to as the Computational Theory of Mind (Ludwig & Schneider, 2008). 
This has implications not only on our discussion and review of symbolic 
and sub-symbolic models but also grounded versus feature-based cognitive 
models. 
Alan Turing formally demonstrated that deterministic formal 
systems could be represented computationally with a so-called Turing 
machine, a mathematical processor defining an abstract machine consisting 
of tape of infinite length (subdivided into cells) and a head able to read and 
write symbols onto this tape. The Turing machine is always in one of an 
infinite set of possible states, and its next state is entirely dependent on its 
current state and the symbol on the tape currently being read. Furthermore, 
which new symbol to overwrite the current state’s symbol, which cell to 
move to next and which new internal state to enter, are all determined 
based on a table of rules (Haugeland, 1985). Concerning cognitive science, 
this implies that the physical structure of a particular machine (organic or 
inorganic), is irrelevant for furthering our understanding of cognition 
because cognition is computation (Ellis & Humphreys, 1999). This is in 
stark contrast to grounded views of cognition, where the hypotheses are 
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mostly based on the specific physical embodiment of the intelligent agent 
and their situational grounding. 
Nevertheless, numerous critics object to the general idea of Turing’s 
thesis and Simon and Newell’s PSS hypothesis, whereby symbol 
manipulation is the critical characteristic of intelligent systems. For 
example, Harnad (1990) argued that cognition, and in particular, semantic 
cognition from the perspective of physical symbol system theorists, suffers 
from the consequence of circular definitions akin to trying to find the “true 
meaning” of a particular word in a dictionary only to “bounce” from one 
entry to another, which is the symbolic equivalent of a merry-go-round. At 
this stage, we will omit a review of much of GOFAI, even cognitive 
architectures such as ACT-R, SOAR or COGENT, as this would exceed the 
current scope of highlighting computational models of semantic cognition 
and more pertinently, would not further our discussion of grounded versus 
feature-based knowledge representations. Instead, we will turn our 
attention towards historical and current formalisms and models of 
semantic cognition. 
The Arbor porphyriana (tree of Porphyry, see figure 3.1) marked the 
birth of semantic networks as a form of knowledge representation in the 
third century A.D., by the Greek Philosopher Porphyry (234 - 305 A.D.), 
who extended Aristotle’s syllogistic reasoning with the explicit 
demarcation of relationships using tree branches and leaves (Sowa, 1979). 
In particular, Porphyry’s tree consisted of taxonomies starting from the 
most generic level (SUBSTANCE ® material ® BODY vs SUBSTANCE ® 
immaterial ® SPIRIT), to intermediate levels (e.g. BODY ® animate ® 
LIVING vs BODY ® inanimate ® MINERAL) and the final level (ANIMAL 
® rational ® HUMAN vs ANIMAL ® irrational ® BEAST). Although 
Porphyry’s tree was successful in clearly defining relations, one of its 
disadvantages was the lack of formal notations. Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839 - 1914), one of the founders of semiotics, the study of sign systems, 
introduced existential graphs as a means for exhaustively outlining first-
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order logic. This graphical representation could also be translated into 
predicate calculus, hence having the advantage of formalising a vast array 
of everyday problems mechanistically using a finite series of truth-
functional steps, leading to a binary final-state (Bundgaard & Østergaard, 
2007). 
Ross Quillian’s (1967) work on semantic associative networks using 
spreading activations marked the first foray into representing concepts in 
parallel across various nodes, based on taxonomic hierarchies between 
concepts being represented by nodes, and their associations being captured 
by the types of relations explicitly encoded in the network links. Collins and 
Quillian (1969) extended this notion of hierarchies being the fundamental 
structure of cognitive models of semantics by providing mechanistic 
explanations of then well-known behavioural studies exploring reaction 
time differences between verifying sentences such as “a terrier is a dog” 
and “a terrier is a mammal” using the ISA relation. They proposed that the 
faster reaction time for the dog condition versus the mammal condition is a 
result of having to traverse one (terrier ISA dog) versus two ISA nodes 
(terrier ISA dog ISA mammal) in the conceptual network.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Arbor porphyriana (tree of Porphyry). Source: Hellström (2012). 
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Although these historical and more recent examples of structuring 
meaning have been widely influential, a key shortcoming of these methods 
is the lack of focus on how the human cognitive system acquires these 
representations. The main theoretical emphasis has been historically placed 
on the representational structure as opposed to knowledge acquisition and 
induction. A new general theory to address this shortcoming stems from 
the development of Latent Semantic Analysis. 
3.4 Latent Semantic Analysis 
The quintessential and widely popularised approach to modelling 
semantics from a distributional perspective is Latent Semantic Analysis 
(LSA), outlined in a seminal publication by Landauer and Dumais’ (1997). 
LSA statistically realises the distributional hypothesis, that meaningfully 
related words tend to appear in similar contexts (Wittgenstein, 1953). LSA 
is a theory and practical algorithm for inductive knowledge acquisition and 
representation. At its most fundamental level, LSA is both a theory and a 
statistical technique for meaning representation relying on a large bag of 
words (BoW), typically consisting of large volumes of unstructured text 
data. In mathematics, a bag is termed a multiset, where a set is allowed to 
have duplicates and the order is irrelevant. For example, if bag A = {dog, dog, 
cat, rabbit} and bag B = {cat, dog, rabbit, dog}, A and B are equivalent. LSA 
measures the frequency of these words occurring across many documents. 
LSA is a corpus-based approach to modelling semantics and is technically 
not a cognitive model per se. 
Latent Semantic Analysis is a type of vector space model (VSM), where 
documents are represented as points in a vector space, with points closer 
together being more semantically similar, while points further apart are 
more dissimilar. The core theoreticians behind the development of LSA 
(e.g. Landauer & Dumais 1997; Landauer, 2002) even describe their 
approach as a new paradigm to cognitive science itself. The focus is not on 
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collecting data under strict laboratory conditions, as is typical for much 
behavioural research, but under naturally realistic conditions, given that 
the underlying data fed into LSA is generated naturally from people doing 
tasks in the real world. 
One of the most significant advantages of VSMs over GOFAI 
systems of semantic modelling is the ability to generate knowledge 
representations without the need for tedious hand-coded atomic units of 
knowledge and their interrelations by manually creating rules and 
numerous ad-hoc adjustments to handle exceptions (Norvig, 1992). VSMs 
were initially created for applications such as information retrieval and 
many of their core principles led to the creation of search engine algorithms 
such as Google’s PageRank (Manning, Raghavan, & Schütze, 2008). It is 
likely that VSMs will only become increasingly important as online search 
gradually transitions from keyword searches to semantic web search. 
There are numerous misconceptions of what LSA is comprised of, 
both regarding a theory of meaning as well as its relatively sophisticated 
algorithmic implementations, with many psychologists simplifying it to a 
mere proximity matrix (Landauer et al., 2007). This is an unfair treatment 
of the elegance and simplicity underlying LSA and also misrepresents one 
of the core aspects of the technique, namely its ability to make inferences 
about in-depth relations and acquire knowledge through inductive inference, 
hence the emphasis on latent meanings. Landauer and colleagues have 
stressed on numerous occasions that they do not assume the mathematical 
details of LSA to be mechanistically related to cognitive or neural processes. 
LSA typically generates thousands of semantic dimensions when 
capturing the statistical variabilities in word co-occurrences. These 
dimensions correspond to the underlying semantic features embedded in 
the text, known as the latent semantic dimensions. One has to trade off 
between having too few (< 300) and too many dimension (> 2,000). Having 
an insufficient number of dimensions leads to a poor representation of the 
semantic content of the documents in the raw corpus, while too many 
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dimensions will lead to over-fitting and idiosyncratic associations 
emerging, that is more a result of the specific texts being used as opposed 
to the underlying semantics within and between passages (Landauer, Foltz, 
& Laham, 1998). 
Using Marr’s tri-level of analysis (Marr, 1982), starting with (i) 
computational (what does a system do), (ii) algorithmic (why does it do these 
things), and (iii) implementation (how does it do these things), the present 
author argues that LSA occupies Marr’s first level of abstraction - the 
computational layer. However, others (e.g. Landauer et al., 2007) have 
proposed that LSA may provide a narrow perspective at the algorithmic 
level. Indeed, one of the undeniable successes of LSA is its reasonably long 
history of successfully modelling a range of behavioural findings from the 
cognitive sciences, ranging from lexical decision tasks to semantic priming 
studies (Landauer et al., 1998), and its use in symbolic AI systems and 
contemporary machine learning. 
When LSA models are used for comparisons with behavioural data, 
the higher-dimensional vectors are used to represent different words, and 
words are compared to each other using the cosine so that the range is 
between -1 and 1 (inclusive). For illustrative purposes, the closest words 
associated with the target word cup, and their corresponding cosine could 
be as follows: mug (0.84), glass (0.54) and bowl (0.24), which indicates that 
mug is semantically more similar to cup, followed by glass, and bowl. 
Interestingly, one of the surprisingly simple ways of extending such 
comparisons beyond single words, for example, to sentences, is to sum the 
vectors across all the words in a sentence and then compare the cosines of 
the summed vectors representing the sentences.  
A core point of comparison between LSA and human knowledge 
representation is based on word-word similarity ratings. Based on Anglin’s 
(1970) empirical research on word sorting using concept and grammatical 
relations, it has been shown that children and LSA have a word-word 
similarity correlation of 0.50, though this decreases to 0.32 for adults, 
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because parts-of-speech structures become increasingly important, and are 
beyond the mechanistic scope of LSA (Landauer et al., 1998). One intriguing 
test of LSA in a human domain was conducted by Landauer et al. (1998) by 
training an LSA model on corpus data consisting of a first-year 
undergraduate psychology textbook (Myers, 1995), and then evaluating the 
model based on four-option multiple-choice questions used for two cohorts 
of undergraduate psychology students. The LSA model scored 60% in this 
semantic domain test, which was significantly above chance, and was 
sufficient for passing the tests, although slightly below the average score of 
the undergraduate students. This proof-of-concept experiment indicates 
that by adding up the individual word-level vectors, more complex 
semantic chunks (e.g. questions) can also be represented using LSA.  
More recently, Jones, Kintsch and Mewhort (2006) have shown how 
LSA’s cosine similarity measures are predictive of lexical priming effects, a 
“bread-and-butter” technique used in psycholinguistics and cognitive 
science, where recognition of a word is faster and more accurate when 
preceded by a related word (for example, doctor-nurse). Nicodemus et al. 
(2014) even used LSA in a clinical neuroscientific study investigating the 
genetic pathways related to category fluency - a commonly used 
neuropsychological task. In this task, participants are required to name as 
many instances of a category (e.g. ANIMAL) in a short period, and the key 
measures are the overall number of correct words listed (e.g. DOG) and the 
number of incorrect words listed (e.g. CAR). However, Nicodemus and 
colleagues also used LSA to generate clusters of words for target categories 
based on the higher-dimensional meaning space, for representing the 
cognitive search processes of navigating the semantic space from the target 
category. Based on the behavioural data from the category fluency task and 
the LSA-derived category fluency measures, Nicodemus et al. narrowed 
the search for common genetic variations in schizophrenia, called single 
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP), across 665 participants and discovered 
three candidate SNPs for further research. 
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In providing this highly selective glimpse into the extant literature 
of Latent Semantic Analysis, we have seen that LSA has not only become 
one of the most influential theories and models of semantics but is also 
being used across a wide range of clinical and commercial applications, 
such as genetic profiling and information-retrieval systems. 
3.5 Disembodied Sub-Symbolic Models 
Sub-symbolic models of semantic processing emerged as a direct 
challenger to more traditional symbolic models, many of which required 
time-consuming and cumbersome explicit hand-coding of symbolic facts in 
the form of rules (and exceptions) such as propositional networks. As a 
general rule of thumb, sub-symbolic models tend to be based on 
representations that have an element of statistical learning and as a result 
are also more likely to be associated with continuous values, unlike 
symbolic models, which commonly have discrete values representing 
specific informational states. The present section will focus on artificial 
neural networks, also known as connectionist networks. Other disembodied 
sub-symbolic models like genetic algorithms and fuzzy classifiers will not be 
covered as they are not widely used for modelling cognitive semantics. 
Traditional computers, but also the majority of GOFAI and 
symbolic models of cognition, rely on serial processing, where a single 
computation occurs at any given moment, and linear chains of 
computations unfold. Having said this, it is worth noting that some 
production systems do indeed have weaker elements of parallel or 
cascaded processing such as Soar’s elaboration phase and ACT-R’s spreading 
activation. However, like the human brain, artificial neural networks 
operate in parallel, in other words, processing can co-occur across the 
system, which is why these types of models are also widely known as 
parallel distributed processing (PDP) models. The fundamental principle with 
connectionist networks is that a large number of elementary processing 
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units can lead to highly complex and intelligent emergent behaviours akin 
to biological systems relying on billions of neurons (Goodfellow et al., 
2016). 
Neural networks and related approaches like deep learning have 
been immensely successful and popular in AI. Deep learning typically 
consists of many hidden layers and more complex learning rules and 
procedures involving representations generated with Boltzmann machines. 
Recent developments over the last decade have seen deep learning systems 
significantly outperform once cutting-edge AI technologies on core tasks 
like image and speech recognition (LeCun et al., 2015). These approaches 
can solve highly complex problem solving on board games like Go (Silver 
et al., 2016), which was once thought to be the pinnacle of all AI challenges. 
Some estimate that deep learning alone could be worth $17 trillion US 
dollars2. For purposes of brevity and relevance, we will omit technical 
details such as AlphaGo, Google DeepMind’s Go-playing AI, being a hybrid 
system based on deep neural networks and tree search. However, much of 
this hype can be traced back to developments in the underlying 
mathematics of these deep networks and the availability of cheaper and 
more powerful processors, in particular, the Graphical Processing Units 
(GPUs) and Tensor Processing Units (TPUs) being utilised. Although these 
developments are impressive, they are less important for evaluating 
historical and current developments of PDP models in cognitive science, 
even though this is likely to change in the future. We will now explore some 
of the underlying principles associated with connectionist models 
developed in cognitive science, with a particular focus on semantic 
representations. 
Connectionist networks are usually composed of a set of input and 
output nodes, with a set of hidden nodes (or several layers of hidden nodes) 
sandwiched in-between. These nodes are usually connected, and in many 
                                                      
2 Source: ARK Investment Management LLC, Global Federation of Exchanges. 
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cases, fully inter-connected between the layers, which all have weights 
representing the strength of associations between the nodes. Each of these 
nodes has a threshold for firing (activating the next node), and a particular 
type of activation function that computes and transforms the net inputs 
coming into that particular node. A common activation function widely 
used in cognitive science modelling is the sigmoid activation function, an S-
shaped function, where, as the net input to that node increases, the 
probability of that node firing also increases. Neural networks are typically 
initialised with normally-distributed random weights, although, this is a 
widely-debated and very active area of mathematical and statistical 
research, see Yam and Chow (2000) for a discussion. A common approach 
to learning in simple 3-layered feed-forward networks is the back-
propagation of error algorithm, which takes place through several epochs, 
each following a six-step process. First, stimuli activate the input nodes. 
Second, these input nodes activate hidden layer nodes. Third, the hidden 
nodes activate output nodes. Fourth, outputs are compared to target values 
and fifth, an error signal is propagated back to input nodes. Lastly, the error 
signal is used to change the connection weights given a specific learning 
rate, where a larger rate equals faster learning, with a cost of missing the 
optimal minima (Goodfellow et al., 2016). 
The most influential computational theory of semantic processing 
was developed within the PDP research programme, the “hub-and-spoke” 
model (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). This model integrates earlier 
conceptual ideas postulated by Donald Hebb in the 1940s (Hebb, 1949) with 
Geoffrey Hinton’s multi-layered connectionist modelling of storing 
proposition knowledge (Hinton, 1981). One of the first PDP models to be 
used by the PDP Research Group, which also acts as a foundation for many 
related models (see Rogers & McClelland, 2004 for a historical overview), 
as well as the original modelling research presented at the end of this 
chapter, consists of a simplified neural network model of semantic memory 
(Rumelhart, 1990). This feed-forward neural network model learns 
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associations through back-propagation, by associating a set of 
arbitrary/symbolic stimuli and concept labels, where similar inputs to the 
model are represented by corresponding hidden layer representations. This 
PDP computational model demonstrates that traditional taxonomic 
hierarchies (e.g. Quillian, 1967) can also be represented using sub-symbolic 
feedforward neural networks. 
However, in theory, the PDP framework does not exclude the 
possibility of grounded representations being used as the inputs. Rogers 
and McClelland (2004) claim that perceptual similarities can indeed be used 
as inputs. However, PDP models are currently still based on inputs that are 
arbitrary and symbolic (Barsalou, 1999). Although, one of the first pioneers 
to use connectionist modelling to ground categories in perceptual stimuli 
was Harnad (1992), who used feed-forward neural networks with back-
propagation, for category-learning of lines of eight different lengths into 
three categories of short, middle and long. Based on a set of elegant and 
straightforward simulations on one-dimensional stimuli, lines being 
represented as input vectors (though a variety of different formats were 
used), Harnad (1992) mechanistically extended the original theoretical 
ideas proposed in Harnad (1990), on the symbol-grounding problem, and 
offered a tractable toy-model solution to address the challenges of 
connecting physical objects to symbolic cognitive models. More 
contemporary research, leveraging this approach and significantly 
extending it originates from the more recent field of Cognitive Developmental 
Robotics, which will be our final focus in this review of mechanistic models 
of human semantic cognition. However, we first explore some 
shortcomings of the connectionist approach. 
Despite the success of PDP models in cognitive science, there are 
three common shortcomings associated with such models. Firstly, from an 
information theoretical perspective, one might argue that the present 
distinctions between symbolic and sub-symbolic computational processes 
are incorrect at worst and superficial at best. This is because, quite 
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paradoxically, sub-symbolic models like artificial neural networks can 
indeed be formally expressed by a universal Turing machine, and therefore 
by definition, are symbolic. Earlier discussions of connectionism being non-
symbolic (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981), have been mainly replaced by the sub-
symbolic interpretations initially proposed by Smolensky (1988). 
Furthermore, like in the case of LSA’s usage and interpretation within 
psychology, neural networks are also not interpreted from a symbolic 
perspective and are typically described as sub-symbolic in introductory 
textbooks (e.g. Eysenck & Keane, 2005). The main reason for their sub-
symbolic interpretation in psychology stems from neural networks’ 
learning and storing distributed representations, as opposed to having 
specific tokens representing entire concepts. 
Secondly, in spite of broad structural similarities between artificial 
neural networks and neuronal assemblies in the brain (e.g. nodes/neurons or 
weights/synapses), the differences outweigh the similarities. McClelland, 
Rumelhart and Hinton (1988) state, despite surface-level similarities and 
neuro-plausibility of these PDP models, the main appeal is based on 
providing a mechanistic account of psychological phenomena for 
furthering our understanding of potential candidate computational 
structures and processes. Although many researchers use neural networks 
as a mechanistic proxy to real neural architectures for simulating specific 
neural circuitry (e.g. Sejnowski, 1981), this is uncommon in cognitive 
science, where ANNs are more widely implemented as a behaviour-based 
approach to problem-solving. This, however, also leads to the third 
shortcoming. Interpreting the behavioural characteristics of neural 
networks can be somewhat challenging in the absence of explicit 
representations that can be formally analysed. Current cutting-edge hybrid 
methodologies between ANNs and GOFAI approaches (e.g. fuzzy rule-
based systems) are helping to gradually overcome this limitation. 
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3.6 Grounded Developmental Robotics 
In this final overview section, our focus will be on robotic systems 
inspired by grounded and developmental principles, with a particular 
focus on the grounding of language in sensorimotor interactions of robots. 
Developmental robotics is an interdisciplinary paradigm for robotics 
research and is tightly coupled with practical insights from developmental 
psychology (Cangelosi & Schlesinger, 2015). First, however, we will aim to 
provide a highly selective overview of how the field of developmental 
robotics emerged, in order to illuminate its unique inter-disciplinary 
origins and its central difference from traditional robotics and AI research. 
Robots are synthetic organisms that function autonomously and 
adaptively under ever-changing environmental demands. The word ‘robot’ 
originates from the Czech writer Karel Čapek’s play R.U.R (Rossum’s 
Universal Robots), and means “menial labour”. Historically, the origins of 
this field can be traced all the way back to mechanical mathematics, 
intricate mechanical ducks (e.g. Jacques de Vaucanson’s eating, drinking 
and digesting duck) and modern-day factory robots. 
Asada and colleagues (2001) claim that developmental robotics is a 
new paradigm for humanoid robotics because of its focus on sensorimotor 
contingencies that enables learning to occur in naturalistic settings. 
However, for a more psychologically relevant perspective on 
developmental robotics, with a detailed and up-to-date introduction and 
analysis of the field, Cangelosi and Schlesinger (2015) provide a wide-
ranging analysis of developmental psychological phenomena and their role 
in developing learning mechanisms in artificial systems. Next, we will 
cover some of the work from Angelo Cangelosi and collaborators in more 
detail, starting from software-only artificial neural networks to cognitive 
systems embedded in software simulations and physical instantiations (via 
the humanoid robot iCub). 
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Cangelosi, Greco and Harnad (2000) pioneered the use of neural 
networks for hybrid symbolic and sub-symbolic systems to not only 
ground actual objects, but to use these basic representations to further 
ground more abstract representations associated with these objects, 
through a process of grounding transfer. In their computational experiments, 
they used a set of four shapes (circle, ellipse, square, rectangle) defined 
using a retinal representation coding (Jacobs & Kosslyn, 1994) instead of 
abstract representations such as circle = {1,0,0,0}, ellipse = {0,1,0,0}, square = 
{0,0,1,0}, and rectangle = {0,0,0,1} which would be common practice. This 
more complex representation of the inputs was based on retinal units 
receiving inputs from partially overlapping receptive fields originating 
from a 50 × 50 pixel matrix, where the centre of the receptive fields had a 
greater influence on the retinal units because of a Gaussian distribution 
function centred on the receptive field. In addition to this retinal input, 
there were six additional linguistic and symbolic input nodes, using a one-
hot coding scheme, for each of the four shapes and the symbolic 
designations symmetric and asymmetric. There were five hidden nodes, and 
the output nodes mirrored the input nodes. Abstract categorisation 
(symmetric versus asymmetric) is feasible directly based on the inputs 
alone, which they term sensorimotor toil. Their method of grounding transfer 
used a Boolean combination of grounded category names. This method 
allowed for the indirect grounding of the abstract concept of symmetry. 
This study demonstrated that the so-called sensorimotor toil dilemma, a 
time-consuming and unrealistic process of supervised learning of all 
concepts, could be avoided via symbolic theft because some concepts can be 
grounded indirectly in raw sensory activations, while others could then be 
based on a scaffolding built on the grounded categories. 
Cangelosi and Riga (2006) extend the grounding transfer 
mechanism using two robots (one as the demonstrator and the other as the 
imitator) in a virtual environment, where each robot has 12 degrees of 
freedom, a humanoid-shaped torso, with two ‘arms’ forming a gripper, on 
 56 
a four-wheeled robotic chassis. In this study, the back-propagation of error 
in the neural network of the imitator robot not only learns to correct its 
motor response (based on joint angles) but simultaneously learns the 
linguistic labels of the corresponding actions. Therefore, the imitator robot 
(after training) mirrors the actions of the demonstrator robot and can also 
perform actions based on their corresponding names. Using a similar 
modular neural network (MNN) approach to Greco, Riga and Cangelosi 
(2003), the imitator robot’s higher-order abstract categories are grounded 
in the combinations of specific names. Cangelosi and Riga implement a 
chained approach to sensorimotor grounding, with three distinct stages. In 
the most fundamental level of grounding, known as basic grounding (BG), 
the imitator robot’s eight primary action names (CLOSE_LEFT_ARM, 
CLOSE_RIGHT_ARM, OPEN_LEFT_ARM, OPEN_RIGHT_ARM, 
LIFT_LEFT_ARM, LIFT_RIGHT_ARM, MOVE_FORWARD, and 
MOVE_BACKWARD) are directly based on the robot’s actions in the 
virtual environment. A novel approach to the higher-order grounding of 
concepts is introduced in this study through the demonstrator robot also 
providing names of combined actions. The second type of grounding is 
known as first-order higher grounding (HG1), where two basic actions that 
have been previously trained via BG are combined into a composite 
behaviour. The example provided by Greco et al. is “GRAB [is] 
CLOSE_LEFT_ARM [and] CLOSE_RIGHT_ARM” (p. 681). Whereas, the 
second-order higher grounding (HG2) results from the combination of a basic 
level action (BG) and a first-order higher-order routine (HG1). This research 
demonstrates not only the feasibility of grounding new actions in direct 
sensorimotor interactions, although this is still a highly active area of 
research in AI and cognitive science (e.g. Kiela, 2017; Kiela & Clark, 2017), 
but exhibits the feasibility of language from others (the demonstrator robot) 
being leveraged for indirect grounding of actions. 
Yamashita and Tani’s (2008) cognitive developmental robotics 
research with a different humanoid robot provides yet another extension of 
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the original work on grounding transfer mechanisms developed by 
Cangelosi and Riga (2006). Yamashita and Tani’s functional hierarchies of 
handling objects emerged through the system’s self-organisation of 
temporal sequences of behaviours segmented into discrete and modular 
units. This is an intriguing prospect for AI research, although it seems that 
imitation might be a more psychologically plausible mechanism for 
cognitive modelling purposes (Iacoboni, 2009; Cangelosi, 2010). 
Stramandinoli, Marocco and Cangelosi (2017) extend their original 
grounding transfer mechanism with a more explicit focus on linguistic 
grounding of abstract words which cannot be grounded in perceptual 
modalities, to explore the nature of abstract action words through the 
analysis of the model’s internal activation units using Principal component 
analysis (PCA). To the present author’s best knowledge, Stramandinoli et 
al.’s research was the first set of directional results demonstrating that 
grounding abstract action words can be achieved by reusing (at least 
partially) the sensorimotor representations, in support of a grounded 
perspective on higher-order cognition. This indicative finding is based on a 
qualitative analysis of a 3-dimensional PCA plot of the hidden activations 
of the various types of network training, and the significant overlap in the 
hidden unit activation values when comparing sensorimotor trained 
representations with abstract action verbs (e.g. MAKE). 
An interdisciplinary perspective comprised of psychology, 
neuroscience, and linguistics coupled with the cognitive modelling and the 
burgeoning domain of cognitive developmental robotics is critical for a 
deeper understanding of the interplay between action and language, and 
also to “disentangle ambiguous issues, provide better and clearer 
definitions, and formulate clearer predictions” (Cangelosi & Borghi, 2014, 
p. 346). Cangelosi and Borghi concretely further the debate on grounded 
versus abstract representations concerning action and language by 
identifying three phenomena. First, natural language in conjunction with 
sensorimotor and emotional information play a role in conceptual 
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representations. Second, the mirror neuron system (MNS) is related to action 
and language processing. Third, developmental robotics, using artificial 
embodied agents - both physical robots or software emulations - can play a 
role in identifying the mechanistic interplay in the integration between 
action and language. Cangelosi and Borghi (2014) also highlight that 
cognitive scientists and philosophers who are influential in developing 
grounded cognition as a discipline (e.g. Clark, 2008; Barsalou, 2008), are 
reconsidering their view on cognition being purely grounded in 
sensorimotor activity, and are also considering the role of language. This 
marks a shift in the direction of the grounded cognition research paradigm 
because it could help overcome the unproductive impasse on embodied 
versus disembodied cognition and help generate new empirical and 
computational research directions. 
In a related research endeavour on grounding mechanism, De La 
Cruz et al. (2014) explored the feasibility of embodied models via epigenetic 
and grounded approaches to modelling elementary mathematical 
cognition, in particular, handwritten digit recognition based on the widely 
used MNIST machine learning benchmark dataset. This MNIST training 
data consists of 28-by-28 pixel images split across ten classes (0 - 9). The 
embodied modelling was run using the virtual simulator of the iCub 
humanoid robot and three modules: an auto-encoder neural network for 
processing visual information (visual module), a feed-forward neural 
network for controlling iCub’s fingers (motor module), and a generalised 
regression model for associating the different classes of numbers to 
particular finger configurations (visuo-motor association module). These 
modules were pre-trained independently, before their merging, after which 
the entire network was trained using backpropagation. Although the iCub 
platform’s hands each have 9 degrees of freedom (DoF), only seven were 
used in this study. The thumb, index and middle fingers each have 2 DoF, 
while the pinky and ring fingers, which are glued together, have only 1 
DoF. De La Cruz et al. (2014) compared the digit recognition rate between 
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the embodied version of the model and a disembodied version without 
finger configurations in the form of proprioceptive sensory data and found 
that the embodied model performed significantly better (greater 
classification accuracy), with a difference of 7.4% between the embodied 
and standard model. 
In the final section of this chapter, we will experimentally explore 
grounded, feature-based and hybrid representations. Despite a plethora of 
computational research on different types of representations, as can be seen 
from the overview of abstract, both symbolic and sub-symbolic, and 
embodied developmental robotics, there has been limited focus on 
comparing these different representations. In other words, models have 
been created for two divergent approaches, with a lack of empirical and 
modelling work at the intersection of these polarised theoretical 
perspectives. Therefore, we will explore the robustness of these distinctive 
representational formats in a proof-of-concept computational experiment 
focusing on noise tolerance. 
3.7 Computational Study I: Noise Tolerance 
3.7.1 Theoretical Background 
Human beings have a remarkable ability to categorise objects in the 
real world based on both perceptual features (e.g. a dog has legs, or a bird 
has feathers) and relations between concepts (e.g. bread and butter), which 
is typically known as the conceptual web account (Quine & Ullian, 1970). 
Goldstone and Rogosky (2002) investigated connecting concepts to either 
each other, an external source, or both, using a constraint satisfaction network 
for translating between two artificial conceptual systems and a graph 
matching algorithm called ABSURDIST (Aligning Between Systems Using 
Relations Derived Inside Systems Themselves). In their constraint 
satisfaction network, each node represents a given hypothesis regarding a 
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correspondence between systems A and B, while the interconnections 
between the nodes constitute the constraints. Therefore, the ABSURDIST 
network does not learn any associations per se but is merely used to store 
a set of hypotheses regarding the similarity of the two inputs of coordinates 
representing the different conceptual systems. Externally-grounded 
representations consisted of absolute coordinates, while internally-
grounded ones were based on the relative distances between the 
coordinates themselves. Principally, the ABSURDIST algorithm is not a 
computational model of cognition but an abstract information theoretical 
construct for investigating how conceptual systems can have meaningful 
correspondences. They extend Fodor’s (1998) notion of conceptual identity 
between different conceptual systems being a prerequisite for successful 
mapping by proposing similarity itself would be sufficient. In other words, 
the concept of a teacup does not have to be identical between two people in 
order for their respective conceptual systems to contain the concept, as long 
as the concepts each play an equivalent role within their respective systems 
(Goldstone & Rogosky, 2002). 
The ABSURDIST algorithm evaluates systems based on comparing 
the Euclidean distances of two matrices and finding correspondences 
between the two. It is evaluated based on its tolerance to distortion, by 
gradually perturbing the coordinates of the “concepts”, with noise sampled 
from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of zero. Goldstone et al. tested 
the ability of ABSURDIST to find correspondences between two idealised 
and simplified conceptual systems as a function of ever-increasing amounts 
of noise being injected into the network and tested how internally-, 
externally-grounded or a combination of the two impacts ABSURDIST’s 
conceptual mapping performance. 
The ABSURDIST simulation results showed that two conceptual 
systems do not need to contain identically defined concepts in order for 
these to be successfully mapped to each other. This argues against Fodor’s 
(1998) claim of concept identity being critical for conceptual 
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correspondences. Goldstone et al. further discovered that for conceptual 
translations, internally-grounded concepts (based on relative Euclidean 
distances between coordinates) performed better than externally-grounded 
concepts (absolute coordinates), but that a combination of both internally- 
and externally-grounded concepts had the best performance. Hybrid 
stimuli showed the most gradual decline in accuracy between the systems 
as a function of increasing noise). These findings suggest an interesting 
hypothesis, namely that, there might be a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between intrinsic and extrinsic information. This would have strong 
implications for radically embodied accounts and grounded-only or 
distributed-only accounts of human cognition. The results suggest that a 
combination of extrinsic and intrinsic relations for representing concepts is 
advantageous. 
In the next section, we extend the ideas of Goldstone and Rogosky, 
by modelling artificial conceptual systems using feedforward neural 
networks from a cognitive modelling perspective as opposed to an 
ABSURDIST-like general graph matcher. Consequently, the neural 
networks in our simulations below will learn conceptual representations 
using training data consisting of feature-based, grounded and hybrid 
representations. Based on Palminteri, Wyart and Koechlin’s (2017) 
delineation of computational modelling approaches in cognitive science, 
Goldstone and colleagues’ study can be seen as an analytical approach, 
whereas our adaptation represents an instantiation of cognitive 
hypotheses. This not only allows us to model human cognition and thereby 
draw cognitively-relevant mechanistic implications but also to bridge the 
mostly independent computational modelling work spanning the areas of 
traditionally feature-based semantic modelling, and the more recent and 
extensive cognitive developmental robotics research, inspired by theories 
of embodied and grounded cognition. 
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3.7.2 Methodology 
3.7.2.1 Feature-based Data 
In this study, 20 amodal representations originate from a direct 
adaptation of Rogers and McClelland’s (2004) extended training corpus of 
animal and plant features (see figure 3.2). Inputs in this feature-based 
representation capture the conceptual similarity based on the types of 
features selected in the original model developed by Rogers and 
McClelland (2004). 
 
Figure 3.2: Example format of the feature-based representations from Rogers and 
McClelland (2004). 
3.7.2.2 Grounded Data 
Although the PDP approach implemented in Rogers and 
McClelland (2004) could be used to represent perceptually-inspired 
semantic representations by replacing the original context-property 
conceptual pairs with perceptually-inspired characteristics, this would not 
be based on any current theories or hypotheses of grounded cognition. 
However, one of the most influential grounded hypotheses is Barsalou’s 
Perceptual Symbols System, which is prominently associated with silhouettes 
of concrete objects like CHAIR, as that is the example used by Barsalou 
(1999). In developmental psychology, there is well-established empirical 
evidence (Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988, 1992; Imai, Gentner, & Uchida, 
1994) that lexical categorisation is learnt from distinguishing between 
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shapes based on the saliency of object functions and parts. More recently, a 
large team of Google DeepMind researchers (Ritter et al., 2017), used state-
of-the-art one-shot learning models trained on the ImageNet dataset, to 
show that their computational model also had a shape bias akin to the 
findings from the developmental psychology literature, indicating that 
shape, as opposed to colour, is the dominant factor for categorising objects. 
As a result of these empirical and computational experiments, the 
grounded data format used in this study is object form, more specifically, the 
silhouette extracted from naturalistic images of the 20 different concepts 
being represented. This is a gross simplification of genuinely grounded 
perceptual inputs but is used in the present proof-of-concept study to 
ensure that grounded and feature-based representations are well-matched 
in their informational content. 
The grounded input is captured by first extracting the outlines of 
the 20 objects from standard JPEG colour images. In theory, state-of-the-art 
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) would be the optimal class of 
algorithms for extracting the most semantically-sensitive information from 
these images, especially when combined with other current trends in 
machine learning such as pooling and averaging across pixels from this type 
of image data (Goodfellow et al., 2016). However, that would change the 
architecture of the network and would therefore not be a controlled 
comparison with the feature-based data described previously. Therefore, 
the 2D outline of the image is transformed from a 2D to a 1D format by 
finding the medial point of the image (xc , yc), and then iteratively (i) 
calculating the Euclidean distance (di) between this point and successive 
contour points in a counter-clockwise pattern (see figure 3.3). This 
transformation has three fundamental shortcomings, which are: (i) unequal 
vector lengths across the 20 concepts (depending on the number of pixels 
in the silhouette of the image), (ii) exceeding the number of data points 
feeding into the 50 input nodes of the network, and (iii) having data 
intervals that do not fall within the 0 and 1 range as in the feature-based 
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model. These shortcomings are overcome by applying a smoothing 
function to the raw 1D vector and then sampling 50 equally-spaced 
intervals to output a 1D vector of length 50, which we then rescale to make 
the maximum Euclidean distance equal 1. 
 
Figure 3.3: Silhouettes and their corresponding silhouette profiles based on the 2D to 
1D transformation. 
3.7.2.3 Simulation Details 
We use an artificial neural network consisting of two hidden layers 
(60 nodes in layer 1 and 30 nodes in layer 2) using the back-propagation 
supervised learning algorithm. The network weights for all neurons are 
initialised randomly using a Gaussian distribution, and the back-
propagation algorithm is run for 10,000 iterations, using a logistic activation 
function, with a learning rate (α) of 0.01 and momentum (β) equalling 0.9. 
This ensures that the final network weights (post-training) are the result of 
gradual learning processes, where the initial random values are small and 
have a weak influence on the target values. A small learning rate is traded 
off with a larger momentum parameter to ensure that the global minima is 
not missed but simultaneously speeding up the rate of convergence 
(Goodfellow et al., 2016). However, given that both parameters typically 
range between 0 and 1, the modelling is skewed towards a slower algorithm 
with more stable learning. Finally, the network error is measured using the 
Sum of Square Error (SSE). We follow the approach laid out in Rogers and 
McClelland (2004) and ensure that during network training, each epoch 
consists of presenting each stimulus once in a randomised order since the 
weights are updated after every stimulus. The core assumption is that in 
most ANN models, minor adjustments are made to the network, simulating 
pig 
tree fish 
rose 
cat robin 
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everyday experiences, which gradually build towards a distributed 
knowledge representation.  
The same neural network architecture is implemented for 
comparing feature-based, grounded and hybrid representations’ tolerance 
to noise perturbations. Suitable data formats are selected for each condition, 
while not biasing the number of input representations. Therefore, in 
addition to the same neural network architectural and learning parameters, 
each model also consists of the same number of data inputs and outputs (20 
target concepts). Furthermore, it would be a biased comparison of the 
hybrid representation against the two others if the hybrid inputs consisted 
of twice as much information or were trained on an artificial neural 
network with different architectural parameters (e.g. 2 × 50 inputs). In the 
case of the feature-based and grounded data representations, we use a 
constant number of network inputs (n = 50). In the case of the hybrid data, 
the methodological challenge of representing both feature-based and 
grounded data formats as network inputs without doubling the total 
number of input nodes (from 50 to 100) is overcome by sub-sampling 50% 
of the most informative features (least correlated) within the feature-based 
and grounded stimuli. Therefore, the total number of hybrid inputs remain 
the same during network training across all three conditions.  
Model Architecture 
No. 
Iterations 
Learning 
Rate (α) 
Momentum 
(β) 
Error 
Feature-
based 
L1.60 : L2.30 10,000 0.01 0.9 0.00929 
Grounded L1.60 : L2.30 10,000 0.01 0.9 0.00943 
Hybrid L1.60 : L2.30 10,000 0.01 0.9 0.00914 
Table 3.1: Model parameters and sum square error for ANN training of feature-based, 
grounded and hybrid models. 
 
The noise perturbation is applied to the network using a 3 ×  21 
factorial design, with three categories of data representations (feature-
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based, grounded and hybrid) and 21 levels of noise increment from a factor 
of 0 (no noise) to 1 (maximal noise), with increments of 0.05 noise. The 
random noise is sampled from a uniform distribution and is combined with 
the input data to simulate the loss of neurons associated with the semantic 
information. Each network is trained 1,000 times at every noise increment, 
resulting in a total of 63,000 (3×21×1000) neural network models, each 
being run for 10,000 epochs. This is required to generate 1,000 predictions 
for every noise increment so that reliable estimates across the predictions 
can be made to generate an overall accuracy level for a given type of 
network (based on input representations) at a particular noise increment. 
In this experiment, in addition to the two core manipulations, firstly the 
format of semantic representation, and secondly, the level of noise, there is 
a further peripheral manipulation of investigating how noise impacts 
semantic representations as a function of the number of concepts being 
represented. This additional objective aims to better understand the scaling 
potential of grounded representations, which has not been previously 
explored, unlike the case of distributed representations, where simulations 
(Goldstone & Rogosky, 2002) have shown that networks become more 
efficient and more tolerant to noise as they scale up. Finally, another aim of 
this study is to explore the resultant semantic representation following the 
training of the neural network with grounded representations, and to 
evaluate the grounded network’s ability to classify stimuli that are not part 
of the original 20 concepts used during training. 
3.7.3 Results 
We explore the noise tolerance of the neural networks trained on 
feature-based, grounded or hybrid representations. Classification accuracy 
(%) is measured based on the neural networks correctly classifying the 20 
concepts according to the diagonal of the confusion matrix between observed 
and predicted classes. Unsurprisingly, figure 3.4 shows that as the level of 
noise perturbation increases from a factor of 0 to 1, in 0.05 increments, for 
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all types of data formats, there is a gradual decline in accuracy, though not 
reaching chance-level benchmarks across the three models (for 20 concepts, 
at chance-level, the benchmark is 100/20 = 5%). 
 
Figure 3.4: Performance of the neural networks trained on feature-based, grounded and 
hybrid representations as a function of noise. Error bars are not included as the error 
margins are too small. 
 
Interestingly, however, when looking at the moderate range of 
noise (between 0.2 to 0.6), feature-based representations are more tolerant 
to noise than grounded representations, although with a higher level of 
noise (between 0.65 and 1) this difference disappears and both 
representations are equally impacted by noise perturbations. The most 
interesting finding of these simulations is the superiority of hybrid over 
both grounded and feature-based representations once noise perturbation 
reaches 0.15, which is maintained up to a noise factor of 1, where grounded 
and feature-based models level-off at 21% while the hybrid model plateaus 
at 38%, an almost two-fold superiority in noise tolerance. 
Previous computational experiments (Goldstone & Rogosky, 2002) 
have shown that as intrinsic systems scale, their tolerance to noise increases 
almost exponentially. In the current simulation, we first explore whether 
there is also an advantage to noise tolerance as the number of concepts 
increase in grounded models. Second, we explore the nature of this increase 
using an experimental design of 7 × 21 factorial combinations, with seven 
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categories of number of concepts (in our simulations: 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 15 and 
20 concepts) and the same 21 levels of noise increments used previously. 
Once more, 1,000 neural network simulations with differently seeded 
initialisation weights are run for each one of these combinations (7 × 21 × 
1,000 = 147,000 models) before estimating the average classification 
accuracy across the 1,000 models for each experimental condition.  
 
Figure 3.5: Classification accuracies of the grounded neural network. 
 
In figure 3.5, we can see that the grounded network’s classification 
accuracy increases as a function of the number of concepts being 
represented (compared to relative chance-level benchmarks). This is likely 
to be due to the interrelations between the different inputs being more 
distributed for a larger number of concepts. Even at a noise perturbation 
factor of 1, there is a positive relationship between the number of concepts 
represented in a network and level of classification accuracy compared to 
chance-level benchmarks. For example, with 4 concepts, the model is 1.76 
times better than chance (chance-level: 25% vs model: 44%), while with 15 
concepts this increases to 2.55 times (chance-level: 6.67% vs model: 17%), 
and with 20 concepts this increases to 3 times as high as by chance alone 
(chance-level: 5% vs model: 15%). 
 
 69 
 
Figure 3.6: A Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) representation of the grounded semantic 
space (A), and a hierarchical cluster plot of the same grounded semantic space (B). 
Please note that for the MDS plot, the fish category has been excluded for depicting the 
other associations more clearly. 
 
Lastly, from figure 3.6 we can see that our silhouette-based 
grounded representation successfully captures the taxonomic properties of 
all 20 concepts based exclusively on perceptual inputs. The superordinate 
categories animal and plant are split first, followed by further divisions 
between mammals and birds, and trees and flowers, respectively. Moreover, 
the grounded neural network can also successfully generalise by 
meaningfully representing the novel concept OSTRICH. 
3.8 Discussion 
Our proof-of-concept simulations of noise perturbation on 
grounded, feature-based and hybrid representations presented in this 
chapter highlight the potential benefits of pluralistic semantic 
representations. In conjunction with the extant literature on cognitive 
developmental robotics, our study suggests that it may be helpful to move 
away from the black-or-white debates on grounded versus amodal 
cognitive representations. This debate on “are concepts grounded?” might 
be more helpfully reformulated as “to what extent are concepts 
grounded?”. Additionally, the present work supports Lenat et al.’s (1991) 
prediction that as the so-called conceptual web increases in size, it becomes 
A B 
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easier for semantics to emerge from rich intrasystem relations, as larger 
semantic networks are more tolerant to noise. 
A new finding in this study is that semantic features can be learnt 
purely through the bottom-up grounding of perceptual characteristics, 
even when exclusively using shape information. Without including higher-
order semantic characteristics in the training data (e.g. 
ISA…Tree|Plant|Animal or CAN...Fly|Sing|Move|Grow), the present 
grounded feedforward neural network model shows how generalised 
features in the raw perceptual inputs themselves can provide sufficient 
statistical regularities for meaningful semantic classifications at a 
conceptual level. A critical difference between the conceptual relations 
codified in Rogers and McClelland (2004) and the present study is that we 
avoid the semantic circularity in modelling higher-order relations (e.g. plants 
vs animals) by excluding these explicit distinctions in the grounded 
training data as this only includes a 2D-to-1D transformed vector-
representation of the silhouette, and no other meta-data. However, one 
might argue that Rogers and McClelland (2004) only used their example as 
a proof-of-concept illustration for outlining the general principles 
underlying the emergence of semantic relations. We agree with this 
interpretation but would add that current approaches to connectionist 
modelling in cognitive science predominantly make use of hand-coded 
features in the training set, while the present example uses information 
naturally available in our environment. This allows for the relatively 
straightforward and efficient scaling of the present mechanistic approach 
for representing semantics grounded exclusively in shape information. 
Furthermore, using the same neural network trained on the grounded data, 
classifying novel concepts that were not part of the original data set is 
demonstrated by the new concept ostrich. This novel concept is not only 
correctly “placed” in the bird category, but also near the penguin (see figure 
3.6), another atypical representation of a bird (based only on shape). The 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) plot in figure 3.6 reveals the broad categories 
 71 
that emerge from the neural network trained on grounded data, while the 
hierarchical cluster analysis shows how the divergence of concepts is 
taxonomically aligned to their superordinate plant and animal category 
despite no explicit information being made available during the training 
phase of the network.  
Bridges between perceptual and conceptual systems are not new 
(see Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998), although the present noise perturbation 
experiments show that in parallel distributed systems, a sensory 
reductionist perspective where semantics is entirely contingent upon raw 
sensory data is unlikely to lead to the stability required for conceptual 
systems like semantics and language to develop. Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that grounded and feature-based representations are mutually 
exclusive but are more likely to be mutually reinforcing, based on their 
distinctive contributions to the semantic system. 
Despite a long history of symbolic and grounded accounts of 
semantic cognition being represented as contrasting philosophical and 
empirical positions, there might be mutual benefits for both types of 
representations, given that their unique statistical regularities provide a 
more robust and intertwined semantic representation. This view is also 
supported by detailed reviews of empirical studies of semantics. For 
example, Dove (2011) defends this pluralistic account of cognition based on 
the ability for such representations to have inferential advantages for both 
linguistic and sensorimotor semantic codes. Dove argues that natural 
language can leverage the grounded perceptual codes to extend our 
cognitive reach via symbolic mechanisms such as deductive and inductive 
reasoning. Similar views, albeit from a more computational perspective, are 
provided by Clark (2008, p.47), where he emphasises the fruitful synthesis 
of context-free, amodal and arbitrary symbols being able to manipulate 
non-arbitrary, modality-rich and context-sensitive grounded 
representations. 
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3.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we started with a brief overview of a distinct set of 
abstract symbolic and sub-symbolic models and grounded models from a 
cognitive developmental robotics perspective. Although these categories 
are well-known in cognitive psychology, these distinctions are not entirely 
accurate when taking into account the technical details of the models 
themselves. However, we have outlined the models’ distinctions in this 
manner to reflect the dichotomies present in contemporary cognitive 
science. We have also seen that computational models tend to either be 
agnostic to claims of grounding or be inspired by embodied/sensorimotor 
theories, as is the case with developmental cognitive robotics. However, 
there is a lack of computational modelling research looking at the role of 
scene-based grounding of semantic representations. 
In our proof-of-concept simulations of grounded, feature-based and 
hybrid representations we demonstrate for the first time, that the statistical 
regularities present in the silhouette of an object are sufficient for creating 
semantic embedding spaces well-documented in the cognitive science 
literature based on hand-coded features. The grounded model is sufficient 
for not only classifying trained concepts but also meaningfully classifying 
new concepts that are not originally part of the training set. 
Finally, from the simulations, there is supporting evidence in favour 
of hybrid grounded and feature-based inputs being superior to either 
format in isolation. This is in broad support of a pluralistic model of 
conceptual processing that transcends grounded versus feature-based 
debates and seeks to explore the interplay of both types of information. 
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Chapter 4                               
Extending Symbol Interdependency: 
Perceptual Scene Vectors 
 
4.1 Abstract 
Louwerse (2011) empirically advances the symbol interdependency 
hypothesis by demonstrating the importance of statistical regularities in 
linguistic surface structures. Symbol interdependency posits that meaning 
extraction attributed to embodied representations or algorithms should 
instead be attributed to language. In a series of 7 experiments we find 
evidence for language surface structures encoding meaning best when 
sufficiently constrained by modeller-determined feature sets, with 
performance deteriorating for randomly selected language surface 
structures. Furthermore, Latent Semantic Analysis’ meaning encoding 
improves as weaker dimensions are removed. These findings collectively 
indicate that although language is important, increasing the relevance of 
linguistic statistical regularities is also critical. Our novel approach, 
Perceptual Scene Vectors (PSVs) use object co-occurrences from images to 
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automatically extract strong associative and taxonomic relationships more 
successfully, measured both qualitatively and quantitatively, with an 
original application of a cluster-correspondence metric. PSVs encode 
meaning without modellers hand-coding relevant features, which provides 
an ecologically valid approach to extending symbol interdependency 
beyond language and partially solving the relevance problem in semantics by 
grounding meaning extraction in real-world visual scenes. 
4.2 Introduction 
Human symbolic cognition is commonly argued to be mediated and 
moderated by language itself, essentially proposing that language shapes 
our thinking. This general idea is typically summarised as linguistic 
relativity or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Gipper, Sapir, & Whorf, 1972), 
while the stronger view is called linguistic determinism, which claims 
conceptual processing is entirely dependent on the language people are 
exposed to and habitually use. The linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf, proposed 
that language shapes conceptual categories, which in turn shapes the way 
we conceptualise our world (Whorf, 1956). In linguistic determinism, the 
relationship between language and cognition is tightly coupled while the 
association between cognition and the world is weaker. In contrast, in 
cognitive science, the perception is that thought is more tightly coupled 
with the world, while language augments cognition, like a technology, by 
extending non-linguistic conceptual representations (Holmes & Wolff, 
2010). 
The philosophical origins of linguistic relativity can be traced back 
to the two founders of Semiotics, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857 - 1913) and 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 - 1914). De Saussure (1916) distinguishes 
between sound-images/signifiers, linked to the real-world and symbolic 
entities that are carriers of meaning and the concept/signified which 
represents the mental concept itself. These two theoretical primitives, in 
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conjunction, yield a sign, referring to symbolic interdependency being a 
core aspect of human meaning-making. However, the more prominent 
theory within Semiotics is Pierce’s meaning triad (see figure 4.1), which 
consists of the following three components: (i) object, (ii) interpretant and (iii) 
representamen. The object component has the most straightforward 
interpretation in the sense that it is directly grounded in a physical object, 
even though it should not be confused with the real object, because 
according to Pierce, it is a mere approximation of the true object in the real 
world. Therefore, it is also commonly referred to as the semiotic object. The 
representamen is the amodal representation such as the word DOG or 
{01100100 01101111 01100111}, the binary representation of the word DOG. 
Lastly, the interpretant refers to the “pure conceptual content” or semantic 
aspect of the symbol. As in De Saussure’s theory, Peirce’s theory also 
emphasises symbol interdependency, although the mechanistic details 
remain highly underspecified (see Merrell, 1997 for a review). 
 
Figure 4.1: Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of Sign. 
 
Related to Pierce’s meaning triad, is Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory 
(DCT), also cited in Louwerse’s (2007) original postulation of symbol 
interdependency and therefore sufficiently important for a quick review. 
According to DCT, there are three planes of semantic abstractions, which 
are (i) representational, (ii) referential and (iii) associative. The representational 
level approximately corresponds to Peirce’s semiotic object level and 
representamen level because of the encoding of both linguistic (e.g. the 
Representamen 
Object Interpretant 
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word BOOK) and non-linguistic (e.g. picture of a book) perceptual 
information. The referential level creates links between verbal (called 
logogens) and non-verbal representations (called imagens). Lastly, the 
associative level consists of an interconnected web of relations exclusively 
between amodal word-level representations. However, unlike Peirce’s 
semiotic triad, Paivio’s DCT goes beyond the merely descriptive-level 
theorising of meaning systems and suggests a mechanistic theory relating 
the different levels to existing ideas of the semantic memory system, for 
example, the referential level being equated to working memory, whilst the 
associative stage represents long-term semantic memory. However, 
Louwerse (2011) highlights that Paivio’s DCT is distinct from Louwerse’s 
symbol interdependency theory in that the latter proposes that language 
encodes perceptual information, which in turn mediates both verbal and 
nonverbal cognitive processes (p. 280). 
More recently, cognitive anthropologists have amassed a range of 
observational findings, purportedly in favour of linguistic relativity, by 
uncovering thought processes they claim are associated with specific 
linguistic phenomena. For example, Everett et al. (2005) outlines the 
linguistic constraints on colour perception based on a small remote group 
of indigenous people called the Pirahã, located in the Amazon rainforest in 
Brazil. The Pirahã, a monolingual hunter-gatherer tribe, find it easier to 
both remember and recognise particular colours based on the availability 
of their colour vocabulary. Similarly, Gordon (2004) supports the linguistic 
relativity hypothesis by demonstrating that the Pirahã, who have a very 
limited vocabulary for numbers are supposedly limited to approximate 
rather than exact numerical competencies. Gordon claims that this supports 
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, since it appears to be the case that speaking a 
language without number words has a direct causal influence on the way 
speakers of Pirahã perceive exact quantities.  
However, experimental evidence from Frank et al. (2008) provides 
some of the strongest evidence to date contradicting linguistic relativity, 
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because in a range of studies they find the Pirahã tribe successfully perform 
tasks requiring conceptual processing of exact numerical magnitudes. 
Frank and colleagues argue that given the well-known limitations of visual 
and auditory short-term memory (Baddeley, 1988), the accuracy required 
for the numerical magnitude tasks of Gordon (2004) significantly exceeded 
working memory capacities and more realistically required symbolic 
encoding of the numbers themselves, in the absence of a numerical 
vocabulary for larger quantitates. 
Frank et al. ran a set of cardinality matching tasks, wherein the 
addition or subtraction of one quantity leads to a difference in the sets to be 
matched against the control set. The Pirahã are relatively successful at this 
despite not having the linguistic machinery for representing cardinality 
and/or addition and subtraction, which Frank and colleagues interpret as 
the Pirahã having a mental representation of one despite not having a word 
for this number concept. Therefore, in direct contradiction to arguments put 
forward by Gordon (2004) from the perspective of linguistic relativity, the 
concept of exact cardinality is not dependent on language. However, 
having number words can be a cognitive technology that facilitates the 
ability to remember and operate on exact numbers. These results do not 
support a strong Whorfian perspective. In fact, this demonstrates that 
language is an abstraction, or in the words of Frank et al., “a cognitive 
technology” (p. 2), that builds a scaffolding for more complex abstract 
mental operations, but does not mediate all mental activities.  
Other evidence (e.g. Gilbert et al., 2006) has shown that in the 
perceptual domain of colour, language can significantly facilitate 
performance in discrimination tasks through the use of linguistic memory 
aids and preferred mental processing routes using words as placeholders 
for concept-environment pairings. Thus, language seems to merely provide 
alternative, and at times, more efficient processing routes for the encoding 
and decoding of perceptual experiences as opposed to fundamentally 
changing the phenomenological nature of cognition itself. 
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4.3 Evidence for Symbol Interdependency 
Louwerse’s (2007) symbol interdependency hypothesis, states that 
linguistic processing can be both embodied and disembodied based on 
their respective reliance on modal and amodal semantic processing. The 
philosophical debate on whether language encodes our perceptual 
information has a long tradition dating back to Gorgias of Leontini (485 - 
380 BCE), who went so far as to argue that the physical world can only truly 
be phenomenologically experienced and understood through language. 
However, according to more recent philosophers like Immanuel Kant (1724 
- 1804), the structure and function of language is just one of several 
dimensions that contributes to the human experience of the world (Jarratt, 
1998). Thus, language is seen to have a moderating as opposed to mediating 
influence on the conceptualisation of reality through the primary senses. 
One of the simplest and consistent dichotomies found in both 
language and action is the presence of nouns and verbs, respectively 
corresponding to objects and actions. Monaghan, Chater and Christiansen 
(2005) conducted a series of corpus analyses for discriminating between 
grammatical categories of words (e.g. nouns versus verbs) based on 16 
phonological (e.g. phoneme length, syllable length, presence of stress) and 
distributional cues (co-occurrence with words such as ARE, NO, YOU, 
THAT’s and ON). Based on the discriminant analysis run, Monaghan et al. 
report that 67% of nouns and 71% of verbs are correctly classified using 
only distributional and phonological cues. In other words, based on 
phonological and distributional linguistic information alone, it is possible 
to distinguish between verbs representing actions and nouns representing 
objects. However, Monaghan and colleagues do brush aside the significant 
proportion of the variability unexplained by phonological and 
distributional information alone, given the lack of other semantic 
dimensions they could have tested to explore the relative importance levels. 
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Further evidence directly supporting symbol interdependency’s 
assumption of language encoding perceptual information, arises from a 
recent study conducted by Walker and Parameswaran (2019), which 
elaborates on Walker’s (2016) notion of sound symbolism - sound affords 
expectations about the salient aspects of particular words. Walker and 
Parameswaran conducted a counterbalanced between-participants 
experiment where participants put their hands separately into two thick 
denim bags and grasp onto the two cylindrical objects of different weight. 
The lighter cylinder weighed 44g and the heavier one 190g. The 
experimenter then informed the participants that the objects were kipi and 
moma, without revealing which object corresponds to which name. They 
were then subsequently asked to decide what each of the objects were 
called. Lastly, this pre-test condition was followed by two additional 
conditions to isolate a contribution from vowel and consonant contrast 
cases. As predicted, in the pre-test condition Walker and Parameswaran 
found that in 80% of the cases, the heavier object was named moma, 
whereas, kipi was judged to be the name for the lighter object. Also, as 
predicted, in the vowel contrast test, in 81% of the cases, the names kipi and 
mimi were assigned to the lighter object, whilst kopa and moma were 
attributed to the heavier object. Collectively, these results suggest that 
heavier objects are associated with vowels that symbolise “less pointiness” 
(e.g. kopa and moma) and have open vowels, such that the tongue is placed 
further away from the roof of the mouth (Eide & Gish, 1996). In contrast, 
vowels with “more pointiness” (e.g. kipi and mimi) are judged to be 
associated with lighter objects. Walker and Parameswaran propose that this 
supports language encoding cross-sensory correspondences in the form of 
sound symbolism based on open vowels representing heaviness by 
reference to visual roundedness. Therefore, like Monaghan et al., Walker 
and Parameswaran also support language and the associated linguistic 
machinery as subsuming sensorimotor affordances - a core tenet of symbol 
interdependency.  
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Theoretical evidence referenced by Louwerse (2011) in support for 
symbol interdependency stems from Christiansen and Chater’s (2008) 
novel theoretical account for the following question “why is language so 
well suited to being learned by the brain?” (p. 490). Although, Christiansen 
and Chater’s account is heavily critiqued in the subsequent open 
commentary by numerous cognitive scientists, their perspective is 
sufficiently novel and relevant to symbol interdependency to warrant a 
brief overview. Christiansen and Chater argue that language is akin to an 
organism and by extension faces the same evolutionary pressures as other 
organisms do. Intriguingly, according to their argument, language has 
evolved to survive in the environment of the human brain under selection 
pressures faced by human learning. Therefore, in contradiction to 
grounded cognition theories, they claim that language is not actually an 
arbitrary abstraction or meta-cognitive function but is shaped by 
perceptual, learning, processing and pragmatic constraints. Language 
encodes the structure of thinking and is not a mere adaptation for 
communicative purposes. 
Symbol interdependency is theoretically appealing due to the 
mutually reinforcing effect of hybrid representations and the evolutionary 
metaphor outlined by Christiansen and Chater (2008). Goldstone and 
Rogosky (2002) demonstrate the theoretical system-level advantages of 
intrinsic and extrinsic representations, which, in chapter 3 of this thesis, we 
also find to be the case for feature-based and grounded cognitive 
representations. Furthermore, symbol interdependency is also empirically 
appealing based on findings such as discriminating between actions and 
objects using linguistic structures (Monaghan et al., 2005) and the effects of 
sound symbolism investigated by Walker and Parameswaran (2019). 
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4.4 Surface Semantic Analysis 
Louwerse (2011) states that the importance of statistical regularities 
in linguistic structures is underestimated in both symbolic and grounded 
theories of cognition and that the formation of semantic representations, 
typically attributed to either specific statistical processes, or grounded 
representations should be explained by language itself. The emphasis is 
particularly on mining the semantic representations found in the first-order 
or so-called surface structure of language. First-order co-occurrences are 
the simplest form of frequentist descriptive statistics on words co-occurring 
together. We term Louwerse’s approach to extracting meaning from text, 
Surface Semantic Analysis (SSA), with the aim of positioning it beside the 
better-known Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA). This new approach has a 
strong ancillary claim of embodied representations being mapped onto 
language. The approach is based on previous research (e.g. Louwerse & 
Jeuniaux, 2010) showing a dissociation between deep and shallow language 
processing. Deep processing referring to low-ambiguity linguistic 
situations, whereas shallow processing is both underspecified and 
incomplete. The default mode for language users is shallow processing. In 
contrast, deep processing is a more deliberate and effortful mode of 
linguistic processing, akin to the widely popularised system 1 (fast 
“autopilot”) versus system 2 (slow and logical) dichotomy of human 
decision making (Kahneman, 2011). Louwerse’s (2011) theorising is highly 
relevant to the present thesis, and its importance to the debate on grounded 
and amodal representations is succinctly summarised in the following 
excerpt: 
“The prediction that language encodes perceptual information has 
important implications for the symbolic and embodied cognition 
accounts presented earlier. For the symbolic cognition account, it 
means that results obtained from LSA can also be obtained through 
non-latent patterns in the language surface structure. For the 
embodied cognition account, it means that results attributed to 
perceptual simulations can be traced back to language itself.” (p.7) 
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According to Louwerse (2011), distributional linguistic information 
is sufficient for accounting for the statistical variabilities found in 
sensorimotor data. Louwerse suggests that even though some researchers 
(e.g. Landauer et al., 1998) focus on particular mathematical and 
computational details of algorithms for explaining meaning induction 
(Latent Semantic Analysis), symbol interdependency rests exclusively on 
language. Louwerse makes a strong assertion for meaning being directly 
extracted from language itself, and that the current focus on particular 
types of algorithms such as LSA or even neural network models is 
misguided. This contradicts Landauer and Dumais’ (1997) emphasis on a 
powerful mathematical analysis implemented in LSA that leads to meaning 
induction. 
Louwerse (2011) asks whether or not first-order occurrences will 
result in identical results to that of latent patterns. If LSA and SSA both 
yield the same results, then mere surface-level measures are sufficiently 
powerful for extracting meaning from language, and provide a simple 
“lower-bound” measure for what humans can extract from language (p. 
13). Conversely, Louwerse reasons, if LSA produces different results to 
SSA, then first-order co-occurrences are not sufficiently information-rich 
for meaning extraction. In his first computational experiment Louwerse 
(2011) used the classic Rogers & McClelland (2004) verbal descriptors 
(names of birds, fish, flowers and trees) along with 26 features (e.g. bark, 
branches, … white, and yellow) to create a 16 × 26 matrix as the input to 
multidimensional scaling (MDS). The original matrix is generated using 
LSA cosine values trained on the Touchstone Applied Science Associates 
(TASA) corpus. These values are subsequently transformed into Euclidean 
distances. The MDS coordinates from the x- and y-dimensions are plotted 
for qualitatively exploring the semantic space (see figure 4.2a). In a similar 
fashion, another 16 ×  26 matrix is generated, but using the frequency 
counts in the Web 1T 5-gram corpus, created by Google, which contains 
English word n-grams (unigrams to five-grams) and their observed 
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frequencies. The matrix is an input for MDS analysis in order to visualise 
the verbal descriptors (see figure 4.2b). Intriguingly, this was the first study 
showing that semantic results obtained by LSA can also be reliably 
replicated using mere first-order n-gram co-occurrences. Based on these 
results, Louwerse proposes the need to reconsider the results of embodied 
cognition studies using linguistic stimuli from a disembodied perspective, 
given that language can encode embodied relations and perceptual 
information. 
 
 
4.5 Computational Experiment: Perceptual Scene Vectors 
4.5.1 Theoretical Background 
The common themes of the reviewed empirical and computational 
studies focusing on the interplay between language and cognition are as 
follows: (i) language contains sufficient sensorimotor encodings for 
conceptualising reality, (ii) disembodied and embodied cognition are 
mutually reinforcing, and (iii) there has been too much focus on algorithmic 
or embodied details of cognition and not enough on language. In this 
section, we propose to extend the original symbol interdependency 
hypothesis beyond language, to include other modalities of concept 
A B 
Figure 4.2: MDS plots from Louwerse (2011) of the 16 verbal descriptors × 26 features 
used in Rogers and McClelland (2004). (A) MDS plot based on LSA analysis (B) MDS 
plot based on first-order co-occurrences. 
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representation, with a particular focus on our daily stream of contextual 
information mined from the environment. Much of this information for the 
normally-sighted population is visual, which has inspired our approach. 
Our focus on ecologically valid stimuli based on a realistic scenario 
is three-fold. Firstly, even though Louwerse (2011) has demonstrated that 
both LSA and first-order co-occurrences based on n-grams are suitable for 
taxonomic and associative meaning extraction, a cognitively plausible 
account of how these associations are acquired or stored in the first place 
remains elusive. We argue that the proximities used for the verbal 
descriptors adapted by Louwerse (2011) are based on a set of highly 
structured big data representation, which is an implausible semantic 
memory format, despite being exceptionally well-suited for computational 
meaning extraction. Secondly, the features used in Louwerse (2011) and 
cognitive modelling more broadly (e.g. Rogers & McClelland, 2004) are 
hand-coded in the sense that a human modeller manually selects the 
relevant features to include. Louwerse (2011) implements both the LSA and 
the first-order co-occurrence models this way in order to replicate a well-
known and widely used toy semantic model. However, a general criticism 
aimed at the wider cognitive modelling community is that reliance on such 
apriori features inevitably introduces the confound that the model reflects 
the modeller’s intuitions of a cognitive phenomenon. This brings us to the 
third and most important reason for wanting to use ecologically valid 
inputs for cognitive modelling. Most models of semantic cognition are 
unable to acquire the relevant associations in the first place. In the case of 
traditional symbolic models (e.g. Cooper & Shallice, 2000), the triggering 
functions for particular schemas need to be hand-coded apriori, whilst in 
the case of language-based models (e.g. Louwerse, 2011), the 16 × 26 matrix 
needs 26 features to be defined manually. In both cases, one sidesteps one 
of the key challenges posed by cognitive models of semantics - selecting the 
most relevant semantic features from a collection of hundreds of potential 
contenders based on task- and context-sensitivity. This is arguably one of 
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the most critical, yet overlooked, first steps to realistically representing 
meaning. 
There is a need for a computationally explicit model of semantics 
grounded in acquiring and selecting the most suitable associations from the 
environment automatically, without human modellers hand-coding a 
series of features based on time-consuming and non-parsimonious trial-
and-error iterations. In order to computationally implement such a model, 
our original approach for the cognitive scientific study of conceptual 
processing extracts contextual information from images of naturally 
occurring scenes, and generates a cognitive data representation, Perceptual 
Scene Vectors (PSVs). PSVs are a type of data representation (a 1D tensor) 
that capture the statistical regularities of the environment within which an 
object commonly occurs, so objects that tend to co-occur more often with 
other objects in a variety of prototypical contexts are more likely to be 
related to one another. Therefore, contextual coherency in PSVs across 
multiple exemplars is defined by homogenous distributions and smaller 
cosine distances between the vectors, whereas incoherent contexts are 
defined by a set of PSVs with larger cosine distances and heterogeneity in 
their distributions. The technical implementation details of PSVs is outlined 
in the modelling section below. However, we will first address the 
theoretical justification for introducing PSVs and the importance of context 
more generally and its relevance to conceptual processing. 
Why are naturalistic visual contexts important for the study of 
semantic processing? Based on a review of the extant literature one would 
have to conclude that ecologically valid stimuli have not been a priority for 
much of semantic cognition research - both in terms of the empirical 
literature, based on isolated and decontextualised objects, and 
computational models, reliant on toy datasets of isolated concrete objects. 
There are some notable exceptions, as we discussed in chapter 2, when 
outlining the field of developmental robotics, although traditionally that 
has been more widely associated with engineering as opposed to cognitive 
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science. The lack of ecologically valid research on context-based semantics 
is especially surprising when taking into account the early discovery of 
context-dependent memory - that memory encoding and decoding are subject 
to environmental factors. Pessin (1932) was probably the first researcher to 
study the impact of context on both memory and behaviour. In this early 
study, two conditions are evaluated, one consisting of both visual and 
auditory stimulation and the other being a quiet environment. In the noisy 
condition, participants, rather unsurprisingly, spoke more loudly, but also 
made more overt movements than in the quiet condition. Similarly, in 
Egstrom et al.’s (1972) study of underwater task performance, they found 
strong evidence in favour of underwater training being superior to dry-
land training for an underwater task. Therefore, the context specificity of 
memory-encoding during the learning phase is seen as a critical aspect of 
human learning. 
Why has cognitive science research on semantics ignored context? 
We conjecture that for empirical research, strictly controlled lab conditions 
are easier to achieve when objects are isolated from their context. While in 
the case of computational modelling, a relentless focus on the allegedly 
“key” aspects of a problem are typically a by-product of reductionism. In the 
real world, however, if one were to imagine seeing a slice of toast, it would 
typically be accompanied by other relevant objects (e.g. a loaf of bread, 
butter, knife) and contexts (e.g. kitchen). It would be unusual to imagine 
the slice of bread floating in mid-air void of all other objects in the 
background. Although, this is precisely the way visual objects are treated 
in most experiments. Many objects in our surroundings are in fact in the 
same semantic space and yet physically appear very different (e.g. laptop 
and computer), whilst there are numerous instances of the opposite, where 
they appear to be physically very similar but are in almost orthogonal 
semantic spaces (e.g. real handgun and toy gun).  
A classic finding within cognitive psychology, is the example of the 
word BREAD automatically priming for related words like BUTTER (e.g. 
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Cramer, 1970). Semantic priming, is a cognitive phenomenon where a target 
word (e.g. TRUCK) is processed faster when preceded by a conceptually 
associated prime (e.g. CAR) as opposed to an unrelated prime (e.g. TIGER).  
Although, the facilitation effect of word recognition for BUTTER followed 
by the prime BREAD is a linguistic example, equivalent findings have also 
been recorded using pictorial or iconic stimuli (see McNamara, 2005, for a 
detailed review).  
In relation to our current discussion of the importance of context on 
conceptual processing, a more directly relevant phenomenon, is contextual 
priming, which has been widely documented since the 1970s (e.g. Taylor & 
Juola, 1974; Sanford, Garrod, & Boyle, 1977; Smith, Theodor, & Franklin, 
1983). More recently, the phenomenon has also been documented in a range 
of domains associated with complex human behaviours. For example, 
contextual priming has been shown to impact evaluations of ambiguous 
products based on adjacent advertisements (Yi, 1990), legal proceedings by 
influencing juries and other stakeholders involved in legal proceedings 
(Fraser & Stevenson, 2014), and even impact whom people voted for 
depending on where they voted. For example, Berger, Meredith and 
Wheeler (2008) found that people assigned to a school polling station were 
more likely to support pro-school funding initiatives than those whose 
polling station was assigned to a church. Berger et al. found this to be the 
case even after controlling for demographics, political views and 
geographical location. These findings collectively demonstrate that 
contexts should not be overlooked as non-essential characteristics to be 
excluded from investigations of conceptual processing given its importance 
to real-world scenarios. 
Torralba (2003) demonstrated in a computational model the ability 
to account for contextual priming, where the context of an object provides a 
superior prime for the identification of the target object, compared to the 
intrinsic features of the target prime. Torralba argued that real-world 
scenes are governed by strong configurational properties, that are 
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particularly useful for identifying objects based on these arrangements. In 
a related study, Chun (2000) demonstrated that visual contextual 
information constrains where we look, what to expect and also surprisingly 
guides our attentional spotlight, which enables us to process visual scenes 
more effectively. This has been shown to be both learnt and executed 
implicitly (Chun & Jiang, 1998). In this chapter, we build on the idea of the 
importance of contexts for object identification and extend it more broadly 
within the novel context of semantic memory and operationalise the idea 
through the development of PSVs. 
Direct evidence on the importance of visual contexts for concrete 
objects originates from a phenomenon known as boundary extension, where 
participants not only recall the set of objects they actually saw in a naturally 
occurring scene, but also extrapolate their recall to other objects that they 
would expect to see in the natural scene (Intraub et al., 1996). Gottesman 
and Intraub (1999) have articulated this form of memory distortion as 
inaccurately recalling wide-angle views of close-up scenes. Since the 
participants in these studies are only provided with the “zoomed in” 
perspective, their extrapolation to contextually relevant concrete objects is 
likely to be based on semantic scene associations. 
The above studies demonstrate that contextual processing is 
important for attentional and perceptual processes. However, is it 
genuinely important for furthering our understanding of higher-order 
conceptual processing? Bar (2004) reasons that in order for contextual 
information to be useful to semantic associations, the information extracted 
from contexts has to be processed quickly enough to enable other cognitive 
processes to benefit from this rich information. Biederman et al. (1974) 
conducted four experiments with jumbled and coherent real-world scenes, 
with participants having to select one label between two options that best 
describes the scene. Participants were able to extract semantically 
meaningful information at about 100ms based on selecting scene-relevant 
labels. Thus, one may even argue that the context is processed before the 
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object itself is identified. Even though object identification has been 
historically seen as a serial bottom-up process, there is neuropsychological 
and functional anatomical evidence of top-down activation of visual 
processing. Based on the empirical work of Schyns and Oliva (1994), Bar 
(2004) theorises that this fast processing of contextual information is 
enabled through global cues being dependent on low spatial frequencies 
(blurry images showing proportions of “recognisable blobs”), whereas the 
details of the actual objects themselves are high spatial frequencies 
analysed during later stages of visual processing (p. 621). 
Here, we argue that we see the world as a successive array of scenes, 
wherein objects (in high spatial frequency) are embedded in a 
magnificently rich and yet low spatial frequency surroundings with other 
related objects. We walk into a supermarket and our senses, especially the 
visual system, are bombarded with a plethora of sensations of hundreds of 
objects meshed together in a rich tapestry. All this information hits us in a 
neither serial nor purely parallel manner, but in the form of a continually 
cascading information stream. In fact, there are well-known theoretical 
reviews and studies (e.g. Biederman, 1972; Biederman et al., 1982) that have 
argued that representing and processing concrete objects in naturally 
occurring groups facilitates the recognition of other concrete objects 
typically found in the same contexts. A second argument we make here is 
that objects in our scenes do not inhabit isolated islands; instead, they form 
a rich and meaningful tapestry of associations, which should be exploited 
for the study of semantic cognition. Thirdly, on the basis of our first two 
arguments, we hypothesise that the rich interconnectivity of the objects 
captured by exploring visual scenes leads to a process of grounded symbol 
interdependency. 
Grounded symbol interdependency is a generalisation of 
Louwerse’s original hypothesis; in our view, an extension to account for 
non-linguistic concept representations. Finally, we propose that the 
common associations for both concrete and abstract concepts emerge, to a 
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large extent, not merely from feature lists or language alone but from task- 
and context-specific pairings. This not only facilitates perception, but also 
enables efficient conceptual processing through the increased availability 
of heuristic shortcuts by a process of conceptual integration - the processes 
by which concepts are linked with one another through PSVs. 
In order to integrate concepts, one has to first acquire them. 
Interestingly, concept formation in children is highly dependent on the 
ability to visually explore the environment. Comparative studies on 
congenitally blind and sighted children (e.g. Jaworska-Biskup, 2011) have 
typically tested school-aged children, using batteries of concepts based on 
colours, fauna and flora and inanimate objects, and have shown significant 
limitations in congenitally blind children when it comes to proper concept 
formation and understanding. The studies also indicate that blind children 
depend more on contextual cues for successful conceptualisation instead of 
linguistic structure. 
The central hypothesis of the present study is that our surroundings 
contain sufficient statistical regularities for explaining much of the 
variability (at least partially) in our semantic space. In algorithmic terms, 
this amounts to the claim that images of objects in their natural 
surroundings contain statistical patterns that are sufficiently predictive of 
the dimensions determining our conceptual space. Therefore, we claim that 
our cognitively plausible grounding of semantics in visual scenes, will 
demonstrate computationally the theoretical adequacy for extending 
symbol interdependency beyond language. 
4.5.2 Experimental Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical overview of the importance of context in 
the study of human conceptual processing, we propose a series of 
hypotheses, each of which will be evaluated in the present series of 
computational experiments. 
 91 
I. Semantic maps will show very strong meaningful associative and 
taxonomic associations when LSA and 26 n-gram features (hand-
coded) are used. 
II. Semantic maps will show very weak meaningful associative and 
taxonomic associations when LSA and 26 random “noun features” are 
used. 
III. Semantic maps will show strong meaningful associative and taxonomic 
associations when LSA and 26 random “verb features” are used. 
IV. Semantic maps will show weak and random associative and taxonomic 
associations when only LSA 300 dimensions are used. 
V. Semantic maps will show stronger and more meaningful associative 
and taxonomic associations when LSA dimensions are gradually 
reduced (300 -> 150 -> 50). 
VI. Semantic maps will show the most meaningful associative and 
taxonomic associations when automatically extracted Perceptual Scene 
Vectors (PSVs) are used. 
4.5.3 General Methodology 
As in the work of Louwerse (2011), the above hypotheses all relate 
to results which can be explored qualitatively using MDS plots of various 
distance matrices. These may also be explored quantitatively through 
comparisons to an independent ground truth.  
4.5.3.1 Verbal descriptors and features  
In computational experiments 1-5 of this section, we use the original 
set of verbal descriptors and features used by Rogers and McClelland 
(2004). In experiments 6 and 7, we use a new set of verbal descriptors, for 
which we are not specifying any features as these experiments will 
respectively be using only LSA dimensions and PSVs (see table 4.1). 
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Original	 		 New	
Categories	 Verbal	Descriptors	 Features	 		 Verbal	Descriptors	
Animal	 PINE	 Pretty	 		 tiger	
Bird	 OAK	 Big	 		 elephant	
Fish	 MAPLE	 Green	 		 zebra	
Flower	 BIRCH	 Red	 		 rabbit	
Plant	 ROSE	 Yellow	 		 hamster	
Tree	 DAISY	 White	 		 desk	
		 TULIP	 Twirly	 		 chair	
		 SUNFLOWER	 Grow	 		 drawer	
		 ROBIN	 Move	 		 lamp	
		 CANARY	 Swim	 		 computer	
		 SPARROW	 Fly	 		 butter	
		 PENGUIN	 Walk	 		 jam	
		 SUNFISH	 Sing	 		 toast	
		 SALMON	 Leaves	 		 knife	
		 FLOUNDER	 Roots	 		 plate	
		 COD	 Skin	 		 car	
		 CAT	 Legs	 		 bus	
		 DOG	 Bark	 		 cycle	
		 MOUSE	 Branches	 		 bike	
		 PIG	 Petals	 		 train	
		 		 Wings	 		 		
		 		 Feathers	 		 		
		 		 Scales	 		 		
		 		 Gills	 		 		
		 		 Fur	 		 		
		 		 Living	 		 		
 
Table 4.1: 20 verbal descriptors × 26 features used in Rogers and McClelland (2004); 
Louwerse (2011) used the first 16 verbal descriptors (excluding mammals). The final 
column consists of the new verbal descriptors used in experiments 6 and 7. 
4.5.3.2 TASA Corpus  
All language-based spaces in this study are generated using the 
TASA (Touchstone Applied Science Associates, Inc.) corpus, which consists 
of 37,651 individual documents and 92,393 unique terms. TASA is used in 
the development of the world’s most exhaustive educator’s word frequency 
guide, used by publishers for assessing the vocabulary of different 
textbooks. The corpus itself consists of newspaper articles, novels and 
online sources. We use a particular corpus library available for the R 
statistical programming environment (Günther, Dudschig, & Kaup, 2016), 
which also includes the Web 1T 5-gram, consisting of 1 trillion unigram to 
five-gram tokens used for running LSA. This library is known to have some 
deviations from the benchmarked LSA spaces of the TASA corpus from the 
LSA Research Labs in Boulder, USA. Therefore, in order to replicate the 
current computational models, it is necessary to use the LSAfun package in 
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R. LSA default parameters are used throughout the simulations, unless 
stated otherwise. 
4.5.4 Experiment 1: 20 concepts ×	26 n-gram features 
4.5.4.1 Objective and Methods 
In our first computational experiment, our objective is to 
conceptually replicate Louwerse’s (2011) first analysis using semantic 
associations of 16 verbal descriptors × 26 features, which we extend to 20 
verbal descriptors used by Rogers and McClelland (2004). The verbal 
descriptors are used to extract the relevant n-grams from the 1 trillion 
records in the Web 1T 5-gram dataset. Following the details of Louwerse’s 
experiment, we run classical multidimensional scaling (cMDS) on the 
matrix and transform the 5-gram log frequencies into a matrix of scaled 
Euclidean distances. This experiment is aimed at testing hypothesis 1, that 
semantic maps and hierarchical clustering will show very strong meaningful 
associative and taxonomic associations when 26 hand-coded n-gram features are 
used. The theoretical reasoning resting on symbol interdependency as 
outlined in Louwerse (2011). 
4.5.4.2 Results 
Our first experiment reveals that semantic maps and hierarchical 
clustering show very strong meaningful associative and taxonomic 
associations when 26 hand-coded n-gram features are used. In figure 4.3a 
we see the categorisation of trees, flowers, birds, fish and mammals. 
However, the corrplot does show weaknesses in coherence of the flower 
and mammal categories as the groups, despite being visible, are quite weak. 
This is also reflected in hierarchical cluster analysis (see figure 4.3d), where 
flowers and mammals form unusual groupings, for example, DAISY is 
grouped together with DOG and PIG. However, superordinate taxonomic 
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relations (e.g. PLANT vs ANIMAL) are not present in the meaning 
extracted from the n-gram features. 
4.5.5 Experiment 2: 20 concepts ×	26 random n-gram noun features 
4.5.5.1 Objective and Methods 
In this experiment, we replicate the first experiment’s method, with 
one critical variation - the hand-coded 26 features used by Louwerse (2011), 
are replaced with 26 random nouns. This is implemented by randomly sub-
selecting from a list of 4,554 common nouns3. Then 26 nouns are randomly 
selected, to create a matrix of 20 verbal descriptors × 26 features, which is 
analysed using classical MDS. The step of randomly selecting 26 nouns and 
then generating an MDS plot is repeated 10 times and the average results 
are used for analysis. In this experiment we are testing the second 
hypothesis, that semantic maps and hierarchical clustering will show very weak 
meaningful associative and taxonomic associations when 26 random noun n-gram 
features are used. We find that meaning extraction from language, despite 
containing sufficient statistical regularities for modelling semantics, in support 
of symbol interdependency theory, is only sufficiently powerful when 
language is significantly constrained to increase the symbolic 
interconnectivity, which the selection of specific features helps enable. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of the 26 nouns being randomly selected for each 
iteration to be strongly associated with the 20 verbal descriptors is minimal as 
we speculate that the noun-to-noun symbol interdependencies to consist of 
small-world networks, where arbitrary associative links of degree one (first-
order co-occurrences) are going to be, on average, information poor. 
                                                      
3 Source: http://www.desiquintans.com/nounlist 
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4.5.5.2 Results 
The second experiment’s semantic representations, using 26 
random noun n-gram features (see figure 4.3b + e), are very weak with 
TREES being the only category that has strong inter-category correlations. 
These representations are the weakest semantic encodings across all 7 
experiments, where associative and taxonomic relations at the 
superordinate (e.g. ANIMAL vs PLANT) and basic (e.g. PIG vs DOG) levels 
are the weakest if at all present (TREES being an exception). 
4.5.6 Experiment 3: 20 concepts ×	26 random n-gram verb features 
4.5.6.1 Objective and Methods 
This experiment is identical to experiment 2, with one difference - 
instead of using a subset of 4,554 common nouns, we use 8,537 verbs 
identified in the University of Colorado’s Unified Verb Index4. Here, the 
hypothesis is that semantic maps and hierarchical clustering will show strong 
meaningful associative and taxonomic associations when 26 random n-gram “verb 
features” are used. Verbs are linguistic devices for describing actions, and we 
therefore predict that the verb-to-noun (all verbal descriptors are nouns) 
interrelations are going to be more prevalent than in the noun-to-noun 
scenario. Therefore, more meaningful interrelations between the verbal 
descriptors are likely to be successfully mediated by verbs. However, we still 
predict that these associations will not be as taxonomically and associatively 
strong as in the modeller-selected features in experiment 1. However, if the 
associations are still sufficiently strong, this would lend even greater support 
to symbol interdependency hypothesis than experiment 1, because of the more 
ecological valid modelling approach of not pre-selecting the specific feature 
words, as this is done randomly. This is a wide-spread problem in cognitive 
modelling, especially in the domain of semantic cognition, which can blur the 
                                                      
4 Source: http://verbs.colorado.edu/verb-index/ 
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boundary between whether or not the computationally extracted meaning is a 
genuine output of the model or biased by the modeller’s preconceptions. 
4.5.6.2 Results 
In experiment 3, using 26 random verb n-gram features, (see figure 
4.3c + f), some semantic representations are meaningfully encoded. For 
example, ROBIN and PENGUIN as well as BIRCH, MAPLE, PINE and 
OAK are respectively grouped together. Nevertheless, there are some 
exceptions to this (e.g. ROSE and DOG). The hierarchical cluster analysis 
however reveals that most basic and in particular superordinate categories 
are poorly encoded in the semantic representation based on verb n-gram 
features alone. 
 
Figure 4.3: The differentiation of conceptual representations based on 26 hand-coded 
n-gram features (a + d), 26 random noun n-gram features (b + e) and 26 random verb n-
gram features (c + f). 
 
(a) 26 hand-coded features (b) 26 random noun features (c) 26 random verb features 
(d) 26 hand-coded features (e) 26 random noun features (f) 26 random verb features 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
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4.5.7 Experiment 4: 20 concepts ×	300 / 150 / 50 LSA dimensions 
4.5.7.1 Objective and Methods 
Here we test LSA’s meaning extraction ability by means of the 
commonly used 300 dimensions, trained on the TASA corpus, as well as 
two additional variants of 150 and 50 dimensions. We hypothesise that 
semantic maps and hierarchical clustering will show the weakest associative and 
taxonomic associations when 300 LSA dimensions are used. This is based on our 
assumption that despite moving towards latent semantic interrelations (e.g. 
beyond first-order co-occurrences), this additional information will not 
sufficiently increase the signal-to-noise ratio of linguistic associations. We 
also hypothesise that semantic maps and hierarchical clustering will show 
stronger and more meaningful associative and taxonomic associations when LSA 
dimensions are gradually reduced (300 -> 150 -> 50), as the signal-to-noise ratio 
is likely to increase, leading to superior meaning extraction capabilities, 
reflected in clearer taxonomic and associative relationships. 
4.5.7.2 Results 
In the fourth experiment’s LSA-300 condition, all semantic relations 
are the weakest and most stochastic. In the LSA-150 condition, basic 
categories show some meaningful interrelations (e.g. FISH), while in the 
superior LSA-50 representation, weaker taxonomic relations start emerging 
(see figure 4.4). These results indicate that using fewer LSA dimensions can 
improve semantic encoding. 
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Figure 4.4: The differentiation of conceptual representations based on 300 LSA 
dimensions (a + d), 150 LSA dimensions (b + e) and 50 LSA dimensions (c + f). 
 
4.5.8 Experiment 5: 20 concepts ×	Perceptual Scene Vectors (PSVs) 
4.5.8.1 Perceptual Scene Vectors 
We operationalise and computationally implement the automatic 
extraction of key objects and scene characteristics from images, for creating 
Perceptual Scene Vectors (PSVs), which we define as a 1D tensor (i.e., a vector) 
capturing context-specific and cognitively-inspired statistical regularities. 
Moreover, we also introduce a novel term called cognitive data representation, 
to summarise and justify the underlying cognitive psychological reasons 
for determining why specific data formats should be used. We define the 
importance of cognitive data representations by providing an example. Our 
central aim is to extend Louwerse’s symbol interdependency theory 
beyond language to the broader remit of our continuous streams of 
experiential information, a large part of which we access through our visual 
system. However, if we were to suggest that PSVs should be generated 
based on merely scanning digital photo tags (the keywords people enter to 
summarise key aspects and/or to categorise their photos), then that would 
Experiment 4 
(a) LSA 300 Dimensions (b) LSA 150 Dimensions (c) LSA 50 Dimensions 
(d) LSA 300 Dimensions (e) LSA 150 Dimensions (f) LSA 50 Dimensions 
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not be a suitable cognitive data representation for extending Louwerse’s 
theory, given that these tags are linguistic in nature. 
Prior to outlining the computational details of PSVs, we clarify two 
core assumptions underlying our theoretical justification for focusing on (i) 
only key objects in the surrounding need to be identified and (ii) cognitive 
data representations are inspired by both brain-based as well as 
phenomenologically salient features of human experience. Firstly, as 
discussed earlier, empirical findings (e.g. Intraub et al., 1996) have shown 
that people have object-level associative frameworks, such that they will be 
aware of other “things” and “settings” but not (at least explicitly) reference 
“a blade of grass”. Motivated by the concept of basic-level categories (e.g. 
RABBIT) being more widely used in general contexts, as opposed to 
superordinate (MAMMAL) or subordinate (LOP) ones, we suggest that 
PSVs should also capture experiential-level information from real-world 
scenes. This assumption is important because it determines the particular 
type of scene segmentation algorithm we use for extracting the cognitively 
relevant information from the scene. Our motivation to create PSVs is to 
further the computational study of cognition, as opposed to developing a 
superior engineering framework. In fact, even the first assumption 
purposefully leads us to choose a sub-optimal algorithm for semantic 
applications, as the focus on experiential-level categories inevitably 
discards a great deal of statistical regularities that could be useful in, for 
example, web semantic applications. 
Secondly, suggesting that PSVs are inspired by both brain-based as 
well as phenomenologically salient features of human experience does not 
determine a particular type of representation per se. For example, we 
strongly argue that cognitive data representations change throughout the 
early developmental stages of infancy and toddlerhood all the way into 
early adolescence, gradually becoming more symbolic and less dependent 
on the immediate surroundings. Biederman (2017) defined five types of 
characteristics that are important for scene processing. These are as follows: 
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(i) support, (ii) interposition, (iii) probability, (iv) position and (v) size. Support 
refers to the force-dynamic property of most objects in our surroundings 
being physically supported as opposed to floating in mid-air. Interposition 
refers to objects mingled together in a visual scene such that based on 
information from the relative position of one object from another, it is 
possible to compute who or what is occluding or being occluded. The third 
type, probability, determines the likelihood of objects co-occurring 
together. The typical position of objects, spatial iconicity, has numerous 
stereotypical configurations such as roof usually being on top of a house, 
which has also been a focus area for some EC research (Louwerse, 2008).  
Lastly, objects are commonly associated with standard relative 
sizes. All of these characteristics are cognitively relevant, however, some of 
them (e.g. support) might be particularly relevant for modelling children’s 
development of object physics. However, in our case of representing the co-
occurrences of visual objects and their symbolically associative properties 
based on context, incorporating all five types of Biederman’s categories is 
unnecessary. We suggest that cognitive data structures should closely 
match our phenomenological experience of the environment. This means 
the omission of advanced mathematical or computational strategies merely 
for optimising algorithmic performance. For example, we do not 
supplement our PSVs with elaborate Hierarchical Bayesian classifiers for 
assigning a graded set of probabilities for objects that one might typically 
expect in a given visual scene. Similarly, the phenomenon of boundary 
extension (extrapolating from a limited viewing angle to a wider one) is 
interpreted as a higher-order associative mental capacity as opposed to one 
based on lower-level perceptual information grounded in real-world 
scenes, and so is excluded from the generation of PSVs. 
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Perceptual Scene Vectors are generated in five steps, always starting 
from a set of raw photographs5 - representing ecologically valid cognitive 
data representations of the visual world. The first step consists of extracting 
10 random images per concept-to-be-modelled. In step 2 we implement 
Zhao et al.’s (2017) pre-trained pyramid scene parsing network (PSPNet), 
which consists of a specially trained deep learning network with a pyramid 
pooling module (see figure 4.5), which is most suited for scene parsing as a 
result of the global-scene level priors from the pyramid pooling layer 
integrating contextually and globally relevant information from the visual 
receptive fields. Zhao and colleagues tested PSPNet against a wide range 
of other scene parsers using the ADE20K dataset, which includes 20,210 
training images and 2,000 validation images6, and it consistently performed 
best-in-class. However, more importantly for our purposes of deriving a 
suitable cognitive data representation for naturally occurring scenes, 
PSPNet has the unique ability of specifying the level of local versus global 
level of interest (see figure 4.6). At level 1, PSPNet outputs higher-level 
object masks (e.g. parsing people, tables, computers, cups etc.), whereas at 
level 2 it extracts object parts (e.g. head, arms, cup handle), and lastly, level 
3 extracts parts of object parts (e.g. eyes, nose and mouth). The pre-trained 
PSPNet outputs a text file with object probabilities for every input image.  
 
Figure 4.5: Zhao et al.’s PSPNet framework optimised for extracting global-scene-level 
priors. 
 
                                                      
5 In theory and practice, videos can also be used for increased ecological validity, but we 
avoid this here due to the intractability of implementing such a computational model on 
regular CPUs. 
6 At the time of conducting this study, the test dataset did not exist. 
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Step 3 extracts all object probabilities based on the first level of 
abstraction (objects), as this level is considered to be the most relevant 
format of cognitive data representation (see figure 4.7). This creates a 
smaller text file with only the outputs needed for subsequent stages. At this 
level of abstraction PSPNet has a mean intersection over union (mIOU) 
accuracy of 85.4% on the scene benchmark dataset PASCAL VOC2012 
(Visual Objects Classes). Step 4 transforms the raw text file into a structured 
data format, where each row corresponds to a particular verbal descriptor 
in our semantic modelling (e.g. DOG or PINE) and the columns contain the 
object-level probabilities. For example, in figure 4.8, the top-left image 
depicts a photo of a car including a building, that has an object segmentation 
probability of 73.6%, which is towards the higher end for real-world 
photographs. The final stage, step 5, binarises the probabilities based on a 
modeller-defined threshold for filtering out objects/columns automatically 
identified in the photographs that have probabilities less than 20%. We term 
this threshold the attentional filter, in-part, inspired by Donald Broadbent’s 
(1958) filter model of selective attention. Given that cognitive information 
processing is highly constrained by our limited processing capacity at a 
given time, this “early filtering out” of information is manifested in our 
creation of PSVs via the introduction of this attentional filter. Based on these 
steps, a single PSV for every verbal descriptor being modelled is generated. 
 
Figure 4.6: PSPNet’s 3 level of abstraction: (i) objects (level 1), (ii) object parts (level 2), 
and (iii) parts of object parts (level 3). The network starts with a photograph and 
outputs a text file containing the probabilities of objects and/or object parts. 
 
tart evel evel evel inish 
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Figure 4.7: Example from Zhou et al. demonstrating object-level scene segmentation. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Schematic example of extracting the probabilities and binarising. 
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4.5.8.2 Objective and Methods 
The methodology for this experiment differs from experiments 1 - 
4. This is the first experiment where neither language-based inputs (first-
order word co-occurrences/LSA dimensions) nor modeller-selected 
features are used for modelling semantics. Instead, 20 PSVs (one per verbal 
descriptor) are the inputs to a simple feedforward neural network. 
However, for this particular experiment, we limit the number of PSV bits 
per verbal descriptor to 26 in order to match the informational capacity of 
each verbal descriptor representation to minimise biases in comparing with 
results from experiments 1 - 4. This limit is implemented by first selecting 
the binarised PSV properties (across all verbal descriptors) ranked by the 
proportion of average active bits across all 20 verbal descriptors, although 
duplicates are omitted based on the order. For example, if one PSV 
duplicate is grass = {1,1,1,1,…,0,0,0,0} and another earth ={1,1,1,1,…,0,0,0,0}, 
then earth is omitted. However, this is only a necessity for balancing the 
need of having 26 bits to have comparability with the other experiments. 
The 26 PSVs are the 26 inputs to the neural network, with 20 hidden 
layer units, and 20 outputs, one-hot encoding of the verbal descriptors. The 
ReLU (rectified linear units) activation function is used, which is the 
simplest activation function one can use and is: 𝑓 𝑥 = 	max	(𝑥, 0) ;  the 
output is equal to the input as long as it is greater than zero. A dropout 
layer is used with a rate of 0.4 to avoid overfitting. A final softmax layer is 
used for transforming the 20-bit output to sum to 1, converting it to a 
probability. The network’s learning rate is set to a constant 0.001, and the 
network is trained for 500 epochs to a classification accuracy of 100%. Once 
the neural network training is completed, the inputs are fed back into the 
network, whilst the hidden layer representations for each PSV is recorded. 
These hidden-layer representations are then analysed using classical MDS. 
We predict that the semantic maps and hierarchical clustering will show 
the most meaningful associative and taxonomic associations when automatically 
extracted Perceptual Scene Vectors (PSVs) are used. Support for this hypothesis 
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would provide a strong argument in favour of extending the symbol 
interdependency hypothesis beyond language, to real-world scenes. 
4.5.8.3 Results 
In our fifth and crucial experiment, which tests our novel Perceptual 
Scene Vectors (PSVs) approach for automatic encoding of semantic 
associations without the need for hand-coded features, the results show the 
presence of the strongest taxonomic and associative conceptual 
representations (see figure 4.9). In this experiment, we see clear evidence of 
superordinate classification between ANIMALS and PLANTS (revealed by 
patterns in the corrplot), and also stark basic-level distinctions between 
categories. The only “anomalous” concept leaf in the hierarchical cluster 
tree, is PENGUIN, which is yet meaningfully grouped together with FISH, 
although being slightly further away from the more prototypical members, 
in-line with our expectations. Similarly, the concept CANARY (a common 
pet), despite being grouped together with other BIRDS, is also slightly 
differentiated. Even the more nuanced distinctions, e.g. ROSE and TULIP 
versus DAISY and SUNFLOWER or SALMON and COD (food) versus 
SUNFISH and FLOUNDER, are structured as one would expect, which we 
discuss in the next section, as it is based on a unique advantage of PSVs 
compared to feature-based methods. The absolute and relative heights 
(Euclidean distances) between all classes and subclasses are clearly 
differentiated, and conceptual grouping do not suffer from spurious 
correlations, as seen in the representations from experiments 1 through 4. 
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4.5.9 Experiment 6: 20 new concepts ×	300 LSA dimensions 
4.5.9.1 Objective and Methods 
This is a partial replication of experiment 4, but with only the 
standard 300 LSA dimensions and 20 new verbal descriptors (see table 4.1). 
The objective is to have an additional set of results for benchmarking the 
results from experiment 7. Similar to our hypothesis for experiment 4, we 
once again hypothesise that semantic maps and hierarchical clustering will show 
weak and random associative and taxonomic associations when only LSA’s 300 
dimensions are used. 
4.5.9.2 Results 
In our final two experiments, we directly compare the standard LSA 
300 dimensions (experiment 6) and the PSVs (experiment 7) using a new set 
of 20 verbal descriptors, see figure 4.10. The results of experiment 6 reveal 
A B 
 
Experiment 5 
Figure 4.9: Conceptual representations of 20 verbal descriptors with discernible 
taxonomic and associative hierarchies based on the hidden layer associations of 
the neural network trained using PSVs. (A) The CorrPlot reveals robust 
categorisation of trees, flowers, birds, fish and mammals as well as higher-order 
distinctions between animals and plants. (B) The Hclust further supports strong 
discriminations between the 20 concepts, which is an emergent property grounded 
in the statistical regularities of real-world scenes. 
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the weakest associative and taxonomic relationships, and an abundance of 
spurious weak correlations, even though more sensible associations also 
appear (e.g. BUTTER, JAM and TOAST). Visually inspecting the Hclust tree 
for experiment 6, reveals a common trait of LSA-300 dimensions 
(experiments 4a and 6) for encoding conceptual representations - the lack 
of coherent associations leading to a very flat and undifferentiated tree. The 
corrplot of LSA-300 dimensions also reflects this with the presence of a 
dominant diagonal “activation line”, where the verbal descriptors appear 
to be almost independent of one another.  
 
4.5.10 Experiment 7: 20 new concepts ×	Perceptual Scene Vectors 
(PSVs) 
4.5.10.1 Objective and Methods 
This is a partial replication of experiment 5 but using the 20 new 
verbal descriptors. The methods and hypotheses are identical to those of 
experiment 5. 
4.5.10.2 Results 
In contrast to the results from experiment 6, in experiment 7, the 
same verbal descriptors modelled using PSVs show very strong associative 
relations, where ANIMALS, OFFICE EQUIPMENT, FOOD & 
KITCHENWARE and TRANSPORTATION are neatly grouped together in 
their respective categories. Evidence supporting taxonomic differentiation 
is limited, with the exception of SMALL and BIG ANIMALS as well as 
CYCLE and BIKE versus TRAIN, CAR and BUS being grouped 
independently. Superordinate-level distinctions between ANIMATE and 
INANIMATE relations seems to appear from the Hclust, as it is the first 
divergence point, but the corrplot does not provide sufficient 
differentiation to justify this interpretation. The experimental design 
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limitation of not having sufficient taxonomic variability in these new verbal 
descriptors is covered in our discussion. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: (a + b) Conceptual representations of 20 novel animate and inanimate 
verbal descriptors based on 300 LSA-dimensions. (c + d) The relationships of the same 
20 concepts based on the hidden layer associations of the simple feedforward neural 
network trained using PSVs. By comparing the inter-correlations of the conceptual 
representations generated by the LSA algorithm (a) and PSVs technique (c), we 
illustrate the superior associative relations between and within the animal, office, 
kitchen and transportation categories. Moreover, when comparing the two hierarchical 
clustering solutions, the taxonomic associations based on PSVs (d) is more 
discriminating than those derived through LSA (b). Animate and inanimate differences 
in the conceptual representations is also the first point of differentiation when using 
PSVs as can be seen by the first tree split in plot (d). 
ei
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Experiment 6 
(a) 300 LSA Dimensions (b) 300 LSA Dimensions 
(c) Perceptual Scene Vectors (d) Perceptual Scene Vectors 
Experiment 7 
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4.5.11 Quantifying Semantic Coherence 
We outline a range of nuanced hypotheses for the 7 experiments in 
this chapter, where we make qualitative predictions about the extraction of 
meaningful representations that have strong associative and taxonomic 
relationships (see table 4.2). 
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1:	20	concepts	×	26	n-gram	features	
		 		 		 		 5	 		
2:	20	concepts	×	26	n-gram	noun	features	
		 2	 		 		 		 		
3:	20	concepts	×	26	n-gram	verb	features	
		 		 		 4	 		 		
4a:	20	concepts	×	300	LSA	dimensions	
1	 		 		 		 		 		
4b:	20	concepts	×	150	LSA	dimensions	
		 2	 		 		 		 		
4c:	20	concepts	×	50	LSA	dimensions	
		 		 3	 		 		 		
5:	20	concepts	×	Perceptual	Scene	Vectors	
		 		 		 		 		 6	
6:	20	new	concepts	×	300	LSA	dimensions	
1	 		 		 		 		 		
7:	20	new	concepts	×	Perceptual	Scene	Vectors	
		 		 		 		 		 6	
 
Table 4.2: Summary of our predictions for experiments 1 through 7. Weak predictions 
indicate very poor associative and taxonomic relationships, whereas strong predictions 
more meaningful relationships. 
 
Creating a continuum, in our case, from the weakest to strongest 
relationship, helps provide an ordinal structure to our hypothesis 
dimension, for distinguishing between language- and scene-based meaning 
spaces. Furthermore, it allows us to explore more quantitative metrics that 
compare how well an algorithm can extract meaning. 
Semantic representations, especially in the field of cognitive 
modelling, are typically evaluated using statistical methods such as MDS, 
principal component analysis (PCA) and/or hierarchical clustering 
(Hclust). Our focus here will be on hierarchical clustering due to the 
prevalence of this particular statistical technique for the qualitative 
evaluation of semantic model outputs across a range of empirical and 
modelling investigations (Small et al., 1995; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Rogers 
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& McClelland, 2004). Agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithms 
typically output a tree diagram/dendrogram depicting the cluster 
membership and taxonomy. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering 
specifically starts with all variables as separate clusters and then iteratively 
joining the two most similar clusters together until all clusters are grouped 
together. However, once clusters are grouped together, they are not split 
out during subsequent iterations. The vertical distance (usually Euclidean 
or Jaccard) is a measure of dissimilarity, with greater distances representing 
larger differences between the groups.  
Traditionally, hierarchical clustering outputs take the form of a tree 
diagram and are evaluated based on whether or not they qualitatively 
“make sense”, essentially reducing this to an evaluation of whether or not 
common-sense associative and taxonomic relationships are meaningfully 
captured by the model. For example, are animate and inanimate objects 
subdivided into different groups? Equally, our intuitions allow us to 
understand that concepts such as PENGUINS could sensibly fall in either 
the bird or the fish category but not in the inanimate cluster. When 
comparing more than one hierarchical cluster analysis based on n-
dimensional multivariate data, such intuitions may well be sufficient when 
n is a relatively small number like in most cognitive modelling “toy 
datasets” of typically no more than 20 concepts. However, a robust 
quantitative measure of semantic similarity is pertinent for making reliable 
comparisons across a range of different models, which is currently lacking 
in the contemporary cognitive semantics literature.  
In the extant literature, the need to quantify the semantic association 
plots also largely remains elusive, although the internal validity of clusters 
is typically analysed by visually inspecting the rate of decay of the mean 
square error (MSE) as the number of clusters increase (similar to the 
screeplot in factor analysis). Ball and Hall (1965) are probably the first to 
review the use of MSEs for obtaining the optimal number of clusters. 
Typically, there is an “elbow-point”, which determines that after k clusters, 
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additional clusters are extracted with increasing levels of diminishing 
returns, mathematically captured by the proportion of variance explained (see 
Halkidi, Batistakis, & Vazirgiannis, 2002). However, extrinsic validity of 
clusters, comparing two cluster solutions against one another or in relation 
to an independent ground truth (e.g. data collected from psychological 
studies) is an underexplored area within semantic cognition research. A 
notable exception is Pulvermüller et al.’s (2010) brain mapping study.  
Pulvermüller and colleagues investigated the connections within 
the frontotemporal cortex to discriminate distributed lexical and category-
specific networks, using k-means, a commonly used clustering algorithm for 
partitioning the data into k clusters, where k is determined by the analyst. 
Pulvermüller et al. compare the clustering similarity across experiments 
using the Rand index (RI), which calculates the degree of similarity between 
two sets of clusters by comparing the class labels, and ranges from 0 to 1, 
where 1 indicates perfect correspondence between two classifications 
(Rand, 1971). However, we recommend using the adjusted Rand index (ARI) 
for cognitive modelling purposes, which is the corrected-for-chance form of 
the original Rand index (Hubert & Arabie, 1985). Pulvermüller et al. analyse 
neuroimaging data, where semantic networks are determined based on the 
co-activation of thousands of voxels, and the probability of cluster labels 
overlapping with one another is very small. However, much of cognitive 
semantics research, including the experiments in this chapter, consist of toy 
models with extremely small datasets, and therefore chance-level overlaps 
across vectors of cluster membership are more likely to occur, and the 
difference between the RI and ARI is likely to be significantly larger for 
smaller datasets, making the ARI a more suitable metric for comparing 
cluster similarities between membership groups. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) across all 7 experiments, 
quantifying the similarity in semantic clustering between the various language and 
Perceptual Scene Vector (PSV) experiments and the ground truth clustering from 
Rogers and McClelland (2004). 
 
Finally, we quantify the quality of our semantic modelling 
representations by comparing them to an independent ground truth - a test 
for external validity in our hierarchical clusters. In experiments 1 - 5, this 
ground truth is the original Rogers and McClelland (2004) connectionist 
feature-based network model, while for experiments 6 and 7, inspired by 
Rogers and McClelland’s model, we create a hand-coded feature-based 
model. Our Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) is calculated by averaging 
independent ARIs over several cuts of the tree (range = 2, 4, 6, 8) for all 7 
experiments’ Hclust membership vectors versus their respective ground 
truth representations’ Hclust vectors. The results are summarised in table 
4.3. Generally, across all the experiments, we can see that semantic 
encodings based on PSVs perform the best (experiments 5 & 7), with the 
highest ARI score being 0.93, indicating an extremely high level of 
correspondence with the ground truth representation. This is closely 
followed by Louwerse’s (2011) conceptual replication using 26 LSA feature 
(experiment 1). The representations with the lowest ARI scores are, the 
standard LSA 300 dimensions (experiments 4a & 6), conditions with 26 
random noun n-gram features (experiment 2), 26 random verb n-gram 
features (experiment 3). The representation of experiment 6, with the 20 
new verbal descriptors and 300 LSA dimensions, has the lowest ARI score 
		 Adjusted	Rand	Index	
1:	20	concepts	×	26	n-gram	features	 0.79	
2:	20	concepts	×	26	n-gram	noun	features	 0.44	
3:	20	concepts	×	26	n-gram	verb	features	 0.51	
4a:	20	concepts	×	300	LSA	dimensions	 0.44	
4b:	20	concepts	×	150	LSA	dimensions	 0.59	
4c:	20	concepts	×	50	LSA	dimensions	 0.64	
5:	20	concepts	×	Perceptual	Scene	Vectors	 0.93	
6:	20	new	concepts	×	300	LSA	dimensions	 0.41	
7:	20	new	concepts	×	Perceptual	Scene	Vectors	 0.88	
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of 0.41. However, experiments 4b and 4c, where the LSA dimensions are 
respectively reduced to the first 150 and 50 dimensions have ARI scores in 
the midrange between 0.59 and 0.64. 
4.6 Discussion 
The present chapter’s motivation started with the conceptual 
replication of Louwerse’s (2011) results on extracting meaning from 
surface-level statistical regularities in language but with the aim of 
extending symbol interdependency beyond language. Our extension of 
symbol interdependency, in this chapter, focused on grounding it in real-
world scenes, based on ecologically valid cognitive data representations, a 
framework we introduce for moving beyond simple toy datasets and 
modeller-determined lists of features. 
We successfully replicated Louwerse’s finding of using surface-
level language structures for capturing sufficient symbol 
interdependencies for extracting semantic representations with many of the 
properties found in traditional connectionist models of semantic cognition. 
In doing so, we independently provide support for Louwerse’s symbol 
interdependency hypothesis, and also support the argument that the “input 
data” (e.g. language) is more important than the algorithm itself for 
meaning extraction.  
Both a qualitative analysis of the representations and a quantitative 
estimation of the correspondence between our language-based models and 
the original Rogers and McClelland (2004) model using the Adjusted Rand 
Index provide strong evidence in support of statistical regularities found in 
surface-level language patterns. To our best knowledge, this is the first time 
semantic representations have been quantitatively evaluated to test for 
external validity using an independent ground truth. Nevertheless, one 
general limitation of much corpus-based semantic modelling, including our 
LSA-based experiments, is the comparability of LSA spaces. Even though 
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we use the same corpus as Louwerse (TASA), LSA spaces are typically 
calculated with different default parameters. Therefore, some of the smaller 
differences we have noticed in the taxonomic associations between our 
model and that of Louwerse’s might be due to these “hidden parameters” 
used for generating our respective LSA spaces. However, our findings still 
robustly support Louwerse’s original conclusions. To overcome this 
drawback, we recommend that the cognitive modelling community should 
create a set of standard benchmark spaces that would provide a robust testbed 
for all researchers. Modelling with a set of pre-determined features 
obfuscates the finding of computationally extracting meaningful semantic 
representations from first-order linguistic co-occurrences as the outcome 
could be influenced by the modeller’s knowledge of particular features that 
contain sufficient relationships with the verbal descriptors being modelled 
in the first place. 
The core theoretical objective of experiments 2 (26 random noun n-
gram features) and 3 (26 random verb n-gram features) is centred on 
avoiding modeller-defined features. We reason that this eliminates the 
limitation of information leakage from the modeller to the semantic 
representation generated computationally. As we predicted, when using 26 
random noun-based features, the semantic representations are very weak. 
In fact, the representations are so weak that much of the variability in the 
correlations is largely spurious. Where stronger correlations do exist (e.g. 
TREES), an informal analysis of the n-grams of the words PINE, OAK, 
MAPLE and BIRCH reveals, unsurprisingly, the prevalence of the word 
“tree” in the TASA corpus, which explains the more robust associative 
relations between trees even when other relations are stochastic. In our 
third experiment, with random verb features, our prediction was only 
directionally correct, as we expected to find even stronger semantic 
associations than we did. The use of verb features led to a slightly superior 
semantic representation when compared to noun features, which we think 
can be largely attributed to verbs being more useful for distinguishing 
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animate concepts from one another and from inanimate ones, although this 
remains a speculative interpretation. 
In our standard LSA 300-dimensions model (experiment 4), we find 
the weakest semantic associations, which is surprising given the wide range 
of LSA applications. LSA’s 300 dimensions are ordered from most to least 
important in terms of proportion of corpus variance explained. 
Interestingly, we find evidence for a smaller number of stronger 
dimensions being superior for meaning extraction, because LSA 50 
dimensions (ARI = 0.64) are quantitatively and qualitatively superior than 
150 dimensions (ARI = 0.59), which in turn is considerably more 
conceptually meaningful than 300 dimensions (ARI = 0.44). In our case of 
concrete verbal descriptors, we have evidence for fewer dimensions being 
superior than more dimensions, even though that is unlikely to generalise 
for a wide range of concepts that LSA typically has to model. Therefore, 
given this finding, we are certainly not recommending that fewer LSA 
dimensions are better for meaning extraction in general. 
Landauer and Dumais (1997) originally recommended the semantic 
granularity of the LSA algorithm to be set to 300 dimensions, which was 
found to be optimal for a range of different corpus-based analyses. 
However, the cognitive scientists Griffiths, Steyvers and Tenenbaum (2007) 
tested 100 to 700 dimensions (intervals of 100) and found 500 dimensions 
to be optimal. One key reason for the difference between our results and 
those of Griffiths et al. might be due to the fact that their study examines 
topic models across thousands of complex semantic networks (on a cut-down 
version of TASA) where additional LSA dimensions are more likely to 
contribute “semantic signal”, whereas in our small dataset of simple verbal 
descriptors, additional dimensions are likely to merely increase “semantic 
noise”. Therefore, we do not make recommendations on the optimal 
number of LSA dimensions, as this is not the objective of experiment 4. Our 
focus is on the nature of the semantic representations as a function of 
number of LSA dimensions. 
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In our experiments, both the reduction of LSA dimensions and the 
hand-coding of features lead to more meaningful semantic spaces. Based 
on experiments 1 through 4, we suggest that a common advantage 
exploited by both the reduction of LSA dimensions and the hand-coding of 
features is the increase in the signal-to-noise ratio, facilitating 
computational meaning extraction. The reduction of LSA dimensions 
allows to filter out less relevant/noisy covariation patterns from the latter 
dimensions, which can interfere and distort the earlier and more relevant 
latent semantic dimensions. In the case of modeller-selected n-gram 
features, we, as the modellers, are using our own cognitive apparatus, to 
instil the artificial cognitive model with the most meaningful characteristics 
available to us. This helps encode the most relevant surface-level 
covariations for describing our verbal descriptors. For example, when a 
computational modeller decides to use a specific feature such as BARK, this 
significantly reduces the computational challenge of surfacing the relevant 
linguistic surface structures in the first place. Moreover, from a cognitive 
modelling perspective, it does not provide sufficient mechanistic details on 
meaning extraction, even though, from a linguistic standpoint, it offers 
strong support for a language-centred view on conceptual processing. In 
other words, we argue, the modeller is engaged in arguably the most 
complex and difficult phase of meaning extraction - relevant feature 
extraction, which should instead be mechanistically accounted for in the 
computational model itself. 
The relevance problem is a core theoretical issue for cognitive 
modelling; because of the multitude of possible relations, it is very difficult 
to efficiently determine which ones are relevant (Blasch et al., 2006). Within 
the domain of conceptual processing this is perhaps an even greater 
problem, not dissimilar to the classic frame problem in AI which was first 
outlined by McCarthy and Hayes (1969) and formally outlines the difficulty 
for artificial systems to be able to provide rational default assumptions, 
based on environmental constraints. Human and non-human animals 
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understand relevance typically based on prior experience or instincts, 
unless they find themselves in particularly novel situations. However, for 
the development of computational intelligence, more broadly, and 
computational cognitive models, in particular, this is a difficult challenge. 
In two of our fundamental experiments (5 and 7), we demonstrate 
the computational viability and advantage of using Perceptual Scene Vectors 
(PSVs), our original computational contribution to the study of modelling 
semantic cognition. Using the pre-trained general-purpose PSPNet deep 
learning model (Zhao et al., 2017), we automatically extract object-level 
associations (not features), which across numerous images (only 10 per 
verbal descriptor) generate a little dataset containing rich object-to-object 
statistical co-variations. Using these ecologically valid and automatically 
extracted features grounded in our naturally occurring visual experiences, 
we model a simple feedforward neural network. Thus, the richness in our 
semantic representations does not rely on complex algorithms or big data. 
The hidden layer representations of two separate small training datasets 
(experiments 5 and 7) are associatively and taxonomically more meaningful 
and have the best external validity as measured by the correspondences 
with their respective ground truths. Comparing the results of experiments 
with PSVs with those using language-based inputs further supports the 
feasibility and power of PSVs. PSVs permit the querying of why 
associations or taxonomies are present in resultant semantic spaces, in non-
trivial ways, in other words, beyond the antecedent of “the modeller hand-
coded this specification”. For example, in experiment 5’s PSV-based 
semantic space, CANARY is in the bird class but still differentiates from 
ROBIN and SPARROW. Comparing the PSVs of the three birds revealed 
that amongst birds, CANARY uniquely contains cage, as is also the case for 
RABBIT and HAMSTER in experiment 7, due to their role as pets. Thus, 
grounded-representations are not only ecologically valid cognitive 
modelling inputs, but can also help reveal nuanced relations omitted by 
hand-coded features. 
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In this chapter we have also found a novel application for an 
existing quantitative metric for determining the external validity of 
clusters, in our case the outputs of hierarchical cluster analyses. We propose 
that the use of the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) is most suited to small-scale 
datasets typically used in cognitive modelling of conceptual 
representations as it corrects for chance-level cluster membership overlaps 
which are more likely to disproportionately bias the comparison of smaller 
sets of semantic representations. Our tiered approach of cutting the 
hierarchical tree at several levels and generating a mean ARI for each tree 
should be seen as a simple comparison across superordinate, basic and 
subordinate concept representations. One limitation of our aggregation 
strategy is that we are giving multiple levels of the hierarchical cluster tree 
the same semantic importance. So a misclassification at the superordinate 
level and the basic level are equally important, which is not cognitively 
plausible. Although, in future work, we could create a weighted mean 
based on empirically derived importance factors. Additionally, we would 
include verbal descriptors spanning all three levels of concept categories 
given that we did not have subordinate level concept discriminations (e.g. 
SPORTS CAR versus HATCHBACK). 
In contrast to the original verbal descriptors used by Louwerse 
(2011), one of the key limitations of our new set of verbal descriptors is the 
lack of naturally occurring taxonomic structure. Although topic-level 
associations are present, higher-order pan-topic and taxonomic relations 
remain elusive, which limits our ability to investigate the semantic 
representations in more detail. A second, and potentially more severe 
limitation, is the approach to our external validation. In our experiments, 
we compare our model outputs with those of other models which consisted 
of the Rogers and McClelland (2004) model and another feature-based 
model that we have developed ourselves. Clearly, this is not ideal for 
evaluating computational semantic spaces objectively. In the latter case 
(experiment 7), information leakage from the present author could have 
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easily inflated the Adjusted Rand Index unconsciously, because we are 
comparing our PSV-based model against a feature-based model we 
developed. In our analyses, the traditional feature-based models provide a 
convenient testbed for quantification purposes. However, our 
recommendation for future evaluations of external validity is to collect 
empirical data from human participants and treat that as the ground truth 
for genuine semantic representations. Ontologically, this would obviously 
be preferable given the aim of cognitive science is to better understand and 
model actual human cognition. 
In closing, we summarise that symbol interdependency is not 
limited to the latent and surface semantic associations in language, and that 
our busy visual world contains rich statistical regularities, from which 
high-quality meaning spaces can be computationally extracted. This 
automatic mining of meaning grounded in real-world scenes also helps 
address the relevance problem in cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence by providing an ecologically valid reference frame, our PSV, 
and simultaneously circumvents the dilemma of information leakage from 
the cognitive modeller. 
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Chapter 5                             
Grounding Concrete versus Abstract 
Semantics 
 
5.1 Abstract 
Empirical and computational studies on semantics are usually 
limited to concrete concepts, despite the importance and prevalence of 
abstract words in the human lexicon. Recently, there has been an increased 
focus on describing the content of abstract concepts through introspective, 
emotional, metaphorical and situational descriptions (Borghi et al., 2017). The 
literature converges on emotions being essential for abstract words, 
hypothesised as embodied abstract semantics (Kousta et al., 2011). We first 
replicate the concreteness continuum by re-analysing data from a large-scale 
normative study (Brysbaert et al., 2014). Then, across three novel 
computational experiments, we compare situationally grounded concepts 
with traditional language-based representations. After externally 
validating PSVs using a neuroimaging benchmark, we find PSVs can only 
successfully represent more concrete words. Lastly, we develop our new 
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scene2vec representation, by extending PSVs with emotion expressions 
extracted from photographs which yield noticeably enriched semantic 
representations across the concreteness spectrum, despite a lower 
performance for more abstract concepts. Our original contribution of 
modelling semantics using emotions only partially supports the embodied 
abstract semantics hypothesis and indicates that there is more to 
representing abstract meaning than emotions alone. 
5.2 Introduction 
The English language contains a significant proportion of both 
concrete and abstract words (Kousta et al., 2011); even though concrete 
words appear more frequently, the vast majority of words in the English 
lexicon are abstract (Recchia & Jones, 2012). Both cognitive science and 
artificial intelligence have principally focused on studying concepts from 
prototypical concrete categories like birds, vehicles and artefacts. This 
emphasis is understandable given that these are semantic entities with both 
a mental representation and a physical instantiation and are easier to 
operationalise in empirical and computational studies. Moreover, research 
has shown that concrete words are more accessible to recall than abstract 
words (Walker & Hulme, 1999), which might account for a methodological 
bias towards the selection of concrete words during empirical and 
computational experimental designs. Abstract concepts (e.g. justice, 
calculus) compared to concrete concepts (e.g. cat, laptop) also lack delineated 
referents but are more likely to be used across a broader range of semantic 
contexts. Therefore, we argue, the concept-to-concept associations for 
abstract words can be weaker due to a lack of referents; yet, more of these 
weaker associations for abstract concepts can be flexibly incorporated by 
new relational inferences - a key facet of higher-order cognition - 
combinatorial generalisation. However, the first step to understanding this 
combinatorial constitution of abstract concepts is to investigate the 
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semantic content of abstract words. A mechanistic account of how this 
content is learnt from real-world experiences and then represented in a 
semantic memory system will further our understanding of the interplay 
between concrete and abstract concepts and their role in general human 
cognition. Therefore, abstract concepts provide a crucial litmus test for any 
general theory of cognitive semantics as well as more specific theoretical 
perspectives such as grounded cognition. However, we first need to 
understand why abstract and concrete concepts are different in the first 
place and then to determine whether or not they are genuinely 
dichotomous. 
5.2.1 Comparing Concrete and Abstract Words 
There are currently many perspectives on the similarities and 
differences between concrete and abstract words, and a thorough review of 
this exceeds our present scope. However, the most relevant position to our 
grounded cognition stance originates from Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings’ 
(2005) exploratory research. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings investigated 
how abstract concepts could be situated using a qualitative-quantitative 
framework. Participants consisted of a small group of 24 undergraduates, 
who were asked to produce characteristic properties of three abstract (truth, 
freedom, invention), intermediate (cooking, farming, carpeting) and concrete (bird, 
car, sofa) concepts. Participants reported the thoughts that came to mind 
and described the typical characteristics of the different words. Each 
participant had one minute per word and was prompted with “please 
continue to describe your thoughts as they come to mind” (p.139) after five 
seconds of pausing. From this qualitative research, combined with detailed 
quantitative analysis of the participants’ verbalisations (video recorded), 
using coding schemes (Wu & Barsalou, 2009), the study was able to establish 
the relative proportions of taxonomic, object-specific, setting/event and 
introspective contents present in the self-generated verbalisations. They 
found support for three out of four of their hypotheses. First, both concrete 
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and abstract concepts share situational content, because participants 
frequently referred to different actions, events, goals and affective reactions 
associated with settings relevant to a given concept. However, this is 
particularly true for abstract words, which contradicts Schwanenflugel’s 
(1991) context availability theory, in which abstract concepts are predicted to 
have weaker connections with situational information. 
Second, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) also found that even 
though both concrete and abstract concepts share situational content, the 
specific focus of the content differs. Abstract concepts are unique in that 
their situational focus is not only distributed across a range of complex 
situational configurations but also is grounded in more introspective content 
constituting most prominently emotions, followed by social and event 
content and less importantly physical settings. However, for concrete 
concepts, the focus is more on the specific object-to-object interrelations as 
well as the background contexts. Relatedly, in a property verification task, 
Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) found that introspective features were 
more important for accounting for abstract words. Their third hypothesis, 
somewhat related to their second hypothesis, claimed that abstract 
concepts are more complex than concrete concepts due to the distributed 
nature of the situations for abstract concepts, which was also supported. 
The only hypothesis for which they did not find any supporting evidence 
for is that the content of abstract concepts is simulated, although this would 
be challenging to determine from an exploratory qualitative7 study. This 
study provides evidence for some universality in the mechanistic account 
underlying semantic representations of both concrete and abstract words. 
Although Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) do not discuss the 
mechanistic implications of their exploratory findings, we believe that the 
commonalities in situational information across concepts suggest 
                                                      
7 Technically speaking, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) was qualitative in their data 
collection phase although their analysis consisted of both qualitative (e.g. coding schemes) 
and quantitative techniques (e.g. ANOVAs). 
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significant overlaps in concept representations irrespective of concreteness. 
There are also likely to be mechanistically distinct processes underlying 
concrete and abstract concepts such as the differential role played by 
introspective information. Next, we turn our attention to such mechanistic 
conceptualisations of abstract words. 
5.2.2 Modelling Abstract Semantics 
Only very recently, have some researchers started incorporating 
abstract words in their computational models. For example, Hoffman et al. 
(2018) recently extended the connectionist hub-and-spoke account of 
semantic cognition to apply it to abstract words. At its core, Hoffman et al.’s 
modelling relies on co-occurrence patterns within a linguistic distributional 
system, supervised topic models. This iteration of the hub-and-spoke model 
also incorporates cognitive control and the linguistic context shaping 
meaning based on linguistic and non-linguistic data, which they claim is 
embodied. We disagree with this claim given the non-ecologically valid 
stimuli used in their computational experiments. Despite Hoffman et al.’s 
aims of reconciling disembodied and embodied perspectives and including 
both concrete and abstract words, their model implicitly assumes a bipolar 
distinction between concrete and abstract concepts given the sharp contrast 
of stimuli representations based on either pure embodiment or derived 
embodiment. Hoffman and colleagues promote a more direct integration of 
associations between verbal and non-verbal properties (“embodied view”) 
and the computational linguistic perspective in favour of decoding 
meaning from word distributions across language (disembodied view). 
Given the relevance of Hoffman et al.’s research to our current focus on 
computationally grounding concrete and abstract concepts, we provide a 
detailed review of their work. This is followed by a review of the critical 
differences in the theoretical assumptions of Hoffman et al. compared to 
our present research. We then develop an alternative approach, without 
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reliance on distributed linguistic representations, which is a natural 
extension of our work on perceptual scene vectors (chapter 4). 
Hoffman et al.’s (2018) computational model uses a recurrent neural 
network with 590 units, subdivided into five groups (one central hub and 
four spokes), with 64 verbal input and 64 verbal prediction units (output) 
comprising the concept labels. The 64 concepts consist of 22 concrete 
concepts, 32 abstract concepts, and ten homonyms. In the architecture, 162 
units encode the “sensorimotor properties”, while the context and amodal 
hub each have 150 units (see figure 5.1). Given the recurrent nature of the 
model, the hub representation is connected bidirectionally with the 
sensorimotor properties, verbal predictions and context units, while the 
verbal inputs are unidirectional, feeding into the amodal hub 
representation. This allows the model to learn sequences of words, such 
that the preceding word can influence the conceptualisation of the 
upcoming word. Both the hub and the context pools are hidden layer units, 
thus are based on gradually learnt associations. The authors also argue that 
the “recurrent architecture allows the model to develop representations 
that are sensitive to context” (p. 14). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The recurrent neural network from Hoffman et al. (2018). 
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Hoffman and colleagues use a highly simplified “artificial 
environment” in which they hand-code sensorimotor properties by 
creating six overlapping and three unique bit-representations for category 
neighbours. Therefore, all the stimuli used in their study are created based 
on a priori assumptions on the nature of concrete and abstract concepts. 
Even though we have been critical of such hand-coding practices, from a 
grounded cognition perspective, Hoffman et al. do state that their main 
interest is to implement the most relevant aspect of sensorimotor 
properties, which is that category neighbours typically share more of these 
properties than concepts from different categories. Finally, Hoffman et al. 
generate a synthetic training corpus of 400,000 episodes for training the 
model across a range of different contexts. The training episodes are 
generated using a pseudo-stochastic combination of linguistically-derived 
topic models (for details, see Griffiths et al., 2007) and either constant 
sensorimotor properties or verbal inputs depending on the specific 
simulation run across a series of experiments. Hoffman and colleagues 
argue that their hybrid model is based on cognitive neuroscience evidence 
that concepts are grounded in sensorimotor as well as patterns of 
distributed lexical co-occurrences. Their model successfully accounts for a 
range of typical and atypical semantic cognition phenomena, including the 
role of executive function influences on task-specific meaning construction. 
However, the task-specificity is constructed through the use of homonym 
concepts (e.g. bank) as opposed to a wide range of concepts more generally.  
In our view, this research, although very interesting, struggles to 
genuinely integrate so-called embodied and disembodied information due 
to the artificial nature of the stimuli used. We argue that the model effects 
observed are a direct consequence of the stimuli features artificially 
generated based on a priori assumptions of concept overlaps. We now cover 
a range of evidence-based semantic dimensions in the extant literature, 
before turning our attention to grounding concrete and abstract concepts in 
naturalistic scenes. 
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5.2.3 Dimensions of Semantic Representations 
At this stage, to broaden our perspective and to lay the foundation 
for this chapter and the next, we opt for a highly inclusive definition of the 
term semantic dimension as a measurable extent of some meaning-related 
property. The three main classes of describing semantic dimensions 
commonly identified in the cognitive science literature are as follows: (i) 
taxonomic (e.g. animate-inanimate), (ii) modality-specific (e.g. vision, 
auditory, haptic) and (iii) concreteness (concrete-abstract). We find these 
three areas particularly relevant for grounding concrete and abstract 
concepts because the putative dimensions are likely to be important 
determinants of how concepts are grounded. Lastly, to critically evaluate 
the taxonomic perspective, we will also briefly evaluate an alternative 
perspective, called lexical-retrieval, which is not so much a perspective on 
describing meaning but rather a reinterpretation of neuropsychological 
findings, which lends support to the taxonomic dimension. In this section, 
we briefly outline each of these four perspectives before delving into our 
own computational studies of concrete and abstract concepts. 
5.2.3.1 Taxonomic categorisation  
Cognitive psychologists, especially those studying language, have 
long argued that semantic memory of concrete words is structured 
hierarchically (Rosch, 1975; Ebeling, 1978; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). The first 
seminal neuropsychological clinical case study related to the taxonomic 
categorisation of semantic memory originates from Warrington and 
McCarthy’s (1983) female patient nicknamed V.E.R who suffered a severe 
left hemisphere stroke. They demonstrated that V.E.R’s ability to speak and 
follow relatively simple verbal instructions was severely impaired 
following the stroke, although she was able to point to pictures in response 
to a spoken word, revealing some sparing of semantic memory. The 
exciting discovery was the nature of her memory impairment. V.E.R was 
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significantly more successful at pointing to pictures of animate and natural 
objects than inanimate objects such as tools and other artefacts. This finding 
led them to label the condition as category-specific access dysphasia, which 
more generally refers to category-specific semantic deficits.  
Subsequent evidence provided by Warrington and Shallice (1984) 
revealed the exact opposite pattern in four patients with halted progression 
of herpes simplex encephalitis - a viral infection of the central nervous system 
(Whitley et al., 1982), all of whom performed worse when recognising 
animate concepts than inanimate ones. Consecutive demonstrations of 
independent dissociations in opposite directions collectively support a 
double dissociation interpretation, which points to more conclusive 
evidence for claiming that two distinct cognitive functions might originate 
in different areas of the brain. However, this long-standing hallmark of a 
“genuine finding” in neuropsychology, dating back to Teuber (1955), has 
been questioned previously by Shallice’s (1988) suggestion that 
dissociations only signify discriminations between brain regions if one first 
accepts the premise of modularity - the brain consists of distinct areas 
dedicated to specialised information processing. More recently, Van Orden, 
Pennington and Stone (2001) use the case of reading modules to show that 
such strict adherence to modularity is misguided, due to the inability of 
finding pure dissociations, which leads to the second problem of 
unrealistically finding purer cases, resulting in a regression towards 
increased fractionation and a diminishing likelihood of detecting patients 
with specialised damage. 
However, from our perspective of understanding cognitive 
semantics, the double dissociation of animate and inanimate conceptual 
taxonomies is a particularly significant milestone given that it marks the 
first objectively identified unitary dimension of semantic processing, 
namely animacy versus inanimacy. At this stage, we move away from the 
dichotomous distinctions initially outlined in the neuropsychological 
literature (e.g. Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), because recent fMRI evidence 
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suggests a more psychologically plausible alternative. Sha et al. (2015) 
applied representational similarity analysis to the ventral visual cortex and 
found a graded activation continuum between most animate and least 
animate concepts. Sha and colleagues, using 480 images split across 12 
categories, showed that the most critical dimension (first principal 
component) discriminated between inanimate and animate stimuli. 
Categories KEY, HAMMER and LOBSTER were at the lowest end of the 
animacy spectrum, while images from the categories CAT, CHIMP and 
HUMAN were on the opposite end of the spectrum (high animacy) and 
PELICAN, WARBLER, CLOWNFISH and RAY were in the middle of the 
first principal component. Sha and colleagues argue that the 
neuropsychological findings supporting a dichotomy is “the illusory result 
of stimulus sampling biases” (p. 665). Therefore, previous 
neuropsychological deficits outlining the dichotomous difference between 
animate and inanimate concepts might well be due to sampling from either 
end of the spectrum. 
5.2.3.2 Modality-specific categorisation  
The second framework for delineating semantic cognition also 
stems from the interpretations of the neuropsychological double-
dissociations discovered by Warrington and colleagues (Warrington & 
McCarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). Warrington et al. argued that 
different sensorimotor channels might be weighted deferentially as a 
function of the type of stimuli represented in semantic memory. They 
predicted that semantic memories of animate objects would be associated 
more strongly with perceptual attributes, while for semantic associations of 
inanimate objects, functional properties would have stronger relevance. A 
concrete example of this would be the comparison between the animate and 
inanimate objects LEOPARD and DESK, where for the animal the dominant 
sensorimotor channel would be visual, while in the case of the inanimate 
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piece of furniture, it would be the functional properties of the object (Farah 
& McClelland, 1991, p.341). 
The first pioneering cognitive modelling experiment in the domain 
of semantic cognition and crucial theoretical development in the same field 
culminates from Farah and McClelland’s (1991) landmark publication, 
cited nearly 1,000 times. Farah and McClelland used a connectionist 
architecture to model 20 random concepts (ten animate and inanimate), 
consisting of 24 visual and 24 verbal input units. The emphasis on 
randomness is two-fold. Firstly, the words represented in the hidden layer 
of the neural network were created arbitrarily with -1 and +1, which might 
appear unusual, but is logical given their modelling focus on the 
connectivity of stimuli-groups (living and non-living) and functional and 
visual semantic spaces. Secondly, one of our core arguments we have made 
throughout is the need for ecologically representative stimuli in cognitive 
modelling. Therefore, technical details like “random stimuli” are a vital 
point of departure for our present modelling studies. In fairness, our real-
world grounding is a more manageable endeavour for contemporary 
cognitive modellers than was the case almost three decades ago, due to the 
current availability of increased computational power, the digitisation of 
much of our everyday lives and the ubiquity of machine learning 
techniques developed more recently, in particular, deep learning. A 
theoretically-motivated modelling constraint implemented by Farah and 
McClelland was based on the relative frequency of visual and functional 
properties associated with animate and inanimate concepts. Their 
experimental ingenuity was based on asking participants to read through 
dictionary definitions of living and non-living words and highlight the 
number of instances either functional or visual characteristics were 
described. This quantification was used to test Warrington and Shallice’s 
(1984) theory of visual and functional properties respectively being more 
important for living and non-living objects. Indeed, the ratio for visual-to-
functional for animate concepts was 7.7:1 and for inanimate objects 1.4:1, 
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which indicates that the visual channel was stronger for living concepts 
than non-living ones, even though the original assumption of functional 
properties being more important than visual properties for inanimate 
concepts was found not to be the case. These ratios obtained determined 
the proportion of visual and functional units in the semantic layer of the 
neural network, which was then subjected to gradual noise perturbation 
experiments to simulate brain damage by progressively lesioning the visual 
or functional semantic representation layer of the network from 0% (no 
damage) all the way to 99%. Farah and McClelland’s modelling results 
quantitatively and qualitatively reflected the double dissociation observed 
in the neurological patients, where more significant damage to visual units 
had a more substantial impact on animate concepts, while damage to the 
functional units impacted the inanimate objects (Postle, 2015).   
This perspective of modality-specific semantic memory is 
particularly important for the research presented in this chapter but also 
this thesis in general given its relevance to grounded cognition. A range of 
theories have outlined the importance of modality-specific conceptual 
processing (e.g. Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007; Van Dantzig et al., 
2008; Gallese & Cuccio, 2018), and the connectionist PDP approach 
implemented by Farah and McClelland (1991) highlights the theoretical 
importance of cognitive modelling to mechanistically theorise about 
semantic cognition. 
5.2.3.3 Lexical-retrieval categorisation  
The third framework for explaining semantic processing is called 
lexical retrieval, advocated by Damasio and colleagues (1996), and 
subsequently supported by Grabowski, Damasio and Damasio (1998). At 
its core, Damasio et al. (1996) use neurological and neuroimaging evidence 
to claim that the lateral temporal-lobe is critical for the retrieval of words, and 
does so in a taxonomically structured manner. This argument is in stark 
contrast to the previously discussed interpretations of the double-
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dissociation of modality-specific accounts of animate and inanimate 
semantic dementia given the emphasis is on the retrieval process from a 
mental lexicon. Postle (2015) argues that this might be related to Damasio’s 
neurological background, which places emphasis on observable symptoms 
and is more in favour of characterising symptoms as primary progressive 
aphasia as opposed to semantic dementia, which is more common in the 
psychological literature. Damasio et al. (2004) further support their earlier 
claims using lesion and neuroimaging studies, which shows that the left 
temporal lobe contains partially segregated higher-order cortical regions 
associated with the retrieval of concrete words from different conceptual 
categories. Tranel (2006) further extended this by observing that damage to 
the left temporal polar (TP) cortex is associated with the impaired naming of 
unique landmarks, in support of the mediatory role of the TP in retrieving 
specific classes of stimuli. 
Until now, our overview of the taxonomic and modality-specific 
perspectives has focused on dichotomous or unidimensional properties of 
semantic representations. The lexical-retrieval interpretation was briefly 
outlined as an alternative interpretation of the double dissociation findings 
from Warrington and Shallice (1984). Next, we turn our attention to the 
concreteness continuum, an evolution from previously held dichotomous 
standpoints. 
5.2.3.4 The Concreteness Continuum 
Yarmey and Thomas (1966) showed that concrete words such as 
DOG or TABLE are different to abstract words like LOVE. In their 
experiment, where participants had to learn two lists of abstract and 
concrete nouns, they found that learning concrete nouns was easier than 
learning abstract nouns by comparing the recall accuracy. This study 
marked the beginning of the concreteness effect. This advantage of concrete 
words over abstract words is found across a diverse range of cognitive 
domains. Gilhooly and Logie (1980) conducted a large-scale study of 1,944 
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words and metrics such as age-of-acquisition (AoA), familiarity (FAM) and 
concreteness (CNC) and created the first comprehensive dataset of all these 
measures. Gilhooly and Logie found a strong positive correlation of 0.93 
between AoA and CNC. 
Warrington (1975) was the first to consider a reversal of the 
concreteness effect. One of the patients examined was AB, formerly a high-
level civil servant who performed very well on a verbal IQ test (122) and 
was not showing any signs of dysphasia despite using a restricted 
vocabulary. In the first set of neurological tests evaluating picture and word 
recognition, AB had significant difficulties with the visual version of the 
task compared to the auditory one. AB was able to define an object name 
but struggled to describe the visual features of the object. Warrington noted 
that for patients AB, and EM and CR, this so-called object-agnosia was 
characterised by two forms of response errors when asked to describe the 
visual properties of objects. The first type of error was distinguished by a 
tendency to define concepts by reference to superordinate level categories. 
For example, Warrington notes, that the word HAMMER would be 
described as “some kind of tool” (p. 642). The second type of error was 
characteristic of defining the original concepts (e.g. DONKEY) by reference 
to another object within the same taxonomy, such as a HORSE. Even in 
subsequent visual recognition by forced choice tests, where there was 
simply a yes/no answer to questions such as “is this a bird?”, AB performed 
very poorly. Strikingly, however, AB’s word recognition performance, as 
measured by open-ended verbal responses, for abstract words was normal. 
AB did not have difficult defining words such as PACT (AB’s response: 
“friendly agreement”) or TAME (AB’s response: “an animal not behaving 
wildly”), whereas for concrete words like HAY, POSTER and NEEDLE, 
typical responses were “I’ve forgotten” or “no idea”. Warrington and 
Shallice (1984) further supported this reversed concreteness effect, with 
patient SBY, whose semantic deficits closely matched that of AB’s. 
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Breedin, Saffran and Coslett (1994), demonstrated another 
neuropsychological case where there was a reversal of the concreteness 
effect. Their patient DM, who was suffering from semantic dementia due to 
neural atrophy in the left temporal lobe, had profound difficulties with 
object names, even though much of his knowledge of abstract nouns and 
verbs remained intact. This dissociation led Breedin et al. to argue against 
a “quantitative interpretation” of the concreteness effect, which they stated 
as the superiority of concrete words over abstract words in conceptual 
processing (p.617). More recently, Shallice and Cooper (2013) discuss 
double dissociation as well as neuroimaging studies in support of partially 
separable abstract and concrete conceptual representation systems.  
Evidence on word concreteness effects has amassed significantly in 
recent years in a range of domains such as reading comprehension, word 
recognition and judgements (e.g. Walker & Hulme, 1999; Allen & Hulme, 
2006; Witherby & Tauber, 2017). Nonetheless, only two mechanistic 
candidate theories are available, which are Schwanenflugel and Shoben’s 
(1983) Context Availability Model (CAM) and Paivio’s (1991) Dual Coding 
Theory (DCT). A central tenet of CAM is that due to the easier accessibility 
and the increased availability and richness of contextual information, 
concrete words can be dissociated from abstract words, which also accounts 
for the advantage of concrete words given their conceptual wealth. 
Schwanenflugel and Shoben’s theory is based on lexical decision time 
studies, so their use of the term context refers specifically to the linguistic 
context, which is different from our broader use of the term. They presented 
abstract and concrete sentences, either with or without a context paragraph; 
in the condition without context, participants took longer to read abstract 
sentences than concrete ones, while in the context paragraph condition, 
participants took equally long to read the abstract and concrete sentences. 
The second theory, Paivio’ DCT (1971, 1991), is based on two 
parallel semantic systems, one for verbal semantics and the other for imaginal 
semantics. In DCT, the advantage of concrete words is accounted for by co-
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activation of both the verbal and imaginal semantic systems, while in the 
case of abstract words, only the verbal semantics system is activated. A 
commonality shared by both CAM and DCT appears to be in their same 
predictions for increased processing efficiency or speed for concrete words 
compared with abstract words, be that reflected in faster reaction times or 
lower error rates for the former. However, these two theories, especially in 
the case of DCT with its parallel semantic systems, are also premised on the 
idea that there seems to be a sharp dichotomy between concrete and 
abstract words, and that a continuum between the two is lacking. This will 
be particularly relevant for our re-analysis in the next section, as it 
questions the validity of this premise. 
5.2.4 Concreteness Revisited 
Brysbaert, Warriner and Kuperman (2014) conducted a large-scale 
study with over 4,000 participants, to collect concreteness ratings on a 5-
point Likert scale across 40,000 common English word lemmas, and 
published their dataset. We re-analysed this data to produce a simple 
histogram of concreteness ratings, where the concreteness ratings are split 
into 100 distinct bins (see figure 5.2A). The concreteness ratings are 
distributed continuously across the Likert-scale response variable even 
though there is evidence to support a weak bimodal distribution, with the 
lower end of the spectrum being more leptokurtic than the higher end. This 
helps our interpretation of a concreteness continuum. However, we find, 
that even stronger and more convincing evidence emerges from our second 
chart (see figure 5.2B), where we plot the standard deviations of the ratings 
along the concreteness spectrum. Our analysis shows that words on either 
end of the concreteness spectrum have lower variations in their scores, 
presumably based on their consistent interpretations. Some of the words 
with the smallest standard deviations of zero are TULIP, BIRD, BIKE, FISH, 
HANDSAW and even YO-YO among a list of 280-word lemmas, which also 
have the highest concreteness rating of five.  
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Similarly, for words with the lowest concreteness ratings between 
1.04 and 1.20, the standard deviation was typically less than 0.4, including 
words such as SPIRITUALITY, ENLIGHTENING, and IDEALIZE. Words 
in the middle of the spectrum show the highest level of variation, which 
gradually increases from both concrete and abstract ends. This strongly 
indicates that word concreteness is continuous. Based on these descriptive 
statistics, it would appear that the concreteness dichotomy can be primarily 
attributed to experimenters selecting words from either extreme, which are 
more consistent in their meanings, neglecting the middle of the spectrum, 
leading to results focusing either on abstract or concrete words. This might 
also explain why some of the earlier studies (e.g. Troche et al., 2014) found 
prominent bimodal distributions in concreteness ratings, while a continuity 
emerges in more recent and large-scale studies spanning a wider range of 
words (e.g. Brysbaert et al., 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.5 Role of Emotions in Grounding Abstract Concepts 
Emotions are a central and critical aspect of cognition, despite a long 
history of cognitive sciences ignoring the role of affective processing as a 
key property of cognition. More recently, this has also led to computational 
cognitive theorists extending their more traditional models with emotion 
modules across a range of cognitive architecture like ACT-R (Laird, 2008) 
and SOAR (Dancy, 2013). Developmental theorists such as Bloom (1998) 
Figure 5.2: (A) Histogram of the concreteness ratings of 40,000 word lemmas (B) 
Boxplot of the standard deviations of the same concreteness ratings. See Appendix D 
for enlarged images (p. 334). 
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have also shown that even though some researchers have long investigated 
the use of emotion words in children’s development (e.g. Morton & Trehub, 
2001), emotional development is actually a precursor to the development of 
language, and that the use of emotion words only occurs at approximately 
two years of age. However, the rate of acquisition of emotional words 
steadily increases between two and three years of age (Wellman et al., 1995) 
and might provide a bootstrapping mechanism for the acquisition of 
abstract words (Kousta et al., 2011). Fay and Maner (2012) provide an 
account in which environmental factors in early child development can 
contribute to early non-verbal categorisation. They note that Bowlby (1969) 
suggests the importance of physical proximity between infants and 
caregivers and the association with warmth, and how this early spatial 
proximity can later in development be used for conceptualising more 
abstract concepts like closeness and intimacy (p.1369). Other research has 
extended such spatial proximities to other abstract concepts like warm 
friendship, through metaphoric extensions (Williams & Bargh, 2008), though 
such findings are beyond our focus on emotions and their contributory role 
in grounding abstract concepts. 
Hedonic valence, although related to emotions, more specifically 
refers to the binary opposition of good versus bad, and their corresponding 
strength has been widely cited as a potentially important criterion for, at 
least partially, constituting the meaning of abstract words. Altarriba, Bauer, 
and Benvenuto (1999) initially suggested the importance of valence 
interacting with concept concreteness, although their suggestion was to 
create an additional distinction of emotional words in addition to concrete 
and abstract concepts. Kousta and colleagues (2011) further developed the 
descriptive postulates of Altarriba et al. (1999). Kousta et al. hypothesise 
that the two dominant cognitive theories, dual coding theory and context 
availability model, are both inadequate for explaining these results due to 
their lack of incorporating experiential information in grounding abstract 
concepts. Indeed, their study supported their hypothesis and marked an 
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important discovery for not only cognitive semantics but also grounded 
cognition. 
Building on previous work (Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2009) 
demonstrating the processing advantage of concepts with emotional 
associations, Kousta et al. (2011) ran a series of experiments along with 
predictive modelling of a large-scale database (English Lexicon Project; 
Balota et al., 2007). The dual coding theory and the context availability 
model are respectively based on the empirical findings of imageability and 
context availability. Imageability refers to the ease with which a given 
concept can elicit mental images of things or events, and is commonly 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from low (1) to medium (4) to 
high (7). For example, concrete words such as apple have significantly higher 
imageability ratings than abstract words like justice. Unsurprisingly, 
concept concreteness and imageability are highly correlated (Toglia & 
Battig, 1978). 
Similarly, context availability refers to the ease with which a given 
context or situation can be elicited for a given concept (Kieras, 1978). Kousta 
et al. (2011) revealed that once both imageability and context availability 
were controlled, abstract word processing has a small but significant 
advantage. Moreover, Kousta and colleagues also demonstrate that this 
representation difference can be explained by variations in valence ratings, 
which provides a new unidimensional view of the cognitive semantic 
system, based on concept concreteness. Kousta et al.’s finding suggests a 
novel hypothesis, which they name embodied abstract semantics, while 
simultaneously discrediting dual coding theory and the context availability 
model, both well-established theories of accounting for semantic and 
processing differences between concrete and abstract concepts. 
Vigliocco et al. (2013) extend the behavioural evidence of Kousta et 
al. (2011), using a neuroimaging study which provides evidence for 
activations in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, known for its role in 
emotional conflict resolution (Etkin et al., 2006) through the modulation of 
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hedonic valence. Additionally, correlation analysis on 1,400 words also 
revealed that abstract words are associated with higher emotional ratings. 
In summary, the above findings across a range of different studies point 
towards a strong possibility of emotions being especially crucial for 
grounding abstract concepts, although there is currently no computational 
or mechanistic account of this grounded phenomenon. 
5.3 Computational Study I: Evaluating PSVs using 
BrainBench 
5.3.1 Objective 
Xu, Murphy and Fyshe (2016) developed a small test suite for 
evaluating distributed semantic machine learning models, based on the 
interrelations of brain activations from Mitchell et al. (2008) and Sudre et al. 
(2012). Xu et al. found that words that are correlated behaviourally (e.g. 
reaction times) are also correlated neurally (i.e. have similar neural 
activations). Their BrainBench measure computes a correlation between a 
given distributed model and their benchmark neuroimaging dataset on the 
same set of concepts. Although all 60 concepts in the test set are comprised 
of concrete words across a range of categories from body parts and vehicles 
to vegetables and tools, we use this as a benchmarking exercise for evaluating 
Perceptual Scene Vectors (PSVs) against commonly used distributed 
linguistic models. These 60 words are then used throughout the studies in 
this chapter, although more abstract words are also added for studies II and 
III. Similar to distributed linguistic models, we predict a positive correlation 
between neuroimaging data and our PSV model. 
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5.3.2 Methodology 
Using Xu et al.’s (2016) web-based interface 8 , we individually 
uploaded a range of off-the-shelf linguistic representations, some of which 
Xu et al. provide on the website (Skip-gram, Glove, RNN, Global and Cross-
lingual), while also including LSA models trained separately on the TASA 
corpus and Wikipedia. All of these distributed models included the same 
range of dimensions as Xu et al. For our additional LSA models, we 
included LSA 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 and the standard 300 dimensions. Our 
PSV representations were generated using our semi-automated methodology 
same as implemented in chapter 4, with only two differences. Firstly, we 
increased the number of images from 10 to 20 per concept from which PSVs 
were extracted and secondly, we increased the hidden layer from 20 to 100 
neurons. We manually excluded image search results that we qualitatively 
determined did not satisfy the criteria of an ecologically valid scene one is 
likely to encounter in everyday life (e.g. brand logos or artwork). For 
example, for the word eye, we excluded anatomical diagrams, while for legs 
we discarded an image of a fitness device, which did not include legs. 
                                                      
8 http://www.langlearnlab.cs.uvic.ca/brainbench/#filter_vector 
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5.3.3 Results 
 
 
Figure 5.3: A bar chart of the BrainBench results across a range of distributed “off-the-
shelf” representations and our Perceptual Scene Vector (PSV). The semantic 
representations are ordered from highest-to-lowest correlations. 
 
Although Xu et al. (2016) provide both fMRI and PET BrainBench 
correlation coefficients, we did not find any interpretable differences in the 
two highly correlated scores (r = 0.84, p < 0.01). Therefore, we take the 
average of the two correlations and report this in figure 5.3. According to 
the BrainBench comparisons, both linguistic and our PSV representations 
perform comparably. Our tests with random vector representations also 
confirm Xu et al.’s random benchmark of r = 0.50, but we further establish 
that at a 95% confidence interval9, the variation in r is between ±  0.06, 
which prevents us from interpreting differences in the variations of the 
scores between the language-based and scene-based distributed 
representations. The best distributed linguistic representation is Cross-
lingual (r = 0.68), while the worst performing linguistic representation is 
RNN with 80 dimensions (r = 0.61). All language-based and PSV 
representations (averaged across ten trials of neural network training with 
different initialisations) perform better than Xu et al.’s random benchmark 
                                                      
9 We measured r for the random vector 100 times, and 95 times it is between ± 0.06. 
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of r = 0.50. These results show that although from this benchmarking 
exercise we cannot draw any conclusions on whether or not PSVs perform 
better or worse than language-based distributed models, our visually 
grounded representations perform equivalently. 
5.4 Computational Study II: Grounding Concrete to 
Abstract Concepts 
5.4.1 Objective 
In this computational experiment, we aim to investigate the 
generalisability of our PSVs across the concreteness spectrum, in order to 
understand the strengths and limitations of PSVs across a broader range of 
concepts on the concreteness spectrum. We use concepts across the 
spectrum and split them into concrete, intermediate and abstract concepts. 
Given that PSVs are semi-automatically extracted object-level 
characteristics from naturistic scenes, we expect the quality of semantic 
representations to gradually increase along the concreteness spectrum 
(least to most concrete). In this second study, the quality of representations 
refers to a qualitative interpretation of the category structure of the 
correlation matrix resulting from visualising the hidden layer neurons from 
the trained neural network. 
5.4.2 Methodology 
We extend the 60 concrete concepts from the first study, with 
addition of intermediate (n = 20) and abstract concepts (n = 20) from 
Brysbaert et al. (2014). The concrete concepts have a mean concreteness 
rating of 4.87, with a standard deviation of 0.12. Intermediate concepts have 
a mean concreteness rating of 3.10, with a standard deviation of 0.41, while 
abstract words have a mean rating of 2.20, and a standard deviation of 0.39. 
Both intermediate and abstract concepts are selected by first choosing five 
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distinct words, and then supplementing these with their three close 
neighbours using the TASA-trained LSA space. This is done to ensure that 
our intermediate and abstract words could be compared meaningfully with 
the LSA space in study III. Therefore, we aim at avoiding the selection of 
arbitrary concepts, which would make it more challenging to compare 
strong associative relationships. We reason that randomly selecting abstract 
words is likely to lead to a set of words with low comparability and 
therefore problematic evaluations when comparing interrelations. In study 
III, we also evaluate the concept representations on a one-to-one and one-
to-category basis, for which we need a set of coherently and meaningfully 
grouped concepts. The same method as in study I is used to generate PSVs. 
5.4.3 Results 
The visualisation of the hidden layer units (see figure 5.4) of the 
concepts generated using PSVs shows strong category-level differentiation 
across concrete concepts and even some hierarchical groupings as in the 
case of body parts and clothing. This is also the case for the first two groups 
(closest to concrete concepts) of concepts with intermediate levels of 
concreteness ratings, which are also clearly differentiated. However, from 
the third intermediate group onwards (maths, physics, intelligence, and 
numbers), concepts become less coherently clustered within their specific 
groups, while simultaneously becoming more strongly correlated with 
other intermediate and abstract concepts. In order to qualitatively 
understand the possible determinants of this, we investigate the extracted 
features embedded in the PSVs. 
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Figure 5.4: A correlation plot of the PSV’s hidden layer representations. Concepts are 
grouped into concrete (blue), intermediate (green), and abstract (red) groupings. 
Within both the intermediate and abstract groups, concepts are grouped into the LSA-
based “concept clusters”, and these are highlighted by respectively alternating between 
darker and lighter shaded of green and red. Similarly, we also alternate darker and lighter 
shades of blue for concrete words but use the original order of concepts used by Xu et al. 
(2016). See Appendix D for enlarged images (p. 335 - 336). 
 
The PSV features reveal that intermediate and abstract concept 
features have high levels of global similarities. This includes features such 
as indoor, person and objects commonly found in indoor environments, such 
as chairs, tables and computers. The correlation plot also reveals that PSVs are 
poor at discriminating between more nuanced intermediate and abstract 
groups of concepts like {terrorist, crime, assault, crisis} and {dangerous, 
damage, destroy, hurt}. This is more apparent for larger groups of concepts 
in the abstract set, where knowledge is no more similar to wisdom than to 
contempt. These results show that although PSVs are sufficiently capable of 
representing concrete semantic concepts, the same level of grounding in 
real-world naturalistic scenes is insufficient for grounding some 
intermediate and most abstract words tested in this experiment. 
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5.5 Computational Study III: Extending PSVs with 
Emotions 
5.5.1 Objective 
In our final study, we extend our PSVs with an additional 8-bit 
vector representation of emotions grounded in the natural scene 
photographs, which we name scene2vec. As discussed earlier, there has been 
an increasing focus on the role of emotions in grounding abstract concepts 
in cognitive science. However, we aim to explore this from both a 
mechanistic computational and a grounded cognition perspective. Our 
research objective is to investigate the computational feasibility of better 
representing abstract concepts using semi-automatically extracted 
emotional information from real-world photographs. In this study, we can 
evaluate narrower hypotheses as a result of quantifying the quality of 
semantic representations. We operationalise this via cross-comparisons of 
the correlation matrix obtained from the hidden layer neurons of the 
network trained on PSVs (study II) and PSVs + emotions (study III) with a 
linguistic “ground truth” correlation matrix (LSA space). However, we 
have two accuracy metrics. The first accuracy metric measures concept-to-
concept level matches, for example, concept eye from PSVs being most 
strongly correlated with the eye from the LSA correlation matrix (details in 
next section). The second metric consists of correlations between individual 
concepts like hand from PSVs being most strongly correlated with the LSA 
factor body parts, comprised of {eye, hand, arm, foot, leg}. This second metric 
is a more general category membership measure, while the first is a narrower 
concept-specific one. 
Despite the exploratory nature of our overall study, in this 
experiment, we have a range of directional hypotheses. These not only 
narrowly focus on the specifics of scene2vec, but rather, compare scene2vec 
and PSV representations on both concept- and category-level accuracies, 
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split across concrete, intermediate and abstract concepts. Below we outline 
our five core hypotheses for this, along with supporting evidence and 
reasoning for each. 
I. For both PSV and scene2vec representations, category-level accuracies will 
be higher than concept-level accuracies. 
o There is a decreased probability of misclassification (21 categories 
versus 100 concepts) for category-level matching, which will 
provide a “lower boundary” accuracy threshold. 
o PSVs encode the statistical regularities of objects within natural 
settings, and scene2vec additionally contains emotional 
information. We, therefore, predict that there should be sufficient 
meaningful overlap between these regularities across a category 
(but not within concepts) irrespective of where the concepts sit on 
the concreteness spectrum. 
o Algorithmically, we reason that it will be easier to link grounded 
concepts to more generic linguistics factors (derived from LSA) as 
opposed to the concept-specific associations derived from the LSA 
space. 
II. PSV representations will have the highest level of concept and category 
accuracies for concrete concepts, followed by intermediate, and then 
abstract concepts. 
III. Previous research (e.g. Grondin, Lupker, & McRae, 2009) has shown that 
concrete concepts are more strongly associated with objects in the 
environment compared to abstract concepts. We reason that intermediate 
concepts are likely to fall between these two extremes. 
IV. Scene2vec representations will have equally high levels of concept and 
category accuracies across abstract, intermediate, and concrete concepts. 
o Borghi et al. (2017) have empirically shown that abstract concepts 
are more strongly linked to introspective associations and 
emotions. Therefore, in our scene2vec representation, concrete 
concepts will be successfully grounded in object co-occurrence 
information while abstract concepts will be grounded in object co-
occurrences and emotional data. 
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V. Across concrete, intermediate and abstract concepts scene2vec will have a 
higher concept- and category-level accuracies compared to PSVs. 
o Given that scene2vec representations contain both object co-
occurrence as well as emotional information, we postulate that 
these different formats of cognitive representations will be 
mutually reinforcing across the concreteness spectrum. 
5.5.2 Methodology 
We use the same stimuli as in experiment II, and the LSA space used 
is also identical. The additional manipulation in this experiment consists of 
the extra 8-bits of emotional information. We use Microsoft’s Cognitive 
Services’ Emotion API, a cloud-based, research-grade emotion recognition 
software solution, optimised for real-world scalable emotional 
classification tasks. We collected eight emotional measures, all ranging 
from 0 to 1 (highest emotional rating), see figure 5.5.  
The scene2vec representations’ Perceptual Scene Vector (PSV) 
component is generated using the same methodology as used in chapter 4 
and is identical to experiment II of this chapter. We once again use 
photographs representing an ecologically valid cognitive data 
representation of the visual world and run these through Zhao et al.’s (2017) 
pre-trained pyramid scene parsing network (PSPNet). 
 
Figure 5.5: Example output of the emotion detection and the resultant JSON file. 
Emotional scores are generated individually across multiple faces per image.  
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We have encountered two specific challenges when creating 
scene2vec representations. One of them is the issue we also previously 
discussed in chapter 4 for our PSVs, where we filter out “animated” or 
“commercial” logos that appeared in the automated Google image 
downloads. However, a secondary issue we have encountered in this 
experiment is that many photos do not have visible faces, which impacts 
the quality of the emotions extracted. Therefore, we constrain the image 
stimuli so that at least 4 out of 20 of the photos have visible faces if and only 
if the original 20 randomly selected photos have a person present but 
without their face being visible (e.g. facing sideways). 
In figure 5.6 we illustrate our approach to quantifying similarities 
between our grounded and Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) 
representations. This method is based on Kriegeskorte et al.’s (2008) 
Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA), which quantifies the 
similarities between neuroimaging, behavioural and computationally-
derived representations. Kriegeskorte et al.’s technique computes 
representational dissimilarity matrices (RDMs), using correlation distances (1 
- correlation) within a given representational format (i.e. using concepts’ 
neural signatures). This analysis quantifies first-order isomorphisms 
between concepts. Critically, Kriegeskorte and colleagues compute second-
order isomorphisms by comparing the dissimilarity matrices of 
neuroimaging-based and a theoretical, computational model. This is 
statistically operationalised by calculating a correlation coefficient between 
the two RDMs, which quantifies the correspondence between the 
neuroimaging and computational representations. 
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Figure 5.6: Schematic overview of PSVs, scene2vec and investigating the 
correspondence with LSA by correlating their respective representational dissimilarity 
matrices (RDMs). Concept-level correspondences are a more conservative measure and 
refer to a direct concept-to-concept mapping. Category-level correspondences, on the 
other hand, less restrictively, consider a match to be a concept-to-category association. 
 
In our study, we match our grounded semantic representations 
(PSVs and scene2vec) with the well-established linguistic benchmark of 
LSA. Like Kriegeskorte et al., we investigate second-order isomorphisms, 
but in our case, between two computational representations, see figure 5.7. 
We compute RDMs using the hidden layer representations of PSVs, 
scene2vec and LSA’s 300 dimensions across all concepts. Concept-level 
accuracies are determined using an LSA-based RDM for all concepts. A 
secondary measure of accuracy is our category-level metric, which is also 
based on an LSA RDM, but with 21 a priori LSA factors, each corresponding 
to categories like body, vehicle or tool. 
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Both concept- and category-level accuracies are split between 
concrete, intermediate and abstract concepts, resulting in 12 comparisons 
(see figure 5.7). These two approaches to measuring accuracy are based on 
our assumption that although grounded representations might be suitable 
for more concrete concepts, they will be less appropriate for more abstract 
ones. However, we also predict that our scene2vec representation will be 
superior at discriminating concepts at a higher-order categorical level, 
while not being as valuable for more fine-grained differentiation of 
concepts. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Outline of the 12 different comparisons between grounded and language-
based representations, using our adapted representational similarity analysis (RSA). 
Correlations (cor) between the different representational dissimilarity matrices (RDMs) 
lead to concept- and category-level correspondences. 
5.5.3 Results 
A qualitative visual inspection of the correlation plot (corrplot) in 
figure 5.8 shows that for concrete concepts the interrelations seem very 
similar to those based on PSV (figure 5.4), yet for both intermediate and 
abstract concepts, there are more meaningful associative relations. The 
most noticeable difference is that for scene2vec’s corrplot, the intermediate 
and abstract concepts do not form as distinctive a superordinate cluster as 
is the case with PSVs. This suggests that more nuanced associative 
intermediate and abstract concept relations are captured by our addition of 
emotional information to PSVs (creating scene2vec). Interestingly, although 
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slightly weaker compared to PSVs, intermediate and abstract concepts 
remain strongly correlated with the concrete concepts in the body parts and 
clothing groups. This is understandable given that classifications of people 
and similar indoor scenes are visually present for most of these concepts. 
However, a dominant finding across both PSV and scene2vec 
representations is that two distinct groups are generated for more concrete 
and more abstract concepts respectively, with intermediate concepts being 
more similar, on average, to abstract concepts. 
The hierarchical cluster analysis, depicted in figure 5.9 further 
supports our interpretation that scene2vec and PSV representations are 
largely identical for concrete concepts, although there are more 
associatively meaningful relationships for intermediate and abstract 
concepts in scene2vec. Both dendrograms have similar absolute distances 
across all the concepts, but in the case of PSV representations, for abstract 
and some intermediate concepts there is very little differentiation as is 
shown by several concepts with a difference of zero in their respective 
Euclidean distances. Contrasting this to the tree structure of the scene2vec 
representation, we can see that although there are still more abstract and 
intermediate concepts with zero differentiation, these cases are not as 
prevalent. Moreover, the level of differentiation for abstract and 
intermediate concepts, as reflected by the more nuanced hierarchical 
relationships in the scene2vec representation, suggests that the inclusion of 
emotional information does predominantly support the grounding of more 
abstract concepts.  
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Figure 5.8: A correlation plot of scene2vec’s hidden layer representations. Concepts are 
once more grouped into concrete (blue), intermediate (green), and abstract (red) 
groupings. See Appendix D for enlarged images (p. 337 - 338). 
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Figure 5.9: Hierarchical cluster plot of the hidden layer neurons representing the 
semantic associations of PSVs (A) and scene2vec (B) representations. Concepts are once 
more grouped into concrete (blue), intermediate (green), and abstract (red) groupings. 
See Appendix D for enlarged images (p. 339 - 340). 
 
Our final results compare PSV and scene2vec representations with 
those of the distributed linguistic associations from the LSA 300-dimension 
model (see figure 5.10). The main finding is that across all grounded 
A 
B 
 154 
conditions, concrete words have a high degree of correspondence with 
LSA. Therefore, concrete concepts’ representations grounded in naturalistic 
images, irrespective of whether PSV or scene2vec distributed 
representations are used, is similar to those from LSA. However, for 
scene2vec concrete representations, the accuracy for both concept- and 
category-level correspondences is approaching the maximum correlation, 
while it is slightly lower for the PSV scenarios, indicating a slight but 
consistent advantage of scene2vec even for concrete concepts. Relatedly, 
the intermediate and abstract concept correlations are considerably lower 
across all conditions, although this is particularly the case for the PSV 
representations, indicating that PSVs are very poor distributed 
representations for capturing the semantic variations of more abstract 
concepts. In the case of PSVs, there is a gradual decrease in both concept 
and category correlations from more concrete to abstract concepts. This 
trend is not found for scene2vec representations, where intermediate and 
abstract concepts both have similar levels of correlation with LSA, although 
considerably higher correlations at the category level.  
 
Figure 5.10: Concept- and category-level correlations of PSV and scene2vec 
representations with LSA-300. Bar chart colours depict concepts grouped within the 
three concreteness categories. The error bars show the range of correlations obtained 
across ten trials conducted for the matching tests, where the PSV/scene2vec neural 
network is initialised with different random seeds. 
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Our scene2vec representations capture more LSA-like semantic 
regularities in meaning than PSVs do, especially at the category-level, 
where the lowest correlation is 0.71. A somewhat unexpected result is the 
similarity in both concept and category accuracies for PSV representations 
across all three concreteness categories. Collectively, the differences in the 
accuracies in our results provide support for scene2vec representations, 
which are superior at capturing semantic associations, with their additional 
emotion information, comparable to language-based distributed 
associations, although this performance declines for intermediate and 
abstract concepts. The scene2vec representations also have higher 
correspondences at the category-level than at the concept-level. These 
results collectively suggest a range of strengths but also strong 
shortcomings in our scene-based grounding of semantics of more abstract 
concepts, which we discuss next. 
5.6 Discussion 
Our present study is the first exploratory investigation of 
mechanistically evaluating the scene-based grounding of concepts. 
Moreover, we do this across the concreteness spectrum, with a particular 
focus on representations with (scene2vec) and without (PSV) emotional 
information. All the information encoded in the input representations of 
the studies is extracted either automatically or semi-automatically (some 
irrelevant photos are excluded) from naturalistic photographs. We also 
present a small portion of re-analysed data from Brysbaert et al. (2014) to 
further support the notion of a concreteness continuum as opposed to a 
dichotomy, which others in cognitive modelling and robotics have also 
adopted (e.g. Cangelosi & Stramandinoli, 2018). The research objective of 
the present chapter can be broadly classified as an exploratory 
investigation, with the hope of helping to formulate more specialised 
predictions for future studies. Nonetheless, we do have four overarching 
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hypotheses that we have investigated across our computational 
experiments. 
Our first prediction is that category-level accuracies will be higher 
than concept-level accuracies for both PSV and scene2vec representations. 
This first hypothesis is not fully supported by our results because despite 
that the results are in line with our predictions for scene2vec 
representations, it is not the case for PSVs. This does, however, suggest that 
the additional emotional information is more helpful at discriminating 
concepts at a higher-order category structure, although this more specific 
finding is not predicted by us. This might be due to the role of emotions 
acting as a reward cue across different concepts and situations, which 
might help with concept coherence in a higher-order category structure. 
However, further evidence would be needed to confirm this interpretation. 
Our second hypothesis states that PSVs will have the highest level 
of concept and category correlations for concrete concepts, followed by 
intermediate and then abstract concepts. We justify this by suggesting that 
grounding in object co-occurrences would be more critical for concrete 
concepts than for abstract concepts, and therefore predict a gradual decline 
in grounded representations matching those from the LSA space as 
abstraction increased. Our results directionally support this prediction. 
LSA correlations, for both concept- and category-level accuracies decrease 
as concept concreteness decreased. However, it is worth stressing that 
although not explicitly stated in our hypothesis, we expect a gradual 
decline in both concept- and category- accuracies across the three 
concreteness groupings. However, both our LSA match accuracies for 
categories and concepts show a marked decline for both intermediate and 
abstract concepts. This suggests that although PSVs are indeed capable of 
capturing the statistical regularities of objective co-occurrences 
meaningfully enough for concrete concepts, we overestimated the quality 
of such semantic representations for intermediate and abstract concepts. 
However, given that we only have 60 concrete concepts and 40 concepts 
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across both intermediate and abstract concept groupings, we have to be 
cautious of generalising our interpretations across the concreteness 
spectrum. Moreover, even though we have 20 concepts in both the 
intermediate and abstract categories, given that the concept selection is 
shaped by LSA neighbours (experimental necessity for meaningful 
comparisons), this compounds the small sample bias with an additional 
experimental confound, that of non-random sampling. Therefore, a useful 
future investigation would be to extend this comparison across a 
considerably larger set of concepts, and if sufficiently large, one would 
expect meaningful categories to occur by chance alone without requiring to 
“artificially engineer” it in the stimuli as is done in our case with the nearest 
neighbour criterion. 
We predict that intermediate concept correlations with LSA are 
likely to be in-between those of concrete and abstract concepts’ correlations 
(hypothesis 3). This hypothesis is only partly supported, because although 
this is the case for PSVs, it does not apply to scene2vec. Our fourth 
hypothesis, of scene2vec representations having equal levels of concept and 
category correlations across the three concreteness groupings, is firmly 
rejected. Although scene2vec’s respective correlations for intermediate and 
abstract concepts, within concept and category groupings, are similar, the 
correlations for concrete concepts remains more than 40% higher for 
concept-level correlations and circa 10% - 25% higher for category-level 
accuracies. However, we accept our final hypothesis, scene2vec (compared 
to PSV) representations have a higher concept- and category-level accuracy. 
These results reveal that scene2vec representations are superior semantic 
representations across the concreteness spectrum. Although scene2vec is 
highly correlated on both concept- and category metrics, it provides a more 
substantial advantage for representing more abstract concepts than PSVs, 
given the greater relative differences between the correlations. 
Nonetheless, even with scene2vec representations, intermediate 
and abstract concepts are not as successfully represented as is the case with 
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concrete concepts. Our results provide both qualitative evidence in the 
form of coarser differentiation (when present) of more abstract concepts in 
the hierarchical clustering analysis as well as weaker correlations when 
compared to concrete concepts. Thus, despite making progress in 
improving the mechanistic grounding of abstract concepts, with the novel 
extension of PSVs to incorporate emotions by creating scene2vec, we 
conclude that our efforts are a modest and incomplete step towards 
understanding the acquisition and representation of more abstract 
concepts. 
The results of this study also suggest greater interconnectivity 
between concepts at different ends of the concreteness spectrum, 
particularly in the case for abstract concepts. In the case of scene2vec, 
despite more meaningful associations emerging within intermediate and 
abstract concepts, these are still distinct from the larger set of sixty concrete 
concepts included in the present study, with some exceptions for concepts 
like eye and beauty which share a high degree of semi-automatically 
extracted object-occurrence cues. 
Given our results, this exploratory study provides mixed support 
for the role of emotions in grounding more abstract concepts successfully. 
In fact, despite promising results for the semi-automatic extraction of 
emotions from photos of naturalistic scenes and improvement in the 
representation of more abstract concepts, this research highlights some of 
the issues that remain unresolved. Further research questions have been 
identified to explore the more nuanced relationship between abstract 
concepts and grounding and other complementary mechanisms. Abstract 
concepts are a critical aspect of compositionality in human thinking, and 
we argue that aspects such as generalisability and logical inference are also 
critical not only for mental operations with abstract concepts but also in 
constituting the concepts themselves. Similarly, Shallice and Cooper (2013) 
suggest that there are some fundamental limitations of hub-and-spoke type 
models with representing abstract concepts, which are also pertinent to our 
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current computational approach of representing abstract concepts using a 
simple single-layered neural network. 
Shallice and Cooper (2013) use a quintessentially GOFAI/symbolic 
computational metaphor of an operator and an argument to re-interpret the 
sub-symbolic representation of hub-and-spoke network representations, 
although we think their metaphor can be applied to connectionist models 
in general, including our models presented in this chapter. In their view, it 
is reasonable to assume that concrete concepts have a list structure of 
features, while the operator specifies the type of input representation. 
Concept representations can be determined by different isa, has and canbe 
relations of spoke properties. In the case of our models, instead of different 
spokes (e.g. visual or auditory), one could conceive of different groups of 
semi-automatically extracted objects and emotions as the features. 
However, for abstract concepts, Shallice and Cooper (2013) argue that such 
an approach is ill-suited given the difficulty of deriving a suitable set of 
features and rules, which is easier for concrete concepts with physical 
referents in the real world. In fact, according to Shallice and Cooper, a much 
broader set of nuanced features and operators are likely to be needed for 
representing abstract concepts. Shea (2018) also suggests that the 
conceptual content of abstract concepts is likely to be quite distinct from 
that of concrete words, and reviews the importance of feelings and 
metacognition. In our current study, we have only focused on adding 
emotion expressions to object co-occurrences. Although mechanistically 
grounding metacognition might be promising, we also claim that doing so 
could prove difficult and beset with numerous a priori assumptions. 
The two theoretical positions of Shallice and Cooper (2013) and Shea 
(2018) might help explain why grounding abstract concepts can be so 
challenging. However, our results do suggest that emotions are likely to 
play a crucial constituent part in the content of more abstract concepts. 
Thus, our conclusion of grounding abstract concepts is not a negative one 
as is the case with Shallice and Cooper (2013). Further, we also argue that it 
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might be an intractable task to fully ground all core aspects of semantic 
cognition across the concreteness spectrum in a single representational hub. 
Earlier in this chapter, we have outlined the embodied abstract 
semantics hypothesis of Kousta and colleagues (2011) - how does 
experiential information such as emotions are important for shaping 
abstract semantics? Nonetheless, we did not cover some of Kousta et al.’s 
more extensive arguments around integrating experiential and linguistic 
information. This omission was motivated by emphasising their core 
emotion-based hypothesis, which is our focus, and it is also because we aim 
to mechanistically investigate vital theoretical ideas with the least number 
of assumptions as opposed to a wide range of flexible assumptions. 
Therefore, we avoid a highly pluralistic model formulation with poor 
parsimony. Furthermore, we also avoid incorporating linguistic 
information given the plethora of theories and models in the extant 
literature (see Vigliocco & Vinson, 2007).  
Nonetheless, Kousta et al. (2011) did caution in their discussion that 
neuroimaging evidence suggests that there are likely to be more 
linguistically-relevant brain areas activated in the processing of abstract 
words. This might further explain why our grounded representations did 
not perform as well for more abstract concepts. Although given that we are 
matching the performance against the language-based LSA space, we 
obviously cannot confound the comparison by including linguistic inputs 
in this chapter’s experiment. Moreover, our objective is to understand the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of emotional information accounting for 
semantic representations across the concreteness spectrum. 
How can we reliably further our rigorous scientific understanding 
of semantics from the fields of artificial intelligence and cognitive science, more 
broadly and in particular, cognitive modelling? We predict that 
BrainBench-type litmus tests are increasingly going to play an essential 
theoretical role in cognitive semantics. Xu et al.’s (2016) BrainBench test 
suite for investigating the validity of distributed representations stemming 
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from general machine learning models or, as in our case, more specific 
cognitive models, will pave the way for more objectively analysing the 
neurocognitive basis of semantic cognition. Arguably, the current 
BrainBench stimuli comprising sixty concrete concepts are limiting, but still 
sufficient for demonstrating the comparability of our Perceptual Scene 
Vectors (PSVs) with language-based distributed models. This is quite 
promising given that it suggests that our environmentally grounded 
semantic representations might well be another common format for 
generating human-like meaning structures. However, only future research 
containing a significantly larger neuroimaging dataset will be able to 
support or refute a more generalisable conclusion on the mapping between 
our computationally derived cognitive semantic representations and those 
acquired by neuroimaging studies. Future studies will also need to aim for 
developing more consistent cognitive semantic tests during the acquisition 
of the neuroimaging experiments in order to provide useful and general 
benchmarks, given that BrainBench’s neuroimaging benchmarks are 
obtained from two separate studies with significant methodological 
differences. 
In our present study, our treatment of emotions might be overly 
simplistic. We include “emotions” or facial expressions in our new 
cognitive data representation called scene2vec. However, we fail to extract 
meaningful emotion-expressing actions from a small set of naturalistic 
images automatically. Abstract concepts that are more likely to contain 
significant proportions of emotional content are also more likely to contain 
specific types of actions, which might help further differentiate between 
more general emotion concepts (Shea, 2018). Furthermore, Touroutoglou et 
al. (2015) found that the basic emotions commonly used in “emotion 
recognition software” do not correspond with a brain-based set of basic 
universal emotions. Therefore, facial associations extracted from images do 
not necessarily constitute emotions per se, but acquired responses of 
emotional display. In our stimuli, these learnt responses are likely to be 
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amplified because online images are probably more likely to be 
professionally photographed for a particular purpose (e.g. advertising). 
Thus, our stimuli might contain more meaningful statistical regularities 
than experienced in everyday surroundings. Another limitation, although 
somewhat inevitable given our narrow research objective of grounding 
concepts across the concreteness spectrum using only visual scenes, is the 
exclusion of linguistic information in our study. Language is a deep 
resource of the fine-grained statistical regularities for discriminating 
between broadly similar categories of concepts, which is one of the 
limitations of our scene2vec cognitive representation. Therefore, now that 
we have shown exploratory findings in support of grounding concrete and 
more abstract concepts, to an extent, future studies might want to exceed 
this “minimum threshold” of inputs considered and opt for more 
representationally pluralistic approaches. 
Borghi and colleagues (2017) postulate a descriptive multiple 
representation theory, which combines embodied and linguistic inputs, such 
as situations, introspection, emotions and metaphors. They argue that a single 
representational framework is not sufficient to account for abstract 
semantics. Intriguingly, Borghi et al. (2017) do not discuss the need for 
hierarchical inference mechanisms for the acquisition of abstract concepts, 
as alluded to by Shallice and Cooper (2013). In our view, opting for simply 
expanding the input representations is a risky endeavour given the lack of 
parsimony in resulting theorising due to the underlying complexity and 
degrees of freedom in the underlying input representations. Therefore, we 
believe that a core set of evidence-based semantic dimensions along with 
computational mechanisms for hierarchically integrating these 
components should help develop a more parsimonious theory of semantic 
cognition and in the process help unify grounded and symbolic 
perspectives within psychology, which is our objective for chapters 6 and 
7. 
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In closing, our current computational experiments provide support 
for a weaker version of embodied abstract semantics, the hypothesis 
postulated by Kousta and colleagues (2011). Although our results have 
shown that emotions can indeed improve semantic representations, 
especially for intermediate and abstract concepts, the level of explanatory 
power of visual scene-based grounding also has some limitations given the 
diminished quality for representing concepts without obvious physical 
referents. We conjecture that there are likely to be other contributing factors 
and mechanisms accounting for the content of abstract concepts beyond 
emotion expressions. Future cognitive modelling would ideally 
mechanistically investigate a variety of such descriptive accounts in order 
to understand their relative merits, as initiated in our present study. 
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Chapter 6                                 
Network Topology of Semantics: 
Grounding and Relativity of 
Meaning 
 
6.1 Abstract 
Cognitive scientists have a long history of investigating meaning 
using semantic priming and assuming feature-based representations. 
However, only recently has there been a focus on the geometrical properties 
and relations of meaning, led by Binder et al.’s (2016) research on brain-
based componential semantic representations and Troche, Crutch and 
Reilly’s (2017) three-dimensional unitary semantic space hypothesis. Both 
approaches use linear dimensionality reduction to create a low-
dimensional Euclidean semantic space from semantic ratings. In the study 
reported in this chapter, we have collected semantic dimension and 
importance ratings from 2,062 participants on 544 English words spanning 
the concreteness spectrum. Critically, we also include context-specific 
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conditions (e.g. imagine you are cooking) followed by ratings of the same 
semantic dimensions. We generate a network topology using non-linear 
dimensionality reduction (t-SNE). Our novel application of graph-
theoretical techniques to cognitive semantic networks reveals that (i) 
semantic networks have a small-world structure, (ii) context-free semantic 
networks are organised lexically on a concreteness gradient, (iii) changes in 
context can dynamically modulate the lexical network topology, and (iv) 
scenes are the most critical and influential dimension shaping our 
conceptual networks. Collectively, these findings support a grounded 
perspective on meaning. There is no meaning without context. 
6.2 Introduction 
How is semantic memory organised? Cognitive scientists often raise 
this question (e.g. Farah & McClelland, 1991) but a definitive answer 
remains mostly elusive. One of the foundational aspects of human semantic 
memory is that detailed recollections of when, where, how or why we 
acquired that information in the first place do not typically accompany its 
retrieval, a quality sometimes characterised as noetic (Postle, 2015). 
Semantic memory is a hierarchically organised system responsible for the 
storage, retrieval and processing of facts and concepts (Tulving, 1972). The 
noetic origins of semantic memory are likely to be the basis for Tulving’s 
(1983) distinction between episodic memories and “other memories” 
respectively based on whether one phenomenologically experiences the 
memory retrieval processes as remembering (autonoetic consciousness) or 
merely knowing (noetic consciousness). Even though many semantic 
memories are likely to be initially traced back and grounded in particular 
episodic instances, more commonly, semantic memories cannot easily 
isolate the specific influences that initially contributed to the creation and 
shaping of the memory traces. 
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Moreover, unlike episodic memories, many of our semantic 
memories are shared across people in a given culture (Patterson, Nestor, & 
Rogers, 2007). However, surprisingly little is known about how brain-based 
activations link to our cognitive semantic space - a topological abstraction of 
all the associations. 
Our primary focus in this chapter is the topography of conceptual 
space, which we define as the study of the common geometrical properties, 
such as dimensions, shape and features of that space. More specifically, we 
investigate the topology of complex multi-dimensional meaning, without 
making reductionist and a priori assumptions of linearity. Our emphasis on 
a complex topology departs from more traditional classifications along 
single cognitive psychological continuums such as concreteness, where 
words such as APPLE and DOG are on one end of the concreteness 
spectrum, while other words, such as HAPPINESS and LOVE are on the 
opposite abstract end. Such a conceptualisation of linear semantic spaces 
has some implicit assumptions. The two most important ones being (i) the 
topology is reducible to a single dimension in some meaningful manner, 
and (ii) the dimension (e.g. concreteness) has psychological relevance in 
that it facilitates common cognitive semantic processes. 
In this chapter, we pursue an alternative approach to semantic 
topography, preferring to consider multiple cognitively relevant 
dimensions instead of a unitary one. However, before focusing on the more 
recent extant literature on creating meaning spaces based on specific 
dimensions - conceptual topography, we will start our review by exploring 
the origins of studying the core dimensions of semantic memories, dating 
back to neuropsychological case studies. After all, a conceptual topology, 
be it linear and straightforward or non-linear and complex, nonetheless is 
underpinned by one or more basic dimensions. This brief review will lay 
the foundation for us to explore some of the more recent work on semantic 
topography and ultimately embark on our original human experimental 
work on delineating a brain-based model of semantic topology using 
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psychological measures to examine the structure of the human meaning 
space.  
In the psychological literature on semantics, there are numerous 
structural perspectives for evaluating the nature of semantic 
representations (Brugman & Lakoff, 1988; Rosch, 1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999; Tyler & Evans, 2003; Lakoff, 2008, 2016; Johnson, 2013). However, we 
are particularly interested in investigating empirically-based dimensions 
underlying human conceptual processing. We reason that an appreciation 
of the vital semantic distinctions will enable us to build an evidence-based 
semantic topology derived from these primary dimensions. Therefore, to 
be able to define the space in the first instance and then subsequently study 
the resultant topology’s characteristics and investigate the meaning 
landscape, we start our investigation with a focus on specific cognitive 
semantic dimensions. 
6.3 Multidimensional Semantic Space 
Despite a long tradition of studying semantic cognition and even 
mechanistically simulating conceptual representations using symbolic and 
sub-symbolic modelling, investigations of the human semantic space is a 
very recent endeavour. What do we mean by the phrase topography of 
conceptual space? Inspired by Louwerse’s (2011) symbol interdependency 
hypothesis, we believe that our mental concepts are highly interrelated with 
one another and that this interdependency can be conceptualised in a 
higher-dimensional space. Since topography is the study of the shape and 
properties of a system (usually physical), theoretical and technical tools 
from this domain can be used to generate and interrogate the resulting 
meaning space which emerges from the interrelations of the concepts 
themselves. The scientific utility of complex semantic topologies, from the 
perspectives of both cognitive science and artificial intelligence, will be 
determined by the increased explanatory powers of these spaces compared 
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to simpler, more traditional semantic maps. Troche, Crutch and Reilly’s 
(2014) pioneering work in uncovering the topology of semantic space starts 
with a list of 400 abstract and concrete nouns, with ratings across 365 
participants and 12 cognitive dimensions - each of which is a survey 
question that respondents rate. For example, for the dimension action, 
respondents rate each of the target words on a 7-point Likert scale (Strongly 
disagree to Strongly agree) for this question: “I relate this word to actions, doing, 
performing, and influencing”. After aggregating all ratings across 
respondents, the dimensionality of the data is reduced to three dimensions 
using exploratory factor analysis. This reduction allows the visualisation of 
all concepts in a three-dimensional space for qualitative evaluations using 
a three-dimensional scatterplot and quantification by computing the 
Euclidean distances between all 400 nouns. The distance measure captures 
the semantic relatedness of the abstract and concrete nouns. Moreover, 
Troche et al.’s semantic space’s validity is demonstrated by outperforming 
Latent Semantic Analysis (Crutch et al., 2013). 
 More recently, Troche, Crutch and Reilly (2017) refined their 
original multidimensional semantic space due to a limitation of Troche et 
al.’s (2014) abstract concept feature (ACF) rating approach. The ACF was the 
first psychological instrument for evaluating the semantic relatedness of 
abstract words, which as they state in their more recent work, was biased 
to capture a dichotomised concreteness space with insufficient and 
polarised words (see figure 6.1). ACF is explicitly biased due to the specific 
cognitive dimensions selected. However, Troche et al. (2017) remedied this 
limitation using a set of 14 cognitive dimensions, called the conceptual 
feature rating (CFR) approach. The main difference between the ACF and 
CFR approach is that the latter includes additional dimensions for 
capturing sufficient semantic variations for concrete words. Eight out of the 
original 12 ACF dimensions are carried over to the new CFR, which are as 
follows: (i) polarity, (ii) emotion, (iii) social interaction, (iv) morality, (v) 
thought, (vi) time, (vii) space and (viii) quantity. Four of the original 12 ACF 
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dimensions are dropped (sensation, action, ease of modifying and ease of 
teaching) in the creation of the CFR, and six new sensorimotor dimensions 
are added, which are: (i) visual form, (ii) auditory, (iii) tactile, (iv) 
olfactory/gustatory, (v) visual colour and (vi) self-generated motion. We will 
briefly outline the core justifications Troche et al. (2017) provide for the 
inclusion of these dimensions as part of their new CFR instrument. 
 
Figure 6.1: Example of Troche et al.’s (2014) dichotomous measure of concreteness, with 
the x-axis depicting concreteness ratings.   
 
The polarity of concepts represents psychological valence (positive, 
neutral and negative), and is reasoned to be critical for complex goal-directed 
behaviours. The emotion dimension is supported firstly on the basis of 
research demonstrating the psychological importance of emotional 
processing in many cognitive activities (Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003), and 
secondly, due to recent weak embodiment theories suggesting the role of 
emotional processing as critical to the conceptual processing of some 
abstract concepts (Meteyard et al., 2012). Support for the factors social 
interaction and morality are respectively rooted in the evolutionary benefit 
of cooperating with others and neurological evidence from frontotemporal 
dementia (Zahn et al., 2009) showing increased interference with moral 
concepts. The fifth factor is thought and represents higher-order executive 
functioning for planning and decision making. The dimension time is 
justified because of its role in structuring everyday events, while space is 
justified, somewhat surprisingly, not because of the physical experience of 
our surroundings but due to the grounded cognition literature’s emphasis 
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on space’s central role in metaphoric language (e.g. love is a journey). Finally, 
from the original ACF metric, quantity is included due to the prevalence of 
numerical concepts in language such as count nouns (e.g. 12 eggs) and mass 
nouns (e.g. 1 litre of water), which have been shown to be related to both 
acquisition of concepts and concreteness effects (Gordon, 1985). The new 
CFR also includes six sensorimotor dimensions to provide greater 
explanatory power for concrete words, based on Shallice, Warrington and 
McCarthy’s (1983) outline of the importance of sensorimotor aspects for 
concrete concepts. We show the full dimensions of the CFR in table 6.1. 
Cognitive 
dimension 
Instruction to respondent 
Polarity “I relate this word to positive or negative feelings in myself.” 
Thought “I relate this word to mental activity, ideas, opinions, and judgments.”  
Emotion “I relate this word with human emotion.” 
Interaction “I relate this word with relationships between people.” 
Time “I relate this word with time, order, or duration.” 
Space “I relate this word to position, place or direction.” 
Quantity “I relate this word to size, amount or scope.” 
Morality “I relate this word to morality, rules or any other thing that governs my 
behaviour” 
Visual form “I relate this word to shapes, forms, textures that I can see with my eyes.” 
Tactile “ I relate this word to sensations (e.g., texture, shape, temperature) I can feel 
with my hands or body.” 
Smell/Taste “I relate this word to flavours and odours I can smell and/or taste.” 
Auditory “I relate this word to sounds, rhythms, etc. that I can hear.” 
Colour “I relate this word to colour.” 
Self-Motion “I relate this word to my own self-generated movement.”  
 
Table 6.1: Troche et al.’s (2017) conceptual feature ratings (CFR) instrument, the first 
column contains the 14 cognitive dimensions and the second column the verbal 
descriptions for participants. 
 
Troche et al. analyse the 14 cognitive dimensions using exploratory 
factor analysis to reduce the number of dimensions to three. The three 
factors are labelled (i) endogenous (emotion, polarity, social interaction, 
morality, motion self-generated and thought), (ii) exogenous (colour, 
smell/taste, tactile, visual form and auditory) and (iii) magnitude (space, 
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quantity and time), and the conceptual space is conveniently plotted in a 
three-dimensional scatter plot (see figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.2: The three-dimensional semantic space generated by Troche et al. (2017), 
where dark red points indicate words with highest concreteness ratings, while dark 
blue points more abstract words. 
 
Troche and colleagues’ refined approach, CFR, reveals an 
interesting conceptual topology, although focused explicitly on explaining 
concreteness. Troche et al. demonstrate that there is a continuum between 
concrete and abstract words, based on the difference between their 
previous abstract feature ratings (AFR) and the newer CFR approach. They 
also suggest that due to their conceptual space originating from three 
psychologically-inspired factors, the resultant multidimensional space is 
amodal and therefore more naturalistic. We further clarify the second part 
of this interpretation, which forms part of our discussion. In our view, 
claiming that the semantic space is amodal supports a moderate to strongly 
disembodied stance even though one could also argue that if different 
modalities activate across concepts differentially, then the meaning space 
itself is multimodal. 
Before outlining our specific theoretical motivations for our 
research, we summarise some of the limitations of Troche et al.’s approach, 
which may limit the applicability of a CFR-based space in becoming a 
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general approach to mapping semantics. However, in Troche et al.’s 
defence, this is not their objective, as they clearly state that their research 
focuses on the topology of word concreteness. Therefore, many of the 
limitations identified are more of an opportunity for future research to 
extend their pioneering work and help continue the development of 
cognitive semantic analysis in uncovering the conceptual topology. 
Firstly, in Troche et al.’s CFR-derived multidimensional space, all 
semantic distances appear to be roughly equidistant, where concepts are all 
approximately equally spaced across the MDS spaces. The lack of semantic 
clusters is surprising. Additionally, we consider that Troche et al.’s focus 
on creating a semantic map specifically to account for the concreteness 
spectrum, might have biased the dimensions used. We hypothesise that one 
of the reasons for their semantic map being poor at highlighting smaller 
groups of words is due to a lack of sufficiently similar functional and 
associative words. One can overcome this issue by supplementing the 
existing set of concepts with additional words from particular conceptual 
domains, where one would reasonably predict strong associations to exist. 
However, their choice of linear dimensionality reduction is likely to be a 
substantial contributing factor to the absence of semantic clusters. 
Since Troche et al.’s meaning space itself is created based on latent 
psychological dimensions, it would be difficult to interpret their results 
from a computational perspective, given that CFR aims to identify higher-
order psychological constructs without mechanistic implications. 
Nonetheless, if brain-based components motivate the cognitive 
dimensions, then the emergent conceptual space could be analysed to 
explore and test predictions based on neuropsychological conditions like 
semantic dementia.  
We propose that a conceptual space, constrained by findings from 
neuroimaging would be a fruitful interface between brain- and cognitive-
based semantic spaces. Similarities and differences between these spaces 
could potentially highlight differences based on hardwired semantic 
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associations or acquired semantic associations, which might have 
interesting applications in clinical psychology. Relatedly, this might even 
shed light on typical and atypical neurological developmental patterns in 
children and provide early diagnostic signs based on a relatively 
straightforward CFR-type questionnaire. Disorders such as obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD), are known to be associated with “semantic-
morphing” (Bream et al., 2017). A brain-based conceptual space might be 
able to identify problematic semantic networks early enough for 
interventions to prevent more severe and debilitating symptoms impacting 
the daily functioning of individuals - an essential criterion in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders (APA, 2013) for many 
psychological disorders. 
Furthermore, the CFR approach implicitly assumes that symbol 
interdependency of concepts within a space consists of a non-sparse matrix, 
where every concept is related to every other concept, even if the degree of 
relationship is minimal, due to the Euclidean distances computed across all 
750 words. How realistic is this concerning an ecologically valid cognitive 
data representation? Although we concede that this would be a minor 
limitation of the current CFR’s conceptual space, as thresholding stronger 
associations would overcome this, this raises, in our view, a critical 
question of how to define such a threshold. The main argument we are 
making is that the statistical and mathematical tools that allow us to define 
a topology need to be accompanied by cognitively meaningful constraints 
if the aim is to map the human conceptual space. Therefore, despite that the 
conceptual space successfully represents concreteness, it cannot account for 
modality-specific and taxonomically sensitive associations.  
There has been a long tradition, since Shallice et al. (1983), of 
considering different sensorimotor modalities to be more or less critical for 
particular types of words. How would that be encompassed in the CFR 
meaning space? Troche et al. (2017) suggest that if their semantic space did 
indeed correspond to a brain-based semantic space, then they would be 
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able to transform their statistical model into a powerful computational 
model and be able to, for example, lesion a portion of the magnitude axis in 
the CFR space (p.12). Even though lesioning a single axis might be viable, 
we cannot see a precise method for assigning the dimensions a differential 
set of weights. The CFR-based space currently does not provide relative 
importance of each of the dimensions. However, overcoming this limitation 
would allow for more “simulation-like” case studies of semantics from a 
neuropsychological perspective. 
Finally, one last limitation, which arguably in our view is the most 
important one, is that the CFR-space does not address the effect of contexts 
on both semantic encoding and retrieval. There is an implicit assumption 
that there exists a uniform semantic space, much like in other distributed 
models of semantic memory, ranging from older models like LSA 
(Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and HAL (Lund & Burgess, 1996) to more recent 
machine-learning based models like word2vec (Mikolov et al., 2013). This 
shortcoming applies to a wide range of semantic topologies and not just the 
CFR space, but we believe that this limitation prevents the topology from 
being used in cognitive computational modelling, which would be a good 
litmus test for any psychologically accurate semantic space. We strongly 
hypothesise, in our present study, that the semantic space is highly 
dynamic as a function of context. 
6.4 Human Experiment: Mapping our Meaning Space 
6.4.1 Visualising Semantic Space 
In order to construct an interpretable conceptual space based on 
fundamental meaning components, we suggest that it is theoretically 
necessary to use brain-based cognitive dimensions for generating this 
semantic manifold. The nature of the primitives themselves can change, i.e. 
could be entirely disembodied amodal feature-type or grounded raw 
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sensorimotor stimuli, but the problem remains the same. The underlying 
nature of grounded data is likely to be complex and noisy, but the task of 
generating a conceptual topology remains mostly the same. 
In the case for cognitive scientists investigating semantic spaces, 
there can be a motivation to not go above three dimensions (reasons 
outlined in Appendix B), for example, in Troche et al.’s (2014) scatter plot of 
the endogenous, exogenous and magnitude dimensions. However, we 
argue, that the dimensionality of semantics is very likely to be high-
dimensional, which is why Troche and colleagues’ three dimensions 
explain 69% of the variability in the underlying 14 cognitive dimensions, 
even though our re-analysis shows that five dimensions might actually 
explain 81%, a further 12% increase in variability explained, which is more 
consistent with the core dimensions identified by LSA. However, how 
would we visualise five dimensions simultaneously? Psychologists’ answer 
to this question is typically multidimensional scaling (MDS) or principal 
component analysis (PCA).  
The realisation that traditional dimensionality reduction algorithms 
like PCA are suboptimal for representing non-linear manifolds (discussed 
in Appendix C), recently led, in the field of machine learning, to the 
development of Isomap, by Tenenbaum, De Silva and Langford (2000). 
Isomap is the first algorithm optimising for global structures by estimating 
the pair-wise distances in the original space using geodesic distances, which 
is followed by PCA on these distances (Balasubramanian & Schwartz, 
2002). Similarly, Roweis and Saul (2000) developed a technique called 
locally linear embedding (LLE), which, for our purposes, is conceptually 
similar to Isomap, although it centres most of the points at the centre of 
origin of the map (see Hadid, Kouropteva, & Pietikainen, 2002). The 
technique that we advocate is called t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbour 
Embedding (t-SNE), developed by Van der Maaten and Hinton (2008). This 
technique uses the student’s t-distribution to sample nearby points from 
the original high-dimensional data, which ensures that similar points have 
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a significantly higher probability of being selected (for distance 
calculations) compared to dissimilar points. In a second step, t-SNE also 
computes a similar distribution for the lower-level data representation, 
which is followed by the third and final step, a reduction in the divergence 
between the two distributions. Van der Maaten and Hinton demonstrate 
that t-SNE is significantly superior to both traditional and other more recent 
algorithms for visualising higher-dimensional datasets, due to t-SNE’s 
ability to optimise for both local and global structures in the data. The 
nature of the trade-off between local and global optimisation is tuned using 
the perplexity parameter, which we explore in our analysis. This has led to 
t-SNE replacing most other visualisation methods in many domains of 
machine learning, such as visualising the hidden layers of neural networks 
(Mnih et al., 2015), document search (Ingram & Munzner, 2015), 
recommendation engines (Shankar et al., 2017) and even network security 
(Kolosnjaji et al., 2016). Recent neuroimaging studies have also used t-SNE 
for visualising clusters of voxel activations (Mwangi, Soares, & Hasan, 
2014).  
We hypothesise that given the phenomenological complexity of 
semantic cognition, it seems plausible to assume that the conceptual 
topology of the human semantic memory system is highly non-linear. It 
seems only natural to assume that for explaining a broad spectrum of 
human meaning, a diverse range of local and global features is necessary 
for capturing sufficient complexity. Therefore, t-SNE is likely to be well-
suited, especially given the perplexity parameter, which, has not yet been 
investigated in either empirical or computational models of semantic 
cognition. 
6.4.2 Relative Importance of Dimensions 
Intuitively, on some level, we can all relate to some of our senses 
being more central than others for conceptualising diverse things we 
encounter in our daily lives. A slice of chocolate cake is typically associated 
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with visual and gustatory information but not as much with auditory 
sensations. On the other hand, listening to a musician playing on a grand 
piano is very much associated with auditory and visual modalities, among 
others, such as emotions, although earlier empirical work has overlooked 
this cognitive dimension. Lynott and Connell (2013), for example, collected 
ratings from participants on the extent to which they associated the five 
primary senses (seeing, hearing, tasting, touch and smelling) with a range of 
400 randomly selected noun concepts in order to create modality 
exclusivity norms. Their research found evidence for noun concepts being 
highly multimodal with different modality profiles across noun concepts, 
even though their focus was limited to the five primary senses (see figure 
6.3). 
 In their more recent work (Connell, Lynott, & Carney, 2017), they 
include interoception as a hidden and often forgotten modality critical for 
the sensorimotor grounding of concepts. Interoception covers a wide range 
of internal bodily sensations such as temperature, muscle tension, glucose 
level, hunger and thirst. In their more recent research, they explore the 
interrelations of interoception with the five primary senses previously 
studied, with a specific focus on how this manifests itself across the 
concrete-abstract spectrum. They find that interoception is pervasive across 
the concreteness continuum, although it is particularly critical for abstract 
concepts, from which it is the most important for negative emotion words, 
like sadness. Interestingly, the findings also demonstrate that including this 
additional dimension improves the fit of their model, indicating that 
additional meaningful information is captured by interoception that cannot 
be accounted for by the traditional five senses in their original model. Our 
research addresses one of their original study’s limitations of not being able 
to account for more abstract words. 
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Figure 6.3: Visualising the semantic space generated using PCA of the 400 noun 
concepts in Lynott and Connell’s (2013) modality exclusivity norm study. The labels 
correspond to the most dominant modality. 
 
Ultimately, from our perspective of developing a conceptual 
representation space and investigating this meaning landscape, we build 
on Lynott and Connell’s (2013) research by focusing on semantic primitives 
beyond the six senses. Lynott and Connell’s approach is more ecologically 
valid than using feature sets as the most basic units of semantic cognition, 
which are quite poor primitives in the sense that features themselves are 
not ontologically independent lower-level building blocks of meaning. This 
is also a core characteristic of the research presented in this chapter. 
6.4.3 Brain-based Componential Semantics 
A radically new conceptualisation of semantic primitives is 
theoretically proposed and empirically evaluated by Binder and colleagues 
(2016), with their brain-based componential semantics approach. They avoid 
the pitfalls of “higher-order” semantic primitives in the form of features 
and instead focus on evidence-based representations based on 
neuroimaging research highlighting the essential functional divisions of 
semantics in the human brain. Binder et al. argue that semantically 
“grounding” the concept BIRD using features such as has wings, has a beak 
or has feathers is a key limitation of the standard feature-based models of 
semantics. For example, the so-called “feature primitive” wing is a higher-
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order concept as well, because of links to other nouns like feathers or verbs 
such as flying. Therefore, we believe, features being semantically dependent 
on one another highlights the problem of a symbolic merry-go-round as 
well as its corresponding combinatorial explosion, which contradicts the 
well-established evidence of meaning being at least partly grounded in 
sensorimotor modalities (Meteyard et al., 2012). One of the key common 
themes running through Binder et al.’s research as well as the present thesis 
so far is that in order to better understand the process of concept 
acquisition, we need to pay much closer attention to our everyday 
surroundings, which Binder et al. term “experiential attributes” (p. 2).  
Binder and colleagues' research differs from previous research by 
being a more ecologically valid approach to capturing semantic 
representations, whereby the emphasis is on common neural correlates 
associated with independent functionalities. Some connectionist models 
(e.g. Rogers & McClelland, 2004) purposefully incorporate “features” that 
are taxonomically relevant to allow the statistical regularities to have both 
sufficient within- and between-category coherence and incoherence 
relations, which result in highly interpretable taxonomic discriminations. 
However, we argue, the modeller-defined features pose a significant 
information leakage risk. This hand-coding of features blurs the boundary of 
the semantic space as a product of the underlying features or specifically 
chosen features by the modeller to output specific properties. In contrast, 
Binder et al.’s view of “macroscopic neural systems that can be 
distinguished with in vivo imaging methods” (p.5) provides a theoretical 
footing for the inclusion of all the underlying semantic primitives. 
Binder and colleagues investigate 535 English words, consisting of 
434 nouns, 62 verbs and 39 adjectives. Although the actual queries used to 
collect the ratings from the participants varies depending on whether a 
noun, verb or adjective is rated, they are similar to “[t]o what degree do you 
think of this property as …” (p.14). These ratings are analysed using a range 
of descriptive and inferential techniques, spanning simple radial plots and 
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hierarchical clustering to dimensionality reduction for investigating a total 
of 65 neural attributes. In order to develop a deeper understanding of the 
core independent cognitive dimensions, Binder et al. performed a data 
reduction exercise. Sixteen factors emerged from this analysis, among 
which Vision/Touch (pattern, shape, colour, and texture) was the most 
dominant attribute from the factor analysis with an eigenvalue (EV) of 
12.81, while the three weakest factors are time (EV = 3.22), luminance (EV = 
2.37), and slow (EV = 1.16). We provide a detailed list of all the factors, and 
how we implement them using the conceptual feature ratings (CFR) 
approach in table 6.3. These 16 factors outperform the more traditional 
distributed latent semantic representations. Binder et al. visualise the 
semantic similarities of the representations based on superordinate 
groupings for making the comparisons more interpretable (see figure 6.4). 
By visually comparing between the brain-based components and the LSA 
models, clearer subordinate structures emerge, while strong associative 
relations appear between the various superordinate categories, which is 
somewhat similar to the results from chapter 3 where our Perceptual Scene 
Vectors (PSV) representations display more fine-grained associations across 
the concepts. When exploring the results of Binder et al., it is worth noting 
that they reduced the standard number of LSA vectors from 300 to 65 in 
order to match their brain-based representation. Interestingly, the results of 
the 65 and 300 LSA dimensions are comparable. 
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Figure 6.4: Binder et al.’s (2016) cosine-similarity comparison of 434 nouns using brain-
based representations (left) with LSA representation (right). 
 
Binder et al. also use Cohen’s d effect size to compare both the brain-
based and reduced set of LSA dimensions of within-category versus 
between-category cosine similarities. At an overall level, across brain-based 
and LSA dimensions, Cohen’s d is significantly higher for pairs of words in 
the same category, in comparison to between-category word pairs, 
although this difference is greater for the brain-based (Cohen’s d mean = 
2.64, SD = 1.09) versus LSA representations (Cohen’s d mean = 1.09, SD = 
0.85). This difference indicates that even though both the distributional 
latent semantic and brain-based dimensions can represent the a priori 
category labels successfully, brain-based dimensions are superior at 
capturing taxonomic-level associations in comparison to LSA dimensions. 
Another landmark study is that of Huth et al. (2016), which used 
fMRI to scan seven participants, while they were listening to more than 2 
hours of stories from The Moth Radio Hour - broadcasts stories on a wide 
range of topics. Interestingly, instead of visualising the areas of the brain 
that are highly active during a specific word appearing in the stories (not 
ideal given fMRI’s poor temporal resolution), the authors used voxel-wise 
regression models. From our perspective, it is interesting to note that Huth 
et al. use natural speech (grounded language) to generate semantic maps 
for subdividing the human cerebral cortex. Voxel-wise modelling is used 
because of the complexity of the stimuli that consist of creating a separate 
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regression model for each of the approximately 60,000 voxels. The 
researchers note that a core advantage of using voxel-based modelling is 
the ability to use the model to make predictions on a holdout sample of 
BOLD responses, which are not included during model training. These 
models are used to identify the highest predictive responses across 10,470 
words, from which the top 20 words form a word cloud for 77 semantic 
areas in the left hemisphere and 63 for the right hemisphere. This study 
provides strong evidence for a bi-lateral topology of brain-based semantics, 
which contradicts previous neuroanatomical evidence suggesting the 
dominance of the left hemisphere for semantic processing (e.g. Vigneau et 
al. 2006). 
Huth et al. also ran k-means to extract a set of data-driven semantic 
dimensions to map the distinct areas onto a coarse semantic map of the 
brain, on an inflated map of the cerebral cortex to “blow out” the activations 
hidden in the sulci of the surface. Despite the limited number of 
participants, the authors found support for high-levels of inter-participant 
semantic correspondences. Huth et al. show that semantic maps derived 
from natural speech are mappable onto the cerebral cortex. Despite this 
research’s ecologically valid approach to mapping meaning, it implicitly 
assumes that there is a so-called general semantic map, which plots the 
meaning of words statically. To clarify, we do not disagree with the 
presence of significant overlaps in people’s semantic spaces, as that would 
be difficult to reconcile with the ease and efficiency with which we 
meaningfully interact in our social and physical world. What we are 
hypothesising, is that the semantic map itself is not static but always in flux, 
where experiences gradually alter the semantic network, such that the very 
act of even accessing our semantic network slightly alters the 
interconnections based on a number of factors, one of which is the context 
where meaning encoding or decoding is occurring. 
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6.4.4 Relativity of Meaning 
We postulate, that a central theoretical principle regarding 
conceptual topologies in particular, but semantics more broadly, is that 
there is no meaning without context. Context-dependent proposals of 
meaning are not new in either cognitive science or linguistics research, so 
how does our perspective differ from those previously expressed? We first 
provide a brief outline of existing theoretical and empirical approaches 
before detailing our approach.  
Schwanenflugel and Shoben’s (1983) Context Availability Model 
(CAM) and Paivio’s (1991) Dual Coding Theory (DCT) are undoubtedly 
influential precursors to the claim that context influences meaning, 
especially linguistic meaning. Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger and Stowe 
(1988) conducted a study in which they investigated the types of contexts 
elicited by a range of words, providing support for a positive correlation 
between the availability of contexts and the ease of recognising particular 
words. The fact that words can be semantically ambiguous is not a 
controversial claim in contemporary cognitive science. However, what is 
important to note is that much of this evidence refers to the ability of 
linguistic contexts to influence suitable word-level representations, but not 
necessarily concepts themselves. Yap et al. (2011) showed that contexts 
facilitate word recognition and words with more semantic neighbours lead 
to faster lexical decision times in word recognition tasks. 
Hoffman, Ralph and Rogers (2013) were the first to create an 
objective computational metric of linguistic semantic diversity using a 
corpus-based approach. They build on Adelman, Brown and Quesada’s 
(2006) corpus-based approach, which proposes a metric called contextual 
diversity that computes the sum of all the document in which a particular 
word occurs in. Hoffman et al. outline that one of the critical limitations 
with this metric is that it is more likely to be a proxy for word frequency as 
opposed to genuine contextual diversity, given that the correlation between 
Adelman et al.’s contextual diversity metric and log word frequency is 
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higher than +0.95, indicating a nearly perfect correlation between the two 
measures. This finding is important because it shows that trying to 
understand the impact of context even in highly structured linguistic data 
(term-document matrix) can be confounded by factors such as frequency, 
which obfuscate the validity of measures like contextual diversity 
concerning semantic representations. The example provided by Hoffman 
et al. is the word tax - it might have an overall high contextual diversity 
score because it appears in several documents, even though all of these 
could be related to finance, in which case the actual conceptual diversity 
would still be low (p.720). In order to overcome this limitation, Hoffman et 
al. developed a new metric called semantic diversity (SemD), also based on 
corpus data, not by comparing the word frequencies across documents but 
by generating 1,000-word long context vectors. They reasoned that since the 
British National Corpus (BNC) consists of 3,125 separate documents of 
varying lengths, longer documents are less likely to represent discrete 
topics as they might be entire book chapters or news articles. However, 
their creation of smaller chunks of documents addressed this inherent 
limitation of the BNC dataset for context modelling. Hoffman et al. 
calculated word similarity using context vectors they generated in the LSA 
space. SemD was a better semantic measure for accounting for semantic 
judgments in both healthy individuals and patients afflicted with semantic 
deficits. 
Hoffman et al.’s research is a significant first step for semantics 
research to try to understand the role of contexts on meaning. Moreover, 
their database of over 30,000 words, tagged with SemD scores, provides 
useful metadata for related work. However, the research question of how 
the conceptual space itself is structured was not addressed in this research 
and has also not been addressed elsewhere with a focus on the relativity of 
meaning. With relativity, we do not just mean words that are homonyms, 
words with different meanings. We also consider words that might share 
the same sound (homophones) or orthographic representation (e.g. “the bark 
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of a tree” versus “the bark of dog”) or polysemous - where a single word 
might have two related meaning, as in the case of the word NEWSPAPER, 
which can be both the organisation or the print/digital publication. 
We are proposing that the human conceptual space is gradually 
constructed based on our experiences across various contexts. Every time 
we cognitively process a particular concept, the context morphs the concept 
based on the specific context, task and goals at a given point in time. Of 
course, some concepts are more fluid than others, and we expect Hoffman 
et al.’s semantic diversity metric, SemD, to be a good proxy for this. 
Although Hoffman and colleagues outline a schematic illustration of how 
context might influence conceptualisation, they do not provide a 
mechanistic account for doing so based on their semantic features. They 
provide a diagrammatic/ illustrative example of how the concept PIANO 
might be more associated with sound and emotion dimensions in the context 
of playing the instrument, versus weight and size if the context is lifting the 
piano. We propose to empirically test this idea of context-dependent 
conceptualisation along with the related hypothesis that the meaning space 
of, for example, a PIANO is not only associated with differentially weighted 
brain-based dimensions but also is fundamentally different as a function of 
the context in which it occurs. Contemporary empirical and computational 
research on semantic cognition commonly overlooks meaning as a context-
specific phenomenon. 
6.4.5 Objectives 
Building on the prior work of Binder et al.’s brain-based semantic 
components and Troche et al.’s conceptual feature rating (CFR) methodology, 
we aim to synthesise these two approaches to construct a novel semantic 
network topology. Our research aims to address a number of longstanding 
and overlooked questions on visualising the landscape of human meaning. 
Given the high-dimensionality assumption, we argue that only preserving 
large distances in the conceptual space by minimising the squared error 
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(like in PCA/MDS) misrepresents the meaning space by overlooking 
smaller distances. Our first hypothesis is t-SNE will be superior to MDS for 
representing meaningful and discriminating clusters of concepts. We then 
use network analysis for the visualisation of this data, as this has had 
promising outcomes in the study of complex systems, including functional 
brain networks (Sporns, 2011). We hypothesise that our network 
visualisations should also aid the interpretation of relationships in the 
conceptual topology, unlike investigating structure-less MDS plots (e.g. 
Troche et al., 2017) or word clouds (e.g. Huth et al., 2016). A second 
hypothesis is that the use of t-SNE will allow us to explore qualitative 
semantic variations related to local versus global distances. At lower levels 
of perplexity, concepts within a taxonomy are likely to be more clearly 
differentiated, due to the focus on smaller distances and vice versa at higher 
levels of perplexity. 
Our third hypothesis is that the conceptual topology will consist of 
small-world networks where concepts are more strongly connected to 
neighbouring concepts while the vast majority of concepts are disconnected 
with one another, even though they can be reached with a few links. We 
predict that the semantic space derived using brain-based cognitive 
dimensions is going to obey the principle of small-world compositionality, 
where, on average, the path lengths between the different concepts is 
relatively short in conjunction with increased clustering within the network 
(Watts & Strogatz, 1998). 
We also predict the presence of taxonomic, associative and 
functional relationships in our conceptual network topology, which is our 
fourth hypothesis. However, we caveat that all of these associations are 
unlikely to be meaningfully represented given the limited number of brain-
based dimensions and the large volume of concepts included in our study. 
Our fifth and probably the most fundamental hypothesis, which is 
evaluated on three smaller subsets of the concepts, is that the semantic 
network topology will vary as the background context of a function of 
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concepts. For methodological reasons, we cannot sensibly shift the context 
for all words evaluated. However, for three subsets of concepts, we will 
have a general neutral-context situation, along with two specific contexts (see 
table 6.4). Therefore, we have a total of six pair-wise comparisons. Our 
strong prediction is that each of these network topologies will be 
qualitatively different – that is, semantically organised into meaningful 
structures for those particular scenarios. In the case of the neutral context 
condition, we reason that the dominant lexical meaning structure will 
emerge. 
Our sixth hypothesis is that the relative strength of different 
dimensions will vary across the full range of concepts. Relatedly, our 
seventh hypothesis postulates that the relative importance of the cognitive 
dimensions will vary across concepts grounded in different contexts. Our 
emphasis is on interpretable variations, such that the strength of context-
relevant dimensions will increase, while that of context-irrelevant 
dimensions will decrease. We endeavour not only to understand the 
relative importance of these dimensions across the concreteness dimension 
- as Troche and colleagues already researched this - but to investigate 
whether or not the network topology shifts as a function of differentially 
activated dimensions. Therefore, our large-scale study will measure the 
relative importance of the cognitive dimensions for all words.  We aim to 
reveal the natural partitions in our empirically derived conceptual space. 
To quantify the relative importance of the dimensions, we adopt a 
well-established trade-off technique called Maximum Difference Scaling, or 
MaxDiff in short. The MaxDiff technique was initially developed by 
Louviere (1991, 1992) and then further advanced in a series of subsequent 
studies (e.g. Louviere, Finn, & Timmermans, 1994; Louviere, Swait, & 
Andreson, 1995), originally intended for ranking product attributes. 
MaxDiff is a method for selecting stimuli pairs. The theoretical roots of 
MaxDiff can be traced back to Daniel McFadden’s pioneering work on 
discrete choice models (DCM), summarised in McFadden (1977). 
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Louviere’s (1991) work is an extension of this original DCM theory 
and methodology for ranking discrete features, in our study, semantic 
dimensions, that are cognitively difficult to rank order, especially as the 
number of discrete dimensions to be compared increases. Cognitive 
scientists have not utilised the robustness and advantages of MaxDiff for 
ranking cognitive factors. In MaxDiff research, respondents typically only 
see four or five attributes at a time and select the best and worst attributes 
from the selection in front of them. A single MaxDiff experiment might 
have anywhere between 12 and 16 such individual trade-off screens, where 
results are aggregated across all participants. From the MaxDiff-derived 
relative importance metric, we predict that the cumulative importance of 
all 16 dimensions across all concepts will plateau, indicating that the 
dimensions are selectively important (hypothesis eight). 
In our ninth hypothesis, we predict that higher-order cognitive 
dimensions such as human, communication, self, time and reward will have 
negative correlations with concreteness. Therefore, even though multiple 
cognitive dimensions are likely to be activated for more abstract words, the 
dimensions above will be particularly strongly activated. On the other 
hand, in our tenth hypothesis, we state that lower-order or more 
perceptually-grounded, cognitive dimensions like vision, ingestion, audition, 
place and luminance will be positively correlated with concreteness ratings. 
We also predict that the semantic network topology will not be solely 
grouped within the 14 cognitive dimensions (hypothesis 11) because non-
linear transformations from tSNE in combination with network 
visualisation will yield an associatively meaningful network. 
Binder and colleagues’ research on deriving brain-based semantic 
primitives is, in our view, a significant step forward for ecologically valid 
cognitive semantics research, as it provides the scientific community with 
the opportunity of using these dimensions as building blocks for more 
general theories of human conceptualisation. We believe that their research 
provides an opportunity of moving cognitive semantics research beyond 
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simple and modeller-determined feature sets. Recently there have been 
concerns in the psychological literature, on the circularity of claims within 
psychology. Unlike previous reviews of circularity in the psychological 
literature (e.g. Gigerenzer, 2009), Hahn (2011) provides a balanced 
perspective on admissible and suboptimal circularity in both data gathering 
and theorising. In this review the statement “God exists because the Bible says 
so, and the Bible is the word of God” (p.172) is used to demonstrate how the 
evidence is reliant on the “self-claim” it is trying to support in the first place. 
Such classic cases of circularity in reasoning defy falsification despite being 
logically (deductively) valid, Hahn argues, given that the evidence 
presupposes the conclusion. However, we are told to not necessarily ignore 
such assertions as useful given that there are tools for overcoming this, for 
example, with a Bayesian probability framework which takes into account 
information about one’s beliefs and adjusts the given probability of a 
particular hypothesis being true. Inspired by this type of reasoning for 
empirical research, we argue that the same needs to be the case for cognitive 
modelling.  
There is a proliferation of computational meaning spaces in 
cognitive science dominated by hand-coded features. For many cognitive 
modellers, this might be an obvious truism and not worth discussing since 
simple toy models help us explore the core underlying principles of 
meaning representation parsimoniously. Let us consider the prototypical 
case of the concept of ROBIN being part of the superordinate animal 
category, while PINE being part of the tree category. In most connectionist 
cognitive models this discrimination is based on the modeller’s assumption 
that these concepts are different in a particular way so therefore should have 
a vector representing that difference. 
We claim that this leads to circularity in reasoning when generating 
computational semantic topologies, akin to Hahn’s (2011) God example, 
which we reword to apply to our discussion: “The semantic space exists 
because the features say so, and the features are the core property of semantics”. 
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This type of reasoning, as Hahn outlines, is widespread in science. 
Although inspired by Hahn’s suggestion of Bayesian inference, we 
recommend that the fundamental dimensions of semantics should be 
empirically determined. Avoiding circular definitions ought to enable us to 
generate a semantic topology independent of our a priori assumptions and 
based on empirically-derived primitives. 
 
Summary of hypotheses 
1. Concepts can be discriminated more successfully using the t-SNE 
dimensionality reduction algorithm in comparison to MDS. 
2. Local and global concept associations will be respectively discriminated 
at lower and higher t-SNE perplexities.  
3. The conceptual topology will obey small-world network properties, like 
sparse density and clustering. 
4. The conceptual topology will be organised based on taxonomic, 
associative and functional relationships. 
5. The semantic network of a subset of concepts will morph its structure 
as a function of context (e.g. context-free, moving house or cooking 
scenario).  
6. The relative strength of cognitive dimensions will vary across network 
clusters. 
7. The relative strength of the cognitive dimensions will vary across 
concepts grounded in different contexts. 
8. The cumulative relative importance of all 16 dimensions will gradually 
plateau. 
9. Higher-order cognitive dimensions such as human, communication, 
self, time and reward will have a negative correlation with concreteness. 
10. Perceptually-grounded cognitive dimensions like vision, ingestion, 
audition, place and luminance will be positively correlated with 
concreteness ratings. 
11. The semantic network topology will not be structured solely by 
modality-only distinctions  
 
Table 6.2: A summary of our central hypotheses. 
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6.4.6 Methodology 
6.4.6.1 Participants 
The respondents for this study (N = 2,062; 44% male / 56% female) 
were recruited through the UK-based ResearchNow panel.  They were 
invited to take part in a Psychology online survey which would take 
approximately 30 minutes to complete. In return for their participation, 
they were compensated with panel credits by ResearchNow, which can be 
exchanged for Amazon vouchers. ResearchNow is a world-leading 
professional market and social research panel provider, with over 11 
million panellists in their global database spanning 40 countries 
(https://www.researchnow.com). They abide by the regulations of UK 
industry body MRS (Market Research Society) and the ESOMAR (European 
Society for Opinion and Marketing Research), and comply with new GDPR 
(General Data Protection Regulation) requirements. Panellists on 
ResearchNow are carefully vetted using digital fingerprints and an 
introductory panel survey consisting of 1,000 metrics and geo-IP-validation 
to ensure they are real human respondents as opposed to bots. The panel 
has been used in large-scale academic research, such as medical science 
research (e.g. Graffigna et al., 2015). The data quality has also been 
evaluated by Schoenherr, Ellram and Tate (2015), who have outlined data 
quality risks from fatigued respondents, which we take into account during 
data cleaning. We only recruited participants from the United Kingdom 
who were native English speakers (self-reported). The only other criterion 
was that participants had to be able to complete the survey on a computer 
and not a tablet or mobile device due to the length of the study and the 
volume of stimuli being presented. The mean age was 45 years (range: 18 - 
76). 
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6.4.6.2 Materials 
In total, we selected 500 English nouns drawn from the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981), but 
included an additional 44 words. All words were pre-evaluated to span the 
entire concreteness spectrum. 
6.4.6.3 Experimental Procedures 
In this online study, there were three distinct experimental stages, 
which respondents completed in the same order. The first stage consisted 
of the conceptual feature ratings (CFR) using the 16 brain-based dimensions 
from Binder et al. (2016), where all participants were randomly assigned 80 
words (out of the total set of 544 nouns), which were rated on a single 
dimension randomly assigned to them (out of the total set of 16 cognitive 
dimensions). Unlike in the Troche et al.’s (2017) experiment, in our study 
we did not ask each participant to rate all the dimensions or all 544 words 
in order to drastically reduce the survey length and minimise survey 
fatigue in respondents given that this is a limitation of online research 
panels discussed by Schoenherr et al. (2015). Respondents did not switch 
rating modalities during this stage to avoid interference-based noise 
artefacts. After the participants read the on-screen instructions, they 
confirmed their willingness to participate in the study by clicking on the 
accept button.  
Participants were instructed that there were no right or wrong 
answers and that they should use the entire scale and work quickly, yet 
carefully. Respondents were shown each of the 80 randomly selected words 
individually (horizontally centred + vertically aligned 1/3 away from the 
top of the screen) and asked to rate them according to a dimension on a 
digitised 7-point Likert scale with the following labels: Strongly Disagree (1), 
Disagree (2), Slightly Disagree (3), Neutral (4), Slightly Agree (5), Agree (6), 
Strongly Agree (7). The numbers in brackets were not shown to respondents 
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and are indicated here to outline our data codes. The digitised survey Likert 
scale consisted of a horizontal array of survey tiles (see figure 6.5). After 13610 
word trials, a “rest window” appeared and asked participants to click on 
the next button to start the second stage of the survey. The scale instructions 
for each of the 16 brain-based cognitive dimensions are shown in table 6.3. 
The first stage of the experiment, on average, took 8 minutes. 
 
Brain-based  
cognitive 
dimension 
Instruction to respondent 
Vision I relate this word to shapes, forms, textures that I can see with my eyes 
Negative polarity I relate this word with negative feelings and thoughts, such as sadness, 
disgust, anger, fear or pain 
Communication I relate this word to communicating with others 
Audition  I relate this word to sounds and rhythms that I can hear 
Ingestion  I relate this word with tastes and smells 
Self  I relate this word to myself and my needs 
Motion  I relate this word to all forms of movements 
Human  I relate this word to humans, their faces, speeches or other characteristics 
Surprise  I relate this word to being surprised 
Place  I relate this word to particular places, scenes, settings or landmarks 
Upper limb  I relate this word with my arms 
Reward  I relate this word with benefits, needs and drives 
Positive polarity I relate this word with positive feelings and thoughts, such as happiness, well-
being or arousal 
Time  I relate this word to time, duration or numbers 
Luminance  I relate this word to visual brightness 
Slow  I relate this word to slow things 
 
Table 6.3: Our conceptual feature ratings (CFR) instrument, based on Troche et al.’ 
(2017) question format of “I relate this word to/with…”. The first column contains the 
16 brain-based dimensions derived from the original 65 dimensions evaluated by Binder 
et al. (2016) and the second column shows the question format for respondents. 
 
 
                                                      
10  This was determined when designing the experiment using the R package 
AlgDesign. 
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Figure 6.5: A screenshot of how the conceptual feature rating exercise looks like on a 
computer screen. There is an overall progress bar at the top right-hand side, as well as 
a fraction count for the specific section of the study. 
 
In the second phase, the MaxDiff study, participants were shown a 
word and asked to select the most relevant and least relevant dimension 
from a selection of four dimensions shown on screen (see figure 6.6). Each 
respondent completed 40 MaxDiff exercises. This second stage took an 
average of 19 minutes to complete. However, for this experimental stage, 
the order of words × dimensions for each respondent, across all their trials 
was optimally balanced. Our pseudo-orthogonally designed experiment 
balanced the number of repeats (dimensions co-occurring together), words 
and dimension pairings and word order. Given the large number of words 
tested, we used the R package AlgDesign, which is an algorithmic 
experimental design package that creates, evaluates and outputs complex 
experimental designs like MaxDiff experiments (Wheeler, 2014) to optimise 
the incomplete experimental block design. The final experimental design file 
is used to script the survey in PsychoPy v3.0, a high-level Python library for 
data recording in pre-coded analytical grids to simplify data processing. 
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Figure 6.6: A screenshot of how the MaxDiff exercise looks like on a computer screen. 
 
In the third and final stage of the study, we investigated whether or 
not the conceptual topology is context-dependent. Respondents were 
randomly assigned one of six scenarios to read through. Respondents only 
rated 25 words using the CFR methodology from stage 1. In this between-
subjects design (3 pair-wise comparisons), participants completed the 
ratings once for a single scenario. The six scenarios are shown below, along 
with the 25 words used. This third stage of the experiment, on average, took 
6 minutes to complete. 
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Table 6.4: Stimuli used in the context-specific experiments (phase 3). Twenty-five 
words are rated per scenario, with identical concepts split across two scenarios. The 
neutral-context scenario (not displayed) is derived for these same words from the 
general phase 1 ratings of all 544 concepts.  
 
6.4.6.4 Data Analysis Procedures 
Our initial set of analyses were inspired by Troche et al. (2017), to 
have sufficient points of comparison between our current study 
implementing brain-based cognitive dimensions using the CFR method 
and the original CFR study, which uses pure cognitive dimensions. 
Context 
1. Moving 
House 
2. Kitchen 3. Fire 4. Water 
5. Car Boot 
Sale 
6. Birthday 
Gift 
Please rate the 
next few words, 
while imagining 
that you are about 
to move house, 
and need to lift 
and pack your 
belongings. 
Please rate the 
next few words, 
while imagining 
that you are in 
your kitchen 
preparing a meal. 
Please rate the 
next few words, 
while imagining 
that you are taking 
these things from 
a house on fire. 
Please rate the 
next few words, 
while imagining 
things that can 
float on water. 
Please rate the 
next few words, 
while imagining 
things that can be 
bought in a car 
boot sale. 
Please rate the 
next few words, 
while imagining 
things that can be 
bought as a 
birthday gift 
refrigerator mobile phone apple 
cool box pets banana 
ice cube tray children lemon 
oven clothes cranberry 
microwave documents cucumber 
hob heirlooms pizza 
kettle jewellery lobster 
toaster money cake 
spoon photos food 
fork laptop dinner 
knife TV spaghetti 
plate tablet diamond 
chicken passport jewel 
pork wallet jewellery 
beef cake saxophone 
cucumber chair lamp 
tomato lamp clothing 
apple comb shirt 
bottle cabbage umbrella 
chair tangerine corkscrew 
cup plate spatula 
table fork spider 
door cucumber gun 
window knife mansion 
sink apple puppy 
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Following this initial analysis, we build on this with a range of additional 
analytical techniques, which we outline below. 
Before data analysis, we cleaned the data using a set of pre-defined 
guidelines. However, our criteria were more conservative than those used 
by Troche et al. (2014). We had a larger sample size and therefore 
maintained the statistical power of the study despite the list-wise omission 
of respondents’ data. Our online ResearchNow panel was also likely to 
contain a small cohort of “professional respondents”, a problem first 
outlined by Dennis (2001). We excluded respondents that took less than 15 
minutes to complete the entire survey. Perfect zigzag patterns on the survey 
were identified by searching for inter-stimuli (in order of presentation) 
patterns like “1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7” or “7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1” across seven consecutive 
words. 
In order to integrate concreteness ratings in our dataset (not collected 
from participants), we merged our aggregated word-level responses with 
the concreteness (CNC) score from the extensive concreteness rating database 
(40,000 English word lemmas) provided by Brysbaert et al. (2014). We ran 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to evaluate the presence of higher-order 
factors in our brain-based cognitive dimensions. However, even though 
Troche et al. (2017) used the commonly suggested Varimax rotation with 
Kaiser Normalisation (Kaiser, 1958), an algorithm that is readily available in 
SPSS, we opted not to replicate this part of the analysis. 
Costello and Osborne (2005) provide an updated set of best-practice 
guidelines for social science researchers, supporting maximum likelihood as 
the best factor extraction method as long as it is accompanied by analysing 
the scree plots along with a qualitative interpretation of multiple factor test 
runs. We followed the guidelines outlined in Costello and Osborne (2005). 
However, like Troche et al. (2017), we also evaluated the inter-rater 
reliability across our 16 dimensions using Interclass correlations. 
Our statistical analysis started with non-linear data reduction using 
t-distributed stochastic neighbour embedding (t-SNE). We ran a series of 
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different t-SNE models with a perplexity range of 2 to 181, in order to 
evaluate the trade-off between the preservation of small neighbourhoods 
of meaning versus unearthing the global semantic structures. We also used 
network analysis techniques to graph the conceptual topology. 
Finally, we used a simple Aggregate Logit model (Lipovetsky & 
Conklin, 2015) to compute word-level utilities across all dimensions. The 
MaxDiff data was not analysed using state-of-the-art discrete choice 
modelling approaches such as Latent Class or Hierarchical Bayesian analysis 
(Orme, 2009), due to data sparsity. We had a large volume of items rated 
(544 words across 16 dimensions), despite only having few exposures of 
each word per respondent. 
6.4.7 Results 
6.4.7.1 Inter-rater reliability 
The inter-rater reliability of each of the 16 cognitive dimensions 
measured separately on the conceptual feature ratings (CFR) and the 
Maximum Difference (MaxDiff) importance scale was analysed using a two-
way mixed model. As advocated by Troche et al. (2017), we also used the 
statistical guidelines from Cicchetti (1994) for interpreting the strength of 
interclass correlations in psychological testing. According to Cicchetti 
(1994), interclass correlations below 0.40 are poor and between 0.40 and 0.59 
the level of significance is fair, while the level of significance is good between 
0.60 and 0.74 and excellent when between 0.75 and 1.00 (p. 286). Like Troche 
et al. (2017), all our dimensions on the CFR rating have excellent inter-rater 
reliabilities, even though for the MaxDiff ratings of the three dimensions (i) 
motion, (ii) slow, and (iii) upper limb the reliability was good rather than 
excellent (see table 6.5). This suggests strong consistency in how 
respondents interpreted and responded to rating the dimensions and the 
choice-based MaxDiff importance tasks. This is important given that all 
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following statistics, network analyses and interpretations of our semantic 
topology are based on this data. 
 
Table 6.5: Interclass correlations (ICC) of the 16 cognitive dimensions for both brain-
based conceptual feature ratings (CFR) and the Maximum-Difference (MaxDiff) scores. 
Interclass correlations that are good, as opposed to excellent, are coloured red. 
6.4.7.2 Predicting concreteness ratings with cognitive dimensions 
In order to predict concreteness (CNC) ratings, we merged CNC 
ratings from Brysbaert et al. (2014) with our aggregated word-level ratings 
from the current study. This resulted in a match-rate11 of 98% (532 / 544). 
Unmatched concepts (n = 12) either were compound concepts (e.g. ice cube 
tray) or had different plural/singular forms. Words with differences in 
spellings because of British or American English were mapped manually. 
14 out of the 16 dimensions significantly predict concreteness 
ratings. The strongest positive correlation is attributed to vision (r = 0.77, p 
< 0.001), while the strongest negative correlation to communication (r = -0.54, 
p < 0.001). Thus, higher ratings on the vision dimension correspond with 
                                                      
11 Match-rate in this context refers to the proportion of words successfully linked 
between the 544 words used in the present study and Brysbaert et al.’s (2014) 
database. 
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larger concreteness ratings, while stronger communication dimension 
scores are associated with lower concreteness ratings. In line with our 
predictions (hypotheses 9 and 10), more sensory motor dimensions (vision, 
ingestion, luminance, auditory, and motion) are positively associated with 
concreteness ratings, while higher-order dimensions (communication, 
human, self, time and reward) are negatively related to concept concreteness 
ratings. 
 
Figure 6.7: Correlations between the 16 cognitive dimensions and the concreteness 
ratings merged from Brysbaert et al. (2014). Dimensions are rank ordered (from A to P) 
based on most positive (green) to most negative (red) correlations. The regression line 
and its confidence interval band along with the correlation coefficients and p-values are 
shown alongside each graph. The dimensions positive polarity and upper limb have no 
significant correlations.  
6.4.7.3 Factor Analysis 
Troche et al. (2017) use factor analysis (FA) to determine the final 
number of “compound dimensions” for generating the semantic topology. 
We run a Maximum Likelihood FA on the 16 cognitive dimensions (only CFR 
ratings) based on the guidelines from Costello and Osborne (2005) and 
Raîche et al.’s (2013) heuristics on non-graphical solutions to selecting the 
best factors, which yield a 6-factor solution (see figure 6.8). However, 
visually inspecting the scree plot reveals a gradual decline in variance 
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explained as the number of components increases, which supports the 
independence of our 16 CFR dimensions, given the lack of a distinct “elbow 
point” in the continuous rate of decline. Based on this exploratory factor 
analysis, we decide not to aggregate any of our dimensions into higher-
order factors. The factor loadings (see figure 6.8) even for the first factor, show 
a wide range of variation (from 0.4 to 0.8). The dimension reward, although 
highest on factor two, is also strongly associated with factors one and three 
while factors five and six are single variable factors. Collectively, this does 
not support a small number of latent variables reliably accounting for the 
16 brain-based cognitive dimensions in our study. 
 
Figure 6.8: (A) Factor Analysis components matrix with conditional formatting (blue 
for larger numbers and red for smaller numbers). (B) A scree plot of the first nine 
principal components extracted. Dimensions with a red asterisk, are ones where the 
scale has been inverted for ease of interpretation. 
6.4.7.4 Descriptive Summary 
We extract the concepts with the highest ratings across each of the 
16 dimensions to assess the face validity from an interpretive perspective 
and to examine the top range of associations on the seven-point Likert scale 
for evaluating the dimensions. The weakest “top concept” for a particular 
dimension has a score of 5.1 (concept miracle for dimension surprise), 
whereas the strongest is the word food for the dimension ingestion (see table 
6.6), with a score of 7.0. The top concept-dimension pairings are 
qualitatively meaningful. Larger maximum CFR scores of dimensions are 
also in-line with greater interrater reliability, from table 6.4, indicating more 
consistency for concepts on those particular dimensions. 
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Audition Communication Human Ingestion 
loud 6.1 mobile phone 6.5 man 6.3 food 7.0 
symphony 6.1 telephone 6.4 businessman 6.2 cake 6.9 
clang 5.9 debate 6.2 intelligence 6.1 barbecue 6.8 
squeak 5.8 announcement 6.0 girl 6.1 broccoli 6.8 
piano 5.8 laughter 6.0 sister 6.0 chocolate 6.7 
carnival 5.7 negotiate 5.8 boy 6.0 orange 6.6 
Luminance Motion Negative polarity Place 
sun 6.5 walk 6.0 terrorist 6.1 Christmas 6.3 
carnival 6.0 tornado 5.8 atrocity 6.0 sea 6.3 
lamp 5.8 traveller 5.6 misery 5.8 island 6.1 
moonlight 5.5 ball 5.4 despair 5.7 summer 5.9 
lightning 5.5 football 5.2 thief 5.7 passport 5.9 
summer 5.3 plane 5.2 fight 5.5 season 5.7 
Positive polarity Reward Self Slow 
laughter 6.6 honesty 6.5 intelligence 5.7 boredom 5.3 
love 6.5 marriage 6.4 knowledge 5.6 grief 4.6 
happy 6.5 laughter 6.4 instinct 5.6 walk 4.6 
fun 6.3 motive 6.3 trust 5.4 cloud 4.6 
affection 6.3 affection 6.3 holiday 5.4 wander 4.4 
joy 6.1 development 6.3 family 5.4 flounder 4.2 
Surprise Time Upper limb Vision 
miracle 5.1 time 6.8 hand 6.2 garden 6.2 
loud 5.0 duration 6.5 arm 5.8 car 6.2 
avalanche 4.8 number 6.5 shoulder 5.3 diamond 6.2 
magic 4.6 year 6.3 crossed 5.2 church 6.2 
Christmas 4.2 month 6.1 finger 5.2 boy 6.1 
fear 4.1 money 6.0 sword 5.0 pool 6.1 
 
Table 6.6: The top-6 concepts (out of 544) for each of the 16 dimensions. The numerical 
score is the aggregated conceptual feature rating (CFR) measured on a 7-point Likert 
scale. 
6.4.7.5 Dimensionality reduction: MDS and t-SNE 
Reducing the dimensionality of our semantic ratings is an important 
step in balancing the underlying signal-to-noise ratio in our dataset and 
increasing the interpretability. However, from our exploratory factor 
analysis, we find that a simple linear decomposition into a smaller number 
of dimensions is not feasible given the lack of an optimal “cut-off” point 
and a lack of interpretability. Dimensionality reduction aids 
generalisability and interpretability by extracting key latent interrelations. 
This is the case for both simple linear- and non-linear dimensionality 
reduction techniques. However, we hypothesise that the non-linear t-SNE 
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technique is more suited for semantic data given its machine learning basis 
in detecting lower-dimensional representations from higher-dimensional 
manifolds.  
We test our first hypothesis on the superiority of t-SNE over MDS, 
by visualising all 544 concepts using both methods. Our results, in figure 
6.9, show that t-SNE is superior at representing concepts globally across the 
meaning space as well as more locally in associative clusters. On the other 
hand, the MDS space differentiates extreme items (e.g. explosion and gun) at 
the expense of “squashing” all other concepts. In the MDS space, for 
example, this leads to sunfish’s two nearest neighbours being lamb and 
forest, while for t-SNE, the neighbours are far more associatively relevant, 
pond and sea. These results support our prediction of t-SNE being superior 
to MDS at meaningfully representing semantic dimensions. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Comparing t-SNE’s semantic embedding space (A) with MDS’ space (B) for 
all 544 concepts. See Appendix D for enlarged images (p. 341). 
6.4.7.6 Structure of Network Topology 
Our approach to generating a meaning landscape - semantic topology 
- is based on a two-stage process, consisting of (i) non-linear dimensionality 
reduction and (ii) network visualisation. We use t-SNE, to reduce our 16 
CFR dimensions into two dimensions that can capture both non-linear local 
and global structures within the data. The primary parameter for t-SNE is 
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perplexity, which can range from two to the number of cases divided by three. 
In our case, this results in a perplexity ranging from 2 to 181. 
The t-SNE algorithm outputs a set of x- and y-axis coordinates, 
based on non-linear transformations (depending on the perplexity) which 
we then transpose to calculate the bivariate correlations between all 544 
concepts. These concepts form the nodes of the network analysis. Nodes are 
assigned different colours based on properties such as concreteness ratings. 
A final association matrix, typically called the adjacency matrix, is then 
compiled based on a threshold applied to each element of the dense 
correlation matrix (544 × 544) of pairwise associations. This leads to the 
generation of a binarised adjacency matrix for plotting an undirected 
graph, where the vertices lack directions. This is a crucial step, which has 
significant transformative effects on the underlying network structure. 
However, the transformation of the association matrix (correlation) to an 
adjacency matrix (after binarisation) is needed to ensure that meaningful 
network structures emerge as opposed to having a network where all nodes 
are interconnected. Different thresholds will produce significantly different 
network topologies with varying degrees of network sparsity and 
interconnectivity patterns. Therefore, we explore a range of realistic values 
and present a small “snapshot” in figure 6.10. Realistic thresholds are 
defined based on assumptions like concepts cannot be mostly 
interconnected directly, as would be the case with a very low correlation 
threshold in the region of greater than or equal to 0.50. In our case, both the 
t-SNE perplexity and the correlation cut-off impact network topology. 
Initially, we explore the topology of the network without overlaying 
the specific concept labels. This allows us to focus on the high-level 
morphology of the network and understand how this varies as a function 
of perplexity and the correlation threshold. We generate ten separate 
association matrices for every pair of t-SNE perplexity (2, 50, 100, 181) and 
correlation threshold (0.95, 0.90, 0.80, 0.50). We then average the pair-wise 
associations for each of the 544 concept-pairs across the ten matrices. The 
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correlation threshold is then applied to this averaged matrix to produce the 
binarised adjacency matrix. We visualise this adjacency matrix using 
network analysis, where the spatial arrangement of the nodes and edges is 
structured using a spring algorithm. This algorithm minimises the crossing 
of edges and the spread of nodes to enhance network interpretability 
(Kamada & Kawai, 1989). This exploratory network analysis reveals high-
level structures of the semantic network derived from our brain-based 
conceptual feature ratings (CFR). 
 
Figure 6.10: A matrix of network topologies as t-SNE’s perplexity (columns) increases 
and the correlation threshold (rows) decreases, labelled A to P. The concreteness 
spectrum is indexed using node colour and is binned into the following three bands: 
abstract (red), intermediate (green) and concrete (blue). 
 
When t-SNE’s perplexity remains constant (see figure 6.10) but the 
correlation binarisation threshold gradually decreases from greater than or 
equal to 0.95 to greater than or equal to 0.90, 0.85, and 0.50, a broad global 
structure in the underlying topology emerges - concreteness. More abstract 
and concrete nodes polarise on either end of the network, with more 
intermediate-level concepts in the middle. At the lowest level of the 
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threshold (≥ 0.50), the number of network edges is greatest given that more 
associations are present in the adjacency matrix. At a global level, the 
presence of concrete and abstract concepts at two ends of the network 
indicate that concreteness is a latent structural property of our semantic 
topology. This finding is particularly surprising in our network structure 
given that concreteness ratings are not included in the generation of the 
association or subsequent adjacency matrices. 
The network is entirely grounded in the 16 brain-based CFR rating 
dimensions. Additional metadata such as concreteness ratings are merely 
overlaid as a network node property for visualisation and interpretation 
purposes. Therefore, this has no impact on the topology itself. In figure 6.10, 
at the second highest level of correlation thresholding (≥  0.90), more 
discernible network structures emerge as predominantly spurious 
associations are minimised in favour of retaining stronger associations, 
which are more likely to be semantically relevant. This also enhances the 
interpretability of the network by balancing the prevalence of false 
positives and false negatives occurring from the spurious associations. At 
the same time, the threshold of ≥ 0.90 also captures associations at both a 
local and global level, unlike at the highest threshold (≥ 0.95), consisting of 
very short “local chains” of concepts. However, the inclusion of t-SNE’s 
perplexity as an additional variable adds further complexity, which we 
wish to highlight before outlining our approach to determining a suitable 
threshold for both perplexity and correlation extraction for our overall 
network topology. 
At the highest correlation threshold (≥  0.95), when perplexity 
increases, the local “cluster chains” increase in length, leading to a slight 
decrease in the number of components in the network. However, at both 
the lowest perplexity level of 2 and the correlation threshold of ≥ 0.50, a 
large “network ball” emerges due to the high density of network 
interconnectivity. As t-SNE’s perplexity increases, while the correlation 
threshold is reduced (moving diagonally from A -> F -> K -> P), a gradual 
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shift from local to global meaning occurs. However, as the correlation 
threshold is reduced and the perplexity metric increased, an elongated, 
dense network structure emerges, with once again, a distinct concreteness 
spectrum running through the widest diameter of the network. The range 
of 50 to 181 for perplexity and ≥ 0.90 for the correlation threshold leads to 
discernible network structures. This is the most useful range we 
qualitatively identify for generating an interpretable semantic topology. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11: Three views of the semantic topology of 544 concepts, based on nodes 
colour-coded to represent (A) the concreteness spectrum based on ratings integrated 
from Brysbaert et al. (2014), (B) the most dominant cognitive dimension selected in the 
MaxDiff discrete choice modelling task, and (C) the k-core clusters.  
 
We evaluate the overall semantic network topology of the 544 
concepts based on the (i) concreteness spectrum, (ii) dominant cognitive 
dimension from the MaxDiff discrete choice exercise and (iii) the k-core 
clusters. The aggregated concreteness ratings, obtained from Brysbaert et 
al. (2014), are measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1-5 and overlaid on 
the topology using conditional formatting (see figure 6.11a). The semantic 
topology reflects clustering of concepts based on concreteness. Moreover, 
in the upper region of the network, a more continuous spectrum appears 
from abstract concepts located on the left to intermediate-level concepts 
located in the middle, and concrete concepts on the right side. The 
topology, viewed from the concreteness lens, also reveals the absence of 
highly abstract (red) and highly concrete (blue) concepts adjacent to one 
another.  
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The same semantic topology, viewed from the lens of the most 
dominant semantic dimension (figure 6.11b) reveals a slightly different 
topology than previously reported by Lynott and Connell’s (2013) modality 
exclusivity norm study (figure 6.3), in which concepts were neatly grouped 
based on the dominant modality. We compare the pattern of network nodes 
with the maximally discriminated cognitive dimension (figure 6.11b) and 
the data-driven k-core clustering of the nodes (figure 6.11c). The topologies 
only show some strong network grouping based on cognitive dimensions, 
predominantly limited to the modality ingestion, where the large (orange) 
network group (figure 6.11b) is consistently associated with a single 
dimension. The cognitive dimension of negative polarity is also clustered 
more locally in the network. Negative polarity is predominantly located in 
clusters 10, 13 and 14 (figure 6.11c). Other cognitive dimensions reveal a 
highly distributed semantic pattern across the network. In particular, the 
cognitive dimension place (lavender nodes in figure 6.11b) seems to be 
particularly well distributed across the entire network, as it does not fall 
within any one cluster, but rather, is spread fairly evenly across the 
network. 
Next, we briefly outline the main graph theoretical measures used 
in network analysis before describing our results (see Appendix A, for more 
details). To the best of our knowledge, since we are the first to generate a 
semantic network topology using cognitive dimensions, there are no 
guidelines on which of these measures is most suitable for analysing 
conceptual networks. Even in relatively more well-established network 
analysis domains such as computational neuroscience and psychopathology, 
there is a lack of agreement (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009). 
The most fundamental quantitative network metric is the degree, 
which quantifies the number of connections a specific node has. Nodes with 
higher degrees can be considered more important to the network. Plotting 
the frequency distribution of the degrees of all the nodes creates a degree 
distribution, which is useful for analysing network properties. Another 
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important measure is the clustering coefficient, which measures the 
propensity of a network to have nodes with neighbouring nodes which are 
more likely to be interconnected to nearby neighbours. Random networks 
commonly have fewer clusters, whereas complex networks have higher 
clustering coefficients. A network’s diameter, is the shortest distance 
between the two furthest nodes in a network, such that no other two nodes 
can be further apart as long as the shortest path is taken. We use the small-
world index (SWI), proposed by Humphries and Gurney (2008) to quantify 
the extent to which a network adheres to the small-world properties of a 
network, which in itself is a topic of contemporary disagreement in the 
network analysis literature (Sporns, 2010). At its core, small-world 
networks have two key properties; they have high degrees of clustering and 
short pathways that link these smaller cliques into more global structures. 
Lastly, another commonly used metric is network components, which 
measures the number of disconnected nodes/node clusters that are present.  
 In figure 6.12, we depict our exploratory analysis of the relationship 
between t-SNE’s perplexity measure and network components, diameter, 
clustering coefficient and the small-world index. However, it is important to 
stress that these results are only applicable to our CFR dimensions, and are 
not generalisable to other cognitive semantic networks. Our four 
correlations show, however, that as perplexity increases, the number of 
components and the clustering coefficient both decrease and have 
respective correlation coefficients of r = -0.88 (p < 0.001) and r = -0.93 (p < 
0.001). This is likely to be the case because as perplexity starts to favour 
more global associations, the prevalence of smaller specialised clusters 
decreases leading to fewer components and smaller clustering coefficients.  
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Figure 6.12: Plotting the relationship between a log-rescaled t-SNE perplexity and (A) 
network components, (B) diameter, (C) clustering coefficient and (D) the small world 
index (SWI). We include the regression line and confidence interval band along with 
the correlations coefficients and p-values below each graph. 
 
Predictably, the network diameter positively correlates with t-
SNE’s perplexity (r = 0.72, p < 0.001), which suggests that as more global 
associations between concepts increase, the network diameter also 
increases. Lastly, these three relationships also help explain the fourth 
relation, that of a positive correlation between perplexity and the small 
world index (r = 0.54, p < 0.001). The semantic network grounded in cognitive 
dimensions transitions towards a small-world network as perplexity 
increases due to fewer disconnected network components and greater 
clustering of nodes. 
6.4.7.7 Visualisation of Network Topology 
We now explore the conceptual network topology in greater detail, 
once again with the help of the concreteness rating lens, but this time, 
including the actual concept labels. This final network visualisation (see 
figure 6.13) is generated from 50 iterations for each 10 × 10 combination of t-
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SNE perplexity (range = 40 to 85, with increments of 5) and associative 
threshold (range = 0.81 to 0.90, with increments of 0.01). A total of 5,000 
network models are run during this validation stage, with a graphical grid 
search revealing the perplexity and threshold parameters leading to the 
most stable range (lowest standard deviation) of standardised network metrics 
(average number of components, diameter, clustering coefficient and small 
world index). Our final parameters are a threshold of r ≥	0.92 and perplexity 
of 60. Given the size of the network (544 nodes + 3,264 edges), we explore 
the network structure by starting at the lowest medial portion of the 
network and gradually moving clockwise. In figure 6.13, we qualitatively 
number the network into R1 to R14 regions for referencing purposes.  
The most differentiating aspect of the lowest medial portion of the 
network (R1) is the strong community structure, with strong 
interconnectivity with immediately neighbouring concepts, while being 
almost cut-off from the wider semantic network. This community is 
distinctly negative and includes concepts like tragedy, misery, jealousy, 
denial, fear and fight. This community of concepts also has a diverse range 
of concepts spanning the concreteness spectrum. However, even the 
“micro-conceptual” structure within this region, reveals a gradual 
transitioning from the most negative concrete words at the very bottom of 
the network (e.g. gun, thief, explosion, thunder) to more intermediate words 
(e.g. damage, criminal, tragedy) and lastly more abstract words (contempt and 
disgust). 
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Figure 6.13: Overall semantic topology, including concept labels and the nodes of the 
network colour-coded according to the concreteness spectrum, ranging from red 
(abstract) to green (intermediate) and blue (concrete). The green numbered circles (i.e. 
R1…R14) highlight different portions of the network to aid discussion of more specific 
network neighbourhoods. See Appendix D for enlarged images (p. 342 - 343). 
 
In region R2, there is an interesting network bridging phenomenon, 
wherein the negative community of concepts are connected to the main 
portion of abstract concepts via words like journalist, dictation, sympathy and 
debate. These concepts are intermediately concrete words, which then 
connect to the most abstract portion of the network. This next region (R3) 
consists of the most abstract concepts within the semantic network and is 
defined by words such as wisdom, philosophy, intellect, spiritual, intelligence 
and mind. R4 is a highly distinct region of the network, given that most 
concepts are concrete and yet it is positioned away from the “main blue 
body” of concrete concepts and adjacent to the more abstract words. This 
small cluster predominantly consists of natural disaster/danger concepts, like 
avalanche, landslide, cyclone, hurricane, tornado and flood, which in turn are 
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adjacent to the words dagger, knife and sword, which finally lead to stampede, 
darkness and mob. We find these microstructures within a small cluster of 
concepts interesting because it reveals that t-SNE’s non-linear 
dimensionality reduction, can indeed lead to global structures like this 
cluster of disaster emerging, while still maintaining local micro-structure 
within the cluster. Another example of this is the link between this set of 
concepts in R4 and the most substantial portion of concrete words from 
regions R9-R14 being connected by the path from avalanche →  shark → 
alligator, which then fans out to other less dangerous animals and 
subsequently vehicles and other concrete concepts in R11. 
Further moving clockwise through the network topology, leading 
to R5, we find a small number of concepts related to the theme magnitude, 
with words such as magnitude, capacity, math, duration, capacity, amount, 
moment, era and volume. This region consists of a range of intermediate to 
abstract words, transitioning to R6, with more related intermediate-level 
concepts like length, distance and day leading to R7 with concrete words like 
calendar, evening, morning and location. This region also has other concepts 
like bank and wage as well as event, musical, adventure and rally near one 
another. Collectively, traversing between regions, R5 →  R6 →  R7 also 
features a concreteness gradient from greater abstraction to more concrete 
concepts. The next region (R8) is a fairly broad region with less of a theme 
other than the first central region where the network is entirely concrete. 
Despite that this region contains a mixture of various concepts, they are 
related. There are strong micro-groupings of concepts that can be 
meaningfully interpreted. Towards the “top” of the region, professional and 
place concepts are consistently grouped, respectively containing some of 
these words: professor, doctor, queen and policeman as well as university, office 
and army. Concepts like minister, mayor, banker and bandit are immediate 
neighbours. Region R8 includes body parts like hand, shoulder, ankle, jaw, hand 
and neck, all arranged reasonably tightly but also family relations such as the 
concepts parent, grandfather and dad. Relatedly, in the next region (R9), the 
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concepts women, girl and children appear, although the region is more 
representatively summarised by the dual themes of body parts (e.g. body, leg, 
finger, fingernail, neck and head) and clothing (pants, shirt, dress and costume). 
Once again, despite that more global structures bind all of the concepts in 
the similar regions of the semantic topology, more local structures are 
simultaneously maintained by the direct connectivity of strongly associated 
relations like fingernail/nail, neck/head or leg/pants. This pattern is repeated 
in R10, with cabinet and key being adjacent concepts, and this region being 
more loosely defined by homeware, with other concepts like dresser, iron, and 
bedroom being nearby. However, this particular portion of the network also 
seems to have significantly more spurious associations with animals and 
non-related words like mosque. Region R11 contains two main classes of 
concepts, namely animals (e.g. cat, mouse, camel, canary, beetle wolf, chipmunk, 
lion, bear and gorilla) and vehicles (e.g. limousine, truck, train, cab, bicycle and 
plane). 
An example of a strongly clustered and meaningful group of 
concepts can be seen in region R12, which comprises musical instruments 
(e.g. piano, mandolin, trumpet, harp, fiddle and xylophone), which are 
connected to “loud” concepts like bell and plane before other concrete 
concepts, less discriminated by sounds appear. Similarly, R13 is also a fairly 
discrete cluster of seasonal concepts like Christmas, holiday, winter, spring, 
summer, autumn and season. Lastly, R14 is characterised by a wide range of 
food/animal concepts (e.g. lunch, meal, pizza, pork, cabbage and shrimps), 
transitioning upwards to animal keeping concepts (e.g. zoo, farm, and barn) 
and finally flowers (e.g. daisy, tulip and sunflower). Although R14 contains 
numerous animal concepts like pig and cow, the regions do not include 
animals not associated with food (e.g. bear), and concepts like rabbit are 
more on the periphery of the food regions, closer to prototypical pets like 
dogs, kittens and hamsters. 
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6.4.7.8 Small-worldness of Topology 
This semantic network topology is evaluated formally on its small 
world properties using Humphries and Gurney’s (2008) small-world index 
(SWI) metric. Although detailed network benchmarks are still limited, and 
non-existent for psychologically-derived semantic networks given the 
absence of such models in the extant literature, the recommendation is that 
a small-world index of greater than one is the lenient threshold for a small-
world network, whereas the more conservative boundary is three. We 
calculated the small world index for our semantic network, with a threshold 
of r ≥	0.92 and perplexity of 60 to be: 𝑆𝑊𝐼<=>?=@ = 10.17. Since, to the best of 
our knowledge, there are no widely accepted approaches for evaluating the 
statistical significance of network parameters, we follow the approach 
outlined by Sporns (2010), and created a null distribution model consisting of 
a randomly derived adjacency matrix, with identical number of nodes (544) 
and edges (3,264). 
Our approach, however, differs slightly from merely sampling a 
Gaussian distribution with a numerical range fitting our conceptual feature 
ratings (1-7 Likert scale) and then generating the association matrix using 
this random data. The reason is that in order to maintain the same number 
of edges after selecting our r ≥	0.92 threshold, we also need to have the 
same distribution and set of correlation coefficients in the matrix. 
Otherwise, the number of edges in the network topology would change, 
which becomes a confounding variable in our comparison. Therefore, we 
generate our random association matrix by random sampling (within a 
cognitive dimension) from our real association matrix (without 
replacement). This way we ensure that the associations between the 
concepts and the dimensions are random, but the actual values in the 
adjacency matrix have the identical distribution to our real adjacency 
matrix. Our null distribution arbitrary topology is shown in figure 6.14.   
Comparing our semantic network (SemNet) to the null distribution 
model (RandNet), on graph-theoretical metrics, provides support for 
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distinguishing our semantic network from a random network structure. 
SemNet has a diameter of 56, while RandNet’s diameter is only 7, which 
means SemNet’s shortest path between its two furthest nodes is eight times 
that of RandNet’s. SemNet also has a clustering coefficient magnitudes 
apart from RandNet ( 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑁𝑒𝑡FF = 0.5628	, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑡FF = 0.0095 ), 
indicating that our semantic topology has significantly more tightly knit 
groups. Lastly and most importantly, the small world index of this random 
network is 𝑆𝑊𝐼OPQR?=@ = 0.9991 , well below the more conservative 
benchmark of three and the more lenient threshold of one, for qualifying as 
a small-world network. Comparing our 𝑆𝑊𝐼<=>?=@  with 𝑆𝑊𝐼OPQR?=@ 
supports our cognitive semantic topology consisting of a small-world 
network architecture. Our semantic network topology demonstrates an 
increased propensity to form clusters with paths connecting different 
clusters of concepts, leading to a small-world network architecture. These 
results are supported by bootstrapping the network metrics through 100 
iterations of the null model and calculating 95% confidence intervals (see table 
6.7). 
  SemNet RandNet (N = 100) 
  Mean Mean LCI (95%) UCI (95%) 
Components 10 2.44 2.179 2.701 
Diameter 56 6.76 6.67 6.85 
Clustering Coefficient 0.5628 0.00953 0.0094 0.00966 
Small World Index 10.17 0.9991 0.9886 1.0096 
 
Table 6.7: Network metrics for SemNet and bootstrapped RandNet, including 95% 
confidence intervals for the null model (LCI: lower confidence interval, UCI: Upper 
confidence interval). 
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Figure 6.14: A random topology based on shuffling the semantic dimensions across 16 
dimensions. This random network topology is generated using the identical set of 
parameters as our real semantic topology. This null distribution model also has 544 nodes, 
3,264 edges, an association threshold ≥ 0.92, and t-SNE perplexity = 60. The node colours 
are based on the original concreteness spectrum data and as such, is random in this 
topology. See Appendix D for enlarged images (p. 344 - 345). 
6.4.7.9 Importance of Dimensions 
Our final analysis objective at the overall network level consists of 
formally analysing whether or not all cognitive dimensions are equally 
distributed across the entire network. Based on our earlier qualitative 
evaluations, we found some tentative support for the place dimension being 
more distributed across the network, while the ingestion dimension is more 
localised in the food network cluster. Since we are not aware of a formal 
statistical or mathematical analysis method for analysing the 
“distributional equality” from a graph-theoretical perspective, we have 
repurposed a well-known economic indicator of inequality - the Gini 
coefficient, to meet our analytical objective. At its core, the Gini coefficient 
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measures the inequality among values in a density or frequency 
distribution. Gini (1912) proposed this metric as a measure of accurately 
determining the wealth distribution of nations. A coefficient of 0 (no 
concentration) indicates perfect equality as all values are equally 
distributed (e.g. everyone in the country has the same wealth), whereas a 
coefficient of close to 1, indicates perfect inequality, for example, one person 
has all the wealth. In our analysis, we use the standard computational 
formulation of the Gini coefficient (Cowell, 2000), in which we replace the 
distinct populations with our 19 network clusters, and the wealth measure 
with the number of nodes in a given cognitive dimension that are 
maximally activated from the MaxDiff ratings. The Gini coefficient is 
operationalised by generating an incidence matrix, with 16 rows (one per 
dimension) and 19 columns (one per network k-cores cluster), capturing the 
distribution of concept nodes maximally discriminated across the network 
clusters (see table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.8: The incidence matrix for calculating Gini coefficients. 
 
In addition to calculating the Gini coefficient, we also evaluate two 
additional measures. Firstly, we compute an adjusted Lorenz curve (see 
Dorfman, 1979, for details). This is plotted based on rank ordering the 
incidence matrix (for each cognitive dimension) using the number of 
network clusters activated by a given dimension, ranging from 0 to 1. On 
the y-axis, we have the proportion of network clusters cumulatively activated, 
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while the x-axis is defined by the actual number of ordered network clusters, 
ranging from 0-19 (see figure 6.15). To illustrate this with a specific example, 
consider the place dimension. From the incidence matrix in table 6.8, we can 
ascertain that 15 out of 19 clusters have a non-zero incidence, meaning 4 out 
of 19 clusters are not activated. Therefore, in figure 6.15A, place (dark blue 
curve) starts to increase from point 5 on the x-axis. Furthermore, we use 
hierarchical agglomerative clustering (with Ward’s distance) to group more 
similar cognitive dimensions based on their Gini coefficient, to avoid 
plotting 16 curves, some with minimal differences. The green dashed line 
in figure 6.15A is the “line of equality” and represents the ideal cumulative 
network contribution if a dimension were to activate all clusters equally. 
Thus, the closer a cognitive dimension’s curve is to this dashed green line, 
the more distributed it is regarding overall network importance. 
 
Figure 6.15: (A) An adapted Lorenz-style plot of the cumulative distribution of network 
dimensions’ maximal activations across the 19 k-core network clusters. (B) An overview 
of the 16 cognitive dimensions plotted based on the Gini coefficient and the absolute 
semantic dominance - a measure of the number of nodes being maximally activated. In 
both plots A and B, similar cognitive dimensions are grouped for ease of visualisation. 
 
In figure 6.15B, the second measure we include is the absolute 
semantic dominance, which is the sum of all the node incidences across 19 
cluster for a given cognitive dimension (row sum of incidence matrix). The 
reason we include this is that the Gini coefficient, as well as our adapted 
Lorenze-style curves, are relative measures as opposed to absolute ones. In 
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other words, if a single hypothetical dimension only activated a single node 
in every cluster, its Gini coefficient would be 0.00 (perfectly equal), even 
though 19 out of a total of 544 nodes were activating less than 4% of all the 
concepts in the network. Similarly, we calculate, that if a dimension only 
activated 1 node, then that dimension’s Gini coefficient would be 0.95 
(extremely unequal). Therefore, we suggest that the Gini coefficient is 
contextualised using our absolute semantic dominance measure to indicate the 
overall importance to the network. 
Collectively, all of these metrics converge to one of our study’s main 
findings, namely that the cognitive dimension place is the most important 
contributor to our semantic topology. The dimension place activates the 
greatest number of network clusters (Gini coefficient, 𝐺T	= 0.55), and also 
maximally activates the greatest number of overall network concepts (89 
nodes). This is followed by four groups of cognitive dimensions with 
similar Gini coefficients, in ascending order (more to less important to the 
network): 
 
group_1 = {self, vision, motion, audition, surprise}: 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐺T = 0.63,  
group_2 = {communication, reward, human, luminance}: a𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐺T = 0.72, 
group_3 = {negative polarity, positive polarity, upper limb}: a𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐺T = 0.77, 
group_4 = {ingestion, slow, time}: a𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐺T = 0.85. 
 
Additionally, based on figure 6.15B, we can also see that both vision 
and ingestion also activate a large number of nodes. In the case for vision, 
this is not as interesting, as it happens to be more distributed on both the 
Gini coefficient and higher in absolute concept node activations. However, 
this is not the case for the dimension ingestion, which is positioned in group 
4, with the lowest equality score (highest Gini coefficient) and the steepest 
cumulative distribution curve, but yet based on the absolute number of 
concept nodes activated, it is ranked third, behind vision and place.  
In figure 6.16, we visualise this discrepancy between place and 
ingestion, as both have a large number of concept nodes activated, 89 and 
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59, respectively, but the distribution across the entire network is skewed for 
ingestion, with strong preferential activations only for clusters nine and one, 
hence the significantly higher Gini coefficient. From these metrics and 
visualisations, we start to develop a deeper understanding of the rich and 
complex interconnectivity between the particular basic componential 
semantic dimensions and resulting network topology. 
 
Figure 6.16: (A) Sankey plot of the incidence matrix with place-to-cluster relations 
highlighted. (B) Sankey plot of the incidence matrix with ingestion-to-cluster relations 
highlighted. Even though both dimensions have a large number of concept nodes 
activated, the spread for dimension place is greater. 
 
So far, we have established a range of findings based on our 
semantic network topology, ranging from the small-world structure, the 
role of perplexity in highlighting different aspects of local versus global 
relations in human semantic networks, and that some cognitive 
dimensions, such as place, are more distributed and important. Next, we 
turn our attention to evaluating particular sub-sets of our network in order 
to investigate the relationship between context and semantic topology. 
6.4.7.10 Context-dependent Network Topology 
In this section, we review three separate (between-subjects) network 
comparisons, all with the common objective of understanding whether 
context shapes semantic network topology. The three comparisons are 
similar in format, with each consisting of 25 concepts from the main 
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experimental phase 1 CFR ratings, which is our neutral context. Two specific 
contexts follow this general condition. All networks within the three 
comparison sets have an equal number of nodes (25 concepts), same 
correlation thresholds (≥ 0.75) and t-SNE perplexity (8) but the number of 
edges can naturally vary based on the distribution of coefficients in the 
adjacency matrix. In these comparisons, we do not keep the number of 
edges constant because we are running pair-wise comparisons between 
networks as opposed to a null distribution model. 
In our first comparison between kitchen-related concepts (figure 
6.17), a visual inspection of the neutral-context condition and home move as 
well as cooking context reveals strong structural differences. A pair-wise 
comparison of the home move vs general and the cooking vs general networks 
reveals that in both contexts, there is increased clustering of concepts as 
well as a difference in the number of network components. All network 
metrics are summarised in table 6.9. The degree distributions (figure 6.17D) 
are particularly different for the cooking network, which is bi-modal, 
compared to the other, slightly positively skewed unimodal distributions. 
In the home move network, presumably, concepts not typically associated 
with moving (e.g. sink, window, and door) appear to be clustering together, 
while edible items also form an independent component. In the cooking 
context, the edible items form a distinct cluster but are connected to a highly 
dense cluster, which is also reflected in the relative difference in the network 
density with the cooking context scoring 3× higher than in the two other 
conditions. Lastly, the network diameter of the general context is circa twice 
the size of the other two networks (see table 6.9 for the metrics). 
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Figure 6.17: (A) Semantic network for neutral context, (B) home move context, (C) 
cooking context and (D) showing a comparison of network degree distributions using 
density functions. 
 
In our second comparison between the general condition, a house on 
fire and a water buoyancy scenario with a different set of concepts (figure 
6.18), like in our first comparison, the neutral condition’s concepts are 
structured associatively. However, the two context networks are markedly 
different in both their visual structure and their corresponding network 
metrics (table 6.9). The degree distributions for both the neutral and fire 
contexts are non-Gaussian. In the neutral network (figure 6.18A) the 
concepts are divided into five components (three of which are single 
concepts), where the large components are split between food and household 
and people-related concepts. Local structures are also meaningfully 
interpretable, for example, wallet and money are adjoining as are laptop and 
mobile phone. In the house fire condition, there are two highly dense 
groupings, which we presume to be strongly related to a lower cluster of 
items “not worth rescuing” and an upper cluster of “things to rescue”. 
Interestingly, the concept TV bridges these clusters, which we interpret as 
a concept that falls in-between the two clusters semantically, as it could 
belong to either one of these clusters. Similarly, distant concepts in the 
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neutral condition (e.g. mobile phone and pets) that have a diameter of five 
only have a diameter of one in the fire network indicating the stark 
difference in conceptualisations. 
 
 
Figure 6.18: (A) Semantic network for neutral context, (B) house on fire context, (C) 
water buoyancy context and (D) showing a comparison of network degree distributions 
using density functions. 
 
The water buoyancy network (figure 6.18C) is harder to interpret. The 
network topology, low network density, increased number of components, 
and a lower clustering coefficient suggest a different meaning space than in 
the two other conditions. We speculate that the two large components 
respectively consisting of food and pets, children, some valuables and a chair 
might be “more buoyant” components, although plate is also part of one of 
these components, which weakens our speculative interpretation. 
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Figure 6.19: (A) Semantic network in neutral context, (B) car boot sale context, (C) gifting 
context and (D) showing a comparison of network degree distributions using density 
functions. 
 
Lastly, in the comparison of our third set of concepts (figure 6.19) 
between the neutral context and two “commercial” contexts (car boot sale vs 
gifting) the first commonality we find interesting is that in the neutral-
context scenario, both the network density and the clustering coefficients are 
very high. Once again, like in the previous fire context, in both the 
commercial contexts, strongly associatively relevant clustering of concepts 
occurs. In the car boot sale scenario, items like umbrella, corkscrew, shirt, 
clothing and lamp are tightly grouped ( ≥  2 edges), while jewellery is 
connected to this component, via shirt, by a single edge. This component 
seems to be consistent with the types of objects one might typically come 
across at a British car boot sale. Similarly, the gift network has a densely 
interconnected cluster of items we would consider suitable objects or 
animals as gifts. This “gift” cluster is also meaningfully clustered locally 
with food on one side (food, lobster, spaghetti, dinner and cake) and objects 
and animals on the other (diamond, jewellery, jewel, puppy and mansion). 
Atypical concepts form isolated components across all three networks, 
which include the words gun, saxophone and spider. 
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Table 6.9: Key network metrics across three context comparison sets, each containing a 
neutral context and two context-specific networks. 
 
Collectively, these three comparison sets provide strong support for 
a dynamic and context-specific grounded perspective on semantic topology. 
We have so far qualitatively reasoned why these network structures might 
vary. We now illustrate a more quantitative approach to interpreting the 
topological network differences. From the aggregated brain-based 
conceptual feature ratings (CFR) data, we calculate an original metric for 
understanding the underlying reason for why one semantic topology differs 
from another. In order to do this, we create the differential activation quotient 
(DAQ), which calculates two separate quotients, one for each context, by 
computing the average importance of a single dimension over the relevant 
subset of words compared to all other dimensions over the same subset of 
words. Once two quotients are calculated, one is subtracted from another, 
arriving at the DAQ (see equation 6.1). Each cognitive dimension has a DAQ, 
which leads to a total of 16 differential quotients per comparison. We do 
not take the absolute difference because we are interested in the direction 
of the difference. For example, in equation 6.1, we calculate the DAQ for the 
first comparison neutral (context 1) versus home move (context 2) for both the 
upper limb and vision dimensions. We can see that the DAQ for the upper 
limb is +35%, which means that this dimension shows an increase of 35% in 
the home move context compared to in the neutral condition. Whereas, for 
vision, the DAQ is -32%, indicating that, on average, the visual dimension 
is less important for the home move context. 
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Equation 6.1: The differential activation quotient (DAQ), is the difference in a single 
dimension across two contexts and is based on the CFR ratings of the cognitive 
dimensions across these contexts (C1, C2). In our study, we are only interested in the 
pair-wise comparisons between the different contexts and the neutral context. 
 
 
Table 6.10: Summary of the differential activation quotient (DAQ) between the six 
grounded scenarios and the neutral context. We only show the top and bottom four 
dimensions. 
 
Given that the semantic network topology is grounded in these 
ratings, the DAQ provides a simple route through which we can 
understand why the semantic topologies are different based on variations 
between a grounded scenario and the neutral-context situation. In table 6.10 
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we provide a summary of the highest and lowest DAQs for the six distinct 
context comparisons. All the DAQs in table 6.10 are compared with their 
respective neutral condition. Next, we selectively explore the DAQ findings 
from two out of six comparisons. 
In the home move condition, dimensions upper limb and motion 
becoming more important, while reward and vision are less vital for 
conceptualising these particular concepts in the home move “frame of 
mind”. In the cooking condition, once again upper limb, but this time, time 
and place are also more important, and somewhat unexpectedly vision and 
ingestion are less important. However, that might be because the 
instructions directed the participants to imagine cooking as opposed to 
tasting the food. This is more likely to be grounded in our sense of 
time/space and less on the more dominant visual and ingestion dimensions. 
This also would be in line with ingestion and vision being more important in 
the “default” lexical semantic route of conceptualising the 25 kitchen- and 
food-related concepts. The topology of meaning is dynamic as a result of 
the underlying primitive components changing in importance across 
contexts. 
Now turning to the fire network, the DAQ results suggest that the 
dimension luminance is strongly activated in the fire condition, probably not 
because of the task of having to take things out of the burning house, but 
simply because fire is associated with brightness, which is captured in the 
CFR dimension luminance. Unsurprisingly, the upper limb dimension is also 
more strongly activated, which aligns with the context of having to engage 
in physical activity. Dimensions surprise and positive polarity also increase, 
most likely because a house on fire is a startling event and when thinking 
about saving valuable belongings, pets and children, this might elicit 
stronger emotional ratings. Regarding dimensions that are less activated, 
ingestion and slow are considerably weaker, which is likely because of the 
presence of food concepts in this subset of 25 words, which might have had 
to be suppressed in the fire context, given its irrelevance in an immediate 
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emergency context. Similarly, slow is another dimension that would be seen 
as less important in the context of having to save one’s belongings from a 
house on fire, which elicits the idea of quick actions. 
6.5 Discussion 
Our investigation of the human semantic topology using a large-
scale normative study of brain-based cognitive semantic dimensions via t-
SNE and network analysis reveals new insights, such as cognitive semantic 
networks obey the principles of small-world interconnectivity. Most 
importantly, we provide evidence contradicting long-standing “static 
theories” of semantics in cognitive science (e.g. PDP), linguistics (e.g. LSA), 
and the fields of artificial intelligence and machine learning (e.g. 
word2vec). However, in addition to our exploratory findings, we also 
support numerous previously established findings, which inspired this 
current work, as well as raise questions regarding existing interpretations 
of static semantic spaces. In this section, we first examine the results 
supporting or contradicting previous results and explanations, before 
turning our focus to the original contributions of this study. Next, we 
outline some core limitations of the present study, and where feasible, 
suggest possible improvements for overcoming these. Finally, we conclude 
with a discussion of potential implications specifically for cognitive 
modelling of semantics and more generally for cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence. 
6.5.1 Contributions 
Our adaptation of Troche et al.’s (2017) conceptual feature ratings 
(CFR) using Binder et al.’s (2016) 16 brain-based components reveal very 
high levels of inter-rater reliability, comparable to those obtained by Troche 
et al. for their original 14 cognitive dimensions. Our results suggest that not 
only is it methodologically feasible to use neuroimaging-based semantic 
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components in cognitive psychological research but also that the brain-
based semantic dimensions are phenomenologically meaningful. Similarly, 
for the MaxDiff ratings, we demonstrate the feasibility of gathering data on 
the importance of semantic dimensions using discrete choice methods from 
econometrics. Cognitive rating approaches and econometric techniques are 
rarely integrated, but our results demonstrate compatibility. High inter-
rater reliability supports greater cross-over between neuroscience and 
cognitive science methods when investigating semantic representations. 
Motivated by Troche et al.’s (2017) discussion, in the context of clinical 
applications, our research demonstrates the viability of using cognitive 
semantic ratings derived from neuroscientific dimensions, which might 
unlock the possibility of developing empirical and computational models 
of meaning for "synthetic lesioning" of specific dimensions to reflect 
neurological damage and observe cognitive semantic deficits. High levels 
of inter-rater reliabilities across our brain-based cognitive dimensions 
support such research opportunities. 
This study also demonstrates a range of different relationships 
between 14 out of the 16 concreteness (CNC) ratings. In line with previously 
reported findings from both Troche et al. (2014) and Troche et al. (2017), 
concreteness ratings positively correlate with more sensorimotor semantic 
dimensions (hypothesis 10). As ratings on specific dimensions increase 
(vision, ingestion, luminance, auditory, place and motion) so do concreteness 
ratings. This relationship can be explained by concrete concepts being more 
likely to have real-world referents with reliable variations across 
sensorimotor dimensions. Similarly, higher-order semantic dimensions like 
communication, human, reward, surprise and negative polarity have strong 
negative correlations with concreteness ratings (hypothesis 9). Our results 
lend further support to empirically evaluating semantics using a 
componential lens as pioneered initially by Crutch et al. (2013), given the 
replicability of well-established findings on concreteness ratings. 
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Our results support a concreteness gradient in semantic networks. 
The concreteness dimension is a latent factor in the structuring of the 
semantic topology for concepts, which, we find to be limited to the neutral 
context scenarios. This finding supports the notion that decontextualised 
concepts are more likely to be associated with lexical similarity ratings 
capturing surface-level associations as opposed to deeper associative 
relations (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Furthermore, this is also in 
line with the finding that more abstract cognitive dimensions like human 
display strong negative correlations with concreteness in neutral contexts. 
However, in contrast to the findings reported by Troche and 
colleagues, our semantic dimensions are not reducible to the previously 
established exogenous, endogenous and magnitude factors. Although Troche 
et al. claim that their 3-dimensional conceptual space originating from 
psychologically-inspired factors is amodal, our results suggest otherwise. 
Based on evaluating the cumulative variance explained by each cognitive 
dimension, we do not find graphical evidence for a distinctive “elbow” in 
the number of core dimensions. Non-graphical methods for extraction of an 
optimal number of components also do not yield psychologically 
interpretable dimensions. Lastly, evaluating the concepts with the highest 
dimension-loadings across all 16 cognitive dimensions reveal strong, 
meaningful variations in the types of concepts across all dimensions. 
Together, these descriptive and exploratory analyses support a 
multidimensional perspective, where a three-dimensional model fails to 
represent the complexity of our conceptual associations. Non-linear 
methods for dimensionality reduction and representation needs to gain 
traction in the study of cognitive semantics. Intuitively, this makes sense 
given the highly complex nature of semantics, which, arguably, are the core 
“building blocks” of all human meaning-making. 
Our comparison of a simple two-dimensional plot using both 
classical MDS and non-linear t-SNE reveals that the semantic space is more 
meaningfully clustered using the latter technique (hypothesis 1). As 
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predicted, the semantic space generated using MDS discriminates large 
differences between concepts exceptionally well (e.g. terrorist) while 
“squashing” the semantic space for concepts with smaller but important 
differences. Further support comes from our qualitative explorations of 
quality of both MDS and t-SNE spaces. The interpretability of t-SNE’s 
embedding space is also superior to that derived from MDS which returns 
irrelevant nearest neighbours like SHARK-CABBAGE. We, informally, 
interpret this as a result of MDS “optimising” for global distances as 
opposed to local ones, which leads to concepts with large differential 
ratings plotted in disproportionately distant parts of the embedding space. 
This "extreme plotting" is problematic for the generation of semantic 
topologies, because of the sub-optimal interpretability of the concepts. 
Therefore, we use the t-SNE transformed dimensions as the input to our 
network visualisation and analysis given the preservation of local and 
global semantic relations (hypothesis 2). 
Despite the metaphor of “semantic networks” spanning decades in 
cognitive science research (e.g. Reitman, Grove, & Shoup, 1964; Brachman, 
1977; Bower, 1970), to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use 
cognitive ratings to surface these interrelationships using network analysis. 
Secondly, the network topology allows us to investigate new associative 
measures (e.g. clustering coefficient), which helps uncover hidden 
underlying patterns of interconnectivity within cognitive semantic 
networks. Future research, perhaps from a developmental perspective, 
could investigate the growth of clustering in semantic representations 
throughout early child development, which might provide benchmarks for 
typical and atypical developmental pathways. We provide initial evidence 
in support of cognitive semantic topologies obeying the properties of small-
world networks (hypothesis 3), as previously shown for biological neural 
networks (Sporns & Zwi, 2004) and language (Cancho & Solé, 2001), but not 
for cognitive semantics. Small-world networks, with their unique 
properties of a combination of short and long path lengths, increased 
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clustering and greater hierarchical abstraction might be crucial for 
investigating the topology of semantic networks. Our exploratory results of 
varying t-SNE’s perplexity levels (from more local to global) demonstrate a 
recursive property within semantic topologies, where concepts group into 
ever larger and denser higher-order associative modules. Recursive 
relations could lead to new avenues of mathematical analysis to investigate 
underlying properties in the emergence of semantic complexity, and in 
particular, how this complexity might systematically shift as a function of 
varying reinforcements across a range of tasks and experiences across 
various grounded scenarios. 
However, much of computational semantics research (e.g. Rogers & 
McClelland, 2004) has implicitly advocated for strong taxonomic hierarchies. 
Many computational models are evaluated based on these assumptions 
from early feature norm studies (e.g. Rosch, 1975). We suggest that there is 
a parallel between such taxonomic hierarchies and scale-free network 
models, defined by their degree distribution following a power law. A 
fundamental commonality across these networks is the presence of so-
called network hubs, which have a significantly higher-than-average degree 
centrality. In our view, these hubs represent superordinate categories like 
animal and plant, which have secondary-level leaves, with ever decreasing 
levels of network degree. Studies on how the world wide web is structured 
strongly indicate a scale-free topological organisation, where a small 
number of highly influential hubs (e.g. search engines and web services) 
provide access to highly recursively structured websites. However, our 
semantic network topology does not reveal such patterns and instead has 
small-world properties. 
The most critical finding of our present study is that alterations in 
context can dynamically modulate the more lexical network topology, and 
reshape it based on a more context-relevant structure (hypothesis 5). This 
context-based-topology is found to be the case across all context 
comparisons, where the clustering and interconnectivity within semantic 
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networks in more specific situations reflect the characteristics of a given 
scenario. Therefore, we argue for a shift away from the assumption of 
contemporary cognitive science and artificial intelligence that semantic 
space is constant across different individuals and contexts. For example, 
Huth, Nishimoto, Vu and Gallant (2012) used 1,705 object and action 
categories, from a small sample of five male participants, to claim that the 
semantic space is both continuous and consistent across different people. 
We suggest that these interpretations are an artefact of the use of linear 
dimensionality reduction (PCA) and the same contexts across all 
participants. Recently, some theoretical positions (e.g. Hoffman et al., 2018) 
have started to incorporate the idea that semantic representations might 
indeed be different across different people. However, our view is more 
radical than that. Our results support a topology of meaning grounded in 
real context. Therefore, we advocate both within and between system-level 
variability in the topology of cognitive semantics. 
Additionally, our results show that not only do different semantic 
componential dimensions differentially activate concepts but that this can 
also dynamically shift as a result of changing contexts. Therefore, we argue 
that the meaning topology is multimodal, and our differential activations 
quotient (DAQ) computed across the neutral-context, and context scenarios 
can disentangle the relative shifts in importance of underlying semantic 
components. These results collectively show that dominant dimensions like 
vision, across all concepts, and topic-specific dimensions such as ingestion, 
are weaker for the same sets of concepts when grounded in specific 
scenarios like burning house or cooking. On the other hand, weaker 
dimensions in the neutral context can become more important in specific 
situations. However, even though some dimensions (e.g. ingestion) are 
more stable across different contexts, these dimensions also undergo 
dynamic shifts in extreme cases (e.g. burning house). Therefore, the relative 
strength of cognitive dimensions varies across differently grounded 
contexts (hypothesis 7).  
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Our adaptation of the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz-curve show that 
not all 16 cognitive dimensions are equally important across the semantic 
network (hypothesis 6). This inequality is captured using absolute (number 
of nodes) and relative (Gini coefficient) measures. Regarding absolute 
measures, place, vision and ingestion dimensions maximally discriminate 
more than 10% of the concept nodes in the network, while the primitives 
surprise, upper limb and slow, activate less than 3% of the nodes. Nonetheless, 
the upper limb primitive is more critical across a range of specific contexts 
associated with movement (e.g. cooking and moving house). Through our 
“equality analysis” using the Lorenz-style curve and the absolute semantic 
dominance metric, it is clear that place is the single most important 
dimension, due to its widespread activations across the cognitive semantic 
network. The semantic network contains associative (e.g. minister-mayor), 
taxonomic (e.g. season-spring) and functional (e.g. clarinet-saxophone) 
associations (hypothesis 4) and is not solely structured based on modality-
specific delineations (hypothesis 11). 
On the other hand, ingestion is a less dominant dimension across the 
entire network, because of its strong preferential activation of food-related 
concepts, while slow only activates 4 concepts across 3/19 clusters, resulting 
in the lowest levels of absolute and relative semantic importance. The fact 
that place is the most critical cognitive dimension in both absolute and 
relative measures when it comes to shaping our conceptual networks 
supports the importance of the real-world, scenes, settings and landmarks 
in the study of cognitive semantics. This high utility of the cognitive 
semantic primitive place supports our central thesis of the current 
dissertation. Meaning can and does arise from our everyday surroundings, 
which is not merely limited to language but also incorporates our real-
world physical environment. 
Our conceptual topology is strongly dependent on the assumption 
that the 16 cognitive dimensions are sufficient for explaining much of 
human cognitive semantics. Given that this is the focus of Binder et al.’s 
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(2016) neuroimaging-based study, we do not address the validity of the 
approach per se. Although based on the current results, one might suggest 
that given the fluidity of semantic topology, it might well be that the 65, 
more granular, cognitive dimensions initially analysed by Binder et al. 
might be more suitable. However, for large-scale normative studies like 
ours, the logistical challenges of including 65 dimensions would perhaps 
be insurmountable. Instead, now that we provide support for the context-
specificity of semantic topologies, future investigations could delimit the 
set of concepts to a smaller subset, but investigate these across a range of 
different contexts to evaluate the dynamics of the semantic network. Since 
our current results have shown the variable nature of cognitive semantic 
topologies, future studies could test specific hypotheses as to the types of 
transformations one might reasonably predict as a function of manipulating 
context in subtler ways, in order to understand more gradual 
transformations approximating real-world semantic tasks.  
In our six contexts, the scenarios are discrete. Although this is useful 
for revealing the non-static nature of semantic spaces, it nonetheless lacks 
ecological validity. Ideally, in future studies, more nuanced variations in 
contexts across a small set of fixed concepts might shed light on how symbol 
interdependency, captured by our network topology, shifts from one context 
to another. We hypothesise that there is a further layer of complexity. In 
addition to different semantic topologies across contexts, as in our present 
results, we also expect that within-subject experimental designs might 
reveal asymmetrical transitions in semantic topology. In other words, 
people’s conceptual topology does not merely shift across different 
contexts, but the order of traversing different contexts itself might also have 
an impact on the semantic topology. For example, in the hypothetical case 
of a neutral context (N) along with contexts A and B, we predict that there are 
not merely three different semantic topologies, but six different variants. In 
a transition matrix of 3 × 3 (set = {N, A, B}), where the diagonal indicates no 
transition, we predict the semantic topology to be identical. However, we 
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also predict different semantic network topologies when transitioning from 
a neutral state to a specific context 𝑁 → 𝐴	 ≠ 	𝐴 → 𝑁  as well as in the more 
realistic form of moving from one context to another 𝐴 → 𝐵	 ≠ 	𝐵 → 𝐴 . 
Therefore, in the case of N, A and B, we predict six distinct topologies. The 
difference in the topological network reorganisation across contexts will 
vary as a function of the similarity of contexts, with greater similarity 
leading to fewer shifts. 
6.5.2 Limitations 
Next, we turn to some of the limitations of our current study. 
Although, our results demonstrate that the use of t-SNE can reveal more 
nuanced semantic associations, the presence of an additional parameter (t-
SNE’s perplexity) is not as parsimonious to simple linear dimensionality 
reduction methods like PCA or MDS. Moreover, perplexity also has a strong 
influence on the resultant semantic space, which only compounds this 
limitation. However, we are cautiously optimistic that the benefits of non-
linear dimensionality reduction, though increasing model complexity, 
ultimately will be more successful at capturing semantic interdependencies 
across different levels of abstraction. Our study is an exploratory starting 
point for further investigating non-linear dimensionality reduction and its 
role in cognitive semantic network topography. 
Another limitation of the present study is related to the correlation 
thresholding used for extracting the number of network edges represented 
in the network’s adjacency matrix. We use a single threshold across the entire 
association matrix, which might not be the best way of generating a 
topology spanning the full concreteness spectrum of a semantic network 
grounded in a set of basic componential dimensions. We opt for this simple 
strategy because more sophisticated alternatives in psychological network 
visualisations are currently still being debated without a consensus 
(Barfuss et al., 2016; Christensen et al., 2018). However, this might be a 
limitation for generating semantic network topologies on the basis that 
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different types of concepts across different contexts might have different 
optimal thresholds. However, given the lack of previous research related to 
our study, we are unable to determine any a priori hypotheses. We 
hypothesise that more concrete words might need a more conservative 
threshold (higher than our r ≥	0.92) in order to have more associatively and 
functionally relevant topological properties. However, based on our 
exploratory network visualisations across different perplexity and 
correlation threshold, such a high threshold is likely to damage 
associatively meaningful concept relations for more abstract and 
intermediary words. Therefore, an open question for future investigations 
might be to explore a range of suitable thresholding across the concreteness 
spectrum and cross-validating the results with those obtained 
independently from neuroimaging studies. 
Although not a limitation per se, the network diameter of our 
semantic network seems to be exceptionally large at 56, especially 
compared to the random null distribution model’s diameter of seven. We 
believe this is associated with our semantic network’s concreteness 
chaining phenomenon, manifested by a gradual transitioning between 
concrete and abstract words. This chaining by the latent factor of 
concreteness, not used in the generation of the network itself, is also likely 
to be the main reason for SemNet’s significantly longer diameter. Although 
we consider this diameter difference to be an exploratory finding, we also 
consider this exaggerated difference to only apply to neutral networks of 
the same size. 
We believe that our incorporation of the Gini coefficient and the 
Lorenz-style curves in analysing semantic networks will be useful for a 
range of investigations. One might argue that our operationalisation could 
be improved. Using our incidence matrix, we calculate the Lorenz curves 
and the Gini coefficient only incorporating incidences of the maximally 
activated cognitive dimension for a given cluster. This criterion is likely to 
skew our metrics given that, in some cases, the second, third or even fourth 
 239 
most dominant dimension might be quite strong contributors to a 
particular cluster. Including only the most dominant dimension might be 
overly simplistic, and could be further investigated in subsequent studies. 
Another limitation is that spurious relations between concepts are 
difficult to avoid when concepts are present which do not share much in 
common with other concepts in the stimuli set. At higher correlation 
thresholds, “concept islands” emerge, while at lower thresholds, 
uninterpretable, weak and spurious associations abound. This thresholding 
dilemma is common across network science and is not a specific limitation 
of our study. Although we run 5,000 iterations to minimise such spurious 
associations, recent studies such as Christensen et al. (2018) advocate the 
use of information filtering networks (IFNs), for mitigating this shortcoming. 
However, this problem is well-known as sparse structure learning, where the 
objective is to reduce dimensionality and complexity in order to increase 
interpretability while simultaneously ensuring critical information is not 
lost (Zhao et al., 2011). 
Many of the limitations presented above are due to this study being 
an exploratory investigation even though we did have some explicit 
hypotheses. We envisage, and hope, that subsequent and more detailed 
confirmatory research will help overcome some of the shortcomings 
discussed. 
6.5.3 General Implications 
Our focus now shifts to the implications of a dynamic semantic 
network topology and its resultant phenomena, the relativity of meaning, to 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence. This study supports the notion 
of meaning being dynamic, ever-evolving and prone to alteration as a 
consequence of our grounded reality. To the best of our knowledge, there 
is currently no empirical or computational cognitive research investigating 
this dynamicity of semantic topologies. Our current findings on the 
 240 
relativity of semantic network topologies might have several implications 
on cognitive modelling of semantics.  
Firstly, most current computational models do not incorporate 
context, and when included, it is in the form of linguistic topic models (e.g. 
Hoffman et al., 2018). A natural extension of the work presented in this 
chapter would be to evaluate ecologically valid grounded models of 
semantics across a wide range of contexts to investigate corresponding 
variations in the resultant semantic network topology. Exploring this might 
help delineate a range of mechanistic accounts that could be tested using 
empirically derived ground truths. Secondly, what types of computational 
mechanisms could account for local versus global processing of meaning? 
Our analyses using t-SNE’s perplexity measure might be one interesting 
avenue of future research. Thirdly, how would specific tasks and contexts 
be incorporated into computational models? Are these merely additional 
“spoke-type” inputs feeding into a single hub-style representation layer, as 
in recent models explored by Hoffman et al. (2018)? Would such an 
approach be even successful beyond smaller toy model implementations? 
We conjecture that a single hub-representation encompassing various 
degrees of global to local concepts, across the concreteness spectrum in a 
dynamic context-sensitive format might be challenging to achieve. In our 
view, representational pluralism might be more suited to address some of 
these challenges.  
Fourthly, and critically, since our semantic topology shifts as a 
function of context, it is likely that not only associative but also higher-order 
relational properties might shift. Although our present study does not 
explore this more specific hypothesis, one could imagine that there are rules 
or perhaps even laws that might govern the integration of different primary 
semantic components. We suggest this because, despite the shifts in the 
topology across contexts, our results within each context provides 
reassuringly consistent results. The presence of rules or laws might also 
explain why even though our meaning space shifts from one scenario to 
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another, it does so in a reasonably predictable fashion across different 
individuals. However, this also raises our fifth and final implication for 
cognitive modelling. To what extent does the topology of semantic 
networks change across different scenarios and specific groups of 
individuals. For example, in the burning house scenario, how would a 
firefighter’s semantic space compare with that of ordinary participants? 
Addressing the above questions will help further our current aims of using 
cognitive modelling, grounded in the real world, to address complex 
questions on symbol interdependency through detailed cognitive semantic 
topography. 
Our findings might also have slightly broader implications for 
cognitive science. In this chapter, we present a network science approach to 
understanding and mapping meaning. This approach may have 
advantages for analysing data from cognitive studies using semantic priming 
experimental procedures. Network metrics could be used for detailed 
comparisons of computational models with behavioural and neuroimaging 
findings. Another question might be to explore the network structures of 
implicit and explicit semantic associations. Our study only explored explicit 
semantic associations. 
However, the respondent instructions for completing the ratings 
promptly in the present study aims to allow our brain-based CFR task also 
to capture non-deliberative associations. For example, this includes 
experimental design aspects like rating only a single dimension per 
respondent to increase response speeds and the stimuli words 
automatically changing after selecting a Likert-scale rating (avoiding the 
extra step of pressing the next button). However, we did not collect any 
response-time data or develop more Implicit Association Test type measures 
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), but future investigations could explore 
this in order to evaluate explicit and implicit semantic network topologies. 
Lastly, from a cognitive psychological perspective, our neutral context and 
contextualised topologies suggest that semantic associations between 
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concepts collected under sterile lab conditions might capture interesting 
lexical associations such as the concreteness effect, but not be conducive to 
understanding real-world cognitive semantics. We argue a more ecologically 
valid approach to studying meaning might provide alternative avenues for 
future research. 
We also consider that a dynamic semantic network topology will be 
particularly important for developing artificial general intelligence (AGI) 
because current state-of-the-art performance in AI is highly domain-
specific and non-generalisable. For example, an image classification AI 
agent trained to classify a range of common fruits (e.g. apple, orange, pear) 
would be mainly performing at chance-levels on the related task of 
classifying exotic fruits (e.g. mango, pineapple, guava). This simple 
example's limitations stem from recent advances in contemporary 
supervised learning on millions of human-labelled data points. In our view, 
this is the equivalent of developing AI with a strong bias for local or 
specialist meaning encoding, while omitting the long-range associative 
pathways that lead to the small-world architecture of human meaning. 
In AI, there is a well-established literature on robots, both software 
and hardware instantiations, navigating physical spaces to get from A to B, 
while engaging in object classification and collision avoidance (see Parhi, 
2018, for a review). Nevertheless, almost six decades later, our focus 
remains to shift toward navigating the more complex and ill-defined “maze 
of meaning”, that humans traverse on a daily basis. Machine learning and 
AI “breakthroughs” reported in both the leading academic journals like 
Nature and Science as well as by the media predominantly focus on very 
narrow game playing agents or overly simplistic simulation worlds (e.g. 
Gibney, 2015). Our work is relevant to the field of AI because it shows that 
a highly dynamic and context-dependent human conceptual space can be 
represented more distinctively using non-linear dimensionality reduction 
and network visualisation. This might help future AIs traverse the 
complexities of meaning. 
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6.5.4 Implications for AI 
Our penultimate focus, in this discussion, will be to outline some of 
the pitfalls of AI agents with static semantic spaces and thereby 
demonstrate the power of incorporating dynamic semantic memories. This 
argument should also address the more general problem of overcoming the 
narrow semantic specialisation of most modern AI systems. Let us start by 
imagining an AI system consisting of circa half-a-dozen ML models 
integrated into a single deep learning stack12. Now, let us also imagine that 
this AI platform contains machine learning models like word2vec for 
semantic representations, a pre-trained deep convolutional neural network for 
vision and also has effectors for interacting in the real world. This AI system 
goes through tens of millions of training epochs, independently for each 
machine learning subsystem (e.g. CNN for vision) and all of these models 
trained together in a stack with interleaved data to ensure the presence of 
sufficient statistical regularities between language-based and visual inputs. 
In our analogy, although relevant to a cognitive modelling perspective, we 
will ignore obvious superficial differences between this system and human 
development, like the volume of data. Now, what can this AI system do? This 
AI could perform a range of seemingly intelligent tasks with high speed 
and efficiency. For example, the AI bot could provide useful text-based 
captions when provided with just an image (e.g. Ramisa et al., 2018). 
However, how useful would a static semantic space consisting of eight 
objects (cup, mobile phone, light camping chair, hamster, wallet, tennis ball, rabbit 
and a wooden stool) be for the following two situations? 
In situation one, the AI bot is asked to select and place an object to 
prop open a heavy door, based on the eight objects it can see. In the second 
                                                      
12 A concept in commercial data science, popularized by technical consultancies 
like Accenture and McKinsey Analytics for integrating or “stacking” multiple 
independent machine learning algorithms. 
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situation, the robot is asked to help save the essential things from a burning 
house. We argue that for both these scenarios, our AI agent would fail to 
make sensible choices as a result of the semantic space not being sufficiently 
dynamic for this task and context. We also note that it would be highly 
impractical to have to compute a priori all possible situations in order to 
train the AI agent in a supervised manner, as this is unrealistic given the 
combinatorial explosion of even the more common object use cases let alone 
ad hoc categories such as the ones presented here or more abstract semantic 
associations. Therefore, AGI especially in the domain of meaning-making, 
might more realistically rely on a set of primitive semantic dimensions (the 
syntax) and abstract rules (the grammar) through which these components 
are modulated to yield context- and task-specific semantic topologies. In 
our view, this might help explain both the relative stability and 
predictability of human meaning-making. 
6.5.5 Summary 
In closing, although there has been a recent shift towards more 
“universal semantic theories” (e.g. Vigliocco et al., 2004; Huth et al., 2012; 
Troche et al., 2014) by highly influential cognitive scientists like Matthew 
Botvinick (e.g. Pereira et al., 2018), we argue that the basis of this 
convergence relies on the methodological limitation of not systematically 
varying context. We do not deny the presence of more universal 
representations of concepts that span a range of contexts, as presented in 
Pereira and colleagues’ universal decoder of linguistic meaning. We do, 
however, raise the concern of the usefulness of context-independent 
semantic spaces because this is rarely the case in real-world scenarios. Our 
ordinary meaning construal is bounded by the here and now forces of not 
only a given environment but more specifically a task and context. At times, 
this meaning space also has to accommodate highly atypical and nuanced 
ad hoc categories, which bare little to no resemblance to previously 
experienced situations. A semantic topology grounded in a componential 
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set of basic semantic building blocks helps achieve this and disentangle new 
meaning in otherwise hidden complexities. It is unlikely that we use a static 
semantic space for meaning representation in real-world conditions. Our 
results imply that the human semantic topology varies not only across 
individuals but also within people in different scenarios. Collectively, these 
findings support a grounded perspective on cognitive semantics and that 
there is no meaning without context. 
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Chapter 7                                    
Gender Bias in Grounded Semantics: 
Network Regularisation and 
Debiasing 
 
7.1 Abstract 
Off-the-shelf machine learning algorithms are increasingly used to 
make sense of not only language but also our rich visual world. In chapter 
4, we demonstrate the feasibility of object co-occurrences representing 
semantics but subsequently discover limitations of exclusively scene-based 
meaning in chapter 5. Then, in chapter 6, we revealed the dynamic nature 
of meaning captured using network analysis grounded in cognitive 
dimensions. In this chapter, we extend scene2vec with an additional “off-
the-shelf” algorithm linking visual scenes to linguistic tags. Using this 
modified scene2vec representation, we explore the topical issue of gender bias 
in two popular web-based image repositories - Google Images and Getty 
Images. Using network analysis and our novel application of graphical 
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LASSO regularisation to computational semantics, we show that scene2vec 
trained on Google Images, but not on Getty Images, encodes well-established 
gender-occupation stereotypes from the psychological literature (e.g. man-
doctor or woman-nurse). The presence of context-specific human-like gender 
biases in scene2vec provides a new and scalable method for mechanistically 
investigating bias. Lastly, we develop a simple debiasing technique, called 
semantic feature neutralisation (SFN), which, in our small-scale semantic 
model, can selectively target and remove undesirable biases, while leaving 
desirable gender associations intact. 
7.2 Introduction 
The term bias in cognitive science has several distinct 
interpretations, depending on whether the focus is on artificial neural 
networks, decision making or belief systems. In this chapter, we focus 
specifically on gender biases as a cultural construct. Biases are a 
disproportionate negative or positive inclination towards something or 
someone. Human biases are likely to date back to the very roots of pre-
historic human development. Modern day culture is expected to determine 
the ebb and flow of the dominant streams of contemporary prejudices. 
These cultural inventions of difference can be directly associated with clear 
political and media agendas, but also with more implicit or hidden cultural 
forces that can be difficult to isolate. An example of the former is an increase 
in xenophobia in the United States of America following recent anti-
immigration rhetoric and also in post-Brexit United Kingdom (Inglehart & 
Norris, 2016). There is a steady rise in populism in both Western and 
Eastern societies. Ironically, populism is a global phenomenon (Moffitt, 
2016). 
A dominant example of implicit biases stems from gender-occupation 
stereotyping. Over the last three decades, there has been a steady decline in 
women seeking University-level computer science qualifications. Fuelling 
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this state of affairs are popular and unhelpful cultural stereotypes of “geeky 
unpopular guys” who are obsessed with technology (see Mercier, Barron, 
& O'Connor, 2006, for a detailed discussion). These biases can act as barriers 
to diversifying traditional STEM disciplines (Cheryan, Master, & Meltzoff, 
2015). Relatedly, a widely replicated social psychology example of gender-
occupation biases associates MEN with SCIENCES and WOMEN with 
LIBERAL ARTS (e.g. Bennett, 1982; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; 
Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Greenwald et al., 2009). 
Unfortunately, although some psychologists can unearth human 
biases, others perpetuate them by crafting convincing narratives which 
happen to neatly fit the pre-existing belief systems of the audience. For 
example, some theories (e.g. Alexander, 2003) claim that women prefer the 
colour pink while men prefer the colour blue from evolutionary differences 
(men hunting for animals with the blue sky in the background and women 
picking reddish berries). Kandola and Kandola (2013), the occupational 
psychologists specialising in gender differences, point out that 
evolutionary psychological theories like those of Alexander (2003) are a 
“back-projection of later gender divisions on to earlier ways of life” (p.17). 
These biases are also justified and amplified by the popular press. 
Understanding the cognitive semantics underlying biases can have 
tangible benefits for society. Throughout the present thesis, we repeatedly 
emphasise the importance of real-world grounding of semantic 
associations encoded in computational models. Our central thesis 
encourages avoiding arbitrary hand-coded features, which, in isolation can 
lead to a vicious cycle of encoding and decoding the meaning 
representations one determines a priori. Additionally, we advocate for 
grounded knowledge representations to circumvent the circularity of the 
symbol grounding merry-go-round. In this chapter, we evaluate whether 
our grounded scene-based representations are ecologically valid. If scene-
based grounding is psychologically meaningful, then it is only natural also 
to expect that biases or stereotypes commonly encountered in humans 
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should also be present in our computational models of semantic cognition. 
Therefore, exploring human biases provides a litmus test of the 
psychological relevance of our scene-based semantic representations and 
holds the potential to investigate prejudices in semantic cognition 
mechanistically. 
7.2.1 Historical and Empirical Foundations of Bias 
 In social psychology, the main impetus for a rigorous investigation 
of bias dates back to work distinguishing implicit and explicit cognition 
(Schacter, Bowers, & Booker, 1989). Biases frequently reside in the realms 
of implicit or latent unconscious associations. Explicit cognition, on the 
other hand, is related to higher levels of controllability, intentionality and 
awareness (Nosek, 2007). Our focus in this brief overview of bias will be 
limited to the implicit cognition literature, focusing on the widely 
documented Implicit Association Test (IAT). 
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) define implicit bias as previous 
experiences shaping current or future performance even though the earlier 
prior experiences are not directly recalled and therefore are unavailable to 
introspection (p. 5). The IAT operationalises the psychological 
measurement of implicit biases and evaluates the associative strength 
between a given set of concepts. Although numerous variants exist, the 
most widely used IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) measures 
exemplars from four concepts (e.g. MALE/FEMALE and 
SCIENCE/LIBERAL ARTS) using only two response options associated 
with two concept pairs in a given experimental block. The primary 
dependent variables of interest are response latencies and error rates. When 
participants are asked to compare similar concepts, response latencies and 
error rates are lower than when asked to compare very different concepts. 
Since these measures are dependent on reaction times in milliseconds, one 
generally accepts the IAT as a procedure for extracting implicit 
associations. In Nosek and colleagues’ gender-science IAT, where the 
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concept categories were MALE and FEMALE (e.g. he and she) and SCIENCE 
and LIBERAL ARTS (e.g. physics and literature), the results supported a 
robust “automatic association of male with science and female with liberal 
arts compared with the complimentary pairings” (p. 108). 
 Greenwald et al. (1998) used a wide range of phenomena to 
demonstrate the validity of IAT, which consisted of both innocuous 
demonstrations of biases (e.g. flowers are more pleasant than insects) as well 
as more disquieting effects of strong racial biases when performing the test 
with images of WHITE and BLACK individuals and PLEASANT and 
UNPLEASANT word associations. 
7.2.2 Implicit Gender Biases 
Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald (2002) conducted a large-scale online 
study with over 600,000 tasks across a range of implicit and explicit 
evaluations spanning race, age and gender. In the gender-career IAT version, 
the four concept groups were MALE and FEMALE (e.g. boy and girl) along 
with CAREER and FAMILY terms (e.g. executive and children). The results 
showed a strong and robust preferential implicit association between male 
and career and female and family. 
At a societal level, gender biases constitute a significant issue for 
women deciding to study mathematics or science or pursue technical 
careers in, for example, data science - an applied field at the intersection of 
statistics and computer science. Such leanings are particularly surprising 
when considering that on standardised high-school level mathematics tests, 
girls and boys perform similarly and are equally prepared for studying 
STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). 
Nonetheless, at college-level, men far outnumber women in most STEM 
subjects (Zafar, 2013). In a relatively recent study, Reuben, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2014) showed that in a hiring scenario, when the only information 
available to hiring managers is appearance (revealing gender), men are 
twice as likely to be hired for a mathematical task than women. 
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Interestingly, the scores of a Gender-Occupation IAT can account for this 
difference. Therefore, gender biases directly impact hiring prospects. 
Gender biases along with the negative implications of hiring 
prospects for women in a numerical capacity indicates a strong need to 
investigate the underlying semantic associations of gender bias. Finally, 
given McKinsey’s prediction of artificial intelligence permeating all facets 
of our lives (Pyle & San Jose, 2015), we suggest it is also essential to 
understand biases in machine learning. 
7.2.3 Biases in Machine Learning 
People intuitively think that artificial intelligence (AI), and machine 
learning (ML) do not suffer from human-like biases. A naïve, but common, 
assumption of the general public is that AI/ML is “just mathematics”. What 
most people outside of the niche fields of AI, ML and cognitive modelling 
are not aware of is that the vast majority of thriving computational 
intelligence applications stem from massive troves of unstructured and 
structured data. A wide range of different algorithms exploit this data using 
predominantly unsupervised classification algorithms. In this thesis, we 
have consistently favoured real-world or grounded informational inputs 
for our cognitive computational models. However, in doing so, although 
there are undoubtedly many advantages, we have potentially discounted 
one critical shortcoming - the introduction and perpetuation of harmful 
human biases to cognitive modelling. To foreshadow our subsequent 
discussions, if the inclusion of such biases were feasible into computational 
cognitive models, then this might have advantages and disadvantages. 
However, we first need to establish whether or not human-like biases exist 
in our current iteration of scene2vec. 
It has been well-known for several years that automated statistical 
learning systems are strongly prone to so-called machine prejudice. One of 
the first instances of a well-documented and widely publicised case stems 
from the domain of online advertising and racial discrimination. Sweeney 
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(2013) collated a list of 2,000 names, which were particularly suggestive of 
race. For example, the names Trevon and Lakisha are more common for black 
individuals, while the names Brendan and Katie for white people. Sweeney 
entered these names on Google.com and Reuters.com and recorded the types 
of ads that were automatically generated based on the name entered. On 
both websites, entering “black names” led to significantly more arrest-
related ads than when entering “white names”. This unfairness can 
potentially have significant negative consequences, consciously or 
unconsciously, if, for example, prospective employers perform Google 
searches for job applicants’ names. In this case, the bias was a direct 
consequence of automated click-through systems that map the statistical 
regularities of words with specific online ads. Similarly, there are other 
domains where machine learning biases have crept in, such as credit scoring 
(Hardt, Price, & Srebro, 2016), news (Ross & Carter, 2011) and, 
unfortunately, even criminal sentencing (Angwin et al., 2016). In all cases, 
there is a disproportionate impact on minority ethnic groups and women. 
In a recent computational experiment, published in Science, 
Caliskan, Bryson and Narayanan (2017) explored the presence and effect 
size of biases in semantics derived from an “off-the-shelf” distributed 
language-based model. Caliskan et al. used the well-known GloVe (Global 
vectors for word representation) word embeddings (Pennington, Socher, & 
Manning, 2014). GloVe is a state-of-the-art word embedding algorithm for 
dimensionality reduction and amplification of surface-level language co-
occurrence statistics. These embeddings have specific semantic properties 
that make them particularly appealing. Collobert et al. (2011) have shown 
that words like France are closer to Italy and Austria using embeddings 
because vectors represent concepts, and subtraction/addition of these 
vectors is meaningful. For instance, differences in vectors England and 
London is similar to the same subtraction operation applied to France and 
Paris or Austria and Vienna.  
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Similarly, by subtracting man from woman, gender differences are 
derived with the resulting vector being almost parallel to the vector 
following the subtraction of king from queen (king:man :: woman:queen). 
Caliskan and colleagues used GloVe, with 300 dimensions, pre-trained on 
the most extensive web corpora, called Common Crawl, consisting of 840 
billion case-sensitive tokens, with 2.2 million unique word tokens. Caliskan 
et al. developed an analogous computational variant of IAT, called WEAT 
(Word-Embedding Association Test), which uses the 300-dimensional 
vector representations for a given set of target words to calculate the cosine 
similarity score between all words of interest. Using this technique, they 
successfully replicated all biases documented in Greenwald et al. (1998). 
This ranged from the relatively innocuous biases of flowers are more pleasant 
than insects and musical instruments are more pleasant than weapons, to the 
more offensive racial and gender biases of, respectively, European 
American names being more pleasant than African American names and 
male names being more associated with career words, while female names 
being more associated with family words. 
Sample imbalances can contribute to these biases in language-based 
models - where one or more classes of words or objects are either over- or 
under-represented in different contexts (e.g. documents). In the case of 
classifier algorithms, when a class is overrepresented, then most algorithms 
with the objective function of achieving the highest accuracy level will 
inadvertently be superior at predicting the majority label. The cost of 
misclassification for the majority label is too high, unlike the case for 
minority labels, which have lower impacts on a given algorithm’s overall 
accuracy level (Zhao et al., 2017, p.2). These findings from the literature on 
bias/prejudice and machine learning also support the idea that human 
biases are indeed statistical regularities with sufficiently large signal-to-
noise ratio such that they are successfully captured in language-based 
vector-space models of semantics, a core paradigm of much of 
contemporary ML and AI research. 
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7.2.4 Gender Biases in Machine Learning 
Jenset and McGillivray (2017) conducted a detailed investigation 
on, once again, word embeddings, but over a period of 100 years to 
investigate the temporal dynamics of biases. Jenset and McGillivray used 
Google Books and the Corpus of Historical American English to create nine 
distinct embeddings, each trained on a decade from the 1900s onwards. 
These temporally-distinct word embeddings were used to identify a phase-
shift, between the 1960s and 1970s. This shift is due to a relative increase in 
adjectives such as intelligent and logical co-occurring more with women 
post-1960s. Another underlying factor determining this shift was the 
predominant use of appearance-based adjectives used for women pre-
1960s (e.g. attractive or fashionable). This research highlights the biased 
nature of language and uses chronologically ordered embeddings to 
quantify the impact of the women’s movement objectively. Jenset and 
McGillivray’s results provide empirical support for time-dependent 
statistical regularities of language shaping human biases. Unsurprisingly, 
ML models trained on this biased data will display gender-biased semantic 
associations. 
7.2.5 Awareness of Debiasing Machine Learning 
Successfully debiasing machine learning is critical for addressing 
the needs of a fair and equal society. An early precursor to current worries 
about algorithmic fairness emerged from the framework Discrimination 
Aware Data Mining (DADM), in the context of association rule mining. 
Pedreshi, Ruggieri and Turini’s (2008) far-sighted DADM philosophy, 
based on the civil rights law, states “discrimination refers to [the] unfair or 
unequal treatment of people based on membership to a category or a 
minority, without regard to individual merit” (p. 1). DADM is quantified 
using a term they coined, α-protection, which measures the discriminatory 
power of a particular association rule used for database targeting. More 
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recently, since 2014, a community of commercial and academic researchers 
in machine fairness have initiated an annual conference on Fairness, 
Accountability, Transparency Machine Learning (FAT ML) 13 . These 
initiatives help identify and generate greater awareness of the underlying 
problem and find solutions for debiasing algorithms. Nonetheless, the issue 
of biases in algorithms has largely gone unnoticed in the cognitive 
modelling community. 
7.3 Investigating Gender Bias in Grounded Semantics 
7.3.1 Objective 
Previous machine learning research (Caliskan et al., 2017) has 
demonstrated that gender biases are prevalent in word embeddings trained 
on large-scale language corpora. In our present computational study, we 
seek to investigate whether or not similar prejudices are also commonplace 
in our scene-based representations (scene2vec). We aim to contribute to the 
currently limited but fast-growing extant literature on machine learning 
fairness, in four distinct ways. First, we want to investigate whether 
scene2vec contains gender biases. Second, we want to develop a bias metric 
tailored explicitly for evaluating the bias within semantic association 
networks and not a 2- or 3-dimensional Euclidean embedding space. Third, 
if scene2vec contains gender biases, we want to understand whether or not 
shifting our data source for acquiring the photographs from Google Images 
to Getty Images reduces this bias, given that Getty Images has resilient 
human editorial controls, unlike Google Images. Fourth, if scene2vec 
representations contain gender biases, we intend to evaluate a scalable and 
efficient debiasing approach by applying a so-called late stage adjustment, 
by identifying the biased dimensions and selectively extracting this for 
                                                      
13 https://www.fatml.org 
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inappropriate concepts. In our view, this debiasing technique has the 
advantage of neither requiring re-weighting of raw data (early stage) nor 
adjusting the objective function of the learning algorithm (middle stage). 
7.3.2 Methods 
7.3.2.1 Stimuli for Computational Models 
In this computational study, we use a set of 60 concepts (see table 
7.1), split into ten categories of six concepts. The main gender category 
consists of three male and female words to minimise noise-based variations 
in gender associations. Across all quantitative comparisons of gender 
biases, we use averaged male and female concepts. We have two concept 
categories, which we predict to reveal inappropriate or societally 
undesirable gender biases, which are business and occupation. The clothing 
category is included to reveal strong but “appropriate gender biases”. All 
other concept categories are predicted to be gender-neutral. In table 7.1 all 
60 concepts are shown, for each of which we download ten naturalistic-
looking photographs from both Google Images and Getty Images. As is the 
case for chapters 4 and 5, in this experiment we also manually exclude non-
naturalistic images such as marketing logos, cartoons and diagrams. 
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Table 7.1: The 60 concepts used in the gender bias experiments. The concepts are 
grouped into ten categories. 
 
7.3.2.2 Computational Modelling 
As the foundation of our present modelling simulations, we use the 
identical methodology used in the scene2vec modelling of chapter 5, which 
includes both the object co-occurrence cues from Zhao et al.’s (2017) scene 
parsing network called PSPNet, as well as Microsoft’s Emotion API-based 
facial expressions classifier. Also, like in our previous scene2vec 
implementation, we once more use the same neural network architecture 
and parameters during concept training. However, from the limitations 
discovered in Chapter 5, namely that a limited set of vision-only semantic 
representations constrain the encoding of more abstract concepts 
sufficiently well, we extend scene2vec one final time in our dissertation. 
Given that Zhao et al.’s network uses the standard 1,000 ImageNet classes, 
we expand our scene2vec representation significantly using Microsoft’s 
Person / Gender 
man male gentleman 
woman female lady 
Animals Business Clothing 
cat business trousers 
dog finance shirt 
rabbit meeting skirt 
duck deal dress 
chicken trade suit 
tiger marketing coat 
Fruit Home Nature 
apple bathroom river 
orange kitchen forest 
lemon bedroom mountain 
banana garden jungle 
peach hallway sea 
lychee TV lake 
Occupation Shopping Vehicles 
professor grocery car 
CEO supermarket truck 
doctor shopping bus 
nurse purchase train 
teacher bakery limousine 
assistant sale van 
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Azure’s Vision API’s auto-tagging algorithm 14 , which has 10,000+ object 
classes. Once again, we use a pre-trained, widely-accessible “off-the-shelf” 
deep learning algorithm, which is a widespread practice in recent ML 
publications in this domain (e.g. Caliskan et al., 2017) because it aids the 
reproducibility of computational experiments. 
As we initially discuss in chapters 3 and 4, from the computational 
models of Goldstone and Rogosky (2002) and Louwerse’s (2007, 2011) 
symbol interdependency hypothesis, we believe in the mutually reinforcing 
property of perceptually grounded and linguistic information. Therefore, 
we incorporate Microsoft’s auto-tagging algorithm to include additional 
language-based features. However, these features are merely a “proxy” for 
expanding the limited 1,000 ImageNet classes. Therefore, our raw stimuli 
are still only naturalistic photographs, but our scene2vec features now 
incorporate linguistic cues. 
Auto-tagging algorithms (e.g. Wang et al., 2006) have been useful 
for coping with the increase in unstructured online data and have been 
especially important in the field of information retrieval (IR). Auto-tagging 
algorithms are used for encoding and storing a wide range of interrelated 
visual associations between different images in conjunction with labels or 
tags. For example, Wang et al. (2006) used a collection of 2.4 million web-
images, embedded in a vast and diverse array of naturally occurring texts 
and images to predict suitable tags for new images not used during model 
training. 
Until now in our thesis, all the scene-based computational models 
(excluding the language-based comparisons) consist of object-level features 
(vectors encoding whether or not a particular object or emotion is present). 
However, with the inclusion of image-tagging, we also incorporate 
language based associations with the visual world. Although the model 
input is still consistent with previous chapters (naturalistic photographs), 
                                                      
14 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/#pivot=products&panel=ai 
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we are now utilising the full potential of symbol interdependency - both 
grounded and symbolic associations. In figure 7.1 we display a small set of 
example tags generated for four specific photographs. 
In the four images shown in figure 7.1, we notice that the tags 
generated are very poor at capturing object co-occurrences, which is why 
we interpret our auto-tagging addition as a higher-order 
linguistic/associative property of the scene2vec representation. This lack of 
object-level information suggests minimal overlap between these tags 
generated and the object-level information encoded from the PSPNet 
output. However, when there is duplication, the “duplicated feature” is 
omitted. The algorithm first represents PSPNet features, and then 
emotional information is included in a second stage, and the final stage 
incorporates the tags, with no duplication of cues. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Depiction of four concepts, along with an example image and automatically 
generated tags (only the top 13 tags shown, but the analyses include up to 100 tags per 
image). We show the tags' confidence scores (%) and have manually placed blue (male) 
and red (female) dots adjacent to each tag from co-occurrence in the male or female 
examples shown. 
 
7.3.2.3 Semantic Network Regularisation 
In chapter 6 we empirically advance the idea of using semantic 
network models not only for visualisation purposes but also for 
investigating the topological properties of the resultant semantic network. 
However, we also outline that one of the shortcomings of that approach is 
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that the modeller has to determine an arbitrary cut-off threshold for 
visualising only the strongest correlations. This is not in keeping with our 
central thesis - grounding semantics in the real-world with little or no hand-
coded or arbitrary modeller-determined rules. Nonetheless, it is not feasible 
to preserve all correlation coefficients, as the subsequent network 
visualisation becomes a densely interconnected “ball”, which nullifies 
interpretability. On the other hand, if a very high correlation threshold is 
selected, most nodes end up forming sparse islands with a small handful of 
nodes connected to one or two other nodes, which does not aid network 
interpretability. Therefore, the most suitable correlation cut-off threshold is 
somewhere between these two extremes, which is both visually 
interpretable and sufficiently parsimonious and rigorous to yield consistent 
results. 
One of the main shortcomings of network visualisation in 
psychology, especially psychometrics and clinical psychology, is the 
replication of networks structures in direct and conceptual replications (e.g. 
Forbes et al., 2017). Therefore, in addition to addressing the research 
questions on gender bias in scene-based representations, a secondary 
objective of the research in this chapter is to offer a more rigorous approach 
to representing cognitive semantic networks, given our earlier arguments 
for the advantages of using network models. We aim to increase parsimony 
and interpretability of network techniques applied to cognitive semantic 
models, by estimating networks based on finding an acceptable equilibrium 
between false positives and false negatives, minimising the probability of 
spurious network edges. 
In a recent tutorial aimed at experimental psychologists interested 
in using network modelling for measuring the structure of psychological 
constructs, Epskamp and Fried (2018) outline some of the core 
shortcomings of network analysis applied to psychological data. In this 
section, we briefly provide an overview of their core arguments, before our 
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novel application of their guidelines to our modelling of semantic 
networks. 
In the domain of psychometrics, according to Epskamp and Fried 
(2018), network analysis has seen a great deal of prominence in recent years 
(e.g. McNally et al., 2015), with many experimental psychologists (e.g. 
Schmittmann, et al., 2013) using it to replace latent variable modelling. One 
method for dealing with spurious links/edges in network models is the use 
of regularisation to estimate partial correlation matrices. Given that the 
correlation matrix determines the adjacency matrix, which feeds into the 
network model, it is the correlation matrix that needs to be reliably 
represented. In regularisation methods, common in the machine learning 
field, the aim is to estimate a statistical model by penalising model 
complexity. In the case of our specific network consisting of 60 concepts, 
any simple correlation matrix will be at the upper boundary for complexity 
given that even negligible correlation coefficients near zero are still 
represented as a parameter in the dense correlation matrix. Regularisation 
methods, however, ensure that relationships that are unlikely to be 
sufficiently statistically reliable are excluded from the partial correlations, 
leading to a sparse model, in which only a small subset of associations are 
represented (Epskamp & Fried, 2018). It is worth noting, however, that 
regularisation does not lead to the omission of specific variables (in our 
computational model, these are the 60 concepts), as suggested by 
Christensen et al. (2018), which has garnered some groundless criticism of 
regularisation techniques in network modelling in psychological model 
development. We briefly outline the criticism, followed by a rebuttal, which 
then is followed by the details on network regularisation.  
Christensen and colleagues (2018) claim that “[the] shrinkage of 
correlations below a certain threshold [when using regularisation] also 
contributes to reduced reproducibility because variables can be eliminated 
based on statistical significance rather than theory” (p. 11). Clearly, in our 
case, the “theory aspect” is not essential per se, since we are modelling 
 262 
concepts of interest as opposed to hypothesised psychological constructs 
representing distinct processes. Nonetheless, Christensen et al.’s 
interpretation of what statistical regularisation does to a network model is 
inaccurate. Unlike step-wise regression, for example, which is an inferential 
model selection method, and does indeed omit variables, regularisation in 
network analysis removes spurious edges and not variables. Therefore, in 
our case, regularisation will not lead to a smaller set of concepts being 
represented, but a sparser model with fewer links between concepts, as 
these associations/edges are minimised (Epskamp & Fried, 2018). 
A partial correlation matrix between n concepts represents the 
interrelationships present between concepts on a pair-wise basis after 
statistically controlling for all other associations. In the case of network 
modelling, when a partial correlation coefficient between the two concepts 
is precisely zero, no edge is drawn between the respective concepts. 
However, Epskamp and Fried (2018) highlight some problems with 
exclusively using partial correlation matrices to determine the “ground 
truth” network structure. Costantini et al. (2015) also highlights this 
problem of spurious edges and relates this to false positives. Sampling 
variations in the underlying network data, in our case, the raw signals 
feeding into the scene2vec representation, also means that even when two 
concepts are conditionally independent (e.g. no overlap in grounded 
features), the partial correlation estimates are likely never to be exactly zero. 
Epskamp and Fried (2018) discuss one approach that has seen a great deal 
of popularity, not only in network modelling but partial correlation 
analysis more broadly, which consists of running statistical significance 
tests on all pair-wise partial correlations estimated. Failure for a partial 
correlation coefficient to reach statistical significance then lead to that 
association not being included in the network. Unfortunately, Epskamp 
and Fried highlight the main shortcoming of this approach - the problem of 
multiple testing, which can invalidate the original significance threshold set. 
Moreover, correcting for multiple comparisons is not entirely suitable 
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either in network models, because of the accompanying loss in statistical 
power (Costantini et al., 2015). 
Currently, LASSO regularisation is the state-of-the-art approach for 
overcoming the limitations above while ensuring both interpretability 
(“genuine sparsity”) and replicability. Although LASSO regularisation 
(least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) is a widespread regularisation 
technique and is also used in regression (e.g. Hans, 2009), it is particularly 
useful in the domain of network modelling because of LASSO 
regularisation’s ability to produce not only partial correlation estimates 
near zero but estimates that are precisely zero. This is achieved by limiting 
the sum of all absolute partial correlation coefficients, which has the effect 
of shrinking all correlation coefficients, leading to some becoming precisely 
zero (Epskamp & Fried, 2018, p. 5). LASSO also uses a tuning parameter, λ 
(lambda) which determines the level of sparsity. In cases where λ is set to a 
low value, only a few edges are omitted, which leads to most spurious 
edges remaining, while at the highest level (relative to the highest absolute 
partial correlation coefficient) most edges are omitted, which leads to a 
highly sparse network, and an increased likelihood of false negatives. Then 
one can select a range of λ tuning parameters and visualise a range of 
different network models, from a fully connected to an entirely sparse 
network structure.  
Deciding on a suitable λ value seems to be reminiscent of our 
correlation thresholding dilemma. However, instead of subjectively 
selecting “a suitable” network structure, the best network in LASSO 
regularisation can be selected by minimising some objective information 
criterion. Following Epskamp and Fried’s (2018) guidelines for 
psychological network models, we minimise the Extended Bayesian 
Information Criterion (EBIC). According to Epskamp and Fried, the EBIC has 
been shown to reveal the real network structures of systems where one 
expects to find a sparser network topology (Barber & Drton, 2015). In all 
our network models, we use the default hyperparameter for EBIC = 0.5, as 
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suggested by Foygel and Drton (2010), which is a more conservative 
benchmark that aims to reveal sparse networks of higher specificity, with a 
slightly elevated risk of false negatives. Given our objective of investigating 
gender biases in grounded semantic networks, we opt for this more 
parsimonious threshold. We use this regularisation approach to reveal the 
most robust network edges. This LASSO-EBIC derived network is then 
used to identify concepts connected directly (path length of one) with male 
{man, male, gentleman} and female {woman, female, lady} concept nodes. We 
use three different gendered concepts to represent both genders to increase 
the robustness of gender bias results as relying on a single gender concept 
might be noisy. Even though the network distances between all 54 concepts 
(60 - 6 gender-specific concepts) and male and female concepts are computed, 
only the concepts directly associated with the gendered concepts are 
evaluated for gender bias, as these are the concepts with the highest 
proportion of bias. 
We are the first to apply this graphical Lasso with EBIC optimisation 
to the domain of cognitive semantic networks, both empirical or 
computational. In doing so, we would like to set a new precedent of not 
arbitrarily and qualitatively determining correlation thresholds which 
subjectively satisfy specific modeller-conceived properties. In summary, 
we believe that this additional complexity in our network modelling 
method can be counterbalanced by revealing meaningful semantic network 
interrelationships and avoiding the over-interpretation of unreliable 
network topologies. This more rigours approach is particularly important 
for the present chapter, which seeks to investigate the psychological 
phenomenon of gender bias. 
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7.3.3 Results 
7.3.3.1 Correlation of Google Images 
In our study, the semantic regularities grounded in scene-based 
naturalistic photographs is operationalised using our extended scene2vec 
model. In our first study, we visualise the hidden units of the scene2vec 
neural network trained exclusively on Google Images, using a network plot 
(see figure 7.2), with a modeller-defined correlation threshold of 𝑟	 ≥ 0.50. 
This threshold is set by generating a network with a single component (all 
concepts are linked together), in order to facilitate interpretability. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Visualisation of the semantic networks grounded in Google Images. Links 
are only depicted based on the manually-set correlation threshold of r≥0.50. 
 
In figure 7.2 we see that the vast majority of the 60 concepts we are 
modelling using scene2vec grounded in Google Images are grouped by their 
semantic categories such as fruit, animals, vehicles, nature, business and 
shopping. This is also the case for the category home, except for the concept 
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garden, which, somewhat understandably, is more closely associated with 
the nature category, and directly linked with jungle. Thus, seven out of ten 
categories are grouped by their category or a highly related surrogate 
group. However, this is not the case for the concepts in the category person 
{man, male, gentleman, woman, female, lady}, clothing {trousers, shirt, skirt, dress, 
suit, coat} and occupation {professor, CEO, doctor, nurse, teacher, assistant}. 
First, the person concepts are split neatly into two distinct network regions, 
without any edges between male and female concepts. Second, the clothing 
concepts are split according to gender boundaries, such that trousers, shirt 
and suit are grouped with male concepts while concepts skirt and dress are 
grouped with female concepts.  
Interestingly, the word coat is a central node in this network, 
connecting trousers, skirt, purchase, lady and mountain, therefore spanning 
the gender divide and also meaningfully associated with concepts from 
different categories. However, we believe, that this by itself does not 
necessarily determine gender bias per se, considering that these clothing 
items are predominantly gender-specific15. In the case of the only unisex 
item (the coat), we find that this concept is positioned in-between the two 
gender extremes, which lends qualitative support to the meaningfulness of 
the network extracted. Third, the concepts within the profession category are 
split into two distinct network groups, corresponding to a sharp gender 
divide. The professions professor, CEO and doctor are tightly grouped with 
the male concepts, whereas the professions nurse, assistant and teacher 
cohabit the network region with female concepts. Fourth, and quite 
strikingly, the business category, although clustered together, is exclusively 
in the “male region” of the network with direct links to the man, male and 
gentleman. This network topology of scen2vec based on photographs semi-
automatically extracted from Google Images suggests an extreme gender bias 
                                                      
15 The notion of gender fluidity might contradict this interpretation, which we discuss in 
section 7.4. 
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wherein men are associated with more powerful and lucrative jobs while 
women with more care-related and subservient positions. 
7.3.3.2 Correlation of Getty Images 
In our second network topology (see figure 7.3), we visualise the 
hidden node representations of the statistical regularities of scene2vec, but 
this time, grounded in Getty Images. This second image source consists of a 
professionally edited (left-leaning editorial stance) database of 
photographs curated for a wide range of private and public purposes. At 
first glance, there are many surface similarities between this network 
topology and that grounded in Google Images. Like in the Google Images 
network, this network is also broadly structured around concept categories. 
In specific instances where this is violated, the differences are still 
semantically meaningful. For example, towards the top of the Getty Images 
network, the concept sale is grouped with the business concepts instead of 
the shopping concepts {shopping, purchase, supermarket, grocery, bakery}. 
Similarly, like before, the concept garden is grouped with jungle, and 
forest in the Getty Images network. Lastly, the concepts chicken and duck, are 
grouped with shopping concepts like purchase and bakery as well as the fruit 
cluster. Clothes are grouped in gender-specific network territories, 
although, in this network, concept coat is in the male cluster. However, most 
interestingly, as predicted, when scene2vec is grounded in Getty Images, 
gender bias is not as prevalent as is suggested by the more gender-neutral 
grouping of the profession and business concepts. Except for the concept 
assistant, none of the five other professions is directly linked with a 
particular gender concept. However, subtler gender biases do seem to 
prevail. Although this was not predicted, there seems to be a linear 
continuum of professions that emerges, and from left-to-right, moving from 
more stereotypically feminine gender roles of caring to more male roles of 
power (assistant → nurse → teacher → doctor → professor → CEO). 
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Figure 7.3: Visualisation of the semantic networks grounded in Getty Images. Links are 
only depicted based on the manually-set correlation threshold of r≥0.50. 
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7.3.3.3 Network Centrality 
 
Figure 7.4: Three different network centrality measures (Betweenness, Closeness and 
Strength) across the Getty Images and Google Images networks. 
 
All network centrality measures are normalised to allow for 
comparisons across the different topologies of the networks grounded in 
either Google Images or Getty Images. The network centrality measures, figure 
7.4, show some variability across both networks. For example, the 
betweenness centrality metric indicates that in the Getty Images network 
shopping is highly interconnected, while in the Google Images network, this 
is the case for the concept coat. However, these three network centrality 
measures are probably most useful for suggesting that all concepts are 
relatively equal within their respective networks. However, the Getty 
Images network displays greater closeness and strength centrality, because 
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the concepts are more distributed unlike in the case of the Google Images 
network. However, because of the relatively small size of the overall 
network, we do not generalise any of these exploratory observations of 
network centrality to computationally-derived semantic networks more 
broadly. 
7.3.3.4 Regularised Network Visualisation 
Next, we re-run our network visualisations using graphical LASSO-
EBIC regularisation. As argued above this is expected to increase the 
reliability and reproducibility of our interpretations of the network 
topologies and reveal whether or not the gender bias for occupations 
observed in our unregularised networks also manifests itself in the 
regularised networks. In figure 7.5A and B, we can see that the regularised 
networks have a sparser set of strong network edges and a denser 
proportion of weak (some spurious) links.  
In our network grounded in photographs from Google Images (figure 
7.5A), as was the case for the unregularised network, in this regularised 
version, the concepts are predominantly grouped by the concept categories. 
Once more, when concepts deviate from this pattern it is typically still 
associated in a semantically meaningful manner (e.g. garden with jungle). 
Although, in the regularised network based on photographs from Getty 
Images (figure 7.5B), the concepts duck and chicken form their own distinct 
“island” with no dominant links to other concepts. In the unregularised 
network, these two concepts are still connected with other animals as well 
as food items. However, the regularised Getty Images network suggests that 
chicken and duck are more closely related to just each other, which is 
reasonable given that Getty Images contains more professional photographs 
of meals for these two concepts, which correspond to overlapping objects 
(e.g. plate and cutlery) and tags (e.g. dining and meal). 
Most importantly, the regularised Google Images network lends 
further support to the unregularised network’s gender-biased structure, 
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because here we once again see two distinct regions of the network, 
whereby male and female concepts are respectively grouped stereotypically 
either with the professions professor, CEO and doctor or with roles nurse, 
teacher and assistant. These groupings have been highlighted using dashed 
blue and red lines, respectively corresponding to the male and female 
network regions. These areas are outlined manually merely as a visual aid, 
and should not be interpreted as data-driven network communities. We 
find that not only are the stereotyped occupation concepts in “gender-
specific” regions of the semantic network but in many cases, the professions 
are directly connected to one or more of the gendered concepts, which lends 
direct evidence of the gender bias given the closer proximity of gender-
biased concepts.  
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Figure 7.5: Visualisation of the regularised semantic networks by applying a graphical 
LASSO on the network associations grounded in Google Images (A) and Getty Images (B). 
The dashed blue (male) and red (female) outlines are manually overlaid to help 
highlight the male and female regions. Edge thickness depicts the strength of 
associations between connected concepts. 
 
In the regularised Getty Images network, the gender bias is almost 
absent. The gender-specific concepts of male, man and gentleman as well as 
female, woman and lady form two distinct “gender triangles”, mostly 
independent of the occupational concepts. The occupation concepts are 
meaningfully grouped with the business concepts like in the unregularised 
version. However, the concept assistant is still closer to the female concept 
A	
B	
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triangle and is strongly (thicker edge) connected to both the terms female 
and woman. This is equivalent to the topology of the unregularised network. 
Interestingly, the clothing concepts are asymmetrically grouped by gender, 
where the items skirt and dress are connected to female, woman and lady, and 
part of the same network region. However, that is not the case for items 
shirt and trousers, which are in a more neutral area, although the word suit 
is still directly linked to the word gentleman. Therefore, our scene2vec trained 
on Getty Images is visibly less biased for gender-occupation, based on our 
network visualisations. A cursory glance at a sample set of images for the 
concept nurse (see figure 7.6) also reveals a stark contrast, in which the Getty 
Image photographs are typically more professional and gender-neutral (e.g. 
including male nurses), while those from Google Images are somewhat more 
focused on attractive female models and stereotyped depictions of women 
smiling. 
 
 
Figure 7.6: A depiction of a small and quasi-representative16 set of images for the search 
term nurse in both Google Images (A) and Getty Images (B). 
 
In our results, the unregularised and regularised networks are 
similar. For example, like in the unregularised Getty Images scene2vec 
representation, in the regularised version we also find a continuous path 
across the various occupations transitioning from women/female to assistant 
                                                      
16 Some images were excluded from this collage, but not scene2vec, as these depicted an 
explicitly adult theme. 
 274 
leading to gentleman via suit and CEO. Moreover, the intermediary 
connecting concepts are on a stereotypical gender-biased continuum, with 
roles like doctor and professor being closer to the male end, while professions 
nurse and teacher are closer to the female. These findings tentatively support 
that even simple thresholding of the correlation matrix to generate the 
adjacency matrix provides replicable semantic network structures. 
7.3.3.5 Quantifying Gender Bias 
In our investigation of gender bias of scene2vec, we go beyond 
qualitatively analysing network topologies and quantify the bias more 
rigorously using network analysis. We computationally operationalise this 
by exploiting the immediacy of concepts as a function of the number of 
network edges that are traversed using the shortest path between concepts. 
The prediction is that there will be concepts closer to both genders (e.g. 
clothes), but they do not constitute overt gender stereotyping, while 
stereotyping occupations is an example of undesirable gender bias. Based 
on the regularised Google Images network, because it is more explicitly 
gender-biased, we select 19 concepts, including six occupation, business and 
clothing concepts as well as the word limousine, due to its strong male bias. 
We define occupation and business concept categories (plus limousine) as 
inappropriate for gender differences, whereas clothing is considered an 
appropriate form of gender differentiation, as opposed to bias per se. 
To perform our analysis, we use an unweighted breadth-first search 
algorithm (West, 1996) to compute the distances between the 19 concepts 
and the six gendered concepts (male, female, man, women, gentleman and 
lady). The average distance is computed across three gender concept 
variants, resulting in a single composite distance metric for each gender-
concept pair. These distances are then scaled across all concept-gender 
pairings, such that if a concept, is equidistant from, on average, the male 
and female concepts, then the bias index will be 1 (parity), indicating no 
gender bias. However, if the proportion of female distance is greater than the 
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male distance for a given concept, then this indicates the concepts are 
favourably biased towards men (men are closer to the concept). On the other 
hand, if the male distance is greater than the female distance, then the concepts 
are favourably biased towards women, as revealed by the closer proximity 
of these concepts to the trio of female-gendered concepts. 
 
Figure 7.7: Quantifying the gender bias in the semantic networks grounded in Google 
Images (A) and Getty Images (B). In both plots, the y-axis gender bias index is scaled to 
compare these two networks with different topologies. Gender-neutral concepts are 
indexed at 1 (green dashed line), and larger female distances depict bias towards 
masculine concepts, while larger male distances towards feminine concepts. Darker 
shades of the colours are used to depict stereotypes/biases of interest. 
 
The results (see figure 7.7) of our networks’ quantification reveal 
strong gender biases for all concepts of interest in the Google Images 
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scene2vec representations. The gender biases, which we deem inappropriate 
(e.g. CEO), are highlighted with brighter colours, while those we feel are 
acceptable (e.g. skirt) are presented in lighter shades. When the proportion 
of gender bias is non-existent for a particular concept, the scaled distance is 
very close to one, indicating a 1:1 gender ratio (equidistant). Surprisingly, 
when scene2vec is grounded in Google Images, the male-leaning bias of 
limousine, professor, CEO, finance, trade and deal is even stronger than the bias 
for trousers and shirt. Similarly, the female-leaning bias for assistant, teacher 
and nurse is stronger than the bias for skirt and dress. For the occupations 
nurse, assistant and teacher, the level of gender bias is equally strong as 
demonstrated by the equidistant ratios for these concepts. When 
quantifying the bias in the network using our scaled distance metric, the 
Google Images network is biased across all business and occupation concepts, 
as well as the word limousine. However, the same analysis performed on 
the Getty Images scene2vec network reveals fewer inappropriate but weaker 
gender biases, such as male-leaning CEO and female-leaning assistant, nurse 
and teacher. Appropriate gender differentiation of clothing concepts is still 
present and comparable to that of the Google Images network. This 
difference in the Getty Images scene2vec associations simultaneously 
demonstrates gender differences for more appropriate concepts, while not 
for the majority of inappropriate gender concepts, which suggests that 
scene2vec can successfully encode sufficiently nuanced associations. 
7.3.3.6 Debiasing 
Here, we investigate some “late-debiasing” of semantic 
associations. In order to run a proof-of-concept version of debiasing, we 
develop an algorithm called semantic feature neutralisation (SFN). We apply 
this method to the scene2vec representation trained on Google Images since 
this is the more gender-biased network. In our SFN method, we start by 
creating a “feature filter” through which the semantic network is generated. 
We start with the hidden unit representations of the scene2vec neural 
 277 
network. However, we do not generate correlations directly from these 
hidden layer representations, but instead, we run factor analysis on the 
hidden neuron activations and automatically extract all the factors with an 
eigenvalue ≥ 1. 
From the eight factors extracted, we identify the two factors with 
the highest loadings on the averaged male (man, male, gentleman) and 
female (woman, female, lady) concepts. Our SFN method rests on the 
assumption that these two factors are allowed to meaningfully vary for 
appropriately gendered concepts such as clothes but not for occupation or 
business concepts17. We computationally realise this by replacing the ith 
factor and the jth concept factor score of the 8	𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟	×	60	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 matrix for 
the two gender-dominant factors, with a row-wise average of the factor 
scores across all neutral concepts (e.g. banana). Then the following 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟	×	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 matrix is transformed into a 60	×	60	concept correlation 
matrix, on which we subsequently run the graphical LASSO regularisation 
and network visualisation, with the same parameters as outlined earlier in 
this chapter. 
When analysing the bias proportion, we use the same set of 19 
concepts as used in our previous comparisons, in order to allow direct 
comparability of the debiasing results. These 19 concepts contain two sets 
of six inappropriately biased concepts (occupation and business) along with 
six appropriately gendered concepts (clothes). The presence of two sets of 
inappropriate concepts is essential, because we predict that our simple SFN 
method should be successful in selectively reducing the level of bias at a 
network level. 
In this experiment, we have three distinct conditions, with the 
control being the original Google Images network shown in figure 7.5A, along 
with a visualisation of the proportion of gender bias plotted in figure 7.7A. 
The three separate conditions allow us to evaluate bias reduction for the 
                                                      
17 This is a challenging and highly subjective notion, which we discuss in section 7.4. 
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desired set of concepts and bias maintenance for either inappropriate (but 
not treated) or relevant concepts. Our three experimental conditions are as 
follows: (i) only debiasing occupation concepts {professor, CEO, doctor, 
teacher, assistant, nurse}, (ii) only debiasing business concepts {finance, deal, 
trade, business, meeting, marketing}, and (iii) debiasing both occupation and 
business concepts. We evaluate the network structure and gender bias in an 
identical way to our previous analysis of Google Images and Getty Images. 
We predict that the bias will be selectively reduced, such that in condition 
one, occupations will be less biased, while all other concepts remain equally 
biased. Therefore, clothes, our untreated “control semantic category”, 
should have constant levels of bias across all three experimental conditions. 
 
 279 
 
Figure 7.8: The regularised graphical LASSO networks are shown for the conditions 
consisting of debiasing (A) only occupation, (C) only business and (E) occupation and 
business. The networks have dashed line overlays indicating the specific concepts of 
interest. The corresponding bias plots B, D and F respectively correspond to the 
conditions (i) only occupation, (ii) only business and (iii) occupation and business. The y-
axis represents the scaled gender bias index. Gender-neutral concepts are indexed at 1 
(green dashed line), and more considerable female distances depict bias towards 
masculine concepts, while larger male distances towards feminine concepts. Darker 
shades of the colours are used to depict biases of interest for a given experimental 
condition. See Appendix D for enlarged images (p. 346 - 348). 
 
In our first condition, applying selective feature neutralisation (SFN) 
to only occupation concepts lead to a qualitatively different semantic 
network (see figure 7.8A) grounded in Google Images. In this network, there 
are no longer two distinct network regions split by gender and occupations 
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as was the case in the original network (figure 7.6A). In fact, in this gender 
debiased occupation network, all the occupations are tightly clustered in the 
same network region, with high levels of interconnectivity, although within 
this cluster there are two smaller components comprised of the roles 
professor, CEO and doctor in one, and teacher, assistant and nurse in the other. 
The topology of untreated concepts is still very similar, such as the 
grouping of concepts by their categories, and exceptions such as garden still 
preserved in the debiased network, although there are subtle shifts in the 
visualisation of the topology. The bias index proportions of this debiased 
network in figure 7.8B further support our prediction of SFN’s selective 
debiasing. Only the gender bias for occupations has been re-adjusted, though 
not entirely, while the biases for clothes and business concept remain similar 
to the original network model. However, from figure 7.8B, we can also see 
that not all occupations have been debiased to the same extent. In 
particular, the more traditionally female-biased roles such as assistant, nurse 
and teacher (to a lesser extent) are almost gender-neutral, while professor and 
CEO have visibly reduced in bias but doctor remains equally biased. 
In the second condition, where we debias only business concepts (see 
figures 7.9C and 7.9D), the business concepts are more tightly bound together 
in the network with weaker links to male concepts. The quantified bias 
proportions also show a substantial debiasing effect, with more 
considerable differences for the concepts marketing, business and finance. In 
fact, for marketing, following the SFN treatment, there is even a small bias 
toward females. However, for the concepts deal, trade and meeting the 
gender bias remains preserved, indicating that the two gender factors 
selectively neutralised via SFN, are unlikely to have played a contributing 
factor for the bias inherent in deal, trade and meeting. 
Lastly, in the third SFN-based debiasing experiment (see figures 7.9E 
and 7.9F) where we jointly treat the occupation and business concepts, the 
network no longer explicitly reveals the strong gender bias of the original, 
Google Images based scene2vec network model (figure 7.5A). This SFN-treated 
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network’s bias index also reveals that the semantic bias from the first 
occupation only and second business only conditions are integrated 
additively. 
 
Figure 7.9: A summary plot of average bias levels for the original scene2vec Google Images 
network along with the three debiasing experimental conditions of (i) occupation-only, 
(ii) business-only and (iii) occupation and business. The averages biases are shown split by 
the occupation and business categories in addition to the “control category” clothes. The 
average gender bias (y-axis) is calculated within-concept categories, by taking the 
largest scaled network distance from the averaged male or female concepts and dividing 
it by the overall scaled differences across both genders. The gender bias quantifies an 
overall bias proportion across both genders. The blue dashed line (50%) indicates no 
gender difference. The error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals based on 100 iterations 
of differently seeded initialisations of the scene2vec neural network training. 
 
We summarise our debiasing experiments in figure 7.9 and outline 
four key findings of our SFN debiasing treatment. First, the automatic SFN 
debiasing method can successfully, but not perfectly, debias the resultant 
semantic network as demonstrated across the three conditions. Second, 
across all conditions, the bias is never entirely removed but is reduced. 
Arguably, our results in figure 7.9, mask the findings from the business-only 
condition, in which only half of the concepts’ biases are reduced. Third, 
SFN can be used to selectively target and debias individual groups of 
concepts as seen by the strong interaction between the occupation-only and 
business-only conditions. Fourth, appropriately gendered concepts such as 
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clothes (man:shirt :: woman:skirt) can maintain their preferential gender 
associations despite targeted (occupation or business debiasing) or 
widespread application (occupation and business debiasing) of the SFN 
debiasing treatment. 
7.4 Discussion 
In a series of experiments, we demonstrate the capacity for our 
scene-based representation, scene2vec, to capture human-like gender biases 
successfully. We also embark on an explorative foray into developing a 
proof-of-concept “late debiasing” technique, called selective feature 
neutralisation (SFN). From scene-based distributed representations 
capturing gender biases, we argue that there might be a range of empirical 
and theoretical implications for computational cognitive modelling, artificial 
intelligence and perhaps even somewhat tentatively for gender studies. In this 
section, we will start by contextualising our main findings within the 
broader literature of both implicit cognitive biases from social psychology 
and machine learning fairness. This review leads to the evaluation of the 
relevance of this work to cognitive modelling of semantics in particular but 
also AI systems in the real world. We will try to pre-empt some strong 
criticisms and limitations of our operationalisation of gender in this study, 
particularly regarding gender fluidity, which is something the present 
research unfortunately wholly ignores given our binary gender construct. 
We examine germane directions for future research, some of which we 
outline as next steps, while others we propose as open challenges that we 
currently have no tractable way of solving. Lastly, we discuss the 
implications of our promising but sub-optimal debiasing results for 
scalable applications in the real world. We conclude with a broader 
discussion of gender bias being a cultural construct, grounded in our 
interdependent sensorimotor and language-based or symbol interdependent 
regularities as opposed to biology. 
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7.4.1 Contributions 
With scene2vec, we conceptually replicate a well-known human 
bias established in social psychology using both self-reported measures and 
IAT. Even though the term “stereotype” was introduced in the social 
sciences almost a century ago, by Lippmann (1922), there has not been a 
great deal of attention on the subject of bias (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981). 
Only half a century after the term “stereotype” was coined, did 
psychologists start investigating gender stereotypes. One of the most 
widely cited early examples of empirical support for explicit gender 
stereotypes originates from Broverman et al.’s (1972) discovery of the more 
positive evaluation of masculine traits like competence than feminine 
qualities such as expressiveness and warmth. This finding revealed not only 
a difference in the associations that stereotype men and women but also a 
difference in the appraisal of these gender biased attributes, irrespective of 
sex, age, marital status and education. 
More recently, Rudman, Greenwald and McGhee (1996) reliably 
documented implicit gender biases associating men with power, as 
represented by concepts such as CEO, doctor and professor in our study, and 
women with nurturance, which some might argue is traditionally seen as 
less related with power, and more with professions like nurse, assistant or 
teacher. Furthermore, Rudman and Phelan (2010) showed the presence of 
strong gender roles (e.g. a male surgeon and a female nurse) and also that 
when female participants were primed with such stereotypical gender 
roles, this led to an increase in gender-biased stereotypes and career 
aspirations, relative to controls, and also mediated their significantly lower 
interest in traditional masculine occupations. Even more surprisingly, 
when female participants were primed with non-traditional gender roles 
such as a female surgeon and a male nurse, this lowered their self-concept of 
leadership in conjunction with also lowering their interest in traditionally 
masculine professions. Therefore, Rudman and Phelan (2010) discuss that 
the priming of both traditional and non-traditional gender roles leads to 
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greater gender bias, through two separate mechanisms, in the first case 
through activation of stereotypes while in the second scenario, through the 
reduction of self-concepts. We believe that this research is relevant to 
contemporary discussions of gender biases and how to overcome them, 
given that this evidence suggests the task to be particularly challenging. It 
also highlights that potentially well-meaning and supportive initiatives like 
highlighting non-traditional roles can do more harm than good concerning 
achieving professional gender equality in society, which is increasingly 
shaped by a plethora of machine learning algorithms. 
Given the rise and ubiquity of big data in the contemporary 
commercial, but also, academic sector, it is only understandable that public 
scrutiny over data analytics has been steadily increasing (Bollier & 
Firestone, 2010; Richards & King, 2014). In the recent past, there has also 
been more attention on the generation and legislation of big data guidelines 
(e.g. Zook et al., 2017) as well as the deployment of privacy-preserving 
algorithms (Hunt et al., 2018). However, the debate on machine learning 
fairness, in particular, related to gender stereotyping, has lagged behind 
considerably given the widely perceived lay-perception of machine 
learning “being fair” because “it is mathematics”. We outlined the 
computational language-based experiments of Caliskan et al. (2017) using 
the synthetic equivalent of the IAT, the Word-Embedding Association Test 
(WEAT), which replicates all of the original implicit biases, including 
gender bias. Our computational results build on this and demonstrate that 
gender biases are also prevalent in our scene-based semantic 
representations. 
Our grounded scene2vec representation introduces biases in the 
modelling of semantic cognition. One could argue that our introduction of 
more ecologically valid semantic representations is counter-productive and 
perhaps even harmful because traditional feature-based approaches (e.g. 
Rogers and McClelland, 2004) might not have the same problems. We 
strongly disagree with this argument. First, feature-based connectionist 
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models, to the best of our knowledge, have not been constructed in 
cognitive science (or another field) to evaluate phenomena such as gender 
bias. Second, although theoretically our grounded findings could be 
replicated using modeller-defined feature sets, this introduces the dilemma 
of the computational model merely generating “associations” from desired 
patterns of “cognitive phenomenon” that the modeller determined a priori. 
Third, it is difficult to appreciate the theoretical advantages of exploring 
biases in networks determined by non-data driven inputs. 
7.4.2 Importance of Grounded Data 
We propose that one of the aims of cognitive science should be the 
acquisition and storage of raw perceptual and linguistic information 
simulating human exposure to relevant stimuli. Ideally, this could be 
achieved in an ecologically valid and developmentally sensitive manner. 
This would allow for the simulation of concept acquisition from a 
constructivist semantic network perspective during the early years of 
human development. Simulating the later years of human development, 
one might even investigate pathways of semantic memory degradation, in 
typically ageing cohorts but also those afflicted with conditions such as 
semantic dementia. However, in our view, much of cognitive modelling has 
predominantly focused on specification details of the underlying 
mathematical, statistical or computational assumptions (e.g. model-based or 
model-free reinforcement learning, MDP or POMDP, connectionist networks 
versus singular value decomposition). This comes at the expense of using 
simple hand-crafted toy datasets. This “data” can consist of either hand-
crafted binary features based on verbalised feature norms or even 
generated entirely randomly with certain key requirements such as 
proportion overlap required between concepts within and between a range of 
categories (e.g. Hoffman et al., 2018). This is an “inverse case” instance of 
the infamous computer science acronym GIGO (garbage in, garbage out), 
which states that if flawed data enters into a computational process, flawed 
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outcomes will naturally follow. We suggest that for many cognitive 
computational models, since a great deal of effort is spent crafting the input 
representations to demonstrate a particular phenomenon, it is unsurprising 
that the outputs then are meaningful based on a priori meaning-laden 
assumptions of the modellers. 
At this point, we would like to explicitly foreshadow one of the 
central themes of not only this chapter’s findings but those from some of 
our modelling experiments from chapters 4 and 5 as well. In the words of 
Cooper and Shallice (2006, p. 892), we label the theme “the importance of 
the training set”. We selectively illustrate an interesting exchange, spanning 
years, between two positions espoused initially in Cooper and Shallice 
(2000) and Botvinick and Plaut (2002). We will avoid going into the details 
of the modelling, as the high-level summaries will suffice for our purposes 
of highlighting why training data is more critical than the algorithmic 
specifications per se. Clearly, in doing so, we are also influenced by the 
similar arguments conveyed by Louwerse (2011) in the context of language-
based statistical regularities. 
Cooper and Shallice (2000) developed a novel computational model 
for contention scheduling and control of routine actions, albeit, with a 
hand-crafted set of schemas. Botvinick and Plaut (2002) critiqued this hand-
coding of schemas and instead provided a connectionist alternative, which 
could replicate many of the same action selection patterns and more 
importantly, capture a range of common action slips. However, as outlined 
in Cooper and Shallice (2006, p. 894), Botvinick and Plaut did not solve the 
problem of hand-coding the hierarchical schemas, but simply hand-coded 
the relevant training data in order to generate the required learned 
associations. Moreover, although Cooper and Shallice (2006) did concede 
that if these representations could be determined through the observation 
of human action sequences, or in our terminology, were “grounded”, then 
that might be interesting. Therefore, in both Cooper and Shallice’s (2000) 
original symbolic model and Botvinick and Plaut’s (2002) version, the 
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differences in model type are less critical than what is being hand-coded - the 
hierarchical rules or the training data used to feed a recurrent neural 
network to learn these hierarchies. In our research, however, we use freely-
available image data as the source of all our computational semantic 
experiments. Thus, underlying semantic nuances encoded in the hidden 
neurons of our various Perceptual Scene Vector (PSV) or scene2vec models are 
of practical interest as these are not specified a priori. 
Our position claims that grounded representations are based on real-
world stimuli and can reflect genuine and non-trivial differences when 
grounded in different scenarios. In this study, we tested our prediction of 
Google Images being more gender biased concerning stereotyped gender 
occupations and business concepts than Getty Images. There are differences 
between Getty Images’ repository, based on a strict code of conduct and 
editorial guidelines, versus, Google Images’ minimal filters. Using grounded 
representations trained on a diverse set of real scenarios, like in this study, 
we can generate and evaluate semantic biases that are not determined by 
the modeller, but informed by a variety of different environments. 
Therefore, our grounded semantic models can be more readily 
subjected to actual analysis in order to compare with semantic topologies 
extracted from human participants. This potentially unlocks opportunities 
for cognitive computational models to connect with a range of 
psychologically more interesting problems as opposed to highly simplified 
caricatured meaning models of prototypical birds, fish, mammals, trees and 
plants. Simultaneously, we are cautious not to dismiss the decades of critical 
and highly influential connectionist models of semantic cognition based on 
toy models. Much of our present thesis is solidly grounded and inspired by 
this research. We propose a synthesis of both theoretical toy models (e.g. 
Rogers & McClelland, 2004; Hoffman et al., 2018) in conjunction with 
larger-scale semantic models based on the automatic or semi-automatic 
extraction of meaning from the real world. The first set of toy models could 
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inform a more information theoretical perspective of cognitive science and 
define the core limits of processing mechanisms. 
On the other hand, the more applied cognitive models, experimenting 
with different real-world inputs, could deploy scaled versions of the toy 
models in a diverse range of psychologically interesting domains, like in 
our case with gender bias. If cognitive modellers pursue both the theoretical 
and applied cognitive models, then through mutual reinforcements and 
constraints, we will gradually further our mechanistic understanding of 
cognitive semantics. We currently lack large-scale cognitive semantic 
models that can simulate upwards of tens of thousands of concepts, 
reaching human-level conceptual system complexities. 
Cognitive science has been critical to the success and development 
of artificial intelligence, given the co-evolution of various paradigms in 
both disciplines. However, more recently, the present author tentatively 
suggests, there has been a widening chasm between the two disciplines. In 
the fields of machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI), there has 
been a steady progression towards using more data, more computing 
power and increasingly sophisticated statistical learning algorithms. We 
acknowledge the highly distinct objectives of both fields. Cognitive 
modelling is focused on mechanistic, algorithmic and implementation-level 
aspects of human cognition. On the other hand, AI/ML adopts an 
engineering mind-set for building practical, intelligent systems, 
irrespective of their biological and cognitive micro-foundations. 
Nonetheless, in our view, cognitive modelling has all-too-often focused on 
overly simplistic models with highly fine-tuned sets of model parameters, 
as opposed to relying on gathering high quality and cognitively plausible 
data. This is one of the gaps in the extant literature on semantic cognition 
that we are aiming to bridge with our current work while investigating 
semantic gender biases. 
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7.4.3 Gender Bias 
Gender bias is a significant societal problem, that is not simply 
undesirable and politically incorrect but also has severe economic and 
welfare benefits. Economic analysis has shown that gendered evaluations of 
occupational characteristics (e.g. women as nurturing) have a real impact 
on the gender pay gap (Kilbourne et al., 1994). In real terms, given that female 
full-time employees in the US earn approximately 79% of what their male 
counterparts earn (Blau & Kahn, 2017), we extrapolate these findings, on 
the basis of average current annual salaries, to suggest a gender pay gap of 
circa $10k US dollars for full-time employed women. However, these 
statistics mask the real extent of the gender pay gap given the comparison 
of like-for-like women and men in full-time employment. When taking into 
account the disturbing reality of increased psychological and physical 
vulnerability of women who are not financially independent, see Sanders 
(2015) for a qualitative investigation, the severity of the gender pay gap 
becomes all too apparent. Therefore, understanding and helping to 
overcome gender biases is of high importance.  
A more detailed understanding of our environments coupled with 
fostering a culture without overt biases can start to accelerate the battle 
against this costly inequality impacting approximately half the world’s 
population. A straightforward, actionable insight of our present work 
would be to recommend the use of editorially-curated content like the 
photographs from Getty Images, given the biases of search engines like 
Google Images. Future research questions might explore differences across 
other search engines or image repositories from providers with a different 
editorial leaning to Getty Images. 
7.4.4 Limitations 
Despite our best efforts of investigating a grounded perspective on 
scene-based semantics, our 60 concepts chosen were modeller-defined. 
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Therefore, a reasonable criticism of our current investigation is the 
inclusion of the six gendered terms used (male, female, man, woman, 
gentleman, lady). Although a valid critique, we avoid the use of concepts 
such as he/she because many of the search results returned are that of 
animals/pets. However, future research ought to investigate a broader 
range of concepts than the 60 used in this study. Our limitation was mainly 
shaped by the objective of having network visualisations that were 
relatively small in network diameter to increase interpretability. 
A more severe limitation of the present research is the use of 
polarising gendered concepts in order to investigate gender biases. We feel 
this is a necessity for operationalising our research hypothesis. However, 
more recently, both in popular culture and for a more extended period in 
the academic studies of gender (e.g. Ortner & Whitehead, 1981; Chodorow, 
1995; Parker, 2016) it is no longer acceptable to mention two distinct 
genders, as was done in the present research. There is even some 
disagreement on the existence of two biological sexes. However, this is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion, see Fausto-Sterling (2012) for a 
detailed review. 
Nevertheless, there is a consensus that “[g]ender reflects [a] sense 
of self, social expectations, and role behaviours”, (Parker, 2016, p.165), 
which have evolved from the dichotomy between men and women. This 
notion of gender fluidity has gained a great deal of support and attention in 
recent years and is very likely to continue doing so. Intriguingly, this notion 
of the dynamicity of concepts is the focus of chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Therefore, the notion of concepts being dynamically constructed as a 
function of cultural pressures is very much in line with our work in the 
present thesis. However, unfortunately, at this stage, the present author is 
unaware of conducting investigations into gender biases, while 
accommodating for gender fluidity, due to the need of operationalising 
gender in order to model relevant statistical regularities from the 
environment. Perhaps, in the future, there might be a range of gender 
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identifiers for the continuum between male and female, although even that 
will have classification challenges given that individuals might differ based 
on their position on this spectrum as well as the stability of their culturally 
constructed gender identity. Furthermore, identifiers also go against a fluid 
gender continuum. 
The source of images used for meaning representation is critical, as 
revealed by some of the stark contrast in gender bias between models 
trained on either Google Images or Getty Images collections. There is a high 
risk of reproducing biases present in either historical data or the present 
cultural discourse. Therefore, in particular from an AI/ML perspective, as 
opposed to cognitive modelling per se, it is beneficial to understand if the 
semantic networks can be debiased successfully in a targeted and 
systematic fashion. Debiasing algorithms and machine learning fairness is 
a new and thriving discipline (e.g. Joseph et al., 2016). However, many of 
these cases are based on adjusting for class imbalance using statistical and 
mathematical techniques. In our case, gender biases in semantics, the 
biggest challenge we face is that tried-and-tested rebalancing of input data 
not only reduces bias but also distorts the semantic space itself. 
Furthermore, the question we need to ask ourselves is although gender bias 
is undesirable, are we distorting the space so much with debiasing that it 
loses resemblances to human meaning topologies? If yes, the resultant 
semantic network loses its original purpose. 
7.4.5 Debiasing Semantic Networks 
The current debiasing experiments support the feasibility of simple 
dimension-based filtering techniques like our selective feature neutralisation 
(SFN) to target and reduce gender bias in our grounded scene2vec 
representation. As intended, SFN preserves much of the remaining 
network topology. However, SFN also successfully preserves gender-
appropriate references. This is particularly important for cognitive and 
ML/AI models of semantics, because we argue that there is no clear 
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distinction between bias and meaning-related cues, as these two 
phenomena are synonymous - experience-based statistical regularities. 
We propose a tripartite framework of characterising types of 
techniques for debiasing representations, consisting of (i) early (data), (ii) 
middle (algorithm) and (iii) late (adjustment). In the first class, the underlying 
data is selected from a particular source or is adjusted (e.g. weighted) in 
order to either reduce or eliminate biases before any modelling. An 
example would be choosing a less biased data source such as Getty Images, 
as confirmed by our study because it has a strict professional set of editorial 
guidelines that most in online image repositories lack. Alternatively, others 
have demonstrated the successful use of data pre-processing for increasing 
machine fairness (Calmon et al., 2017). 
The second method of debiasing (middle/algorithm-level) consists 
of modifying the underlying learning algorithm to reduce some objectively 
defined bias criteria. Solutions that fall into this category would be, for 
example, direct modification of the objective loss function, which impacts 
the loss being backpropagated through the layers of a neural network. 
Finally, the third class consists of applying an adjustment to an already 
trained distributed representation. Our selective feature neutralisation (SFN) 
is an example of this last category given that the feature filtering applies an 
adjustment to the learnt associations to reduce bias. 
We now present an argument as to why there is an ease of 
implementation hierarchy of our three classes of debiasing for real-world 
applications on large-scale AI / ML architectures. In order to focus 
specifically on semantic associations, we will select a particular class of 
widely applicable algorithms called recommendation engines. At their core, 
recommendation engines, irrespective of their symbolic, sub-symbolic or 
hybrid architecture, ingest large volumes of continuous streams of data 
from users (e.g. web-based clickstream records, cookies or social media 
likes) to generate higher-dimensional associations, which are then clustered 
by ever-changing business strategy and other contextual factors (e.g. 
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weather). This high-dimensional space can represent customers’ 
behaviours and (to an extent) the latent needs, which is similar to 
distributed semantic models. It is also worth noting that real-world 
recommendation engines, like Sky’s18 movie recommendations, are based 
on more than a dozen separate machine learning solutions, each ingesting 
real-time data from websites, app usage information, social media profiles, 
customer research and most critically, the actual viewing habits of the 
customers. Typically, the deep learning algorithms deployed for constraint-
based optimisation are operated on ML stacks ranging from two or three 
models to dozens of distinct models, each with specific loss functions. 
Prototyping, productionising and maintaining these models requires a 
variety of programming languages/architectures such as Python, R, C++ or 
even SAS, GCP, Hadoop and Apache Spark. Lastly, the final layer of 
complexity stems from various machine learning solutions continuously 
operating across 24+ million customers’ data records across national 
borders, spanning a wide range of different data processing legislation and 
customer-specified preferences. 
We argue that late debiasing solutions are particularly desirable for 
the debiasing treatment of semantic networks and real-time 
recommendation engines. Our SFN method is a “late technique”, that 
avoids time-consuming and costly efforts of having to collate a well-
balanced dataset / iteratively weight original data or make algorithm-level 
adjustments which require a great deal of dedicated research and development 
(R&D) time on a problem-by-problem basis. To the best of our knowledge, 
it is a highly intractable problem to assume that middle/algorithmic level 
debiasing can be successfully executed given the complex ecosystems these 
AI/ML algorithms operate within commercial environments. 
                                                      
18 Sky is Europe’s largest pay-tv and media business spanning the UK, Germany, Italy and 
Austria. 
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Selective feature neutralisation has the advantage of not requiring 
data augmentation or re-weighting, which in many real-time systems 
would be difficult to realise. Furthermore, neutralising core features at the 
end-stage of an algorithm ensures that various debiasing (e.g. gender, 
ethnicity, age, affluence or region) requirements can be dynamically met by 
identifying critical underlying semantic features with specific debiasing 
targets as performed in our analysis. One interesting avenue for future 
research might be to investigate the relative quality, through comparisons 
with ground truths, of early, middle and late debiasing techniques, along with 
metrics of implementation and computational complexity, as the number 
of intertwined debiasing target groups (e.g. gender, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation and affluence) increases. We predict that for early- and middle-
stage debiasing, quality will decline and complexity will increase, while for 
late-stage techniques, both quality and complexity are likely to remain 
constant. 
Ensuring that debiasing solutions can scale effectively is critical 
from a data science and information technology perspective. Efforts to 
promote debiasing for enterprise-wide systems such as automated 
curriculum vitae (CV) association mining, requires large companies, in 
media, technology and finance to be able to debias their AI solutions with 
ease and transparency. With our development of the simple selective feature 
neutralisation (SFN), we aim to be able to offer one variant of this class of 
solutions that are easily deployable and could dynamically adapt to the 
changing requirements of debiasing products and services while still 
preserving appropriate gender differences. 
In addition to technological challenges, sociological and cultural 
factors cannot be side-lined. Meaning is context dependent, culturally 
attenuated and changes over time. Furthermore, in broader machine 
learning fairness efforts, we might easily reach a consensus on deploying 
debiasing algorithms similar to SFN, in instances where a job 
recommendation engine should surface job adverts irrespective of gender. 
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In other instances, there might be uncertainty and public disagreement. For 
example, does an association rule-based recommendation system have to 
recommend products in a gender-neutral way even if behaviours suggest 
shoppers would not be interested? Dilemmas would arise if some 
supermarkets adopted a gender debiased solution and lowered their ad 
targeting utility, while their competitors opted not to debias their 
algorithms and benefited from higher ad targeting utility, revenues and 
profits.  
Despite our proof-of-concept demonstration of SFN and the 
advantages of late-debiasing methods, some questions regarding the 
efficacy of SFN remain. For example, would SFN be equally successful at 
reducing gender bias in a larger scale model (100s of random concepts) or 
even a human-level conceptual system (10,000+ concepts)? We predict that 
SFN is likely to perform poorly in slightly larger-scale “toy systems” but 
perform better on significantly larger/human-scale synthetic cognitive 
systems. Although throughout this thesis, we constructively critique hand-
coded feature selection, we too have inadvertently “constrained” our set of 
60 concepts. We opt for categories of concepts that are predominantly not 
related to gender biases (e.g. fruit, home, nature, vehicles and animals) but 
others that are likely to be more related (e.g. occupation and business) so that 
we can investigate gender bias. However, by constraining the stimuli to 
these 60 concepts, we have ensured that the concepts’ semi-automatically 
grounded features are more likely to be constrained such that we find 
interpretable overlaps between various concept categories. In other words, 
if we pre-determined the six gendered concepts (man, woman, male, female, 
gentleman, lady) and selected the remaining 54 concepts at random from a 
lexicon, then it would be unlikely for us to replicate our current findings. It 
is likely that we would have to sample a large set of random concepts until 
we have a sufficiently large number of meaningful comparators like the 
concepts in our occupation or business categories. Therefore, we predict that 
SFN is more likely to show promising results in smaller (and somewhat 
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curated) datasets like the ones used in this study and significantly larger 
datasets with 10,000+ concepts. 
Furthermore, in our implementation, SFN extracts and selectively 
“neutralises” two dimensions respectively corresponding to male and female 
concepts. However, even in our small-scale semantic model, we find 
concept instances (i.e. 50% of occupations) that are not successfully debiased. 
We suggest19 that by only “neutralising” a subset of factors associated with 
gender concepts we ignore other factors that make smaller contributions. 
Therefore, in future studies, we aim to explore the impact of varying the 
number of dimensions to which SFN is applied. Perhaps, there are likely to 
be domain and bias-specific optimums. This might also shed light on the 
extent to which grounded semantic dimensions have a “long-tail” problem 
of bias. We conjecture that much of the bias might be captured by a small 
set of main dimensions, while achieving an optimal “bias-free” 
representation might require SFN to be applied to a more substantial 
proportion of weaker/long-tail dimensions. However, in this case, SFN 
would need to be adapted as otherwise there is a risk of equally neutralising 
too many concepts across numerous dimensions. We conjecture that some 
form of weighting might need to be introduced to up-weight the debiasing 
of particular dimensions and concepts, while down-weighting concepts 
and dimensions only slightly impacted. Perhaps the weighting factor might 
be proportional to the different dimensions and concepts bias exhibited. 
Another limitation of our study is the lack of an objective metric 
outlining the quality of semantic representations as a function of debiasing 
(e.g. original network, debiasing either occupation/business or both 
occupation and business). Qualitatively, we feel that the original Google 
Images network is more meaningful, especially when compared to the 
debiased alternatives. We do not advocate the perpetuation of gender 
                                                      
19 Our exploratory post-hoc analyses of the 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟	×	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 matrix and scene2vec features 
confirms this. 
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biases. However, given the well-documented implicit cognitive biases 
discussed in the introduction, it is not surprising that a biased network 
might appear to be more meaningful to human observers. A future 
conceptual replication of this study with a broader range of occupations 
and business concepts could also be concurrently run with human 
participants using the cognitive dimensions-based approach from chapter 
6. Alternatively, a language-based distributed representation such as LSA 
or GloVe could be used as a linguistic comparison. This would allow for 
direct quantitative and qualitative comparisons to ever-increasing levels of 
SFN debiasing. 
7.4.6 Summary 
We believe that a world without harmful biases is a goal worth 
striving for, not only for ethical and moral but also economic factors. In this 
study, we provide the first ever computational demonstration of human-
like stereotypical gender-occupation biases acquired from real-world 
visual scenes. Furthermore, our scene-based semantic representations are 
sufficiently sensitive to represent different levels of gender bias depending 
on the source of photographs used for model training. Like Caliskan and 
colleagues (2017) demonstrated for language, we show that in grounded 
visual scenes, our scene2vec can also automatically acquire what humans 
know implicitly, including undesirable biases. This opens up new avenues 
for future research on mechanistically investigating the culturally-
attenuated sources of gender (and other) biases. Future cognitive modelling 
research might even track how semantic networks change over time as 
visual discourses mature. In the process, we have also shown the 
effectiveness of regularisation techniques applied to cognitive semantic 
network models. The aim is to increase replicability of semantic networks 
and to minimise the over-interpretation of spurious associations, especially 
as networks scale. 
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Lastly, our findings lend empirical support to qualitative ideas 
expressed by gender theorists regarding gender bias not being a 
consequence of biology, but rather a direct consequence of our culture. In 
our view, cognitive modelling using a grounded perspective will help build 
bridges between the cognitive sciences and other disciplines investigating 
human belief systems. We hope that our present computational studies will 
lead to more applied investigations of essential topics such as gender bias 
in the field of computational cognitive science. 
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Chapter 8                                   
General Discussion 
 
8.1 Abstract 
This thesis supports the recent trend in artificial intelligence and 
cognitive science to move towards the processing of raw sensory 
information, resurrecting ideas from Brooks-style situated robotics. Our 
original contribution to cognitive science focuses on modelling semantics 
without recourse to hand-engineered features, by grounding meaning in 
real-world visual scenes. The computational and behavioural studies of this 
thesis support the hypothesis of highly dynamic or context-specific 
meaning topologies grounded in the visual messiness of the real world. In 
this closing chapter, we start by outlining our main contributions. Then, we 
address Dreyfus’s (2007) core challenges to grounded AI as well as other 
viewpoints like the symbol grounding problem and discuss prospective 
research and commercial implications of grounded semantics. We conclude 
by exploring three future research opportunities, which are: (i) creating a 
ground truth for benchmarking cognitive semantic models, (ii) large-scale 
semantic modelling, and (iii) developmental investigations of semantic 
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network topologies. Lastly, we propose that a move towards human-level 
AI will benefit from realistic virtual grounding, enabling rapid iterative 
progress while also providing a novel, ecologically-valid foundation for 
cognitive modelling of semantics. 
8.2 Introduction 
This thesis has demonstrated the feasibility of grounding semantics 
in the real world. Cognitive semantics is a complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon, which is at the heart of complex, intelligent behaviours. 
Therefore, semantics is an ideal testbed for investigating grounded 
perspectives, given the ubiquitous nature of semantic processing across a 
range of higher-order cognitive domains. The study of cognitive semantics 
has come a long way since the early theories dating back to Quillian (1967). 
However, we argue that despite numerous advances in investigating 
cognitive semantics, such as symbolic models (Nagy, Seth, & Stoddard, 1986), 
simple neural networks (McClelland, Rumelhart, & Hinton, 1988; Rumelhart, 
Hinton, & Williams, 1986), self-organising maps (Kohonen, 1990), recurrent 
neural networks (Hölldobler, Kalinke, & Störr, 1999), and more recently, 
supposedly, “embodied” hub-and-spoke modular neural networks 
(Hoffman et al., 2018), all of these developments have one limitation in 
common - they are based on hand-engineered or simulated datasets, with 
little or no resemblance to the real world. 
These models lack ecological validity, although some of them have 
been successful in narrowly simulating certain behavioural and 
neuropsychological phenomena of semantic cognition. Nonetheless, 
contemporary models of semantic cognition have little in common with 
human phenomenological experiences of the world. The input features 
used are either hand-coded based on properties revealed from feature-
norm studies (Cree & McRae, 2003; McRae et al., 2005) or are merely 
randomly generated based on set thresholds of overlaps for concepts 
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assumed to be in the same category (e.g. Hoffman et al., 2018). This thesis, 
on the other hand, uses real-world visual stimuli to develop an alternative 
scene-based approach to representing meaning. 
The origins of investigating meaning have well-known Western 
philosophical, linguistic and empirical roots but also overlooked Indian 
philosophical precursors dating back millennia. The ancient South Asian 
study of Samkhya-Yoga synthesises perception, inference and memory. Our 
focus has been on the interplay between perception and semantic memory, 
which is a natural consequence of our grounded approach across both our 
computational and empirical studies. The extant literature on grounded 
cognition (e.g. Barsalou, 2008, 2010; Glenberg et al., 2008) suggests an 
increasingly influential role in emphasising the importance of real-world 
sensorimotor associations which constitutes the building blocks of human 
intelligence. 
Grounded cognition rejects the notion of cognition being the result 
of computational manipulation of amodal symbols, devoid of perceptual 
and environmental content. Throughout this thesis, we have steered clear 
of grounded perspectives on semantics which overtly oppose computations 
and representations (e.g. Chemero, 2011), because we feel this literature 
typically misconstrues the core tenets of computational cognition and 
conflates a number of issues due to misinterpretations of mechanistic 
accounts, which are beyond the scope of our focus on grounded semantics. 
In our literature review (chapter 2), we discussed how cognitive 
psychologists overlook the historical influences of artificial intelligence (AI) 
and cognitive robotics while only sketching out the importance of these 
fields for the future of grounded cognition research.  We resurfaced some 
of the pioneering but somewhat forgotten AI and Brooks-style robotics 
research from the 1970s and 1980s, which have shaped modern-day 
grounded cognition. In this thesis, we embark on operationalising Brooks’ 
(1999) original vision of from pixels to predicates, although we focus more 
narrowly on the grounded interdependency of associations for meaning 
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extraction and representation. This has been possible due to recent 
advances in machine learning and the availability of web-based image 
repositories, which we argue, cognitive scientists are not sufficiently 
exploiting, unlike our AI counterparts. Although we use a range of 
distributed language-based models and incorporate language tags as a 
grounded input in chapter 7, our focus throughout the thesis has remained 
on naturalistic scene-based object co-occurrences containing sufficient 
variability for capturing rich concept-to-concept associations. 
8.3 Main Contributions 
Our approach to grounding semantics in the real world use a range 
of deep learning models to process visual inputs and shallower neural 
networks for representing the scene-based statistical regularities, 
predominantly focusing on object co-occurrences, although emotional 
expressions and linguistic tags are later incorporated. A range of 
dimensionality reduction techniques and visualisations such as 
multidimensional scaling (MDS), dendrograms, correlation plots and 
regularised and unregularised network analyses are used to explore the 
hidden neural network representations capturing the statistical 
associations and emergent generalisations. Our focus has been on this 
bottom-up concept-level understanding. 
Throughout our computational modelling studies, we 
incrementally developed our approach to grounding. We started with 
shallow feedforward neural networks processing rudimentary one-
dimensional silhouettes of images, which are compared with traditional 
feature-based and hybrid inputs (both feature-based and grounded) to 
conceptually replicate the mutually reinforcing nature of hybrid 
representations (chapter 3). Building on Goldstone and Rogosky (2002), we 
show that hybrid representations have a markedly slower rate of decline in 
concept classification accuracy as a function of increasing levels of noise 
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perturbations applied to the hidden layer representations. Grounded 
representations perform the poorest, while feature-based inputs are 
moderately tolerant to increasing levels of noise. This supports a more 
pluralistic cognitive semantic perspective. 
We then moved away from the “form-only” proof-of-concept 
grounding by using Zhao et al.’s (2017) off-the-shelf pyramid scene parsing 
network (PSPNet), a state-of-the-art deep convolutional neural network for 
object segmentation in conjunction with a feedforward neural network for 
representing object co-occurrences (chapter 4). Our comparisons of the 
grounded semantic representations (perceptual scene vectors - PSVs) with 
conventional distributional language-based representations (both latent 
and surface semantic analysis) reveal the efficacy of using naturalistic scenes 
for grounding the meaning of concrete concepts. We also show that 
language surface structures encode meaning best when sufficiently 
constrained by modeller-determined feature sets, with performance 
deteriorating for randomly selected language surface structures. 
Furthermore, the meaning encoding of Latent Semantic Analysis improves 
as weaker dimensions are removed. These findings collectively indicate 
that although language is important, increasing the relevance of linguistic, 
statistical regularities is also critical. PSVs can semi-automatically extract 
strong associative and taxonomic relationships, measured both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Critically, PSVs encode meaning without 
modellers hand-coding relevant features, which provides an ecologically 
valid approach to extending symbol interdependency beyond language 
and partially solving the relevance problem in semantics by grounding 
meaning extraction in real-world visual scenes. The statistical regularities 
in PSVs are sufficiently rich for meaning representation. 
In chapter 5, we first replicate the concreteness continuum by re-
analysing data from a large-scale normative study (Brysbaert et al., 2014). 
This is followed by extending PSVs using emotional expressions extracted 
from images (scene2vec) and demonstrating that grounded semantics leads 
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to high-quality representations for more concrete and some intermediate 
concepts while being inadequate for more abstract concepts like freedom. 
However, emotion-related inputs increase the quality of semantic 
representations, particularly for more abstract concepts. Our original 
contribution of modelling semantics using emotions only partially supports 
the embodied abstract semantics hypothesis (Kousta et al., 2011) and indicates 
that there is more to representing abstract meaning than emotions alone. 
In the large-scale human semantics study on the geometrical 
properties and relations of meaning in chapter 6, we synthesise and extend 
Binder et al.’s (2016) research on brain-based componential semantic 
representations, and Troche et al.’s (2017) cognitive dimensions. Using our 
brain-based cognitive dimensions, we find that the local and global 
topological properties of the semantic network are best captured using non-
linear dimensionality reduction (tSNE). We reveal that cognitive semantic 
networks have small-world properties and context-free semantic networks 
are organised lexically on a concreteness gradient. We also establish scenes 
as the most important semantic dimension, supporting a grounded 
perspective. Critically, the network topology of meaning is highly context-
dependent, which lends support to our present thesis of grounding 
semantics in the real world, and that there is no meaning without context. 
Lastly, in chapter 7, we extend our grounded scene2vec semantic 
representation using language-based tags, given the mutually-reinforcing 
nature of grounded and distributed representations (chapter 3) as well as 
the limits of grounding for representing more abstract concepts (chapter 5). 
Using two distinct image sources (Google Images and Getty Images) for 
training separate semantic networks, we find support for context-specific 
human-like gender biases. Our grounded semantic models can, therefore, 
represent well-established psychological traits, a prerequisite for grounded 
models to inform the mechanics of human semantic cognition. Using 
semantic feature neutralisation (SFN), we can selectively target and remove 
undesirable biases. In this final closing chapter, we aim to discuss 
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prominent critiques, which lead to us outlining future commercial 
applications of scene-based grounded semantics and future research 
directions. 
8.4 Responding to Critiques of Grounded Cognition 
8.4.1 Grounded Semantics and Dreyfus’ Critiques 
Hubert Dreyfus has been one of the staunchest critiques of AI (see 
Dreyfus, 1997, 2007), which leads to many in linguistics and psychology to 
use his arguments as support for a more embodied perspective on human 
cognition. Dreyfus’ criticisms targeted the symbolic and logic-intensive 
GOFAI, to which even early rudimentary connectionist models from the 
1980s would be strong rebuttals. However, somewhat surprisingly, 
Dreyfus (2007) more recently also attacked “embodied AI”, which we 
interpret from the broader grounded AI perspective. The main issue is how 
embodied AIs will “directly pick up significance and improve our 
sensitivity to relevance since this ability depends on our responding to 
what is significant for us” (Froese & Ziemke, 2009, p.470). Our focus will be 
on Dreyfus’ (2007) alleged failures of embodied or grounded AI as opposed 
to his earlier ones targeting GOFAI. In chapter 2, we outline and label (C1 
to C5) Dreyfus’ main critiques of grounded AI models, which we have 
inadvertently addressed in our present computational and empirical 
studies. 
Dreyfus’ overarching critique (C1) is that grounded intelligence 
(Brooks-style AI) does not have situational awareness - the ability to 
acknowledge relevant features under real-world conditions based on the 
system determining these particular features to be salient as opposed to 
being pre-determined by a human modeller (Froese & Ziemke, 2009). In our 
empirical research (chapter 6), we establish that meaning is indeed sensitive 
to context-dependent relevancies and that the relevant features (the cognitive 
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dimensions) are either stronger or weaker across different situations, such 
as luminance and upper limb dimensions being respectively dominant in the 
house on fire and home move scenarios.  
From a computational perspective, our context-specific semantic 
networks reveal substantial differences in the quantitative and qualitative 
nature of meaning as a direct function of the training set (Google Images vs 
Getty Images). Therefore, the grounded semantic computational models 
demonstrate context-dependent relevancies. However, we concede, that all 
situational conditions across our grounded research are categorical and 
highly distinct (i.e. house on fire vs gift giving). Perhaps these large 
situational differences exaggerated the differences in the resulting semantic 
networks. Given the exploratory nature of much of our research, we opted 
to test broad general hypotheses. However, future research could test 
specific hypotheses investigating computationally-derived grounded 
semantic networks where the situation changes more continuously. For 
example, although we used naturalistic photographs for most of our 
computational studies, future research could use video footage and apply 
scene2vec to every nth frame, and develop a time-series based semantic 
network topology. This approach could also be applied to the study of 
routine action control, which has been based on either hand-engineered 
rule-bases (Cooper & Shallice, 2000) or hand-coded datasets (Botvinick & 
Plaut, 2002). 
The second critique from Dreyfus (2007) claims that grounded AI 
lacks understanding. If confined to Brooks-style robotics or even more recent 
research on developmental robotics (Weng, 2004; Schmidhuber, 2006; 
Cangelosi & Schlesinger, 2015) Dreyfus’ critique would remain 
unchallenged. However, our present work on grounded semantics is a first 
small step toward allowing AIs to develop an understanding of their 
environment. Our grounded computational models encode meaning that is 
not pre-determined by the modeller and is based on the environment and 
yet is comparable to language-based distributed models. This thesis goes 
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further. Not only do we claim that the environment needs to be understood 
by AIs, but that understanding itself is a grounded phenomenon. We do 
not claim that scene2vec representations have bona fide understanding, but 
we do maintain that grounded semantics is likely to be necessary for 
developing general understanding. Grounded cognitive models of 
semantics are likely to also bridge our theories of semantic memory in 
human and non-human primates and other animals. Seeking to account for 
semantics beyond language- or feature-based accounts is a necessary 
means for understanding the putative mechanisms of associative 
intelligence more broadly. Also, from an evolutionary perspective, the 
association cortex of the human brain does disproportionately expand 
compared to other higher primates (Buckner & Krienen, 2013). 
Future work to critically evaluate, and perhaps, extend our present 
work might lead to Dreyfus’ third criticism (C3) being addressed, namely 
the “inadequacy of current embodied AI for advancing our scientific 
understanding of natural cognition” (Froese & Ziemke, 2009, p.467). In our 
chapter 2 introduction, we argued that the inability for current “grounded” 
computational models of semantics to provide sufficient insights into 
human cognition is directly related to the GOFAI practice of modellers 
determining a phenomenon of interest and then hand-coding so-called 
“grounded representations” (e.g. Hoffman et al., 2018). Our study of the 
human-like biases found in scene2vec representations suggests that there 
might indeed be parallels between human cognition and grounded 
semantic models developed in the present thesis. Moreover, our proof-of-
concept chapter 3 study on feature-based, grounded and hybrid 
representations support the earlier findings of Goldstone and Rogosky 
(2002), whose computational model discredited Fodor’s (1998) influential 
theory claiming relations between concepts in a semantic system are 
insufficient for mapping concept correspondences. Computational models, 
grounded or otherwise, are capable of furthering our understanding of 
natural cognition, contrary to Dreyfus’ assertion. 
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Another criticism, although more minor, of behaviour-based 
robotics, is that embodiment does not overcome the grounding problem 
(C4; Froese & Ziemke, 2009, p.467). Given that this thesis does not focus on 
embodiment but instead grounding, we suggest that our grounded 
semantic models are based on the dynamics of the real world. However, we 
propose that an exciting avenue for future research could be to investigate 
the interactions between embodiment, grounding and language, as their 
relative importance is likely to vary in a context-sensitive manner. Future 
work would ideally explore interdependencies between different formats 
of grounded associations, shaping the building blocks of higher-order 
cognitive semantics. One potential opportunity might be to examine scene-
based correlates of the cognitive dimensions used in chapter 6’s empirical 
investigation of semantic topology. This would require an extension of our 
computational implementation of grounding semantics, which is 
exclusively limited to vision. 
Grounding a computational model or robot with the objective of 
having human-like experiences is unrealistic if we fail to provide a 
sufficiently realistic environment. Our use of naturalistic web-based 
photographs as opposed to dynamic live feed via cameras was a 
simplification due to computational processing limits. Though, future 
research could use parallelised GPUs or even custom-built TPUs (tensor 
processing units) for executing the most computationally demanding 
processing stages.  
Dreyfus’s (2007) fifth and substantial criticism of embodied robotics 
and AI is the frame problem (C5). The familiar “looser philosophical 
formulation” of the frame problem is the relevance problem - understanding 
what is relevant in a given circumstance. One of the greatest strengths of 
our scene-based grounded semantics is the non-division between meaning 
and context. This leads to a tight coupling between conceptualisations and 
perception. Meaning emerges from the continuous and discontinuous 
shifts in the frame itself. In scene2vec, objects that co-occur more frequently 
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across different images are also conceptually bound together. Here, the 
distinct images can be interpreted as frames. Therefore, grounded 
semantics overcomes the relevance problem through context-specific and 
bottom-up meaning encoding and representation. However, we 
acknowledge that Dennett’s (2006) original interpretation of the frame 
problem, referring to first-order logic is not addressed by merely grounding 
associations in the real world. Nonetheless, we have shown that grounded 
semantics has already or at least has the potential for overcoming the five 
main critiques of grounded AI outlined in Dreyfus (2007). 
8.4.2 Grounded Semantics and Johnson-Laird et al.’s Critique 
Johnson-Laird, Herrmann and Chaffin (1984) provided a rigorous 
critique of traditional feature-based semantic networks like Collins and 
Quillian (1969) primarily as a result of connections only existing between 
concepts as opposed to with concepts and the world. Except for language-
based semantic models, this critique from over three decades ago still 
applies to most cognitive models of semantics. Like Collins and Quillian’s 
(1969) network model of semantic cognition, Anderson and Bower’s (1973) 
Human Associative Memory (HAM) also consists of abstract propositional 
information, without reference to perceptually grounded information. 
These criticisms could be equally applied to even the most recent 
“embodied” variants of computational models of semantic cognition (e.g. 
Hoffman et al., 2018) where the propositional information is merely 
offloaded to artificially generated stimuli based on pre-determined 
similarities. 
Our grounded model of semantic cognition, scene2vec, addresses 
Johnson-Laird et al.’s objection to only “concept-to-concept links” by 
breaking free from the symbol merry-go-round. We present a novel method 
for grounding semantics, in which concepts are rooted in both a number of 
naturally-occurring features in the real world and the resulting symbol 
interdependency between concepts themselves. 
 310 
8.5 Future Applications 
Despite a relatively long tradition of modelling semantics in 
psychology, to the best of our knowledge, there have not been any 
significant applied contributions to commercial applications using artificial 
intelligence (AI). Similarly, although cognitive science and neuroscience 
influence cutting-edge AI research (e.g. Silver et al., 2016), much of this is 
based on empirical research defining the boundaries of fruitful AI frontiers 
as opposed to implementing cognitive models. This is probably because 
traditional cognitive models of semantics are hand-engineered, small-scale, 
effortful to build, and lack real information given the a priori modeller 
specifications. Therefore, such cognitive models have limited, if any, 
applied utility in real-world applications. On the other hand, although not 
a cognitive model per se, distributed language-based semantic models like 
LSA and GloVe have been immensely successful in a wide range of 
business applications because of the scale of concepts represented, 
grounded in real human discourses. 
Similarly, we suggest that this thesis’ grounded scene2vec cognitive 
semantic representation will be more relevant for applied use cases in AI 
and robotics. However, we claim that visually grounded models ought to 
be especially suitable for modelling concrete real-world concepts. 
Moreover, more holistically grounded models (i.e. incorporating language 
and sensorimotor signals) are likely to lead to advancements in artificial 
general intelligence (AGI), transcending contemporary successes in narrow 
domains. 
8.5.1 Implications for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics 
Semantics is typically seen as the “holy grail” of cognitive science, 
semiotics, philosophy and neuroscience (Jackendoff, 2002), but also of 
artificial intelligence (Kiela et al., 2016). To this list of fields, we add 
robotics, given that sophisticated robots co-habiting a world with humans 
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would benefit from having a human-like understanding. To achieve this 
feat, we propose, robots’ semantic representations ought to be grounded, 
at least partially, in the real world. However, would a “software-only” or 
virtual world suffice? Yes, but only if this virtual reality is sufficiently 
phenomenologically aligned with real-world properties. In other words, a 
GOFAI-style blocks world would be too simplistic to contain sufficient 
statistical regularities between objects within given scenes for an AI to 
acquire human-like semantic topologies. However, a high-fidelity virtual 
world like the Real Sim City20 environment (see figure 8.1) that is based on 
real-world settings would contain most of the critical regularities necessary 
for grounded semantics to support the development of human-like 
semantic topologies in AIs and robots. 
 
Figure 8.1: Depiction of two virtual scenes in Real Sim City modelled on real-world 
locations. 
 
Here, we propose the novel idea of virtual grounding as an 
alternative to traditional hand-coded worlds but also the recently coined 
term virtual embodiment (Kiela et al., 2016). This is similar to using physics 
engines to acquire physics knowledge (e.g. Tassa et al., 2018). From our 
empirical research from chapter 6, we identified scenes as the most critical 
cognitive dimension across a broad range of concepts, while body-related 
                                                      
20 https://realsim.ie/realsim-city/ 
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dimensions (e.g. upper limbs) were less discriminating. This suggests that 
the environment we live in and the particular spatiotemporal properties of 
our experiences are likely to be more central for representing meaning than 
body-related regularities. A clear implication of this is that the AI or robot 
does not need a human-shaped body, but rather, needs to be placed in a 
human-like environment, for human-like meaning spaces to emerge. This 
argument challenges a wide range of embodied AI and robotics viewpoints 
becoming increasingly dominant over the last decade (Mainzer, 2009). We 
suggest that physically embodied AIs/robots (e.g. iCub) and virtual 
embodiment (virtual iCub) are less critical to semantics compared with the 
virtual grounding of AIs/robots. The advantages of virtual grounding, 
however, are comparable to those outlined for virtual embodiment, such as 
scalability, long-term feasibility (due to cost/effort), rapid iteration and 
largely human-free execution (see Kiela et al., 2016, for details). 
Second, grounded semantic models are based on a core set of object 
and other scene-relevant regularities, which are likely to be reducible to a 
core number of dimensions, although these are likely to range from a dozen 
or so to several hundred as opposed to 3-dimensions, as suggested by 
Troche et al. (2017). These dimensions might be an opportunity for AI 
models, and robots relying on grounded semantic topologies to acquire 
context- and task-specific meanings but apply them more generally across 
spatiotemporal boundaries and novel situations never previously 
encountered. Thus, we suggest that grounded models of semantics are 
likely to further the study of transfer learning in contemporary artificial 
intelligence. In transfer learning, the knowledge represented based on a 
specific set of tasks and contexts can be applied more broadly to other tasks 
and contexts not previously encountered by the AI. This has significant 
implications for a plethora of AI applications. For example, contemporary 
state-of-the-art AI agents like AlphaGo (Silver et al., 2016) can beat world-
class level Go champions but fail to beat a novice at chess, because of overly 
specialised intelligence, that fails to generalise to high-order game 
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strategies. Similarly, in the domain of meaning, text-based topic models can 
be trained on millions of snippets of text data on restaurant food reviews, 
but perform at chance-levels when classifying topics about movie reviews. 
Successful AIs that can navigate the complex tapestry of meaning require 
transferable meaning topologies to function across different tasks and 
scenarios intelligently. 
Third, AI models and robots that have grounded semantic 
topologies and can bootstrap a set of common underlying scene-based 
dimensions are also more likely to develop meta-learning capabilities. 
Acquiring first-order semantic associations is a fundamental prerequisite 
for more complex behaviours to emerge. However, sophisticated logical 
and analogical semantic reasoning systems capable of solving real-world 
tasks need to make higher-order inferences. 
One implication of our research is that this ever-increasing semantic 
abstraction can be grounded in cognitive dimensions. AIs and robots could 
be placed in increasingly sophisticated environments to ensure a gradual 
acquisition of semantic structures required for highly complex behaviours. 
Although some developmental roboticists (e.g. Georgeon & Cordier, 2014; 
Froese & Ziemke, 2009) advocate for training simple models and then 
gradually increasing complexity, this is typically achieved through 
different hand-coded levels. However, we, on the other hand, speculate 
that an AI or robot could develop across a graded series of virtually 
grounded environments that vary in complexity. At each grounded level, the 
AI not only learns the relevant first-order associations between objects but 
also higher-order relations such as the temporal dynamics of events, which 
could lead to a bottom-up grounded development of causality and perhaps 
even agency21. This speculation would need to be empirically tested. 
                                                      
21 Other mechanisms would also be necessary at this stage such as a forward model of an 
AI’s actions. 
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Fourth, we propose, that AIs which rely on grounded semantic 
models are also more likely to display superior human-like common sense 
reasoning - a highly challenging task. There are numerous crowdsourced 
common sense relational datasets like ConceptNet, which contain triples 
such as “pen”, “UsedFor”, “writing” (Liu & Singh, 2004). However, 
constructing, maintaining and scaling these datasets is usually incredibly 
challenging and is reminiscent of the failed GOFAI attempts to codify “all” 
semantic knowledge in expert systems from the mid-1960s through to the 
early 1990s relying on knowledge bases and inference engines. Grounded 
semantic models are a possible candidate for implicitly representing these 
associations without the need for hand-coding particular relations. 
However, this is likely only to be fruitful if meta-learning capabilities are 
present since causal relations between objects will be a requirement. Future 
work on hierarchical learning might further clarify the limits and 
opportunities (if any) of grounded semantics representing more abstract 
concepts. 
Lastly, the above implications lead to one of the most appealing and 
useful frontiers for grounded semantic models - developing Explainable 
Artificial Intelligence (XAI). Despite the vast plethora of successes in machine 
learning, much of contemporary achievements originate from relatively 
opaque deep learning models, see Shwartz-Ziv and Tishby (2017) for a 
detailed overview of why deep learning models are widely recognised as 
black boxes. This has a significant consequence on the usability of AI models 
and the deployment of robots in environments where humans roam freely. 
The proliferation of XAIs is likely to be critical across a range of 
business, law, defence and medical domains because humans need to 
understand why an AI behaved in a particular manner, especially if human 
well-being is at stake. Traditionally, in the domain of machine learning, 
there is a trade-off between performance and explainability, with neural 
networks being high on performance (e.g. classification accuracy) but low 
on explainability, while decision trees are low on performance and high on 
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explainability (e.g. a list of if-then conditions). Current state-of-the-art 
techniques for XAI being developed by DARPA in a programme started in 
2017 and aiming to finish in 2021 (Gunning, 2016), use model layering, where 
deep learning models and interpretable tree models are combined using 
model induction. Within this DARPA programme, decision rules can be 
extracted from the tree-based models inferring associations from the deeper 
explanatory neural network associations. The objective is to have AI models 
with high performance and explainability, although, we argue, this 
increases the overall model complexity. 
On the other hand, our grounded semantics approach may not 
require sophisticated layering of different types of models because the 
underlying semantic dimensions are based on scene-based reinforcements. 
More complex grounded models of semantics with multiple levels of 
abstractions (e.g. causal inferences) could, in theory, be explained by 
exploring an AI’s semantic topology’s developmental pathways based on 
scene-level statistical regularities. This could provide an opportunity also 
to evaluate unwanted biases in the regularities learnt, which can then be 
debiased by selectively targeting and neutralising specific statistical 
associations. XAI is a growing sub-discipline within broader AI 
technologies and perspectives, but as AI solutions start becoming 
increasingly important and widespread, the onus will be on accountability 
through simple explanations. Grounded semantics might be one such 
candidate approach for XAI. 
8.5.2 Implications for Advertising and FinTech 
Here we explore potential applications of grounded semantics 
purely as a monetisable technology as opposed to a mechanistic cognitive 
model for furthering our understanding of how inter-concept dependencies 
can be rooted in our environment. Companies spend a highly variable 
proportion of their net revenues on annual advertising budgets. In the UK 
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alone, advertising spend is predicted to reach £20bn in 2019, a new record22, 
which excludes billions of additional spend on ancillary services ranging 
from creative industries to market research. 
Traditionally, advertising is split into two categories, (i) above-the-
line (ATL) mass media campaigns and (ii) below-the-line (BTL) personalised 
targeting via mail drops or emails. However, in the digital era of increased 
personalisation, advertising effectiveness has become a central priority for 
all Chief Marketing Officers (CMOs), ultimately responsible for 
advertising. 
Companies typically have a brand strategy - a corporate view on the 
intangible meaning assets of a company to acquire new prospects and 
retain existing customers. For example, a traditional media conglomerate 
might want to differentiate itself from new digital native players by 
running nostalgic advertising campaigns combining emotional and 
rational messages about specific services through ATL and BTL campaigns. 
Conducting advertising research on a given set of campaigns can be 
prohibitively expensive and slow. Recruiting respondents, running a focus 
group or programming a quantitative survey with multimedia elements 
capturing the ad campaign is a complex activity requiring many skilled 
professionals. However, such research might indicate whether or not a 
given ad performs in-line with expectations. A problem with this format of 
research is that by the time the results are available, the campaign has 
already finished, which means the learnings from the research lack the 
tactical relevance of making any actionable recommendations or 
adjustments to the campaign. Therefore, all-too-often, campaign research 
“plays catch-up” by only helping to understand future advertising strategy 
as opposed to impacting tactical campaign execution.  
                                                      
22 Source: https://www.thedrum.com/news/2018/06/20/uk-advertising-spend-track-top-
20bn-2019 
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However, with grounded representations such as scene2vec the 
video footage and imagery (e.g. for digital and print adverts) could be 
analysed without any primary research. The scene2vec outputs could help 
position the ads relative to other ads (akin to concept-to-concept relations) 
but also the underlying grounded features or dimensions. Relative ad 
positioning could help qualitatively and quantitatively provide timely 
feedback on whether or not a particular advert is strategically aligned with 
a company’s desired brand associations23. This could be done before the 
campaign goes live. For example, if a media owner wanted to have an 
emotional advert like the well-known John Lewis Christmas ads, then close 
alignment between the media ad and John Lewis’ advert would suggest 
that to be the case. A company could compile a database of representative 
competitor ads and apply scene2vec on the various ad materials to extract 
semantic associations and output a network visualisation of all the ads in 
the database. Then, a new target advert could be evaluated using scene2vec 
to evaluate the relative position among its competitors. This would be an 
intuitive and easy-to-interpret method for evaluating ad-to-ad semantic 
associations. 
Furthermore, these ads could also be explored not only based on the 
inter-ad comparability but also their underlying associations with the main 
features captured by scene2vec. For example, using our chapter 7 
implementation (object co-occurrences, emotion expressions and linguistic 
tags), each of the ads could be evaluated against particular dimensions (e.g. 
happiness) for better understanding the underlying semantic cues. The 
combination of ad-to-ad and ad-to-dimensions diagnostics could help provide 
                                                      
23 For example, the fast fashion brand H&M might be satisfied to have their ad be positioned 
near Zara, a slightly upmarket fast-fashion brand, but that would not be the case for a high-
end fashion brand like Gucci or Hugo Boss. 
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quick and actionable tactical recommendations to help determine the 
execution format of the ad24. 
Similarly, in the nascent sector FinTech 25 , machine learning 
algorithms analyse tens of thousands of data points for most consumers to 
deploy recommendation engines for personalising product offerings, and 
even customised prices. However, current technologies commonly use 
structured data and text-based unstructured data to make these 
recommendations. We propose that some of the digital image data could 
also be analysed using grounded scene2vec-type representations for 
understanding the underlying meaning associations from the websites 
already captured by the digital cookies26 . Each customer could have a 
digital semantic fingerprint capturing their unique lifestyle preferences. 
Ideally, if the FinTech and banking sectors could be regulated to use 
these technologies responsibly, as opposed to exploiting customers by 
cross-selling unnecessary financial products, this could help banks develop 
superior customer rewards offers as opposed to the traditional catch-all set 
of services such as cashback and generic retail vouchers for shops and 
restaurants. In this scenario, a grounded semantic model could help the 
FinTech sector make useful personalised recommendations for banking 
products and services, based on data already being collected but not 
analysed. Banks could use this technology to enhance customer experience, 
reducing customer churn, and lower banking fees, which are typically 
inflated as a hedge for customer attrition. 
                                                      
24 For example, the campaign execution duration of a suboptimal advert could be decreased 
to save money. 
25 A sector which uses “technology”, typically machine learning and block chain, to help the 
finance industry. 
26 This would not require any additional terms and conditions given GDPR regulations 
already apply to cookie data. 
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8.6 Future Research 
In this penultimate section, we outline a selection of prospective 
semantic research avenues in the cognitive sciences, predominately 
focusing on cognitive modelling. The overarching theme throughout our 
subsections is the focus on using real information grounded in the 
environment as the building blocks of developing cognitive models of 
semantics, and ultimately, a mechanistically-grounded general theory of 
cognitive semantics. 
8.6.1 Empirical Ground Truths for Semantic Modelling 
There are currently no agreed benchmarks for comparing 
computational models of semantics with empirically-derived human 
meaning associations. Although this is less important for AI applications, it 
is fundamental to evaluating the efficacy of computational models in 
cognitive science. In this thesis, we have used several benchmarks, each 
with different strengths and weaknesses. First, we use language-based 
spaces such as LSA, GloVe and Skip-Gram for comparisons with our 
grounded representation. The main advantage of using these linguistic 
spaces for benchmarking cognitive models is the relative ease with which 
these spaces can be accessed. However, the limitation of using language-
based representations is that they are not cognitive representations per se. 
Iteratively developing cognitive models to better capture statistical 
regularities solely found in language omits grounded information found in 
non-linguistic sources, like visual scenes. 
Second, we use BrainBench, a small-scale neuroimaging-based 
representation, which has the advantage of representing different neural 
activation profiles across concepts, but is unlikely to capture all concept-
related associations. However, we argue that scaling these types of datasets 
to human-level conceptual system scales will be prohibitively expensive 
making it impractical. 
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Third, using pure cognitive dimensions, without foundation in 
neuroimaging studies, like in Binder et al. (2016), is scalable but ultimately 
not as parsimonious given that it is difficult to generate an explicit set of 
criteria for inclusion of particular dimensions. Fourth, in chapter 6, our 
hybrid technique might be optimal for exploring scalable ratings across 
thousands of concepts as well as being based on neuroimaging foundations. 
This could also lead to future explorations of computational lesion studies 
to simulate particular neural atrophies in a grounded computational 
semantic model.  
In our empirical study of conceptual topologies, we find evidence 
in favour of dynamic meaning structures, which are subject to context-
based shifts, leading to our conclusion of there is no meaning without context. 
Therefore, static meaning spaces are unlikely to be particularly useful for 
understanding everyday mental representations of meaning outside the 
sterile conditions of laboratory experiments with decontextualised 
concepts. We suggest that future investigations use 10,000+ concepts as 
opposed to our circa 500 words but simultaneously conduct more nuanced 
smaller-scale contextualised experiments with dozens of words in real-life 
settings. Our experiment with ad hoc categories is an “extreme conditions” 
test (e.g. house on fire versus cooking) to see if topologies shift. Now, that we 
have established topological shifts, refined hypotheses regarding concept, 
task and context combinations can be investigated. This will change the 
focus to a dynamic study of meaning as opposed to the present-day static 
conceptualisations of semantics. 
8.6.2 Large-scale Cognitive Semantic Modelling 
We believe our scene-based grounded semantic models will scale 
more effectively as a result of not requiring hand-coded feature sets. Future 
cognitive modelling studies of semantics could start using even more 
ecologically valid stimuli than our present studies (e.g. video streams), which 
could incorporate other forms of grounded statistical regularities. Sound 
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signals from videos could be analysed using natural language processing 
(NLP) and Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 27  (MFCC), to respectively 
process language (communication dimension) and sounds (auditory 
dimension). Building on previously discussed neuroimaging work (Binder 
et al., 2016), future studies could also incorporate dimensions beyond the 
five primary senses.  
The cognitive dimension luminance could be measured by 
quantifying the brightness levels of particular objects in scenes. The 
dimensions upper limb or ingestion could be evaluated using pre-determined 
upper body regions of interest and a CNN such as PoseNet28. The dimension 
human could be represented based on the presence/absence of humans in a 
particular video frame. This could ultimately lead to a computational 
model of semantics that is not only applied to dozens or even a hundred 
concepts as in chapter 5 of this study but tens of thousands of concepts, 
gradually approximating the size and complexity of the human semantic 
memory system. This has the potential to raise a plethora of new research 
questions, some of which might help further streamline our current 
pluralistic perspectives on representing meaning. For example, do small-
world properties of grounded cognitive semantic networks change as a 
function of network size? Are grounded representations better at capturing 
semantic associations in larger systems? How do context-specific shifts in 
the topology manifest in the network at different scales? Although 
somewhat far-fetched, could grounded representations be used to help 
translate semantic spaces across different animals, if salient semantic 
dimensions are represented appropriately, e.g. for dogs, olfactory features?  
                                                      
27 MFCCs are known to represent sounds in a similar manner to the human auditory system 
(see Kiela & Clark, 2017). 
28 PoseNet is deep learning based pose estimation model, which is part of the OpenCV 
toolkit. 
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We believe that some of our original analytical investigations of 
cognitive semantics, for example, network visualisation, analysis and 
regularisation techniques might also be particularly useful for interpreting 
meaning representations as systems scale and non-linear complexities 
compound at an increasing rate. 
8.6.3 Development of Semantic Network Topologies 
Developmental cognitive roboticists narrowly investigate 
grounding from the dual perspectives of embodiment and language but 
overlook the role of the environment in conceptual development. For 
example, Mirolli and Parisi (2009) adopt a Vygotskyan perspective on 
conceptual development in robots, based on increasing linguistic 
sophistication. Similarly, Lallée et al. (2010) propose a cognitive robotics 
framework based on linguistic and embodied regularities, while Farkaš, 
Malík and Rebrová (2012) use reinforcement learning on sensorimotor 
representations for grounding meaning. However, none of these studies 
explores the role of grounding meaning in real-world cues or develop 
topologies for investigating concept relations. Therefore, it follows, that 
these studies do not explore the gradual developmental shifts in 
computationally grounded semantic topologies, which could provide a 
mechanistic testbed for developmental theories of psychology. 
Future computational studies might capture scene-based 
information typically encountered by infants, toddlers and young children 
through the use of body-mounted cameras. Grounded computational 
representations like scene2vec could then, over time, model conceptual 
topologies and evaluate changes in the structure of the semantic networks. 
This could be done for typical and atypical populations to investigate the 
role of the environment. For example, how might a physical disability or 
emotional distress in early childhood constrain exposure to grounded real-
world associations? We predict that network properties such as small-
worldness are likely to emerge at a particular stage when long-range links 
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between commonly unrelated concept node clusters start emerging. Such 
computational models could be evaluated against behavioural assessments 
of cognitive performance. 
Grounding and investigating semantic networks is merely the first 
step. The present research has shown that even representing the topologies 
of smaller sets of concepts can be highly dynamic and context-specific. This 
is likely to increase in complexity as studies incorporate scene-based and 
language-based grounding in conjunction with embodied grounding using 
sensorimotor regularities. Future computational studies could “bring to 
life” these holistically grounded semantic topologies by incorporating 
spreading activation mechanisms to, for example, test these models using 
behavioural semantic priming associations and higher-order analogical 
reasoning tests. 
8.7 Conclusion 
The overarching objective of this thesis has been to further the field 
of grounded semantics using a range of computational and empirical 
studies. Our approach has predominantly used non-linguistic scene-based 
grounding of semantics as an alternative to both hand-coded features and 
embodied sensorimotor signals.  
First, we resurface grounded cognition’s origins in AI and robotics 
which paved the way forward for linguists and cognitive scientists to 
investigate bodily and situational factors shaping meaning. Second, we 
show that hybrid representations comprised of feature-based and 
grounded stimuli are more robust than either format individually. Given 
that cognitive semantics has traditionally overlooked the grounded 
perspective, we make this our focus. Third, we extend symbol 
interdependency by revealing that language surface structures encode 
meaning particularly well when constrained by modeller-determined 
feature sets. Critically, we demonstrate the feasibility of semi-automatically 
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extracting strong associative and taxonomic relations from object co-
occurrence relations in naturalistic images. 
Fourth, we show that despite object co-occurrences being validated 
against a neuroimaging benchmark, grounded semantics is better at 
representing more concrete than abstract concepts. Combining object co-
occurrence regularities with emotion expressions, scene2vec, however, 
improves the quality of abstract semantic representations. Fifth, in our 
empirical study, we reveal the small-world network topology of the human 
meaning space, which is structured lexically in a neutral context, while 
contextual shifts dynamically modulate this topology. This study also 
reveals the dominance of scenes in human semantic memory. Sixth, we find 
context-dependent human-like biases in our scene2vec representation, 
which supports the psychological plausibility of grounded representations. 
In conclusion, this thesis has provided support for a novel 
computational viewpoint on investigating meaning - scene-based grounded 
semantics. Future research scaling scene-based semantic models to human-
levels through virtual grounding has the potential to unearth new insights 
into the human mind and concurrently lead to advancements in artificial 
general intelligence by enabling robots, embodied or otherwise, to acquire 
and represent meaning directly from the environment. 
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Network Analysis 
 
A.1 Overview 
In chapters 6 and 7, several types of network analyses and 
visualisations are run for computationally and empirically investigating 
grounded semantics. We provide additional technical details and 
definitions related to networks in this Appendix. 
A.2 Graph Theory 
Graph theory is the mathematical study of networks dating back to 
the 18th century. Using a popular puzzle (Koenigsberg bridge problem), Euler 
(1736) proved that a path by which someone could cross all seven bridges 
exactly once and return to the starting point did not exist (see figure A.1). 
This finding demonstrated the advantages of abstracting distance and 
graphical position, which gave rise to the idea of geometry of position 
(geometria situs). This example also shows the real-world or applied origins 
of graph theory. 
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Figure A.1: An overview of the Königsberg bridge problem at different levels of 
abstraction. Source: https://plus.maths.org/content/bridges-k-nigsberg 
A.3 Network Analysis 
Network analysis is based on graph theory and is the science of 
characterising networks, an abstract system comprised of a set of nodes 
(elements of a system) and edges (links between elements). Edges can be 
directed or undirected, where the former indicates asymmetric information 
flow, while the latter, symmetrical information flow. In this thesis, we 
exclusively focus on undirected edges.  
A network’s most basic data representation is the adjacency matrix, 
which, in a binary graph, contains the presence (1) or absence (0) of a link 
between all node pairs (see figure A.3). This is the data structure generated 
from the associations (e.g. correlation or distance), by including strong 
neighbours through applying a threshold to the associations, which 
subsequently leads to visualising a sparse network. 
The physical layout of the network is only important relative to the 
node and edge relations. The length of edges is not important, and nor is 
the position of nodes in 2D space. We use the Fruchterman-Reingold, a 
force-directed or spring algorithm, for determining the layout of network 
visualisations (Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991). This technique, as well as 
other layout variants (see figure A.2), do not alter the network structure 
(node-to-node relations) but only the format in which a network is 
depicted. Our motivation for using the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm is 
two-fold. First, it yields network visualisations that are easier to interpret 
because of non-overlapping edges, and second, it is aesthetically pleasing.  
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Figure A.2: The same network visualised using three layouts, which are random (A), 
circle (B) and Fruchterman-Reingold (C). The Fruchterman-Reingold layout has the 
advantage of greater interpretability.  
A.4 Main Network Metrics 
The size of the network is simply the number of nodes present. In 
connected graphs, there is only one component, see figure A.3 for an 
example of a connected graph. Networks can also be split into several 
subgroups, where the number of subgroups determines the components 
metric. The diameter of a network is a helpful measure for describing 
compactness, based on network paths - the number of steps required to go 
from one node to another. In figure A.3, the longest path to get from node 
A to E is 4 (A-B-C-D-E), while the shortest path is 2 (A-D-E). The diameter 
of a network or its component is the “longest of the shortest paths across all 
pairs of nodes” (Sporns, 2011, p.15). 
 
Figure A.3: The same network structured geometrically (A), a cascaded system (B) and an 
adjacency matrix (C), showing the presence (1) and absence (0) of edges between node 
pairs.  
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Finally, the density of the network is one of the main network 
measures and refers to the proportion of edges available in a given network 
to the maximum number of possible edges, ranging between 0 to 1. 
Directed and undirected graphs have different density calculations given 
that in directed graphs, edges between two nodes are counted twice, while 
only once in undirected graphs. 
In the case of undirected graphs, the maximum number of possible 
edges among k nodes is k * (k - 1), and the formula for density, shown below, 
also includes L, the number of observed edges. In other words, the density 
of a network is the number of actual links as a proportion of the number of 
possible links. In the network from figure A.3, the network has a total of 5 
nodes (k), and 7 edges (L), resulting in a network density of 0.7. We illustrate 
how network density changes in a graph with four nodes and a varying 
degree of links in figure A.4. 
 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 	 2𝐿𝑘	×	(𝑘 − 1) = 	 2	×	75	×	(5 − 1) = 0.7	 
 
 
Figure A.4: Example of how network density changes as a function of increasing the 
number of links (L) from a single link (A) to all six links (F). The networks A-F all have 
four nodes (k). 
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Limits of Simple Plots 
 
B.1 Overview 
In chapters 6 we outlined the advantages of using non-linear 
visualisation techniques such as t-SNE (t-distributed Stochastic Neighbour 
Embedding) for higher-dimensional datasets. Here we briefly outline the 
main difficulties of using simple plots (e.g. radial graphs) to represent 
multidimensional datasets. 
B.2 Challenges of Visualising Multiple Dimensions 
In machine learning and data science more broadly, one typically 
uses parallel plots, radial graphs, or even word clouds. One of the critical 
constraints with all of these more traditional data visualisation techniques 
is that they each visualise a limited number of dimensions simultaneously. 
For example, word clouds typically represent word frequencies in the form 
of the size of the words, where the position of the words can be random or 
forced to fit a particular shape. So, if the word calculator occurs in a corpus 
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twice as frequently as the word tablet, then the former might be twice the 
size of the latter (or some other pre-set scaling factor). 
Further elaborations of the word cloud (e.g. adding colours), could 
add a new dimension to the plot. Additional attempts at discriminating 
extra dimensions (e.g. changing the font of the words) can be hard to 
perceive unless a highly intuitive dimension is chosen to be represented by 
different fonts, such as “older items” being depicted by old English fonts 
while newer items in modern fonts like Arial.  
However, visualising beyond two- or three-dimensions is rarely 
feasible as the additional dimensions layered on top of existing dimensions 
leads to visual interference. Thus, this type of layering of one dimension on 
top of another dimension rapidly reaches its maximum utility after three 
dimensions. 
The reduction of dimensionality in a dataset can be achieved by 
applying traditional linear dimensionality reduction techniques. Popular 
linear variants are principal component analysis (PCA) and multidimensional 
scaling (MDS), while t-SNE is an increasingly prominent non-linear 
dimensionality reduction technique. 
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Limits of PCA and MDS 
 
C.1 Overview 
In chapters 3 and 4 we use multidimensional scaling (MDS), but in 
subsequent chapters with typically more concepts being modelled, we use 
t-SNE for dimensionality reduction. Here we briefly outline the challenges 
of using PCA and MDS for modelling semantics. 
C.2 Dimensionality Reduction 
In cognitive semantics research (e.g. Rogers & McClelland, 2004) as 
well as in our computational analyses in chapters 3 and 4, MDS can map 
higher-dimensional structures in lower-dimensional maps consisting of 
two or three dimensions. MDS can represent the concepts such that similar 
concepts are mapped more closely together while different ones further 
apart. Ideally, the distances in the lower-dimensional map reflect the 
similarities and dissimilarities of the higher-dimensional representation. 
For example, PCA finds a linear projection of higher dimensional data 
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points by maximising the variance of the projected data, which relies on the 
preservation of large distances (Jolliffe, 2011). 
The classical example of demonstrating this idea in machine 
learning uses the so-called “Swiss-roll”, where the Euclidean distance is not 
the best measure of distance between two points in non-linear manifolds. 
In the case of the Swiss-roll, geodesic distances, as opposed to Euclidean 
distances, are more suitable. In figure C.1 we show how a small Euclidean 
distance between two points is a large geodesic distance, where the latter is 
a better approximation of the non-linear manifold representation.  
 
Figure C.1 Example of comparing Euclidean and geodesic distances on a 3-dimensional 
flat Swiss-roll. Source:  https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~epxing/Class/10715/lectures. 
 
We argue that the cognitive semantic space is an example of highly 
complex and non-linear topology, and therefore not best suited to linear 
dimensionality reduction, which favours larger distances in space while 
discounting smaller ones. In the computer science literature (e.g. Gisbrecht, 
Schulz, & Hammer, 2015), the focus on smaller and larger pair-wise 
distances are, respectively, referred to as either preserving local- or global-
structures. Thus, in traditional cognitive science visualisations of semantic 
spaces, we argue, the semantic space’s quality is compromised by not 
focusing on the local structures inherent in the high-dimensional input data 
due to optimising an objective function mathematically designed for 
maximally accounting for global structures. 
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Enlarged Images of Results 
 
 
Throughout the thesis, some images are too small for detailed 
evaluations in the print version. Therefore, in this appendix we provide 
enlarged formats of a selection of our results where the readability of charts 
needs to be enhanced. This is done either by amending the page layout or 
by splitting the images into multiple panels across different pages. The 
figures appear in chronological order as presented in the thesis along with 
their figure annotations. 
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A 
B 
Figure 5.2 (A) Histogram of the concreteness ratings of 40,000 word lemmas (B) 
Boxplot of the standard deviations of the same concreteness ratings. 
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Figure 5.4: Left Panel: A correlation plot of the PSV’s hidden layer representations. 
Concepts are grouped into concrete (blue), intermediate (green), and abstract (red) 
groupings. Within both the intermediate and abstract groups, concepts are grouped 
into the LSA-based “concept clusters”, and these are highlighted by respectively alternating 
between darker and lighter shaded of green and red. Similarly, we also alternate darker and 
lighter shades of blue for concrete words but use the original order of concepts used by Xu 
et al. (2016). 
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Figure 5.4: Right Panel: A correlation plot of the PSV’s hidden layer representations. 
Concepts are grouped into concrete (blue), intermediate (green), and abstract (red) 
groupings. Within both the intermediate and abstract groups, concepts are grouped 
into the LSA-based “concept clusters”, and these are highlighted by respectively alternating 
between darker and lighter shaded of green and red. Similarly, we also alternate darker and 
lighter shades of blue for concrete words but use the original order of concepts used by Xu 
et al. (2016). 
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Figure 5.8: Left Panel: A correlation plot of scene2vec’s hidden layer representations. 
Concepts are once more grouped into concrete (blue), intermediate (green), and 
abstract (red) groupings. 
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Figure 5.8: Right Panel: A correlation plot of scene2vec’s hidden layer representations. 
Concepts are once more grouped into concrete (blue), intermediate (green), and 
abstract (red) groupings. 
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Figure 5.9A: Hierarchical cluster plot of the hidden layer neurons representing the 
semantic associations of PSVs. Concepts are once more grouped into concrete (blue), 
intermediate (green), and abstract (red) groupings. 
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Figure 5.9B: Hierarchical cluster plot of the hidden layer neurons representing the 
semantic associations of scene2vec. Concepts are once more grouped into concrete 
(blue), intermediate (green), and abstract (red) groupings. 
 
 
 
 
B 
 341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Comparing t-SNE’s semantic embedding space (A) with MDS’ space (B) for 
all 544 concepts. 
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Figure 6.13: Left Panel: Overall semantic topology, including concept labels and the 
nodes of the network colour-coded according to the concreteness spectrum, ranging 
from red (abstract) to green (intermediate) and blue (concrete). The green numbered 
circles (i.e. R1…R14) highlight different portions of the network to aid discussion of 
more specific network neighbourhoods. 
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Figure 6.13: Right Panel: Overall semantic topology, including concept labels and the 
nodes of the network colour-coded according to the concreteness spectrum, ranging 
from red (abstract) to green (intermediate) and blue (concrete). The green numbered 
circles (i.e. R1…R14) highlight different portions of the network to aid discussion of 
more specific network neighbourhoods. 
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Figure 6.14: Left Panel: A random topology based on shuffling the semantic dimensions 
across 16 dimensions. This random network topology is generated using the identical 
set of parameters as our real semantic topology. This null distribution model also has 544 
nodes, 3,264 edges, an association threshold ≥ 0.92, and t-SNE perplexity = 60. The node 
colours are based on the original concreteness spectrum data and as such, is random in 
this topology. 
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Figure 6.14: Right Panel: A random topology based on shuffling the semantic 
dimensions across 16 dimensions. This random network topology is generated using 
the identical set of parameters as our real semantic topology. This null distribution model 
also has 544 nodes, 3,264 edges, an association threshold ≥ 0.92, and t-SNE perplexity = 60. 
The node colours are based on the original concreteness spectrum data and as such, is 
random in this topology. 
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Figure 7.8 A|B: The regularised graphical LASSO network is shown for the condition 
consisting of debiasing only occupation (A). The network has dashed line overlays 
indicating the specific concepts of interest. The corresponding bias plot is shown in B. 
The y-axis represents the scaled gender bias index. Gender-neutral concepts are indexed 
at 1 (green dashed line), and more considerable female distances depict bias towards 
masculine concepts, while larger male distances towards feminine concepts. Darker 
shades of the colours are used to depict biases of interest for a given experimental 
condition. 
A 
B 
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Figure 7.8 C|D: The regularised graphical LASSO network is shown for the condition 
consisting of debiasing only business (C). The network has dashed line overlays 
indicating the specific concepts of interest. The corresponding bias plot is shown in D. 
The y-axis represents the scaled gender bias index. Gender-neutral concepts are indexed 
at 1 (green dashed line), and more considerable female distances depict bias towards 
masculine concepts, while larger male distances towards feminine concepts. Darker 
shades of the colours are used to depict biases of interest for a given experimental 
condition. 
C 
D 
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Figure 7.8 E|F: The regularised graphical LASSO network is shown for the condition 
consisting of debiasing occupation and business (E). The network has dashed line 
overlays indicating the specific concepts of interest. The corresponding bias plot is 
shown in F. The y-axis represents the scaled gender bias index. Gender-neutral concepts 
are indexed at 1 (green dashed line), and more considerable female distances depict 
bias towards masculine concepts, while larger male distances towards feminine 
concepts. Darker shades of the colours are used to depict biases of interest for a given 
experimental condition. 
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